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ABSTRACT
This dissertation uses qualitative and quantitative case study data to appraise the
application of economic demand models in pluralistic low income settings. Primary data from
Cape Town, South Africa, are used to interrogate three elements of the neoclassical paradigm:
the budget constraint, utility function and underlying preference-sets, and hyper-rationality and
the assumption of full information.
The neoclassical budget constraint may be affected by changes in price or income. This
dissertation explains how perceptions of quality, community context and fear of social sanction
may affect the perceived price of service access. Community context and support networks also
affect an individual's available financial resources although conventional demand models do not
capture the income effect of payments made directly to providers by non-household members.
According to ordinal utility theory, consumers must be able to rank various bundles of
commodities according to the satisfaction they yield. This dissertation considers how perceived
quality, fear of community sanction, illness type, awareness of different providers and the
mismatch of supply with perceived need can affect the composition and ranking of those
bundles.
Finally, New Institutional Economics (NIE) utilises satisficing and less than full
information instead of strict optimisation. This dissertation attempts to formalise the NIE
contributions by describing common strategies for satisficing and considering how the
household and community context of care seeking may affect service use.
A number of empirical and methodological techniques are used to estimate demand
functions and move theory into practice. Longitudinal health diaries are used to collect data on
health service use, expenditure and self-rated health. The data are analysed using panel data
methods. The findings illustrate that, without a better understanding of demand-side barriers to
effective diagnosis and treatment, curtailing the spread and impact of communicable diseases in
pluralistic, low income settings will be difficult if not impossible.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
1) OVERVIE\V
"[A] legacy of health sector reform in practice is the recognition that the
reorganisation of the 'supply side' does not necessarily feed through to more
accessible and effective health care for poor people. There is now more
recognition that the health behaviour of individuals, social networks and
community initiatives have an immediate and important impact on health risks
and prospects, and that quality, participation, transparency and accountability
of services are vital. Matching an effective and efficient 'supply side' to a pro-
active 'demand side' is another emerging challenge for health policy in the
decade ahead." Pg 24 (DFID, 2000)
In pluralistic health settings, patients have a choice of providers when seeking treatment for
ill health. However, structured treatment protocols such as DOTS for TB, ACT for malaria and
ARV treatment for HIV /AIDS are seldom offered by all service providers in a market. In Cape
Town, South Africa, private doctors can diagnose TB but cannot treat it. Malaria treatment
cannot be obtained from a pharmacy or market but can be obtained from a private doctor, public
clinic or even a tertiary hospital (public or private) in severe cases. Antiretroviral treatment for
HIV /AIDS is available from any private doctor but is only available at a small number of public
clinics. This raises a number of questions about the demand for health services: How do
patients know where to go? Is there a risk that they will go to the 'wrong' provider? What are
the implications of seeking care from a provider who cannot offer diagnosis or treatment? And
of course, can we afford to ignore these demand-side phenomena when designing treatment
protocols for communicable diseases in resource poor settings?
These questions are not trivial in a province where the HIV prevalence rate was estimated at
15.7% in 2005 (Department of Health, 2005 ), TB incidence was recently estimated at 222 per
100,000, and where TB and HIV were among the three highest causes of years of life lost in
Cape Town in 2001 (Dudley et aI., 2003). Life expectancy in South Africa is now estimated at
47 years for men and 49 years for women (World Health Organisation, 2006), despite the fact
that South Africa is now classified as a middle income country with a GDP per capita of
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$8,506* that spends approximately 8.4% of GDP on health (World Health Organisation, 2006).
Of course South Africa has the second highest level of income inequality in the world, which
may go some way towards explaining poorer health outcomes (Budlender et aI., 1998).
Persistent inter- and intra-racial income inequality, as well as significant rural/urban income
inequality may also be exacerbated by unequal health service supply. In the rural Northern
Province, a study of health seeking behaviour amongst TB patients by Pronyk et al. concluded
that patient delay contributed to a greater proportion of median total delay than did service
provider delay (Pronyk et aI., 2001). However, while gaps in supply may be to blame for poorer
health outcomes in some rural settings, the Cape Metropole has a proliferation of public and
private providers offering both primary and tertiary health services (Statistics South Africa,
1998; Western Cape Department of Health, 2006).
To address an empirical challenge such as this, one would normally turn to a body of theory
for assistance in structuring, investigating and ultimately designing policy responses to the
problem. Economists have been studying the demand for health services for almost half a
century. Theoretical models which evolved from these efforts range from simple utility
maximising models to more complex specifications that consider the effects of health 'needs'
(Heller, 1982; Heller, 1976) and the optimal stock of health 'capital' (Grossman, 1972a) among
other factors. If theoretical considerations dominated the period from 1960 through to the early
1980s, then empirical considerations dominated the subsequent period as researchers sought to
translate the theoretical tenets into statistical models using real world data. In the study of
demand however, there remains a particular disjuncture between the economic theory of
demand, and the substantive body of applied work on demand, health service use and treatment
seeking. The economic theory does indeed provide more than one potential framework for
thinking about the process of health seeking and the demand for health services. Some specific
aspects of that framework have also received considerable attention in the empirical literature -
the work on willingness to pay is one such case in point. However, as Chapter 2 will illustrate,
many empirical studies attempting a more general investigation of demand have tended to
outline a body of economic theory before going on to describe an empirical investigation which,
if not unrelated, is certainly primafacie independent of that theory.
There will always be a tension between the need to construct a conceptual or empirical
model of behaviour that accurately reflects reality in all its complex fluidity, and the need to
construct one that is tractable, measurable, quantifiable and relatively easily applied. The
literature review in Chapter 2 acknowledges that there are more variables predicting human
behaviour than can be incorporated in a formal demand model. In addition, many of the
• 2004 Dollars
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variables known to impact the demand for health care are difficult to characterise and measure
quantitatively in the way needed for an empirical demand model. This may be proposed as an
argument for abandoning further work on demand models with their necessary focus on highly
variable individual behaviour. However, focussing instead on health systems and supply side
factors exclusively will not ensure the efficient or effective delivery of health services in
complex settings where demand side behaviour can pose particular challenges to diagnosis and
treatment. And nowhere are efficiency and effective delivery more important than in those
developing countries battling high rates of TB, HIV and malaria, diseases that require
considerable formal interaction between the individual and supply side mechanisms for
treatment to succeed. In this sense then, a model is a conscious abstraction of a complex
problem to something simpler that allows the most salient features to be investigated. The
tension between richness and complexity on the one hand, and the necessary simplification that
comes with modelling can never be entirely resolved but it can be consciously examined, as this
text seeks to do.
This dissertation does not attempt to develop a new theory of demand for health services.
Instead, this work seeks to understand the determinants of treatment seeking behaviour in a
pluralistic low income setting with high communicable disease prevalence. The study then
seeks to establish whether the complexity of that behaviour and its determinants can be tractably
integrated into economic demand theory, and what the benefits of that integration might yield.
This thesis also seeks to assess whether other established and emerging bodies of economic
theory, not yet applied to health seeking in comparable settings, might further contribute to our
understanding of demand for health services. Particular theories critiqued in the text include the
Lancaster Model, used as the basis for willingness to pay models but not general demand
analysis, New Institutional Economics, used to explain supplier induced demand but again, not a
general model of demand, and the soft budget constraint, used to explain firms' behaviour in
socialist states but not yet applied to health seeking in any way despite deriving from the tenets
of microeconomics.
The intended empirical contribution of this dissertation follows from this exploration of
theory. As Chapter 2 illustrates, the empirical literature on demand is, to some extent,
dominated by studies from wealthy country settings. Those studies that are set in developing
countries have commonly failed to explore any interplay between illness type and service choice
and tend to present barriers to access as a list of mutually exclusive factors. Self assessed health
is often measured in the simplest of ways, if at all, and health service providers are generally
considered to be homogenous, albeit within broad categories imposed by the researcher.
Perhaps due to the influence of work conducted in developed markets, empirical models
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generally make little allowance for health seeking as a social phenomenon despite the fact that
extended families can playa significant role in the consumption of health services in developing
countries. Also likely to be context-sensitive is the measurement of variables such as education,
household income and time costs, and the impact of those variables on health seeking. This is
pertinent as global interest in inequalities and meeting the needs of the poorest has yet to be
translated into adequate local policy knowledge. Research on inequity in South Africa has thus
far focused on health outcomes or service utilisation in rural populations, with findings
dominated by insufficient health service supply. For these reasons, this research is intended to
make both a general contribution to our empirical understanding of demand, but also a very
specific contribution to our understanding of demand in the study setting.
In short, by expanding the set of influences on treatment seeking behaviour and improving
the way that demand is measured, this study hopes to increase the contribution that demand side
analysis can make to our understanding of effective treatment for TB in marginalised urban
communities in South Africa. Insofar as those findings are generalisable, the intention is also to
improve the understanding of treatment seeking for communicable diseases in other comparable
low- and middle-income settings.
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2) TUBERCULOSIS AS A CASE STUDY
2.1) INTRODUCTION
TBIHIV co-infection is a global concern and failure to effectively treat TB in poorer
countries highlights global inequities in health. Tuberculosis is worse now than at any other
time in recorded history, killing more people than any other curable infectious disease. Poverty,
malnutrition, poor sanitation, overcrowding and now HIV all contribute to the spread of TB,
which in turn exacerbates these factors further. A TB sufferer can be out of work for up to nine
months and most TB cases occur in countries where there is Iittle or no income support for the
unemployed (World Health Organisation, 2003).
Twenty-two high burden countries account for 80% of TB cases globally. TB kills
approximately 2 million people every year and infects a further 8 million. Of the 2 million
deaths attributed to TB each year around the world, 98% occur in developing countries - often
robbing households of their primary income earner (World Health Organisation, 2003).
Although contagious, TB is a curable disease for which cost effective treatment is available
even in the poorer regions of the world. In spite of this, both the incidence and the death rate
are growing and the WHO attributes this trend to multiple factors including the breakdown of
health service provision, the spread of HIV /AIDS and the emergence of multi-drug strain
resistant TB (World Health Organisation, 2002).
As mentioned earlier, South Africa experiences some of the highest prevalence rates of TB
and HIV in the world. In the Western Cape, TB prevalence is rising faster than the rest of the
country while cure rates are falling despite widespread and free provision of DOTS for TB.
Literature from other settings ascribes poor cure rates to delays in seeking treatment, delays in
diagnosis and failure to adhere to the treatment regime i.e. poor health seeking behaviour (see
for example Arora and Sarin, 2000; Barker, 1994; Edginton et aI., 2002). The causes of these
failures require further exploration. A rural South African study revealed TB was seen as a
punishment for transgressing cultural rules regarding sex. Respondents also believed that there
should be abstinence from sex while on treatment (Edginton et aI., 2002). The stigma
associated with TB in India is also widely documented (Balasubramanian et aI., 2004; Rajeswari
et aI., 2005). A study in Vietnam observed patients paying for private (non-DOTS) TB
treatment rather than accessing free DOTS through the public system, because of the reduced
threat to privacy posed by private providers (Lonnroth et aI., 2001). Research in Thailand warns
" ... increased awareness and stigmatisation of AIDS and inadequate knowledge ofTB can result
in delay in seeking TB care and in treatment non-adherence." (Ngamvithayapong et aI., 2001)
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Focussing the analysis on a curable disease such as TB, which affects mainly the poorest
groups in the \Vestern Cape i.e. the so-called 'African' and 'Coloured' populations', enables the
evaluation of social context on individual decision-making while controlling for supply factors.
Health service supply in urban areas is relatively high, enabling detailed analysis of barriers
posed by gender, stigma, socio-economic factors and poor service quality, while still
considering service utilization and health outcomes. The high HIV prevalence in the African
population and relatively low prevalence in the Coloured population also allows the impact of
HIV-TB 'cross-stigmatisation' to be explored. Access to TB care will thus be studied to
identify any mismatch of community preferences and public supply.
2.2) A GLOBAL REVIE\V
Tuberculosis (TB) is a contagious disease caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis (M.Tb.), a
bacterium transmitted through sputum expelled during coughing, sneezing, talking or spitting
(AIDSmap, 1997; World Health Organisation, 2002). One in ten people infected by the bacteria
are affected by it Le. develop active, symptomatic TB (World Health Organisation, 2004).
There is often a significant delay between exposure to, and activation of, the illness with
exposure often occurring in childhood and activation during adulthood. Illness occurring
shortly after exposure is commonly referred to as primary TB, while illness occurring after a
period of dormant infection is known as reactivation TB (AIDSmap, 1997). Individuals
suffering from active TB (either primary or reactivation) are commonly known as TB affected.
Only TB affected individuals are contagious and if left untreated, each affected person can
infect a further 10-15 people a year (World Health Organisation, 2002). In TB endemic areas,
this contagion parameter can rise to 20-28 secondary infections per infectious case (Pronyk et
aI., 2001). For every 12-20 of these secondary infections, TB will affect approximately 2-4
people. One third of the world's population is currently infected with TB and a further 1% of
the world's population is newly infected each year (World Health Organisation, 2002).
Both the incidence of TB and its rate of increase are highest in the WHO African region,
where TB incidence for 2000 was estimated at 290/1 00000 and the annual rate of increase in the
number of cases was estimated at 6% per annum. TB caused an estimated 1.8 million deaths
t Given South Africa's political history it is no longer widely acceptable to make explicit reference to a person's race or ethnicity as a defining
individual characteristic. That said, communities largely continue to reside in homogenous ethnic groups and wealth, health risk and many other
factors vary systematically between the country's different population groups. As such, it is impossible to avoid referring to race or ethnic group
entirely if these lingering inequalities are to be addressed. In this thesis then, the terms 'race', 'ethnicity' and 'population group' are used
interchangeably. Study participants are not however allocated to these groups by an external observer, instead, they are asked to classify themselves.
Of course they are able to refuse any such classification or to classify themselves according to any description they choose. Most respondents did not
object and selected the category descriptors applied in South Africa in the past. As such, the labels 'Black/African', 'Coloured', 'White' and 'Indian or
Asian' are applied. These are not intended to confer any racial or other stereotypes, or to be derogatory in any way.
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around the world in 2000, of which approximately 226,000 (12%) were attributable to HIV.
According to Corbett et aI, 31% of new adult TB cases in the WHO African Region were
attributable to HIV, thus emphasising the significant role of HIV in prolonging and promoting
the TB epidemic in the region. In areas with high HIV prevalence such as sub-Saharan Africa,
this effect is particularly marked (Corbett et aI., 2003).
2.3) rns SOUTH AFRICAN TB EPIDEMIC
In 1996, TB was classified as a national priority in South Africa and directly observed
treatment, short-course (DOTS) was adopted by the Department of Health (Sinanovic et aI.,
2003). This approach has continued and, at present, control strategies rely on passive detection
and directly observed therapy for affected individuals (Pronyk et aI., 2001). Despite the
availability of TB treatment and past success in treating the disease, incidence is rising and cure
rates are falling (Western Cape Provincial Administration, 1999/2000). It is likely that the
coincidence of HIV and TB is a contributing factor to this phenomenon.
The HIV prevalence rate for South Africa is estimated at 22.4% (Dudley et aI., 2003). In
2000 it was estimated that the country had 2 million co-infected adults, the largest number in the
world. At 509 per 100,000t the incidence of TB in South Africa is also amongst the highest,
while the death rate stands at 139 per 100,000. South Africa's TB incidence rate increased by
8.7% between 1997 and 2000, with an estimated 50% of adult TB cases and 59% of adult TB
deaths attributable to HIV (Corbett et aI., 2003).
"In sub-Saharan Africa, about 30% of Hll/-positive patients die within 12
months of treatment. Hll/-positive patients with smear-negative TB ... fare
even lvorse. " page 1519 (Harries et al., 2001)
Survival rates for HIV -positive, TB affected individuals undergoing DOTS is lower than for
those affected only by TB. The nature of HIV can result in false-negative sputum tests for those
co-infected individuals that do seek care. However, the social stigma attached to HIV, and the
debilitating nature of many opportunistic infections can prevent or delay treatment seeking at
the outset (Harries et aI., 2001). Delayed diagnosis adversely affects treatment outcomes for
TB. Another factor adversely affecting treatment outcomes is treatment adherence. Many of
the factors that delay treatment seeking, such as social stigma or debilitation by opportunistic
infections, can also reduce adherence to the DOTS treatment regime.
* This data is for the year 2000.
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2.4) TB AND TB TREATMENT IN CAPE TOWN
The Western Cape is highly urbanised with 89% of its population living in urban areas, the
majority of whom live in greater Cape Town, the provincial capital city (Statistics South Africa,
1998). TB incidence in the City of Cape Town is estimated at 222 per 100,000. Most TB
treatment in the city is ambulatory care provided by primary health clinics situated within a 5km
walk of any TB patient. These clinics tend to be nurse driven, with access to a medical support
officer. Drug supplies are regular and clinics have access to an extensive secondary support
network including a large TB laboratory and nearby TB and general tertiary hospitals, all of
which are well equipped and well staffed. However, despite this established and extensive
system, adherence rates and treatment outcomes have been sub-optimal (Dudley et aI., 2003).
In all sub-districts of Cape Town (excluding the South Peninsular), TB is one of the top 10
causes of death. The areas worst affected are Khayelitsha where TB accounts for 14% of
deaths, Nyanga (9.8%), Helderberg (6.4%) and Oostenburg (5.9%). After homicide and
HIV/AIDS, TB is the third highest cause of years of life lost, accounting for 7.7% of life years
lost in Cape Town in 2001 (Groenewald et aI., 2003). Between 1997 and 2002, the number of
reported TB patients in Cape Town rose by 50%, with 87% of all TB cases diagnosed at public
primary health care facilities and the remainder diagnosed at hospitals and private practitioners
(Toms and Vallabhjee, 2003). The following table summarises the total number of TB cases
registered in Cape Town between 1997 and 2002, while the graph details the case load per
district:
Table 1.1: Total Number of TB Cases R~p..istered1997-2002 (Toms and Vallabhjee, 2003)
YEAR TOTALTB 0/0 TB 'NOT 0/0 CURE
REGISTERED INCREASE TRANSFERRED INCREASE RATE
PER YEAR IN' PER YEAR
1997 16,112 - 13,870 - 65%
1998 17,472 8% 14,970 8% 66%
1999 18,340 5% 15,769 5% 64%
2000 20,830 14% 17,244 9% 70%
2001 21,394 3% 18,361 6% 73%
2002 24,075 13% 20,950 14% N/A
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Figure 1.1,' Case Load per District (Toms and Vallabbjee, 2003)
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In the Western Cape, mv prevalence is estimated at between 7.1% and 10.5%, although
some areas have prevalence rates as high as 18.3%. HIV prevalence is expected to plateau at
25%-30% for the general population of Cape Town (Dudley et aI., 2003), suggesting that any
negative effects of co-prevalence will increase in coming years. As is the case elsewhere, HIV
is considered a contributing factor to the poor performance of the TB control programme. In
this context particularly, the added burden to the health service infrastructure caused by mv is
expected to overstretch the capacity of the system and undermine the TB control programme
even further (Dudley et al., 2003; Helbling, 2003; Sinanovic et aI., 2003).
A number of studies have considered ways to boost service capacity by introducing
community support initiatives to supplement clinic based TB care (Dudley et aI., 2003;
Sinanovic et aI., 2003). These studies have shown favourable results which suggest that HIV
status is not the only factor undermining effective TB control. Generally, community support
initiatives improve system effectiveness by improving treatment adherence. However, these
initiatives may not be the only way to improves adherence and studies around the world have
begun to investigate other means of improving both adherence and early case identification by
exploring how patients interact with the health systems around them (Auer et aI., 2000;
Borgdorff and Maher, 2001; Edginton et aI., 2002; Johansson et aI., 2000; Khan et aI., 2000;
Miti et aI., 2003; gamvithayapong et aI., 2001).
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2.5) DOTS, DOT AND SAT
By 2005, the WHO aims to ensure that 70% of all infectious TB cases are detected and 85%
of those cases effectively treated. The primary tool for reaching these targets is DOTS and
$9.lbillion has been set aside to achieve the goals as laid out in the Global Plan for 2005 (World
Health Organisation, 2003).
The DOTS strategy as advocated by the WHO comprises five key elements (World Health
Organisation, 2002 and; World Health Organisation, 2004):
1) Political commitment: National governments must make TB treatment a
priority and must commit the resources for nation-wide treatment coverage.
2) Microscopy services: Cases should be detected from among people with
persistent cough, using primarily sputum smear microscopy in a country-wide
laboratory network.
3) Drug supplies: Drug supply to health centres should be uninterrupted and
treatment available to all TB patients.
4) Use of effective regimes and direct observation of treatment: Short-course
chemotherapy should be provided and patients and heath workers should
commit both to completing the full course of treatment and ensuring that all
doses are taken.
5) Surveillance and monitoring systems: Governments should implement a
recording and reporting system that monitors treatment outcomes, with the aim
of achieving an 85% cure-rate. Staff should be given the necessary support to
realise this aim.
A1l22 of the highest burden countries have adopted DOTS and, by 2000, 55% of the global
population had access to DOTS. Even in the poorest countries, DOTS produces cure rates of up
to 95% thus saving lives, preventing new infections and preventing the development of multi-
drug resistant TB. A six month supply of drugs for DOTS can cost as little as $10 per patient,
making TB treatment under DOTS "one of the most cost effective of all health interventions"
(World Health Organisation, 2002).
Despite the obvious success of DOTS, TB is not yet under control and the direct
observation of treatment has come in for considerable criticism (Garner and Volmink, 2003;
Macq et aI., 2003; Pope and Chaisson, 2003).
Although direct observation (DOT) remains core to the WHO strategy for TB control, there
is considerable debate over whether it is essential to the success of DOTS (Garner and Volmink,
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2003). Proponents of direct observation argue that extreme measures are necessary to maintain
case-holding and prevent the spread of multi-drug resistant TB. Opponents of the strategy argue
that its rigidity raises ethical concerns and that there is no evidence to prove it more effective
than self-administered treatment (SAT) (Macq et aI., 2003).
Randomised controlled trials conducted in South Africa, Pakistan and Thailand between
1999 and 2001 aimed to measure the effectiveness of DOT relative to SAT. These studies
showed little or no benefit of DOT (Gamer and Volmink, 2003). While the results from South
Africa and Pakistan concluded that DOT had a neutral (or negative) effect on treatment, the
results from Thailand concluded that DOT had a small positive effect. Pope and Chaisson
(2003) argue that these findings are spurious. In the South African case, they state that over-
worked nurses deliberately biased the selection of participants and that the investigators were
negatively predisposed towards DOT. The investigators in the Pakistan study are similarly
accused of a negative predisposition towards the practise. Only the investigators in the Thai
study were considered "sanguine" about DOT. The trials are also accused of failing to
operationalise DOT in a manner consistent with the study's definition (Pope and Chaisson,
2003). While Gamer and Volmink (2003) call for more scientific evidence regarding the
effectiveness of DOT, Pope and Chaisson (2003) remind us that treatment adherence is a multi-
factorial phenomenon that cannot be explained by randomised controlled trials of this nature.
Despite the apparently inflexible definition of DOT, there is considerable variation in its
implementation. DOT providers may be supporters or supervisors and a diverse range of people
(including health care professionals, lay community health workers or even close relatives of the
patient) can act as the DOT provider. As the provider varies, so too does the site of delivery,
which can include clinics, hostels, hospitals, health centres or patient's homes. Although DOT
can be offered in isolation, it is often implemented as part of a broader package of food-aid,
social support or skills-training, which act as patient 'incentives'. The original picture of the
heath professional watching the patient take their medication as part of an institutionalised
health service is evolving, raising new questions and challenges to effective TB control (Macq
et aI., 2003).
"This calls for more reflection about how DOT is developed and organised
as part of a complex and lengthy set of interventions, the choice of DOT
provider, and the role of incentives and enablers ... lessons should not only
come from TB care, but also from management experience of other chronic
diseases." (Macq et aI., 2003 pg 108)
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3) STUDY OBJECTIVES
3.1) PRIMARY AIM
The primary aim of this thesis is to understand the determinants of treatment seeking
behaviour in Cape Town, South Africa, and examine whether the complex and dynamic
determinants observed through empirical research can be incorporated into existing economic
demand models. A secondary aim of the research is to inform debates about how to improve the
effective use of health care services with a particular focus on tuberculosis.
3.2) OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are to:
1) Understand how individuals assess their need for health care and identify the primary
factors that impact that perceived need.
2) Explore how individuals formulate their choice set when seeking healthcare and which
service providers are likely to be included or excluded from the choice set under
different conditions.
3) Understand the composition and role of the budget constraint by investigating price and
income constraints to health seeking generally, and health seeking from particular
providers.
4) Probe the potential influence of the household, community and broader social setting in
the individual assessment of need, the formation of the choice set and 'the impact of
price and income constraints on health seeking.
5) Develop an econometric model of health seeking behaviour which:
a. Measures the impact of perceived health need on the demand for health
services
b. Examines the determinants of provider choice and allows for multiple care
seeking/care seeking from more than one provider if appropriate
c. Models the impact of price and income constraints on care seeking and allows
for the explicit measurement and interaction of other barriers to care seeking
d. Explores how social context affects health seeking behaviour
e. Is able to inform policy decisions aimed at; i) improving the delivery of TB
services and ii) potentially combining TB and HIV services.
3.3) METHODS
The objectives of the study are addressed using a combination of qualitative and
quantitative data collection and analysis methods. Qualitative data collection was conducted
using a focus group methodology and analysed using modified grounded theory techniques.
The quantitative data collection employed survey data methods in the form of a weekly diary
over the course of eight weeks. The quantitative data was analysed using descriptive statistics
and regression analysis using Stata Version 9. The methods are described in detail in Chapter 3
of the thesis.
3.4) INFORMING POLICY DECISIONS
As global thinking begins to favour joint programs to address TB and HIV, health seeking
behaviour for TB needs to be evaluated in an urban setting where geographic access i.e. distance
to services does not pose a significant barrier to care seeking, TB treatment is free at the point of
use, the DOTS protocol is applied and where care seeking for TB can be contrasted with care
seeking for other illnesses. This analysis will aim to explain (in part at least) why cure rates are
falling in the Western Cape despite consistent TB service supply. The results will also provide
insights into issues around the uptake of TB services in other contexts and may inform the
planned roll-out of antiretroviral treatment for HIV.
4) STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis begins with an overview of the demand literature, followed by a thorough
exposition of the research and analytical methods employed to achieve the study'S aims. The
findings are then presented over four chapters: health need is analysed first in Chapter 4,
followed by the formation of the choice set in Chapter 5 and constraints to health seeking in
Chapter 6. Finally a comprehensive model of demand is presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8
contains a discussion of the findings drawing relevant conclusions, while Chapter 9 outlines
appropriate policy recommendations.
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CHAPTER TWO:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
1) STRUCTURE OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
A study of this nature covers a broad scope of literature. After defining the key concepts
referenced throughout this document, the following review groups articles by their relevance to
the research topic and identifies three key theoretical foundations pertinent to the field of study,
namely:
1. Psychosocial models for explaining health-seeking behaviour e.g. the Andersen
Model.
2. Economic models for explaining health-seeking behaviour e.g. the Human Capital
Model.'
3. Models or concepts that enable us to link health seeking behaviour to the equity of
service supply.
Following a synopsis of the theory, this review draws on a wide range of empirical research,
focussing particularly on studies that have attempted to assess patient demand for health
services. The applied literature is largely characterised by studies from more developed
countries aimed at quantifying financial risk to health insurers and other third-party payers
including the state. The relevance of these findings to the setting of this study is questionable.
However, the extent to which these studies dominate the demand literature prohibits their
universal exclusion from the review. That said, where possible, emphasis is placed on demand
studies set in less developed countries.
The review concludes with a synopsis of the literature on care seeking for TB particularly,
identifying the gaps in the literature which this study aims to address.
2) DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS
Although this dissertation draws primarily on the tenets of economics, other disciplines
have contributed significantly to our understanding of the demand for health services. In
interdisciplinary work of this nature then, it is necessary to explain the terms used commonly
throughout this document, terms that may have different meanings in different fields of study.
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2.1) WHAT IS HEALTH?
Definitions of health vary from the negatively oriented 'absence of disease' (Jones, 1994) to
the World Health Organisation's positively oriented " ...state of complete physical, mental,
spiritual and social well being". Jones classifies the former definition as a product of the
medical model and the latter as a product of the social model (Jones, 1994). The social model is
expounded by Appleton and Cowley (Cowley and Appleton, 2000) who define health as a
function of social, personal and physical resources which may be internalised or manifested
externally. An alternative to the more extreme positive and negative definitions is Lalonde's
'health field' concept, which defines health as a function of human biology, lifestyle factors,
environment and healthcare organisation (Lalonde, 1974).
While definitions of health may be highly subjective at the patient level, economists prefer
to work with the 'absence of disease' concept that is more easily quantified. In this view,
health's only economic value lies in its use and health is not limited to discrete time periods i.e.
one can accumulate a 'stock' of health (Grossman, 2000; Lockett, 1996). Mooney (Mooney,
1992) is concerned that health economists desire easy quantification, which shapes assumptions
regarding the individual's utility function'.
2.2) DEMAND FOR HEALTH SERVICES
The Dictionary of Health Economics defines demand as a "request for a healthcare
product" (pg 32 Earl-Slater, 1999) while Wittor et al. define deinand as "the quantity of a good
purchased at any given price" (pg 273 Wittor et aI., 2003). Wittor's definition is derived from
Neoclassical economic theory, which dictates that demand will equal supply in equilibrium.
Out of equilibrium there is either excess demand or supply. Where there is excess demand, the
price will rise until supply meets demand. Where there is excess supply, the price falls until
demand and supply are equal. However, when the price mechanism does not operate freely,
markets may remain out of equilibrium. This is the case in many health markets where the state
and other agencies subsidise or regulate delivery.
Conventional demand models have 'actual use' as the dependent variable, which assumes
that markets are in' equilibrium and there is no unmet demand. 'Demand,' as used in the
majority of health economic analysis, should read 'use' (McPake et aI., 2002). In this
discussion however, 'demand' is used in the sense of the Dictionary of Health Economics'
'request for a healthcare product', which may not result in consumption if there is a mismatch of
supply and demand and the 'request' is unmet.
• See the later discussion of utility functions and utility maximizing.
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Demand for health care is derived from the demand for health as an outcome. Consumers
demand the outcome (health) rather than the input (health care) and are partially responsible for
the production of that outcome. Demand is dependent on the perceived effectiveness of the
input, the value of the outcome relative to the cost, and the consumer's budget constraint. The
value of the outcome is a subjective individual measure that may outweigh both the cost and the
budget constraint, raising complex ethical and moral issues' (Earl-Slater, 1999; McPake et al.,
2002; Mooney, 1992).
2.3) THE ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH NEEDS
2.3.1) NEED
When defining health needs a number of conflicting concepts arise, particularly individual
versus clinical notions of need. Individual and population-based measures of need may also
differ but population level need falls outside the bounds of this study (Culyer, 1976).
The literature on health seeking commonly applies a clinical/biomedical concept of need
(Raine et al., 2003; Stone, 2002; Veenstra, 2002). However, a lay-person may not recognise a
clinical need if it does not generate an identifiable symptomology. Conversely, individuals may
perceive themselves to have a health need that would not be considered a clinical need.
Perceived health need is commonly measured by wellness scales or multi-attribute indices such
as the SF36 that collect data on perceived wellness/ill-health (Balasubramanian et al., 2004;
Bowden and Fox-Rushby, 2003; O'Keefe and Wood, 1996). 111 health is thus frequently treated
as synonymous with health need.
Another alternative to the biomedical concept of need is the 'capacity to benefit framework'
proposed by Matthew (Matthew, 1971). McGuire integrates th is framework into the chapter on
Physician Agency in the Handbook of Health Economics. He argues that the patient's capacity
to benefit from medical care is a fixed construct which approximates a demand curve and that,
in the absence of full information, supplier induced demand may cause patients to consume
above their capacity to benefit curve. Although this construct is used by McGuire to explain
supplier induced demand, one could similarly argue that the absence of full information about
their capacity to benefit may also result in patients consuming below their capacity to benefit
curve (McGuire, 2000).
2.3.2) FROM NEED TO DEMAND
A perceived need may not result in health seeking behaviour if sufferers are unaware that
treatment is available, or if available treatment is perceived to be too expensive, painful, risky or
t Detailed consideration of these issues falls outside the bounds of this discussion.
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time consuming. As such, 'need' may not exactly correlate with demand for health services and
it is thus important to compare individual perceptions of health need with reported demand for
health services and measures of health service utilisation. This is clarified further in the
analytical framework presented in Chapter 3.
3) PSYCHOSOCIAL MODELS OF HEALTH SEEKING BEHAVIOUR
A number of psychosocial models have been devised to explain health seeking behaviour.
These models can significantly enhance our understanding of the economic theories described
subsequently and can also help to identify shortcomings in the economic framework by seeking
to explain phenomena that are either omitted or not fully explained by the economic models of
demand. Three of the most commonly cited psychosocial models are the Health Beliefs Model,
the Theory of Reasoned Action and the Anderson Behaviour Model. These are described in
some detail below because of their frequent application to problems of health service demand
and the extent to which they impact on our understanding of similar economic models. Other
psychosocial models such as the Organisational Constraints Model, the Diffusion of Innovations
Model and the PRECEDE Model impact only on particular facets of the economic models and
as such, are listed briefly below for purposes of completeness.
3.1) HEALTH BELIEFS MODEL
This model proposes that health behaviour is determined by the perceived:
• susceptibility to an illness,
• severity of the illness
• benefits of preventing or treating the illness, and
• barriers to prevention/treatment
Risk and severity of illness are weighed against benefits of treatment or prevention and the
cost in terms of time, money and other factors (Scrimshaw, 2001). This process is implicit in
the Neoclassical Economic notion of demand outlined above.
Despite its widespread use, a number of criticisms have been levelled against the Health
Beliefs Model. Patients with chronic illness may learn to 'manage' the system and thus not
behave in the expected manner. The model is difficult to quantify and fails to account for
organisational, environmental and social factors impacting on behaviour (Scrimshaw, 2001).
The model also assumes that consumers strictly maximise their utility in the objectively rational
sense i.e. that they use full information to formulate a preference set that is complete, reflexive,
and transitive - which may be misleading (Lane, 1991).
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3.2) THEORY OF REASONED ACTION
The Theory of Reasoned Action attempts to "predict an individual's intention to engage in
a behaviour in a specific time and place" (Scrimshaw, 2001). According to this theory,
behaviour is preceded by intent, attitudes, beliefs regarding outcomes, subjective norms; and
normative beliefs.
This extends the Health Beliefs Model by incorporating an individual belief structure and
acknowledging the' influence of external environmental and social factors (Hubley, 1993).
However, behavioural intent is the immediate predictor of behaviour in this theory, not
environmental or social context. Failure to consider action, target, context, and time when
considering intent will thus undermine the predictive value of the model (Scrimshaw, 2001).
Empirical application of this theory suggests that past behaviour is the best predictor of
intention and future behaviour (Sutton et aI., 1999), this justifies the collection of a service use
history and investigation of 'failure' to use health services during past illness episodes. It also
suggests that 'demand' is not formed in isolation but within a dynamic social context.
3.3) ANDERSEN BEHAVIOUR MODEL
This model overlaps significantly with the Health Beliefs Model and the Theory of
Reasoned Action. It incorporates environmental and social factors as well as the notion of a
personal predisposition towards certain behavioural traits, attributing health seeking behaviour
to (Andersen, 1995; Andersen and Newman, 1973);
a) Personal or population characteristics that might predispose individuals to seek or not
seek care,
b) Enabling resources, and
c) Perceived need for care as determined by eitherlboth subjective and objective heath
status determinants.
3.4) OTHER PSYCHO-SOCIAL MODELS
The Organisational Constraints Model focuses on the incentives of both the patient and
provider. The model proposes that market competition, the existence of cost-effective
alternatives for care and personal factors, account for variations in service use (Pickin et aI.,
2002). This informs a dimension of the manner in which patients compile their preference sets.
The Diffusion of Innovations Model is concerned with the filtering of health information or
learning through a community, over time, via certain channels. This model fails to explain the
maintenance of behaviour change or the nature of behaviour itself, as it represents a
manifestation of multiple communications (Scrimshaw, 2001). However, the model might
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explain why some health service options are incorporated into a preference set and others not.
The PRECEDE model is prominent in the field of health promotion. Also known as the
precede-proceed model the theory emphasises two central propositions; firstly, that health and
health risks are caused by multiple factors and secondly, that this multiple-cause phenomenon
necessitates a multidimensional communications effort to affect behavioural, environmental
and/or social change (Green, 2003). This suggests that the determinants of demand are more
complex than the Neoclassical model considers.
4) ECONOMIC MODELS OF HEALTH-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR
Economic models that assist in operationalising, measuring and understanding health
demand include utility maximisation models, human capital models and household production
models. To this list, one should also add the contribution of New Institutional Economics
(Leonard, 2000b).
4.1) UTILITY MAXIMISING MODELS
4.1.1) SIMPLE UTILITY MAXIMISING MODELS
In this model, consumers optimise their utility subject to some constraint (usually
budgetary) (Chiang, 1984). It is assumed that consumers have homothetic preferences
represented by a function homogenous of degree one. If we are interested in the demand for a
good such as health, Hicksian separability: requires that we consider the alternative i.e. 'all
other goods' (Varian, 1992).
This model explains that the demand for medical services depends on the price of those
services, the price of other goods, total income and preferences or tastes. For health services to
be normal goods in the economic sense, own-price elasticity should be negative, cross price
elasticity should be positive and income elasticity should be positive (Akin et aI., 1985a; Heiler,
1982; Rosen, 1995)~
4.1.2) ADAPTATIONS OF THE UTILITY MAXIMISING MODEL
4.1.2.a) A model that solves if the price of care is zero
The simple utility maximising model will not solve if health services are free. Acton and
Becker therefore assume that services without user fees still incur a 'time cost'. Their model
can therefore be solved even if p=0 (Acton, 1975).
This adaptation predicts that:
t See pages 148-149 of Varian (Varian, H.R., 1992, Microeconomic Analysis. W.W. Norton & Company, London and New York.)
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• As the price of medical services falls to zero, demand becomes more
sensitive to time costs.
• The effect of wage income and non-wage income on the demand for health
services differs. Increases in non-wage income have a consistently positive
effect on demand. However, increases in wage income have an ambiguous,
often negative effect.
This adaptation does not permit the incorporation of indicators of health 'need' or
demographic variables that may influence demand. In addition, time price does not have a
conceptual place if one is assumed only to be at work or at leisure. By this assumption, the time
spent seeking health services is considered leisure time. Specifying the value of time is
complex and often value laden (Akin et aI., 1985a).
4.1.2.b) Differentiating between preventive versus curative care seeking behaviour
Heller differentiates between the consumption of preventive and curative health services.
He argues that preventive services are only consumed if perceived to be significantly less
expensive than curative services. Curative services are associated with a particular illness
experience and an expectation that the service wi II alleviate the illness (or its symptoms)
(Heller, 1982).
The cost of curative care is the expected price of a cure multiplied by the perceived
probability of contracting the illness. The perceived probability of illness is incorporated into a
holistic 'perceived state of health" determined by:
a) The nature of the external environment, particularly the 'virulence and
prevalence' of pathogenic agents.
b) The level of consumption of clothing, shelter, food, safe water and other
products which can protect the individual against the external environment.
c) The consumption of preventive health services.
Age also inhibits one's ability to resist disease, with higher risk periods occurring during
early and later years in less developed countries.
Conclusions from this model suggest that the consumption of preventive services and other
commodities reduces the need for curative services. As such, the net price of preventive
services and other commodities is the cash and time price of the goods respectively, less the
effective savings in expenditure on curative services.
IHealth status is not the only determinant of demand for health services in Heller's model. The demand for health services is likely
to be dependent on both this perceived state of health and economic factors such as income and market prices. However, health
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• The price elasticity of demand for preventive services and other
commodities is negative.
• The price elasticity of demand for curative services is indeterminate, as is
the cross-price elasticity of demand for curative services and preventive
services, or curative services and other goods.
• Although the cross price elasticity of total demand for medical services and
the demand for necessary medical services cannot be categorically signed,
Heller argues that it is negative.
• The direction of the income effect on the total demand for medical services
is indeterminate as an increase in income may have multiple effects. It may
increase the demand for excess care (Le. total demand for medical services
less demand for 'necessary' medical services), it may reduce illness and it
may increase the demand for preventive services and other goods.
• "The effect of a change in the amount of time required to consume any good
is equivalent to the effect of an increase in the cash price of that good
multiplied by [the wage rate} .... " (pg 269 Heller, 1982)
4.1.2.c) The Lancaster Model of Demand
Lancaster provides an alternative to traditional utility theory that is potentially determinate
and able to cope with the particular traits of health seeking behaviour. According to his theory,
preference sets are comprised of ranked characteristics rather than ranked goods. Goods are
only ranked indirectly as a function of the characteristics they possess. As such, a good itself
does not give utility to the consumer rather, this is conveyed through the characteristics of the
good. Lancaster also proposes that a good will have more than one characteristic, many
characteristics may be shared by more than one good, and that combinations of goods may
possess difference characteristics from each of those goods individually (Lancaster, 1966). The
simple form of his model is formalised as follows:
Maximize U(z)
Subject to px::; k
With z = Ex
z,x 2: 0
status and economic factors are to some extent interdependent and this can complicate the analysis of health service demand.
(Heller, P. S., 1982. A model of the demand for medical and health services in Peninsular Malaysia. Soc Sci Med, 16(3),267-284.)
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In this specification, z denotes the characteristics of goods while x denotes the goods. The
maximand U (z) thus denotes the utility derived from the consumption of the characteristics.
Lancaster describes this utility as being "defined on characteristics space (C-space)"(pgI36).
Of course the characteristics in themselves cannot be purchased; instead the goods must be
purchased to enjoy their characteristics. As such, px ::;k is the budget constraint, which is
described as being "defined on goods space (G-space)"(pgI36). The term z = Bx relates the
characteristics (z) to the collection of goods available (x) through the consumption technology
B, which is assumed to be fixed. The final term is a simple non-negativity constraint that may
not always apply. In order to relate the budget constraint to the utility curve, both must be
moved into the same 'space'. Whether they both move into the goods or characteristics space is
determined by the structure of the matrix B (Lancaster, 1966)
Applying this structure to a hypothetical case of health seeking then, patients would rank
provider characteristics such as drug availability, staff attitudes etc rather than ranking
providers. This ranking would be required to have the properties of completeness, transitivity
and reflexivity. Providers would then be ranked indirectly as a function of the characteristics
with which they are associated. Lancaster's model can cope with r characteristics, m activities
and n goods. As such, it can accommodate multiple providers, with multiple characteristics and
health seeking for multiple illnesses. It does however require that the characteristics possessed
by a good are the same, and in the same quantity for all consumers. The only element of
personal choice is thus the choice and ranking of characteristics and not the allocation of
characteristics to goods.
This model, as with the traditional model, is also a utility maximising model with no
explicit accommodation of alternatives to strict maximisation. While it is conceivable that
patients would have more information about the characteristics they would prefer from a
provider than their preference for the provider itself, it is less conceivable that they may be able
to assign those characteristics accurately to a provider and hence to consume the bundle of
goods that would yield the utility maximising collection of characteristics. This model has not
yet been applied empirically to health seeking.
4.1.2.d) The soft budget constraint
When an individual has access to extended family resources or holds a reasonable
expectation that the State will facilitate health seeking - either through the reduction of prices or
the augmenting of income through grants - a softer budget constraint may apply. Application of
a soft budget constraint moves the discussion away from neoclassical economic theory, towards
a game theoretic approach.
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The soft budget constraint is commonly used to describe or explain the behaviour of firms
in transition and socialist economies (Komai, 1998). In these markets, subsidies, credits, price-
supports and the unenforceability of bankruptcy all subject state firms to a soft budget constraint
(Li and Liang, 1998). According to Komai et aI., the features of the soft budget constraint
(SBC) are empirically observable and measurable. A characteristic set of motives, with
predictable effects on actors' expectations and behaviour, work through a characteristic set of
means (Kornai et aI., 2003). The SBC uses a game theoretic framework rather than a
neoclassical framework and as such, the emphasis is placed on the interaction between
economic agents rather than the behaviour of a single economic actor (Lindbeck and Weibull,
1988).
By convention, SBC syndrome refers to the case where both parties in the relationship are
organisations. However, this is more a function of the theory's application to date than any
limitation of its structure. In fact, Kornai et al. readily explain that the theory evolved from
microeconomic theory and particularly the budget constraint of the individual (Komai et aI.,
2003). It is therefore not implausible that SBC syndrome can be used to explain the behaviour
of individuals in health markets. The concept is particularly useful for explaining how (and
why) economic agents may interact to facilitate any 'out of budget' health spending i.e. health
spending that exceeds household resources, by a given individual.
In conventional SBC theory, budget constraints are usually softened through fiscal tools, the
extension of excessive credit and other indirect methods such as tariff barriers to deter
competition (Komai et aI., 2003). Individuals in health markets may face similar 'softening'.
For example, to facilitate the purchase of health services above the budget line, individuals are
often extended credit which they cannot (or will not) be expected to repay. Indirect methods of
support take a different form in the individual case but are no less relevant - a patient's relatives
may provide transport, childcare or free accommodation to facilitate the purchase of health
services above the budget line. There is also an equivalent to the fiscal support incorporated in
SBC syndrome; individuals may be exempt from their usual contributions to a communal or
familial financial pot in order to facilitate health spending over their budget constraint i.e. in
excess of household resources.
SBC syndrome is credited with three key behavioural effects. Firstly, management efforts
to maximise profits or reduce costs are reduced. Secondly, organisations facing SBCs become
less responsive to changes in prices (of inputs and outputs). Finally, organisations with SBCs
may be able to obtain inputs to 'production without paying for those inputs. This may inflate
demand for these inputs and lead to shortages (Komai et aI., 2003). We can translate these
effects into the language of individual health seeking. In the first instance individuals may have
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a reduced incentive to minimise the costs of health seeking and may, for example, seek fee for
service private care over free public care. In the second, individuals may be less responsive to
the price of health services. Finally, if we assume that health services are an input to health
production (as the model below describes), the SBC may augment demand for health services
and lead to shortages. A SBC on the demand for health may also thus crowd out other
individual or household spending.
The formal theory of the soft budget constraint has not yet been applied to the problem of
health seeking but it is evident that this theory can accommodate many of the potential
characteristics of health seeking in a way that the neoclassical theory of the hard budget
constraint cannot.
4.2) HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION MODELS.
This model formalises the actions of an individual who uses two inputs (market goods and
time) to maximise the utility of two commodities produced in the home. This replaces the
notion of direct utility derived from health services with one of indirect utility Le. one does not
gain positive utility from the health service but from the effects of the service. This corresponds
with the notion of derived demand explained above and, to some extent, also with the Lancaster
Model. By introducing household relationships into the production (and consumption) function
one can model the economic effects of household level demographic variables (Akin et aI.,
1985a) and begin to see impact of an individual's social environment on their health seeking
behaviour. However, this does not allow the exploration of community level factors that may
facilitate or prevent health service usage.
The household production model also introduces the concept of a shadow price such that the
price of a commodity is determined by the cost of its inputs and the efficiency of the production
function, rather than the market. If the market is not determining price, we can no longer
assume that price will regulate supply and demand and maintain market equilibrium. This
reinforces concern that health service consumption occurs out of equilibrium and demand does
not equal use.
Again, this model is not without its own drawbacks. Firstly, the comparative statics do not
differ from a simple utility maximising model with time costs, such as that developed by Acton
(Acton, 1975). The model also fails to incorporate any concept of health need or health status
(Akin et aI., 1985a).
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4.3) HUMAN CAPITAL MODELS
The Grossman human capital model is a version of the household production model in
which health is a 'commodity' produced using own time and market inputs. Health is viewed as
a "durable capital stock that depreciates with age and can be increased by investment" (pg 348
Grossman,2000).
The production of health stock (or health capital) is modelled by a household production
function in which medical care is one input of many. Accordingly, the shadow price of health is
determined by more than the cost of health services. This model shows that the shadow price of
health rises with age as the rate of depreciation of the health stock increases; and falls with
education as more educated persons are assumed to be more efficient producers of health.
Furthermore, "an increase in the shadow price may simultaneously reduce the quantity of
health demanded and increase the quantity of health inputs demanded. " (pg 348 Grossman,
2000).
The individual simply chooses whether or not to invest in health or other commodities that
yield positive utility, knowing that the discounted value of lifetime consumption cannot exceed
the discounted value of lifetime income. Thus the model is consistent with economic theory, as
the marginal cost of investments in health must equal the marginal rate of return to those
investments (Akin et aI., 1985a),
This model can be presented in two distinct forms Le. as a pure investment model and as a
pure consumption model. Analysis of the pure investment model suggests that positive
relationships exist between:
• health capital and the wage rate,
• health capital and education,
• the demand for market-produced health services and age,
• the demand for market-produced health services and the wage rate,
• the demand for market-produced health services and education.
A negative relationship exists between health capital and age (Grossman, 2000).
Analysis of the consumption model is more ambiguous due to wealth effects. With the
standard assumptions of the model it is not possible to state the direction of the relationship
between age, the wage rate or education and either the demand for health services or the
demand for market-produced health services (Akin et al., 1985a; Grossman, 2000).
Akin et al. identify two benefits of this model; the inclusion of some concept of health
need, and the ability to sign demographic variables in the investment model. However,
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'need' is not optimally modelled as health stocks are assumed to depreciate linearly with age
and the effects of 'health shocks' are not considered (Akin et aI., 1985a)
A further concern regards the use of education as a proxy for human capital, when
economic theory provides little impetus to do so. Finally, the Grossman model assumes that
individuals have complete certainty about their stock of health, how to increase (or decrease)
that stock and at what price (Akin et aI., 1985a). This hyper-rationality underpins Neoclassical
notions of demand.
4.4) NE\V INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
While Neoclassical theory is characterised by perfect information, New Institutional
Economic (NIE) theory identifies the following characteristics of the market for health services
(Akin et aI., 1985a; Leonard et aI., 1999; Leonard, 2000b):
• Asymmetries of information i.e. information is not shared equally between patient and
health service provider.
• Bounded rationality, characterised by less than perfect information about choices and
decision sets which may not include all possible options.
• Transitivity may not hold as preferences vary according to the context and nature of the
perceived health need.
The process of health seeking is characterised by uncertainty, infrequency and asset
specificity.
In most health systems asymmetries of information between the doctor (or provider) and
patient, manager and owner, or payer and payee can lead to conflicts of interest (Arrow, 1963).
Constrained optimization models were an early attempt to resolve this conflict but they failed to
explicitly analyse the role of information and ownership rights. This failure led to the
development of the principal agent model (or agency theory) (Varian, 1992).
A principal-agent problem occurs when a less-informed principal (e.g. the patient) wants to
induce a better-informed agent (e.g. the doctor), to take an action which is costly to that agent.
The challenge is to construct an incentive scheme that' will induce the agent to act in the best
interests of the principal and not override the patient's goal, perpetuating the conflict (Hart,
1996; Varian, 1992). In the context of health, the utility function of the principal and agent are
interdependent, information is asymmetrical and transaction costs exist.
The agency model has been usefully applied in the study of alternative payment
mechanisms and the role of imperfect agency in mediating provider incentives (Ellis and
McGuire, 1986). Transaction cost analysis has helped to devise complex incentive
42
compatibility constraints to reduce inefficiency and optimise remuneration. Despite this, the
structure of payments in health systems remains relatively simple and is seldom devised after
due consideration of both the patient and provider's utility functions (Mooney and Ryan, 1993).
In the absence of formal incentive compatibility constraints, Mooney questions the capacity
of a patient to monitor a health service provider. Patients may not be aware of this
responsibility and if they are, information asymmetry may prohibit monitoring. If the patient is
able to monitor the provider, what is their recourse if they identify a failure to perform? If there
are multiple providers the patient could always seek a second opinion but in resource poor
settings this is seldom the case. Even if multiple providers do exist, second opinions are seldom
encouraged in publicly funded health systems (Mooney, 1992).
. .
Agency theory has been criticized for its simplicity as the principal may be any number of
patients with divergent needs. Which one incentive scheme will ensure that the agent acts on
behalf of them all? How patients or communities might organise themselves is the subject of
some collective bargaining analysis but is seldom considered in context of demand for health
services, which tends to have a very individual basis. The model needs to accommodate
multiple relationships and allow for indirect forms of sanction by patients who might 'vote with
their feet' if alternative providers exist.
4.4.1) OPTIMISING VERSUS SATISFICING
NIE rejects the hard core of the Neoclassical paradigm, which focuses exclusively on
optimization. Instead, it is assumed that bounded rationality forces individuals to adopt
satisficing strategies i.e. to achieve acceptable aspiration levels with less than full information
rather than strictly maximising utility. Thus objective rationality is replaced by subjective
rationality as individuals are assumed to:
1) Limit the alternatives in their feasible set
2) Value their information processing costs more highly than assumed by
traditional rational choice theory, and
3) Settle for a process of satisficing.
Lane similarly proposes that the assumptions about rationality do not advance our
understanding of utility maximising behaviour. Instead it is the assumptions about goals and
how people characterise the choice situation, that can be useful in understanding and measuring
utility maximisation (Lane, 1991).
While criticisms of rationality have validity, they are not insurmountable. Economic
rational choice theory is useful provided that one is: aware of its shortcomings, does not use it as
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a gospel of human behaviour, and remembers to supplement it with common sense, intuitive
thinking about human nature and the context of the situation being analysed (Sen, 1982).
In the context of health seeking behaviour, bounded rationality has direct implications. One
needs to consider which alternatives fall within the patient's feasible set. If information
processing is considered costly, then one also needs to investigate the proliferation and nature of
possible 'short-cuts' to decision making such as the use of reference groups or opinion leaders
to guide service choice. This necessitates a community or social orientation to the analysis of
health seeking behaviour in so far as reference groups and opinion leaders are drawn from the
individual's community or society.
5) THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH SERVICES
5.1) PSYCHO-SOCIAL VERSUS ECONOMIC MODELS OF DEMAND.
The psycho-social and economic models of demand detailed above provide alternate
conceptual frameworks for empirical analysis. These conceptual frameworks help to identify
the independent variables affecting the demand for, or use of, health services. Although the
frameworks stem from different intellectual traditions, the substantive analysis derived from the
two schools of thought does not differ significantly. The main difference between the two lies
in the treatment of community-level variables, which tend to be considered in psycho-social
models and not in economic ones. For clarity then, the next section focuses solely on the
application of economic models of demand - with reference to community level variables where
relevant.
5.2) EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC TENETS
Most economic studies of demand address the implications of introducing user fees for
health services (Conteh and Hanson, 2003). These studies tend to take either a disease-specific
approach (Dalal et aI., 2002; Dyer et aI., 2002; Ogborne and DeWit, 2001) or a facility-specific
approach (Olsson and Hansagi, 2001; Olsson, 2001) to understanding health service utilisation
and demand. Data sources are generally quantitative survey-based sources varying from
longitudinal surveys (Chakraborty et aI., 2002) to ad hoc cross-sectional surveys (Gaitatzis et
aI., 2002; Ngalula et aI., 2002; Saxena et aI., 2002; Welch et aI., 1984). Wiseman et a1. have
also recently utilised diary data collection methods to inform treatment seeking behaviour and
this method holds some promise for future studies of this kind (Wiseman et aI., 2005; Wiseman
et aI., 2006).
As mentioned previously, there is a proliferation of empirical literature on demand from
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wealthy countries settings. These studies cannot be omitted entirely due to their influence on
our overall understanding of demand for health services however, where possible, the following
section will focus solely on studies set in less developed countries.
5.2.1) APPLYING UTILITY MAXIMISING MODELS
Heller was among the first to investigate the use of health services in a developing country
context and particularly (Heller, 1982);
• the sensitivity of service use to costs of care both in terms of time and financial
resources (including income),
• the correlation between the consumption of medical care and rates of illness,
• the choice between traditional versus modem facilities,
• the choice between public versus private facilities, and
• whether patterns of use varied across ethnic groups.
These areas have since been investigated by other authors including Akin et al. (1985a),
Sauerborn et al. (1994), Gertler and van der Gaag (1990), Mwabu (1986) and van der Yen and
van der Gaag (1982).
Heller found that the demand" for medical services was highly inelastic to changes in
income, price and the time taken to seek services. He also found that demand was responsive to
changes in the relative prices of different medical services and to changes in the composition of
the time spent accessing care (Le. travelling time versus waiting time etc). This implies that
different providers are substitutes rather than compliments. He also identified greater shifts
away from traditional medicine amongst higher income earners (Heller, 1982).
Sauerborn et al. concluded that the price elasticity of demand'! varies across age groups and
income groups and is highest for infants and the lowest income quartile. Elasticity may be
greater in the poorest income quintile because they only seek care when illness becomes more
severe (and thus the use of health services less discretionary) (Sauerborn et aI., 1995). This
emphasises the importance of a 'health need' measure in empirical analysis.
Mwabu focussed on a single illness episode and found that patients utilised multiple
providers during the episode (Mwabu et aI., 1993) Many studies have investigated the use of
particular service facilities including emergency departments (such as Bazargan et aI., 1998) and
community pharmacies (for example Sepehri et aI., 2003). Others have analysed the use of
services for particular health needs such as postnatal care (Chakraborty et aI., 2002), paediatric
•• Although Heller refers to his dependant variable as 'demand', he is in fact measuring use as defined in this
document.
tt Again, while the authors refers to their dependant variable as 'demand', they are in fact measuring use
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care for children exposed to family violence (Onyskiw, 2002), care for patients in the terminal
stages of AIDS (Ngalula et aI., 2002) and care for those afflicted with epilepsy (Gaitatzis et aI.,
2002). However, these studies failed to explore the interplay between illness type and health
service use. Illness type (rather than illness severity) may determine elasticity of demand for
various health services. These findings also tend to present the barriers to access as a list of
mutually exclusive factors rather than ,an interdependent whole, where the relative importance
of each barrier varies between individuals, communities and illness-experiences (Brach and
Fraser, 2000; Muller, 1986; Ojanuga and Gilbert, 1992).
Sahn used a nested multinomial logit model to analyse the effect of demographic variables
and duration of illness on the use of health services (Sahn, 2000), while Saxena et al. examined
socio-economic and ethnic differences in service use by children and young people in England
(Saxena et aI., 2002). Their respective findings identify differences in usage but do not explain
why those differences might exist. They make little allowance for health seeking as a social
phenomenon, influenced by cultural norms and established familial or community habits
(Pearce and Smith, 2003; Wallerstein, 2002).
5.2.2) APPLYING HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND HUMAN CAPITAL MODELS
Few studies have applied the household production function, possibly due to the complexity
of translating the theory into a workable statistical model. However, Ellis et al. analyse
household-level demand determinants in their study of demand for inpatient and outpatient care
in Cairo. Unsurprisingly, they conclude that wealthier consumers prefer to purchase higher cost
and quality services; and that age, gender, education and coverage by health insurance all
impact on demand for services. They are unable to estimate price responsiveness because of the
interrelation between price and quality in Cairo and the absence of a suitable variable to control
for quality in their multi-stage, discreet choice model (Ellis et aI., 1994).
Yen et aI. claim to be "motivated by a household production model" in their study of the
demand for traditional medicine in Taiwan. They conclude that the elasticity of demand for
traditional services is more sensitive to changes in the time and money price than to changes in
income. They also conclude that Western medicine is a 'gross substitute' for traditional
Chinese medicine and that insurance, lifestyle factors and demographic factors impact on the
demand for health services (Yen et aI., 2001).
Gerdtham and Johannesson use a Swedish micro-dataset to estimate an ordered probit
model of demand for health in which health capital is captured with a categorical measure of
overall hea1th status. They conclude that the demand for health increases with income and
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education and decreases with age, obesity, urbanisation and marital status (Le. single people
have a higher demand for health services) (Gerdtham and Johannesson, 1997).
5.2.3) APPLYING THE TENETS OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Using elements of New Institutional Economics, Zweifel and Manning explore moral
hazard and consumer incentives in health care. They utilise empirical evidence from natural
experiments, observational comparisons of individuals and the Health Insurance Experiment.
Their study concludes that the demand for medical care is responsive to changes in the net-price
(i.e. is price-elastic) and that there may be a moral hazard effect as consumer choice is biased in
favour of newer, more expensive technology (Zweifel and Manning, 2000). These findings
have not been tested in impoverished settings, where out of pocket health service payments
compete directly with payments for food and fuel.
Leonard uses the concepts of physician agency and information asymmetry to explore why
both states and markets are failing in parts of Africa. His analysis reveals that NGO's have the
institutional capacity to deliver high quality services while private GPs, and government
organisations that charge fees, are unlikely to succeed. He contends that markets characterised
by asymmetric information require more than a price mechanism to function optimally. He
does not believe that such necessary additional mechanisms exist in many African states as
practitioners engage in a 'race for the bottom', spending money on observables such as drugs, x-
rays and other tangible diagnostic tests. The presence of asymmetric information makes
patients risk averse and these private doctors lack the reputation to overcome patient concerns.
It is this 'reputation' which NGOs have succeeded in generating over years of service in African
countries and which inevitably facilitates their success (Leonard, 2003).
Alternatively, traditional healers are not concerned with reputation as they apply outcome
contingent contracts (i.e. they only expect payment if the treatment is successful). Outcome
contingent contracts generally raise the question of enforcement, i.e. how does the healer ensure
that patients will pay and not claim untruthfully that the treatment was unsuccessful? However,
traditional healers have superstition, a unique tool of enforcement, on their side. The healer
knows that if a patient lies they may avoid payment for a time but will eventually get sick again.
The patient will believe this next sickness is a curse brought upon them because of their non-
payment. The result is that sooner or later, patients pay up and the system functions effectively
(Leonard,2003).
Leonard's findings reinforce concern that health markets operate out of equilibrium and that
the price mechanism does not regulate supply and demand. Instead, public supply appears to be
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operated on a command basis with strong information asymmetries between market and state
undermining optimal delivery. At the level of the consumer, information asymmetry shapes the
preference set of the user and impacts 'optimal' service selection. These asymmetries are not
incorporated into the neoclassical models above and, as Leonard did not set out to understand or
measure the demand for health services, their impact remains to be explored. These findings
also emphasise the fact that service use cannot be reliably and consistently equated with
demand.
5.3) CHALLENGES TO THE ESTIMATION OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH SERVICES.
"Perhaps the oddest aspect of the work is the extraordinary effort expended by
Acton and Miners, on the one hand, and the household production theorists, on the
other, to develop theoretical models that are clearly distinguishable from one
another in several important respects, but then to estimate the models as if they
were virtually identical" (Chapter 4, pg 128 Akin et al., 1985a)
There appears to be a disjuncture between the theoretical foundations and the empirical
work conducted on the demand for health services. Most empirical papers either ignore the
theory or outline a set of theoretical tenants before specifying an entirely separate (and often
barely related) statistical model. Economic theory has been criticized for offering little
guidance on specifying statistical models. What the theory does offer however, is a number of
"rigid points" including the following (Akin et aI., 1985a):
• Quantity must be an endogenous variable in Marshallian demand equations.
• Price must be an exogenous variable in Marshallian demand equations.
• In the household production model, medical services are one input in the production of
health and being ill is not a prerequisite for the production of health.
Notably, the theory does not specify:
• Which medical goods should be grouped together in a demand equation.
• Whether inpatient and outpatient visits should appear together in a system of
demand equations.
This latitude allowed by the theory and, in some cases, simple violation of the "rigid points"
has resulted in misspecification of price and quantity by Grossman, failure to treat time as
endogenous by household production theorists, the use of inappropriate samples and the
inappropriate inclusion of both inpatient and outpatient visits' in a single model (Akin et aI.,
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1985a).
As a general point, demand theory is challenging to apply in an empirical context and even
if the model is tractable mathematically, collecting appropriate data may not be possible.
However, aside from this general concern, there are a number of specific challenges faced by
researchers trying to apply demand models including the incorporation of health needs, allowing
for the potential heterogeneity of health services, the impact of demographic variables and the
correct methods for quantifying input variables without introducing bias into the models. Each
of these challenges is briefly discussed below.
5.3.1) HOMOGENOUS VERSUS HETEROGENEOUS HEALTH SERVICES
Original theoretical demand models tend to treat health services as homogenous (Acton,
1975; Akin et aI., 1985a; Akin et aI., 1985b; Becker, 1964; Becker and Maiman, 1975).
Goldman and Grossman incorporate service heterogeneity into their model of paediatric care
visits by treating the quantity and quality of visits as endogenous variables (Goldman and
Grossman, 1978; Goldman and Heuveline, 2000). Alternately, Heller incorporates service
heterogeneity by discriminating between necessary and discretionary medical care (Heller,
1982).
Empirical applications of these models have sought to include indicators of variable service
quality (Akin et aI., 1985a; Leonard, 2000a). However, few models allow for a choice between
services of equivalent quality that may differ on some other basis such as perceptions of
propriety for different treatments. For example, traditional healers offer a very different service
to the local general practitioner but both might be considered high-quality care options when'
suffering from a headache in rural South Africa.
The theoretical structure of a demand model, and its subsequent empirical application,
should incorporate this and other forms of heterogeneity in health services.
5.3.2) THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
It is understood that health needs vary at different ages but theorists seem unable to fully
account for this staggered variation in demand. Grossman assumes this problem away by
treating health needs as a continuous function of age (Akin et aI., 1985a; Grossman, 2000).
While it is complex to incorporate staggered, age-related needs into a theoretical model, new
statistical packages have made it relatively easy to incorporate this phenomenon into empirical
applications of the theory. The use of age-splines and age-gender interactive dummy variables
could greatly enhance our understanding of the relationship between age and the demand for
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health services.
The complex impact of education and income on demand for health services is more
difficult to unpack. Grossman finds education to be positively related to demand for medical
services in his investment model, while in his consumption model the relationship between
education and the demand for health services is unpredictable (Akin et al., 1985a; Grossman,
2000). Education is also correlated with income, introducing multicollinearity into statistical
applications of theoretical models. Even if we could separate out the effects of these different
variables (and labour economics does give us some clues as to how this might be done), we do
not yet fully understand the income or price elasticity of demand for health services. Heller
concluded that the demand for care was price inelastic (Heller, 1982) while Gertler concluded
that demand was price elastic at lower levels of income (Gertler and Van der Gaag, 1990).
Sauerbom et at. similarly found demand to be inelastic overall but highest for infants and
children and the lowest income quartile (Sauerbom et aI., 1994).
A number of empirical studies deal with the socio-economic determinants of demand,
addressing the equity of access to health services and linking health and poverty or health and
wealth. However, few studies have sufficient variation in their income data to allow extensive
analysis of socio-economic determinants of demand. Even fewer studies speak to the manner in
which demand reflects the equity or inequity of health service supply as service use is
considered analogous to demand and markets are therefore assumed to be in equilibrium. This
interaction needs to be explored with the view that preference sets shape demand and supply
shapes use in the market for health. If use determines health outcomes (to any significant
degree) and population level measures of these health outcomes determines supply, then
inequality can become entrenched in a system that is not responding to demand. Factors that
shape preference sets, such as individual perceptions of health need, may differ systematically
across individuals thus 'biasing' the shape of the demand function and the point at which supply
and demand meet. As such, failing to address divergence in supply and demand (rather than
supply and use) potentially overlooks systematic inequalities in a health system not regulated by
the price mechanism and fraught with problems of asymmetric information (Arrow, 1963).
5.3.3) QUANTIFYING INPUT VARIABLES
Measuring the demand for health services necessitates specifying and quantifying variables,
the measurement of which may be subjective and dependent on the research context. These
variables primarily include:
• Prices of, and expenditure on, healthcare
• Time costs
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• Quality of health services
• Definition of socio-economic status
• Classifications of health problems
Each of theses will now be discussed briefly, drawing on the main conclusions and
recommendations from the literature.
5.3.3.a) Prices of, and expenditure on, health care
The most correct variable to use for the price of health services is the ex ante price that
consumers expect to pay. When prices differ substantially between service providers or service
providers vary the asking price by the socio-economic status of the patient, there may be a
significant difference between the price the patient expects to pay and that which they end up
paying and it is the expectation that shapes behaviour. Divergence between ex ante and ex post
prices may also occur in cases where the patient has little or no experience of a particular
provider type and as such, has little information on which to base a pricing expectation (Bitran,
unpublished draft).
That said, collecting ex ante pricing expectations can be difficult when expectation is
rationalised by the actual payment amount after a treatment seeking event. A common
alternative to the collection of ex ante pricing expectations is the collection of total expenditure
on health as reported by the patient (Shepard and Cooper, 1987). However, as the number of
visits (a common proxy for the quantity of health care consumed) is considered endogenous to a
demand model, total expenditure measures may introduce multicollinearity into the demand
equation (Akin et aI., 1985a). Actual expenditure may also suffer from selectivity bias as the
distribution of prices faced by those who actually used a service will differ from those faced by
the general population (Bitran, unpublished draft).
Collecting prices from providers rather than patients is also potentially misleading if prices
differ on the basis of patient characteristics (including whether or not they have health insurance
and what form that health insurance may take), the provider may simply not be able to give an
accurate measure of price.
Apart from the challenge of correctly measuring price, other methodological
considerations arise including (Bitran, unpublished draft):
• The fact that prices may not vary significantly in the developing country context,
complicating econometric analysis of the demand-response to chances in price ..
• The price level may be so low compared to consumer's overall income and wealth that
any variations which do occur may not be material to the consumer.
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Similar problems arise with the measurement of quality, and whether to collect data from
providers or from patient evaluations. While the patient's evaluation of quality may be
endogenous to a demand function, the provider's estimation of quality - while exogenous - may
not reflect the dimensions of quality that matter to patients. Furthermore, the price and quality
of the option not chosen is rarely collected in household surveys.
5.3.3.b) Travel and time costs
Economic theory necessitates accounting for direct and indirect costs of health seeking
(McNamara, 1999a, 1999b; Sauerborn et aI., 1994). However, care should be taken when
valuing the opportunity cost of time, particularly in agrarian societies, communities with low
employment rates and those were few women work in the formal marketplace. The cost of time
spent travelling to health services can be quantified using a number of methods. The two most
common methods are as follows:
1. The distance covered to reach services is multiplied by the cost of transport per
kilometre (Akin et aI., 1985a; Cowley and Appleton, 2000; de Bartolome and Vosti,
1995; Leonard, 2000b).
2. The time to travel to the facility is multiplied by an appropriate opportunity cost
(Asenso-Okyere and Dzator, 1997; Dor et aI., 1987; Gertler and Van der Gaag, 1990;
Hotchkiss, 1998; McNamara, 1999a, 1999b; Sauerborn et aI., 1994).
The key problem with the first method is that it takes no account of the quality, permanence
or existence of the roads to reach the health service provider. The same can be said for the
quality, availability or existence of public transport. The first method also fails to satisfy the
economic definition of cost. By accounting only for direct costs, indirect opportunity costs such
as the opportunity cost of the time spent travelling, are ignored (Bitran, unpublished draft).
Furthermore, direct costs may in fact be zero at the point on use, thus complicating analysis of
the impact of prices.
Conversely, the second method fails to take into account the direct costs of travel. In
addition, a significant challenge is posed by the accurate estimation of opportunity costs. For
example, high unemployment rates and difficulties in valuing work done in the home
complicate the valuation of time (Bitran,. unpublished draft). One possible solution is to leave
time in minutes or hours as either a categorical or continuous variable, rather than converting
the time to a cost value (Abraham et aI., 1992; Heller, 1982). However, this does not address
the fact that the value of this time will vary across individuals in systematic ways.
Finally, it is important to note that travel time is not the only time spent seeking health
services. Waiting time and time spent in consultation also needs to be accounted for (Schneider
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and Palmer, 2002). Measuring the opportunity cost of time spent waiting, in consultation and.
travelling is subject to the same challenges as those mentioned above.
5.3.3.c) Quality of health services
There is little consensus regarding the appropriate way to measure service quality when
estimating demand empirically. Some authors elect to ignore the issue of quality entirely (Dor
et aI., 1987; Grootendorst, 1995) or assume quality is uniform across all services (Sauerborn et
aI., 1994). Other authors use one or more of the following indicators; expenditure on care per
person covered (Akin et aI., 1995; Vogel, 1994), drug availability (Akin et aI., 1995; Asenso-
Okyere and Dzator, 1997; Hotchkiss, 1998; Mariko, 2003; Mwabu, 1986; Schwartz, 1993;
Vogel, 1994), physical condition of facilities (Akin et aI., 1995; Vogel, 1994), community
dummy variables to capture differences between communities (Bolduc et al., 1996), quality as a
function of the initial state of health or household characteristics (Ching, 1995; Gertler and Van
der Gaag, 1990), facilities perceived most suitable for particular illnesses (Ellis et aI., 1994;
Leonard, 2000a; Mariam, 2003), whether consultation took place with a doctor (Heller, 1982;
Hotchkiss, 1998; Leonard et aI., 2002; Schwartz, 1993), level of staff training (Heller, 1982;
Hotchkiss, 1998; Leonard et aI., 2002; Schwartz, 1993), crowding (Hotchkiss, 1998; Propper,
2000), facility size (Hotchkiss, 1998; McNamara, 1999a, 1999b), range of services (Hotchkiss,
1998; Propper, 2000), process quality (Leonard et aI., 2002), attentiveness and politeness of
clinician (Leonard et aI., 2002), appropriateness of the prescription (Leonard et aI., 2002), drugs
prescribed per patient (Leonard et al., 2002), laboratory testing (Mariko, 2003), patient response
to a quality rating scale (Mariko, 2003; Sahn, 2000), number of beds (McNamara, 1999a,
1999b), opening hours (Schwartz, 1993).
As with prices, Bitran (unpublished draft) proposes that perceived rather than actual quality
affects the consumption decision. However, Akin et al(1985a) argue that perceived quality is
endogenous to the consumer and is thus unsuitable for use in the econometric specification of
demand. Gertler and van der Gaag therefore developed a quasi-production function that models
quality as a function of the individual's characteristics, severity of illness and education on the
one hand; and the provider's geographic location on the other hand. This production function
could then be used as a constraint in a constrained optimisation exercise (Gertler and Van der
Gaag, 1990).
5.3.3.d) Definition of socio-economic status
Socio-economic status can be difficult to measure in countries (or contexts) where wealth is
not held in monetary form and income is neither regular nor enumerated in any formal sense.
For example, many rural communities store wealth in livestock and have significant seasonal
variations in income. As a result, some authors have employed wealth indicators which take
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into account the type of roofing on a person's home, the number of rooms in their house, the
type of sanitation and electrical or white goods contained in the horne (King, 2002). Of course
this has raised a second set of challenges regarding comparability across settings and even the
appropriate asset indicators to include in a single setting.
5.3.3.e) Classifications of health problems
Understanding how a person's illness or disease impacts on their selection of health service
provider is an important part of understanding the demand for health services. Unfortunately,
this raises the question of how you define that illness or disease. More obvious options might
include: defining the disease according to the health care provider's diagnosis, defining the
disease according to the patient's self-diagnosis or collecting only the set of symptoms from the
patient without trying to identify a particular disease or diagnosis (Le. defining the disease or
diagnosis post-hoc) (Mwabu, 1986).
With the former options one must consider that people will only know their diagnosis if
they have sought formal care and one may have difficulty differentiating the diagnosis of a
traditional healer from that of a Western style doctor. Self-diagnosis may be subjective and
culturally dependent. As such, collecting a set of symptoms may be the most objective means
of classifying health problems.
5.4) QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY
CONTEXT
There are a number of areas where the qualitative sociological or anthropological literature
significantly expands the domain of the empirical economic literature on demand presented
earlier in this chapter. The complexity and dynamism of care seeking behaviour, quality of care
issues and social contextual factors constitute particular cross-contextual themes that generate
additional insights into care seeking behaviour. After describing the qualitative insights
regarding the medical domain in South Africa, this section briefly summarises the contribution
of these three themes to our understanding of health seeking behaviour.
Descriptions of the medical domain and cultural constructions of illness are shown by the
qualitative empirical literature to impact materially on care seeking behaviour (see for example
Jaramillo, 1998; and Russell, 2005). In South Africa, the medical domain is highly pluralistic
with treatment options ranging from western medicine offered either privately or through the
public system, to traditional medicine and spiritual healers as described in Chapter 1.
Importantly, South Africa's health system has undergone considerable complex restructuring
since 1994 aimed at decentralising the delivery of services and removing systemic inequities
(Kane-Berman, 2000). Gibson describes how that process of transformation frequently failed to
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coincide with the day to day reality of health service use. Confusion over the new structure and
the correct entry-point for treatment, and a growing disillusionment with the quality of curative
services at the public primary care level were key themes emerging from Gibson's investigation
(Gibson, 2001). These perceptions may go some way towards explaining the use of the private
health sector by approximately 300/0 of people without medical insurance in South Africa
(Schneider and Palmer, 2002). Aside from private sector use, the use of traditional and spiritual
healers is also widespread in South Africa although Abrahams et al. conclude that, 'at least for
pregnant women in Cape Town, these services are seen as complementary to biomedical
services rather than substitutes and that self-medication plays a similar supplementary role
(Abrahams et aI., 2002).
Although there is considerable overlap in the empirical literature, quantitative economic
models are arguably less successful at capturing the complexity of treatment seeking behaviour
than comparable qualitative studies on the subject. Although treatment seeking for TB is
summarised in considerable detail in the next section it is worth noting here how that literature
has contributed to our understanding of the complex nature of care seeking generally. In the
Gambia, gender differences in provider choice, a lack of knowledge about TB, TB stigma and
high transport costs all contributed to complex treatment seeking patterns (Eastwood and Hill,
2004). Similarly in Cali, Colombia, TB diagnostic delay was attributed to stigma, cultural
explanations for TB symptoms and poor interpersonal quality in the health system (Jaramillo,
1998). A Kenyan study found that TB treatment in the formal sector was seen to be agonising
and lengthy, especially when compared with traditional alternatives. In this setting as in others,
prolonged self treatment and consulting traditional healers. increased the complexity of
treatment seeking and significantly delayed diagnosis (Liefooghe et aI., 1997). Thus
information shortages, gender, stigma, cultural explanations for disease manifestation, the
communal context of care seeking and the poor quality of patient/provider interactions all act as
determinants of care seeking behaviour frequently omitted by, or poorly integrated into, the
more quantitative empirical economic literature on demand.
In the same way that the empirical economic literature on demand may be accused of over-
simplifying treatment seeking behaviour, that literature might also be accused of over-
emphasising the technical domains of service quality relative to interpersonal aspects of quality.
Two studies from Tanzania highlight some of the mechanisms through which the
patient/provider relationship can materially impact treatment seeking behaviour. Most recently,
Tibandebage and Mackintosh demonstrated how the breakdown of patient/provider
relationships affected service access, highlighting systemic patterns of exclusion and abuse
(Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005). In an earlier study in Tanzania, Gilson et al illustrated
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how patient satisfaction influenced the willingness to adhere to treatment and the effectiveness
of care (Gilson et aI., 1994). There is a growing qualitative literature investigating the complex
facets of interpersonal quality and particularly dimensions of trust between patient and provider.
Gilson describes effective health care as a relational activity requiring relationships of trust and
'mutual understanding' between patient and provider (Gilson, 2003). Using data from primary
care providers in South Africa, Gilson et al explain how patient/provider trust is rooted in both
interpersonal and institutional trust. They conclude that respectful treatment is the central
demand of primary care users (Gilson et aI., 2005). Thiede similarly describes how the
patient/provider relationship is based on the exchange of information. He observes that
culturally diverse societies such as South Africa's are often low-trust environments thus
undermining that exchange (Thiede, 2005).
Of course themes of trust and interpersonal notions of quality portray health seeking as a
social phenomenon necessitating human interaction and communication. This review has
already mentioned the general failing of economic demand studies to contextualise health
seeking within a social or community context. While this is a weakness of the empirical
economic literature, it a particular strength of the sociological/anthropological literature on
health seeking. The qualitative literature provides the lens of social relations including the
constructs of social support, social networks, social evaluation, social capital, social cohesion,
social inclusion and exclusion and, within the health domain, therapy management groups to
integrate the behaviour of the individual into their wider social environment and understand the
reciprocal impact that the individual and their society have on one another (see for example
Gartrell, 1987; House, 1987; Janzen, 1987; and Sen, 1999). In the study ofTB these facets of
social relations have been shown to materially affect adherence to treatment and even the timely
uptake and diagnosis of TB. Common social-enablers include aspects of financial, material and
emotional support at the patient, household, community and health system level with significant
gender-based differences in support in many settings (see for example Johansson and Winkvist,
2002; Sengupta et aI., 2006; Sumartojo, 1993; and Zachariah et aI., 2006).
However, social relations commonly have a negative dimension in the context of TB, as
with many other diseases. Stigma, or the fear of losing social connectedness with all its
associated value can delay treatment seeking, reduce adherence and adversely affect treatment
outcomes. TB affected patients fear censure from relatives and. neighbours and even decreased
chances of finding a marital partner (Karyadi et aI., 2002). In their review of the literature on
TB stigma, Macq et al differentiate between enacted stigma and perceived or internalised stigma
and conclude that cultural beliefs about transmission are the primary determinant of TB stigma.
They also note that TB stigma is frequently associated with other 'stigmatised' patient
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characteristics such as gender or poverty (Macq et aI., 2006). Importantly, a recent study from
Northern Thailand also reported that AIDS stigma might increase TB transmission risk because
of resultant delays in TB treatment seeking and/or treatment non-adherence (Ngamvithayapong-
Yanai et aI., 2005). This has particular relevance to the proposed study.
5.5) \VHAT DO WE KNO\V ABOUT CARE SEEKING FOR TB?
Understanding care seeking for TB can inform care seeking for other chronic and acute
illness. However, the role of demand for health services is particularly pertinent in the case of
TB as cost-effective treatment is available in most countries but recovery from the disease relies
on the prompt and compliant accessing of that treatment. Applied studies in both developing
and developed countries have pointed to significant variations in the timing and nature of health
seeking for tuberculosis. As mentioned earlier, a disease of this nature, that predominantly
affects the poor, may also go some way towards aiding our understanding of those determinants
that affect the relative inequality of health outcomes and informing Wagstaff's identified future
research requirements. Of course there are limits on the extent to which findings regarding TB
can be generalised to other cases and this is discussed in the next chapter, which outlines the
methodology of the proposed study. What follows here is simply a review of the pertinent
literature on the disease, outlining the state of the art on care seeking for TB and identifying the
gaps in existing knowledge on the topic.
5.5.1) DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN HEALTH SEEKING BEHAVIOUR
Approximately two thirds of all identified persons with active TB are male. It remains
unclear whether this is due to a higher prevalence of the disease amongst men or lower
notification of the disease amongst women (Ngamvithayapong et aI., 2001; Thorson et aI.,
2000). Generally, women tend to seek more healthcare from lower qualified providers and to
spend less money per visit. In the case of TB this can result in delayed diagnosis for women,
adversely affecting their chances of survival (Thorson et aI., 2000).
A qualitative study conducted among TB patients from both urban and rural areas of
Vietnam, identified distinct gender differences in the factors contributing to delays in; a)
treatment seeking, and b) the pattern of treatment seeking behaviour. Generally, patients
attributed delays to "fear of social isolation, economic constraints and inadequate staff
attitudes". However, the fear of social isolation and concern about staff attitudes was more
marked amongst women than men, while men were more affected by economic constraints.
Men tended to delay treatment seeking longer than women and to go to public providers (the
most effective provider in this context) when they did seek care. Women would start seeking
care earlier but would practise self medication or visit private providers before going to public
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providers (Johansson et aI., 2000). This appears to reinforce the findings of another study, that
women are more likely to choose providers based on the proximity to home (Thorson et aI.,
2000).
An urban study in Zambia also identified longer diagnostic delays for women. These delays
were attributed to the fact that women tended to have lower levels of education, heavier work
loads and less mobility than their male counterparts. Women in the Zambian context also had
less independence and fewer financial resources. It is hypothesised that the high rates of TB-
HIV co-infection have stigmatised care seeking for TB in the Zambian context and the authors
recommended combining TB services with existing paediatric services already attended by
women, both to cut the cost and to increase the anonymity of care seeking (Needham et aI.,
2001).
5.5.2) SEEKING PRIVACY AS WELL AS CARE
A study in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, where TB care is "excellent" and free at the point
of delivery in the public sector, identified another interesting phenomenon. Some patients
prefer to pay for treatment in the private sector where there are. no administrative procedures to
test eligibility, no tracing of treatment defaulters, no official registration of TB and no DOT.
The flexibility in diagnostic procedures and drug regimens were also attractive to patients.
These characteristics protect patient integrity but also threaten system attempts at TB
surveillance and disease control. These findings led investigators to conclude that; "the use of
rigid approaches to TB control that do not encompass a strong component of responsiveness
towards the needs of individuals may be counterproductive for public health" (page 935
Lonnroth et aI., 2001).
Studies in Pakistan (Khan et aI., 2000) and Manila in the Phillipines (Auer et aI., 2000),
identified the same behaviour; despite effective (and free) public sector provision of TB
services, patients opted to visit private providers first. In both contexts, private providers were
less adept than their public counterparts at correctly diagnosing the disease during the first
consultation - resulting in significant delays in diagnosis. Private providers also tended to give
patients less information about TB, leaving patients with their own pre-conceived notions that
TB is incurable and that completion (or non-completion) of the treatment regime is immaterial
to the outcome.
5.5.3) MULTIPLE CARE SEEKING
Recent studies in rural South Africa (Edginton et aI., 2002) and Thailand
(Ngamvithayapong et aI., 2001) identified community perceptions of two types of TB - a
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'Western TB' that can only be cured by western medicines, and a 'Traditional TB' which can
only be cured by traditional healers. Ignorance of the symptoms ofTB and perceptions ofTB as
retribution for contravening cultural rules has led patients to seek care from multiple providers,
often beginning with traditional healers or self-medication (Dalal et aI., 2002; Edginton et aI.,
2002; Harries et aI., 2003; Ngamvithayapong et aI., 2001).
The Zambian study mentioned previously identified patients who made six visits and more
before their TB was diagnosed. These patients tended to be visiting private providers (and fee-
for service traditional healers) who were less aware of the symptoms of TB and failed to
correctly diagnose the problem. Besides being ineffective, visiting private providers eroded
patients' income further with each additional visit (Needham et aI., 2001).
Once diagnosed, adherence is often further affected by perceptions that TB is incurable
(Khan et aI., 2000), that patients must abstain from sex during treatment, by fear of stigma,
difficulty accessing services and even the negative attitudes of health workers (Edginton et aI.,
2002).
5.5.4) WHERE ARE THE GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE?
Harries et al. call for research that considers whether delays in treatment seeking vary
between social groups and are in any way determined by factors such as gender and poverty.
They suggest that priority be given to the groups with the longest delays and greatest difficulty
accessing care. As such, the proposed study targeted the poorest, most marginalised groups in
the setting.
Access to income and education, social status and legal rights all impact on women's ability
to access health care in the case of TB and other illnesses, particularly where there is some risk
of social exclusion as a result of infection (Pope and Chaisson, 2003). The impact of these
variables needs to be explored in the urban, South African context. This investigation should
inform not only TB care strategies, but care strategies for other chronic illness in particular and
acute illness in general.
No South African study has yet explored the proportion and motivation of TB affected
people seeking care in the private sector. Although the private sector is well regulated and
highly sophisticated in South Africa, TB may not be a disease with which private practitioners
are immediately familiar and this too needs to be explored. Many studies have identified
proximity to providers as a key constraint to women seeking care - does this constraint hold in
urban Cape Town where a TB clinic is within 5km from home or do other factors prevent
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women (and men) from seeking care?
6) LINKING HEALTH SEEKING BEHAVIOUR TO EQUITY AND EQUALITY
6.1) HEALTH EQUITY VERSUS EQUALITY
The difference between health inequity and equality is the subject of some debate. Asada
and Hedemann define inequity as inequality caused by an unfair social system. Alternately, the
WHO defines inequity as an inequality that is "susceptible to human intervention" (Asada and
Hedemann, 2002). The International Society for Equity in Health combine these two concepts
somewhat, defining health equity as; "the absence of potentially remediable, systematic
differences in one or more aspects of health across socially, economically, demographically, or
geographically defined population groups or subgroups" (Macinko and Starfield, 2002).
Sen argues that health equity is interwoven with a broader notion of social justice.
According to this hypothesis, the following aspects of health equity should be considered:
• One needs to distinguish between health achievement and the capacity to achieve health, a
capacity which mayor may not be exercised.
• Health equity concerns not only health and health service delivery but also the ways in
which resource allocation and social arrangements tie health into other contexts.
• 'Levels' of health equity (or inequity) are dependent on both super-structural allocation in
society, e.g. what resources are allocated to health rather than education etc; and sub-
structural allocation of resources e.g. what resources are allocated to primary care as
opposed to tertiary care. ?" (Sen, 2002)
The WHO-UNICEF Alma-Ata Conference is frequently credited as the founding point of
the 'health for all' movement. This conference shifted the global health focus onto primary
health care, believing that this would improve access to healthcare and positively impact health
equity. Despite this effort, the disparity between rich and poor (both within and between
countries) is growing such that" ... in no known country study produced to date does the poorest
20% of the population receive as much as 25% of the financial benefit of government
expenditure. "(pg 720 Wagstaff, 2001).
6.2) SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND EQUALITY
Wagstaff describes a dichotomous relationship between health and poverty. Poorer
communities are sicker and sicker communities are poorer, as poverty exacerbates illness and
illness perpetuates poverty. He identifies four key findings from the empirical literature on
socioeconomic inequalities in health:
60
1. Inequalities generally disadvantage the poor who die earlier and have higher morbidity.
2. Inequalities tend to be more pronounced for objective rather than subjective indicators
of ill-health.
3. The extent of health inequality varies greatly across countries and this variation changes
with the measurement indicators used.
4. Socio-economic inequalities in health appear to be growing in both the developing and
industrialised worlds.
Figure 2.1 illustrates Wagstaff's concept of the routes through which unequal health
outcomes are determined.
Figure 2. 1: Conceptual framework linking policies to health sector outcomes
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Wagstaff differentiates between proximate determinants of ill-health such as smoking,
alcohol consumption and poor diet, and underlying determinants of ill-health such as household
resources, community factors, and health system determinants (Wagstaff, 2002). He uses the
examples of higher health service utilisation by the poor in OEeD countries and the higher
incidence of smoking among wealthy black South Africans to illustrate how proximate
determinants of ill-health do not always disadvantage the poor. He argues that the contribution
of underlying determinants should be analysed using tools such as decomposition analysis i.e.
regressing inequalities in the various determinants of health onto a measure of inequalities in
health outcomes.
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"The contribution to inequality in health by a particular proximate determinant
depends partly on its distribution across socio-economic groups and partly on its
impact on health" (pg 99 Wagstaff 2002)
Gakidou and King developed and applied a measure of total health inequality that
encompasses all inequalities among people in a society, including variation between and within
groups (Gakidou and King, 2002). They conclude that reporting total health inequality
alongside average levels of population health is particularly revealing, informing health policy,
and enabling cross-country comparisons of inequity and the analyses of the determinants of
inequity. The World Health Organisation has subsequently adopted this method (Wagstaff,
2001). It should be noted that inequality in this context generally refers to the inequality of
health outcomes.
6.3) FUTURE RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS
While we can measure the inequality of health outcomes between groups and countries, we
do not yet fully appreciate the determinants of that variation. Wagstaff (2002) makes three
points regarding the current status of research on health inequality:
1. While the extent of health inequalities is known, publicly financed health care still fails
to reach the poor in almost all developing countries.
2. While current knowledge suggests that health inequalities reflect inequalities in other
individual and household level variables, we know little about the relative importance
of these inequalities in determining health outcomes.
3. We need more information on the impact of programmes and policies on health sector
inequalities ..
In the final section of this chapter we consider how these research questions might be
partially addressed by focussing on a disease such as tuberculosis, which predominantly affects
the poor and for which a well developed public sector treatment programme has been in place
for some time.
6.4) THE INCORPORATION OF HEALTH NEEDS
The unequal individual and household variables mentioned above may play into unequal
health outcomes by creating unequal health needs. Grossman attempts to incorporate health
needs into his Human Capital Model by conceptualising a stock of health that depreciates over
the duration of the human life. Grossman's model assumes that needs depreciate constantly
over the course of a life span (Grossman, 2000). Maternal health is one example where this is
not the case and Akin argues that the depreciation of health capital (or the increase in health
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needs) is more likely to be U-shaped (Akin et aI., 1985a; Akin et aI., 1985b). Muurinen, in an
expansion of the Grossman model, allows depreciation to vary with age and other individual
factors including behaviour such as smoking (Muurinen, 1982).
Mwabu uses illness as a proxy for need in a model that explores the interrelationship
between illness and service choice (Mwabu, 1986). Akin et aI. use a similar strategy in their
attempt to control for the bias caused by treating illness as exogenous to the service selection
process (Akin et aI., 1998). The illness-proxy method warrants further investigation but neither
this technique, nor the Grossman Human Capital Model, have been fully tested.
7) CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework adopted in this study draws from the literature previously
discussed, particularly Wagstaff's framework for understanding health inequalities (Wagstaff,
2002). The full conceptual framework is laid out in detail in Figure 2.3 showing all points of
interaction, while the discussion below details the discrete elements individually and identifies
how this conceptual framework constitutes an extension of conventional demand analysis.
7.1) HEALTH SERVICE SUPPLY
The broader context of health service supply is treated as exogenous, affected by market
structure, regulation, provider knowledge, ownership, perceptions of patient preferences and the
behaviour of drug and instrument distributors (Conteh and Hanson, 2003). These variables are
treated as fixed in the conceptual framework and this element of the framework does not
constitute a significant extension of a conventional demand model.
7.2) THE HOUSEHOLD, INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY
Wagstaff (2002) explores the effect of household and community factors on health outcomes.
However, he does not explicitly consider the effect of these factors on individual health seeking
behaviour. The conceptual framework presented in Figure 2.3 details how the household and
community may not only affect the individual's health status but also their health seeking
behaviour. While the individual is the primary unit of analysis we explicitly account for the fact
that all individual action takes place within a facilitating or debilitating social context. While
individual socio-demographic characteristics and household economic status are typically
modelled in demand studies, the departure here is to include community level variables such as
inter-household relations, cultural norms and social capital.
These household, individual and community level variables closely resemble Wagstaff's
proximal and underlying determinants of ill health. In the context of this study however, they
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are considered both determinants of 'need' and determinants of appropriate and/or feasible
health seeking behaviour as suggested by the review of the literature presented in this chapter.
The qualitative data analysis in Chapters 4-6 identify further variables from 'reality' that should
be integrated into the demand model as it is depicted in the conceptual framework.
7.3) HEALTH NEED AND HEALTH OUTCOME
This tier of the framework begs the question 'what is need?' As explained in the previous
chapter, health need encompasses both a c1inicallbiomedical concept of need and a subjective,
self-assessed need based on perceptions of ill health. Subjective, self-assessed need or outcome
is, by definition, always identified by the individual in question. However, a clinical need or
outcome may not be identified or acknowledged by the sufferer. Health needs, both clinical and
self-assessed, can be affected by the household and community environment where financial
resources, cultural norms, human capital and physical infrastructure such as sanitation can pose
health risks or benefits (Wagstaff, 2001 and; Wagstaff, 2002). Typically, where health status is
included in demand models it uses the response to a single question measured on a Likert scale.
This analysis proposes the use of a normalised multi-attribute measure of self assessed need that
is comparable between research. settings and has been validated for use in this context.
7.4) HEALTH SEEKING BEHAVIOUR
In cases of self-assessed need or observed clinical need, the individual has a number of
options, they may (Mwabu et aI., 1993):
• Try to treat the problem with home remedies,
• Seek care from private or public care providers,
• Turn to a traditional or spiritual healer for assistance,
• Choose to do nothing at all, or
• Do more than one of the above, in parallel or in sequence.
This behaviour may be facilitated or constrained by the household and community context
of the individual. As outlined above, this is perhaps the most innovative element of this
framework, that the social context of both individual health and health seeking behaviour is
considered explicitly and treated as endogenous to the model. In addition, the demand model is
specified iteratively to allow the exploration of the number of visits and the range of different
providers consulted.
7.5) HEALTH OUTCOME
Assessment of health outcome suffers from the same duality as the assessment of health
need. Health outcomes may be assessed ina clinical sense or in a subjective sense. The
outcome may not always be determined with any certainty however, it is assumed that
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individuals have enough information at this point to decide whether or not to seek further health
care. If an individual believes they have an unmet need, the framework assumes that they will
revert to the "Health Seeking Behaviour" tier. Unmet clinical needs may not be identified by
the individual, if this is the case they would only be identified by this model if the unmet need
resulted in a negative health outcome.
The analysis in this study places little emphasis on health outcomes. Instead, the focus is on
the process through which positive or negative health outcomes may be measured by the patient.
The broad assumption is that effective health seeking generally defined, coupled with effective,
appropriate and available supply, will maximise positive health outcomes.
7.6) DEMAND
Although demand as such is not presented in Figure 2.3, it is implicit throughout the
framework. The role of demand can thus best be illustrated by the analytical framework
presented in Figure2.2 below. The analytical framework identifies need and utilisation, which
interact through the process of demand. Needs and utilisation are also clearly identified in the
conceptual framework over the page.
Figure 2.2: Analytical Framework
........_ , ,'-•..•-,.•.\
Perceived need \
.••..•.•.. (Subjective Itealtlt status) j
_.......__---::.--._ ..::.:._._ :.:\ _ //
/1- Demand
The final important innovation in the conceptual framework of this study is that health
seeking behaviour is represented as a complex and dynamic process over the course of an illness
episode rather than a single visit to one provider. Maximising the extent to which that
dynamism is captured within a formal quantitative model is a key challenge of this study.
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8) CONCLUSION
The proposed project thus seeks to explore systematic differences between demand and
utilisation, and 'need' and demand. The role of the community as a facilitating or sanctioning
agent will be explored to understand how individuals arrive at a preference set, how individuals
develop optimal health seeking strategies and why certain strategies meet with more success
than others. The impact of illness type on health seeking behaviour (and service choice) will be
explored using TB as a case study, as will the impact of demographic and socio-economic
variables on service use and demand. There will be a particular emphasis on care seeking for
Tuberculosis.
TB is considered a curable disease, yet 37 South Africans die of the disease every day.
Strategies are already in place to disseminate the message that TB is curable and should not be
stigmatised because of its link with HIV (Unattributed, 2003). In Cape Town, effective DOTS
treatment is available for free in walking distance from patients homes and public providers are
well versed on the symptoms of TB. Despite this however, outcomes of the TB control
programme are suboptimal (Dudley et aI., 2003).
"Research is the key to reducing the system-related barriers to care access
through an analysis of the operation of tuberculosis diagnosis and the
promotion of a responsive quality assurance system" (pg 1521 Harries et
al.,2001)
Dick and Buskens called for more qualitative research to understand how patients
"experience their illnesses and treatments" and what the patient-provider interaction means for
both players (Dick and Buskens, 2003). Research of this nature should inform strategies to
improve case identification and case holding, thus promoting effective TB control.
This study thus aimed to explore how individuals from high (TB) prevalence areas viewed
the health services available to them (both TB specific services and other services). Qualitative
research methods investigated how people interacted with those services and what factors might
have impacted or shaped that interaction. Given the data presented above, the targeted
individuals hailed from the Khayelitsha, Nyanga, Mitchell's Plain and Oostenburg sub-districts
of the City of Cape Town. Research was conducted among TB affected and unaffected
individuals from these areas to establish whether the views of TB patients were atypical or
simply representative of any person interacting with the system as an acute or chronic patient.
If the aim of the proposed qualitative research was to understand the drivers of health
service interaction, then the aim of the quantitative phase of research was to measure that
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behaviour. The quantitative phase of the research was conducted in high prevalence areas but
not targeted specifically at TB affected households. This was an attempt to gain a broader view
of health seeking behaviour which could inform both TB service delivery and the delivery of
other services in these communities.
The empirical findings were used to critically analyse existing economic models of demand
rather than imposing a model onto the study at the outset and risking the omission of key
variables or failing to consider pertinent interactions. That said, the conceptual framework
described in this Chapter was imposed at the outset. Chapter 3 then describes both the research
and analytical methods used in the study.
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CHAPTER THREE:
RESEARCH PROTOCOL AND
METHODOLOGY
1) INTRODUCTION
While Chapter 1 outlined the aims, hypotheses and objectives of this study, Chapter 2
examined the literature pertinent to our understanding of demand for health services. The
theory traversed both psycho-social models and economic models of demand, highlighting the
strengths and weaknesses of each model or body of theory. The empirical review focussed only
on the application' of economic models, attempting to place emphasis on research from
developing countries where possible. Due to the observed disjuncture between the theory and
the empirical work on the subject, the intention of this study is not to impose anyone model of
demand but rather to critically analyse conventional demand theory, with an emphasis on
Neoclassical Demand Theory, using the empirical findings of this study. A relevant conceptual
framework is described at the start of this chapter, which also details the research methods
employed to collect data and the analytical methods used to interpret that data.
2) RESEARCH METHODS
This project used both qualitative and quantitative data to address the objectives in the
urban research setting of Cape Town, South Africa. Quantitative data were used to describe the
population of interest including detailed income and expenditure data, measure levels of ill
health Le. perceived health need, track concomitant health service utilisation and apply accepted
empirical techniques to build a model of service utilisation.
However, quantitative data allow only limited investigation of the social context of health
seeking behaviour, the process of health care seeking or the role of, and linkages between,
barriers to service access. Qualitative data were thus needed to explain the process of health
seeking underlying observed utilisation and health outcomes and to try and ~escribe the latent
demand process underlying observed use or non-use. The complexity of care seeking and the
importance of policy-relevant findings further emphasised the need to triangulate findings
where possible. The primary qualitative data thus served to triangulate the quantitative findings
where possible.
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Existing quantitative datasets tend only to collect data regarding the last visit - or a single
visit to a heath service provider, prohibiting any analysis of the pattern of health seeking
behaviour over the course of an illness episode. These datasets also tend to contain limited
measures of health need, offering at best a five-point likert scale of self-reported general health.
These types of scale risk being culturally sensitive to cut-point shift and other forms of bias
which would prohibit comparisons between culturally heterogeneous communities. Qualitative
data does not tend to be available in the public domain in any form. The qualitative and
quantitative datasets also needed to be derived from the same source communities to facilitate
triangulation.
Although the data collection instruments were designed according to the precepts of the
conceptual framework outlined in Figure 2.1, the mode of this research was primarily inductive
and exploratory - aiming to critically analyse existing demand theory from the bottom up using
primary empirical data rather than imposing strict hypotheses about the potential benefits and
limitations of that theory in the study setting at the outset. For these and other reasons, primary
qualitative and quantitative data were designed and collected for the specific purpose of this
study. The data collection methods are discussed in more detail below after a description of the
research setting.
2.1) DETAILS OF THE RESEARCH SITE
The Cape Metropole is home to 65% of the residents of the Western Cape Province. The
Western Cape has the highest Human Development Index in South Africa (Statistics South
Africa, 1996) but the average wealth disguises significant ethnic and gender disparities. The
province is also facing considerable public health challenges. In 1995 the crude mortality rate
for the province was 8.3 per 1000 compared to a national rate of 6.1 per 1000. At 6991100 000,
TB prevalence in the Western Cape is more than double the national average and causes 8% of
deaths amongst women aged 15-44 and 10% of deaths among men of the same age. The
poorest socio-economic groups are the most adversely affected and the age group most at risk is
the economically active 20-39 year old cohort. Prevalence of TB has steadily increased in the
Western Cape since 1997 while the cure rate of 65% remains below the national target of 85%.
Between 1997 and 1998, treatment failure in the Western Cape doubled and cure rates in the
Cape Metropole declined more than any other region in the province, where interruption rates
are approximately 28% (Western Cape Provincial Administration, 1999/2000).
As mentioned in the literature review, the four sub-districts of Cape Metropole with the
highest incidence of TB are Khayelitsha, Nyanga, Mitchell's Plain and Oostenberg. Due to
South Africa's history, sub-districts tend to be populated by ethnically homogenous
communities. As such, the former two districts are populated predominantly by 'Black/African'
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South Africans and the latter two by so called 'Coloured' South African respondents. These
two groups are culturally and ethnically distinct from one another, speaking different languages
and observing different social norms. These four sub-districts of Cape Town were purposively
sampled as 'high TB prevalence communities'.
2.2) PRIMARY QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION
Qualitative data was collected using the focus group/group discussion methodology. The
potential value of the group dynamic was thought to be greater than any potential loss of
information from the fear of speaking in a group. The topics under discussion were not
considered to be invasive or in need of a more private methodology such as individual in-depth
interviews, although discussions amongst TB-affected respondents were run separately from
discussions amongst unaffected respondents. Male and female groups were also run separately.
Recruiting for the group discussions commenced on the 30th of January 2004. Recruiters
were equipped with a standardised Recruiting Questionnaire and asked to recruit respondents
from Khayelitsha, Mitchell's Plain, Oostenberg and Nyanga. Criteria for recruitment classified
respondents according to ethnicity, TB status and gender. All respondents were required to be
between the ages of20 and 39 years, the age group most affected by TB.
Recruiting for the non-TB groups progressed smoothly although recruiters appeared to
determine the eligibility (and even willingness) of respondents before commencing with the
formal recruitment interview. As such there are few instances of failed recruitment for these
groups. This is despite repeated attempts to train recruiters to fill out recruitment questionnaires
for all individuals approached and not to ascertain individual's willingness to participate before
approaching for recruitment purposes. It is also possible however, that the high success rate is
accurate as potential respondents were curious to participate and keen to receive the
participation incentive. Although small, the cash gift of thanks may have been attractive to
potential participants who were drawn from these relatively poor communities. The positive
response to the groups does not seem to have biased the nature of participants in any way. For
example, the first group contained a mix of employed and unemployed respondents, older and
younger respondents within the specified age band, more and less educated, married and single
respondents from Oostenberg and Mitchell's Plain.
As mentioned previously, the groups were stratified by TB status. For the TB groups i.e.
the groups of TB affected individuals, all efforts were made to obtain an even spread of
respondents on clinic DOTS, community DOTS and respondents who had either defaulted or
completed treatment. Clinic DOTS patients were approached through the TB District Managers
for Khayelitsha, Mitchell's Plain, Oostenberg and Nyanga respectively. Community DOTS
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patients were approached through the TB Foundation, an NGO organizing community DOTS
programs in the areas in question. Recruitment of defaulters and those who had completed
treatment commenced on the 30th of January using snowballing techniques and purposive
enquiry within targeted high-prevalence communities.
During February 2004, eight group discussions were conducted with participants from the
high TB prevalence communities listed above. Table 3.1 below shows how these groups were
stratified by gender, ethnicity and TB status. The groups were, moderated in the first language
of the respondents, and followed a detailed discussion guide attached in Appendix 1.
Researchers were able to view and hear the discussion with simultaneous translation from
behind a one-way glass. This reduced any possible research effect that may have resulted from
having a researcher in the room taking notes. The researchers were given an opportunity to
interact with the moderator once during the group to suggest additional probes, lines of enquiry
or points for clarification. After each group discussion, the moderator and principle investigator
on the project had a detailed debriefing. The discussions were audio taped, translated and
transcribed into English. All translations and transcripts were independently validated.
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Table 3.1: Selection criteria for focus group discussions
GROUP STRUCTURE
Gender EthnicitylPopulation Sub-district of Cape Town Age TB
Group Affected
Group 1 Female Coloured Mitchells Plain! Oostenburg 20 - 39 yrs No
Group 2 Female African KhayelishalNyanga 20 - 39 yrs No
Group 3 Male Coloured Mitchells Plain! Oostenburg 20-39yrs No
Group 4 Male African KhayelishaINyanga 20 - 39 yrs No
Group 5 Female Coloured Mitchells Plain! Oostenburg 20 - 39 yrs Yes
Group 6 Female African KhayelishalNyanga 20 - 39 yrs Yes
Group 7 Male Coloured Mitchells Plain! Oostenburg 20 - 39 yrs Yes
Group 8 Male African KhayelishaINyanga 20 -39 yrs Yes
The discussions aimed to draw out the language used to describe health services and
common illnesses, and the basis on which services and illness where differentiated e.g. which
illnesses respondents feared and which they did not. Participants were probed for influences on
health seeking behaviour in general and TB care seeking in particular. The discussion also
explored potential barriers to access, the relative importance of different barriers and how
barriers to care may interact. The discussions provided an overview of the services known to be
available for general use and for the treatment ofTB particularly.
In an attempt to ensure consistency between groups and between the two moderators
working on the project, a discussion guide was provided. The moderators were trained in the
use of this guide, the aim of which was not to restrict the discussion but simply to guide the
flow and to ensure that the moderator provided the same prompts to all groups. Participants
were free to discuss any relevant topics in any order and the guide simply ensured that a core
body of investigation was covered at some point in each discussion. The moderators were also
provided with flip charts and marker pens to facilitate the discussion. These were particularly
useful when respondents listed diseases and health services, grouped services into public and
private providers, and carried out the personification exercise described below.
Two particular methods were employed to assist respondents in expressing their feelings
and in prioritising their needs. The first was a personification exercise and the second a budget
game. The personification exercise asked respondents to describe an individual with suspected
TB. The process explored why the person suspected TB, what they would do about their
suspicion (if anything), who would be told about the suspicions (if anyone) and how that person
was perceived in - and interacted with - their community. This allowed respondents to discuss
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TB from a 'third person distance' without needing to refer to their own experiences or personal
views.
The budget game by comparison was a relatively simple role-play and allocation exercise.
Respondents were divided into two groups and told that they had been elected as the Minister of
Health and that they must now decide how the health budget was spent. They were given a
fixed number of tokens and asked to distribute the tokens between the health services available
in their community and any other services they felt should be offered in their community. The
intention of this exercise was to gain a sense of the priority of the services. By giving a limited
number of tokens, the notion of budgetary constraints/scarcity was upheld in the game.
A copy of the discussion guide, recruitment and screening interviews is provided in
Appendix 1. Analysis of the focus group data is discussed later in this Chapter.
2.3) PRIMARY QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION
2.3.1) DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
This project required detailed income, expenditure and health seeking data. The project also
aimed to track perceived need over time and how that perceived need may shape health seeking
behaviour. A Gates Malaria Project in the Gambia identified diaries as an effective method for
the collection of detailed income and expenditure data over time (Wiseman et aI., 2005). This
methodology was thus expanded to collect detailed physical and mental health data and
information on health seeking behaviour in addition to individual, household and extra-
household income and expenditure. The health diaries were completed on a weekly basis for a
period of eight weeks. The diaries were self-completion instruments although all respondents
were assisted by trained field workers in the first week and any respondents requiring assistance
in future weeks were assisted on an ongoing basis. Fieldworkers also checked the diaries on
collection each week to ensure that all questions had been fully completed.
Information from the diaries was supplemented by a household survey and an individual
health survey which respectively provided household level data and baseline data on awareness,
perceptions and usage of health service providers. These surveys were only conducted once at
the start of the study by trained fieldworkers. Copies of all quantitative instruments are attached
in Appendix 2.
2.3.2) SAMPLING
Chapter 1 identified Khayelitsha, Nyanga, Helderberg and Oostenburg as the sub-districts of
Cape Town worst affected by TB. Khayelitsha, Nyanga and Oostenburg are all predominantly
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urban or peri-urban districts, while the Helderberg includes large tracts of farming land and a
disproportionately large community living in rural or semi-rural conditions. As the intended
focus of this study was on urban health seeking behaviour, Khayelitsha, Nyanga and
Oostenburg were included in the study while the Helderberg was replaced with Mitchell's Plain,
a predominantly urban area experiencing the same TB case load as the Helderberg district (6%)
(Toms and Vallabhjee, 2003).
For historical reasons", the sub-districts of Cape Town are largely populated by ethnically
homogenous communities with Khayelitsha and Nyanga primarily populated by 'Black/African'
South Africans, while Mitchell's Plain and Oostenberg are primarily populated by so called
'Coloured' South Africans. Some integration of communities resulted in a very small number
of 'White' and 'Indian' respondents being included in the sample. These respondents were not
rejected on the basis of their ethnicity, however their numbers are too small for any analysis of
these respondents as a distinct group.
2.3.2.a) Household Selection
The physical selection of households proceeded according. to a multi-stage cluster design.
At the first stage, four sub-districts of Cape Town were purposively selected based on their TB
case load as detailed in Chapter 2 and further discussed above. At the second stage, enumerator
areas were selected within each sub-district and finally, households in each EA were selected
into the sample. Enumerator areas are neighbourhoods of approximately 50-200 households
and are drawn up by the Chief Directorate of Demography at Statistics South Africa (StatsSA)
(Statistics South Africa, 2000/2001).
The Central Limit Theorum indicates that after 30 data points the mean of a sample will
equal that of the population or parent sample and will be approximately normally distributed
and stable (Annis, 2006). As such, a minimum of 30 households was required in each area
under study i.e. each primary cluster. The household sample was then boosted to compensate
for anticipated attrition. A study using health diaries in the Gambia experienced an attrition rate
of less than 2% in year one (Wiseman, 2003) therefore an over-sample of 20% was deemed to
be sufficient. This constituted 6 additional households per primary cluster. Four primary
clusters of36 households added to a total sample of 144 households.
The primary clusters were stratified to ensure a spread within each of the four study areas.
This was achieved by dividing the primary cluster over three EAs resulting in three secondary
• This phenomenon is largely a result of the Group Areas Act, Act No 41 of 1950, that enforced the separation of
different population groups by creating different residential areas for different racial groups and forcibly relocating
individuals to these areas where necessary. The act was re-pealed in 1991 (\Vestern,j., 1997, Outcast Cape Town.
University of California Press.)
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clusters of 12 households in each area under study. The pre-Census sampling frame released by
StatsSA contains the estimated number of dwelling units per EA. Three sampling frames were
created based on the 'main place' names i.e. Khayelitsha, Nyanga and Mitchell's Plain. The
Oostenburg sampling frame consisted of Kuilsriver, Kraaifontein and Brackenfell, areas
consequently designated as 'main places'. From each sampling frame, a sample of three EAs
was drawn with probability proportional to the measure of size of the EAs. The measure of size
should ideally have been the number of adults over the age of 18 in the EA. However, since no
EA-level data beyond the estimated number of dwelling units will be released by StatsSA for
confidentiality purposes, the estimated number of dwelling units was used as the proxy measure
of size.
Once the sample of EAs had been drawn, the EA maps were obtained from StatsSA. The
field team went into each EA and identified landmarks such as schools, telephone booths,
numbered electricity poles, double storey houses etc. These .landmarks were recorded on a
mapping record (see Appendix 3). Using the last digit of the EA number and the grid presented
on the mapping record, one of the landmarks was randomly selected as the starting point for the
sampling process. The interval between the start point and each successive sampling point was
determined by dividing the number of dwelling units by the target number of interviews, i.e.
twelve per EA. Using the random starting point and this interval, dwelling units within the EA
boundaries were selected moving in a spiral from the starting point to the centre of the EA.
Each of the selected households was invited to participate in the study. Households that
were unavailable after three return visits, or which had refused to participate, were substituted
with the household on the left. There was a 13.20/0 non-response rate at the household level
resulting in 19 substitutions in total. Refusals were more common in higher income areas and
the most common reasons given for refusal were that the potential respondent lacked time or
interest in the study.
This sample of households was devised to be representative of the four areas under study
and not of the South African population as a whole.
2.3.2.b) Individual Selection
Although the household was the primary sampling unit and a household survey was
conducted for each household sampled, the study's main unit of interest was the individual.
Once the household interview was completed, all adults over the age of 18 were invited to
participate in the diary study. Respondents were not recruited on the basis of their TB status
and all members of selected households over the age of 18 were eligible and actively
encouraged to participate in the study. This sample was meant to be representative only of these
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high TB prevalence communities and not of TB-affected patients nationally or the population of
the province as a whole.
Participating individuals completed two survey instruments, an Individual Health Survey
and a Weekly Health Diary. The Individual Health Survey was considered the precursor to the
Health Diary and all respondents agreeing to complete the former were aware that they were
agreeing to participate in the latter. In 38.9% of households all eligible adults participated in the
Individual Health Survey. Every effort was made to ensure as many eligible adults participated
as possible, with field managers visiting households with field workers to try to persuade
eligible household members to take part.
Table 3.2 below shows the difference between the number of adults who were eligible and
the number who completed the Individual Health Survey in the 144 sampled households. Table
3.3 gives an overview of the total numbers of participating households and individuals.
Table 3.2: Recruitment Statistics
RESPONSE RATE* FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
0 56 38.9%
1 42 29.20/0
2 32 22.2%
3 10 6.9%
4 2 1.4%
5 1 0.7%
6 1 0.7%
Total: 144 100%
..* Calculated as the number of age eligible respondents less the number of respondents who completed the Individual Health Survey
Table 3.3: Sample Overview
SURVEY INSTRUMENT N
Household Survey 144
Introductory Health Survey 250
Weekly Health Diary 238*
, ."This IS the figure for parttcipatton m thejirst week. See Table 3.4for an overview of the sample In each week of the panel.
2.3.2.c) Quality Control
Throughout the study, field managers conducted call backs to ensure quality control. One or
two households per EA were selected for call back each week. Initially the call backs were used
to check the correct household had been identified for inclusion in the study. Later the call
backs were used to verify, among other things, that the correct individuals were being followed
up and that households had received their incentives. Field managers also spent a significant
amount of time trying to convert refusals and persuading respondents not to drop out of the
study. These efforts are reflected in the very low attrition rate, with at least one respondent in
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all recruited households participating for the full duration of the study.
The sample was not modified for non-response, the effects of which are accommodated at
the data analytic phase through the explicit analysis of non-response and the use of unbalanced
panel data analysis methods.
2.3.2.d) Critique of the Methodology
The primary drawback of this methodology is that it introduces a clustering effect into the
study. The design effect is used in multi-stage sample designs to correct for the difference
between the chosen design and a simple random sampling design. At the sampling stage of a
study, the design effect may be interpreted as the factor by which the sample size for a multi-
stage cluster sample would have to be increased to produce survey estimates with the same
precision as a simple random sample. However, little can be done to ameliorate the design
effect once the data has been collected and its effects will observed in the larger confidence
intervals around survey estimates.
STATA has a series of svy commands that would normally compensate for any clustering
effect in survey data. Unfortunately the use of these commands for panel data analysis is
severely limited. As such, the clustering effect was accounted for in STATA through the use of
'cluster' suffixes on analytic commands where possible. Analytical methods are discussed
further later in this chapter.
2.4) TIMELINE FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Data collection and analysis proceeded according to the following timeline. This timeline
also incorporates the preparation of an interim and final research report prepared for
WHOffDR, the primary funder of the research.
Primary Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis (Focus Groups)
1) Discussion guide development . Jan. 2004 - Feb. 2004
2) Piloting and recruitment Feb. 2004 - March 2004
3) Run groups March 2004
4) Transcription and data analysis April2004 - June 2004
5) Preparation of interim report May 2004 - July 2004
Primary Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis (Diaries)
1) Sample Design Feb. 2004 - March 2004
2) Instrument Design April2004
3) Training and pilots May 2004 - June 2004
4) Revision of instrument second pilots June 2004 - July 2004
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5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
Final revisions and training
Diaries in field
Data Capture
Data analysis
Preparation of interim report
July 2004
Aug 2004 - Sept. 2004
Sept. 2004 - Dec. 2004
Dec. 2004 - Jan. 2005
Jan. 2005 - March 2005
Integration orData Collection and Analysis
1) Integration of secondary analysis, focus groups and diaries April. 2005 - July 2005
2) Develop a final model of health seeking behaviour June 2005 - Sept. 2005
3) Preparation of final research report Aug. 2005 - Dec. 2005
4) Compilation of dissertation Aug. 2005 - July 2006
2.5) ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL
Ethics approval was and granted by the LSHTM Ethics Committee. Local approval was
sought from the Western Cape Department of Health, who approved the project, provided
access to clinic staff for focus group recruitment and asked to be kept abreast of the project's
development and findings.
3) ANALYTICAL METHODS
3.1) METHODS OF QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
The data from the focus group discussions were analysed using modified grounded theory
analysis to draw out findings inductively rather than deductively. This process was done twice,
once manually and once using AltasTi software designed expressly for the purpose of
identifying repeated themes, phrases and words (Muhr, 1997). Once this superficial level of
analysis was completed, the data were organised into thematic content categories and re-
analysed in greater detail using the constant comparison method Le. iteratively comparing new
findings with existing findings and constantly testing emergent hypotheses with new findings
from the data. Findings from the manual and electronic processes were compared and any areas
of divergence resolved with further manual iterations/re-visitations of the dataset (Glaser and
Strauss, 1968; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
Once a complete set of themes had been extracted from the data, these were used to
construct detailed matrices and sub-matrices for groups of respondents i.e. TB affected versus
unaffected respondents, respondents from different ethnic/population groups, and males versus
females. Responses were then compared across groups with all hypotheses retested against the
primary data. These themes and hypotheses were used to construct a set of findings that were
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tested and challenged by an independent researcher with a detailed knowledge of the research
setting who was not directly involved with the project (Coast, 2001).
Overall findings were then organised into homogenous themes that were used to inform the
objectives of the study in a more deductive manner. Aside from providing a unique set of
insights into health seeking behaviour in the research setting, qualitative data also served as a
source of triangulation for the quantitative study findings (Coast, 2001; Gibbs, 1997).
3.2) METHODS OF QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
The quantitative data were analysed using a range of descriptive statistical methods and
panel data regression techniques as detailed below. All analysis was conducted using STATA
Version9, a statistical package appropriate to the methods used. The discussion below first
outlines the general estimation strategies used throughout the thesis, before detailing the
methods used in Chapters 4, 6 and 7, the three chapters that use a set of quantitative methods
requiring some introduction and discussion. These three chapters deal with the estimation of
health need, expenditure on health and the modelling of demand respectively.
3.2.1) ESTIMATION STRATEGIES
The selected estimation methods are based on two primary considerations, namely the
theoretical models underpinning the estimation and the empirical distribution of the data. As
discussed in the previous chapters, the theoretical model underpinning these analyses is the
Neoclassical demand model wherein individuals are strict utility maximisers who derive utility
from consumption, but whose consumption is constrained by a limited budget. When
empirically estimating this theory, demand is considered to be an unobservable latent variable.
Utilisation or consumption is considered to be an observable proxy for demand or an observable
component of demand.
The empirical distribution of utilisation then will differ depending on the measure of
utilisation employed in the model. For example, the distribution of a binary 'use versus non-
use' measure will differ significantly from the distribution of a variable measuring the number
of visits to any provider. As such, different estimation strategies are employed for each of these
specifications. The following discussion provides a brief overview of the generic methods used
in this thesis.
3.2.1.1) Non-linear estimation and latent variables
Analysis of health and related behaviour often necessitates the inclusion of unobservable or
latent variables such as quality of life or health need. These variables generally have to be
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proxied by indicator variables (Jones, 2000). Multiple causes-multiple indicator (MIMIC)
models, estimated as linear structural relationships (LISREL) are often used for this purpose
(Erbsland et aI., 1995; Jones, 2000; van der Gaag and Wolfe, 1991; Wagstaff, 1993) as is the
case with the physical and mental health variables used as indicators of perceived health need in
this chapter and thus as predictors of health service use, service provider choice and the number
of visits to any provider in this study.
As discussed earlier, the demand for health is also a latent, unobservable variable proxied
by health service use. In this study, health service use is measured by qualitative or categorical
dependent variables that equal one if the respondent used any health service provider during the
week under analysis. The dependent variable is equal to zero if the respondent did not use any
health service provider during that week. Usage status will thus vary from week to week over
the course of the eight week panel. Similarly, in the model of service provider choice, the
dependent variable is again a binary categorical variable. Demand for health services, the
variable of interest, underlies the distribution between zero and one in the observed use model
and the model of provider choice. This suggests the appropriateness of non-linear models for
limited and categorical dependent variables for these specifications (Jones, 2000).
3.2.1.2) Count models
The number of visits to any provider has a different empirical distribution from the use/non-
use and provider choice variables. The analysis of the number of visits requires the use of a
count model such as the Poisson or the negative binomial model. Count models are appropriate
when the dependent variable can only take on non-negative integer values. However, their
application needs to accommodate the fact that the data from this study used to model health
care visits have a non-ignorable "spike" of zero values and a skewed distribution with a heavy
right-hand tail. This raises the further challenge of identifying a stochastic model that is
appropriate when estimators lose their desired properties and become biased, inconsistent or
inefficient (Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004; Jones, 2000).
In this dataset, the non-ignorable spike of zero values is caused by a phenomenon known as
zero inflation. A model is considered to be zero inflated if some of the observed zero values of
the dependent variable are generated by a different process to the remaining observations or
counts. In this case, both Poisson and negative binomial models will tend to overestimate the
standard errors and increase the likelihood of accepting a variable as significant when it is not.
Methods exist to correct for this zero inflation using cross-sectional estimation procedures
which will be discussed further in the later methods section.
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3.2.1.3) Longitudinal estimation with panel data
As explained in Section 3.3, the quantitative data in this study are panel data. While most
standard analyses of demand either collect only data on usage of a single provider or a single
visit to more than one provider, the longitudinal nature of this dataset enables the observation of
multiple health seeking episodes to multiple providers for anyone respondent. As such,
provider choice can span more than one category as respondents may have used a combination
of public and private services. The fact that these usage categories will not be mutually
exclusive as a result, prohibits the use of multinomial regression techniques commonly applied
to models of demand for health.
3.2.2) THE ANALYSIS OF NEED
Chapter 4 of this thesis analyses health need. In this thesis, the analysis of need comprises
two constituent parts, the first is the use of concentration indices to measure health inequality,
and the second is the use of regression analysis to analyse the predictors of health need.
In this instance, health need refers to self assessed health as measured using the SF-St
Health Survey, a reduced form of the widely used SF36 tool. The SF-S Health Survey is a
generic, multipurpose short form survey of health status that combines eight health domains to
provide single summary measures of physical and mental health. The eight domains of the SF-S
Survey are: general health, physical functioning, role physical, bodily pain, vitality, social
functioning, mental health and role emotional. These domains are combined using a set of
standardised weights, to provide the physical (PCS-S) and mental (MCS-S) summary indices.
SF-8 scales are scored so that higher values are indicative of better health. All domain scores
and summary scales are scored on a on a continuous scale of 0-100, with scores above and
below 50 being above and below the average of the norm: respectively. Originally developed in
the United States by the Medical Outcomes Study team, the SF8 items have been translated and
adapted for use in more than 15 countries, including South Africa and a number of other
developing country settings. Specific SF8 forms are available for a 4 week, 1 week and 24 hour
recall period and all recall periods have been normed and validated. The recall period used in
the diaries was one week i.e. acute, albeit over an eight week period as the applicable questions
were asked every week for the full eight week cycle. The SF-S values are calculated using
norm-based scoring methods. This method allows meaningful comparison between scales
within and between studies (Ware et aI., 2001).
t The SF8 uses the best item measuring each of 8 health domains in the longer SF-36 Health Survey. Average scores
based on the SF-8 measures are unbiased estimates of SF-36 scores for the same measure (\X'are, J .E., Kosinski, M.,
Dewey, J.E. and Gandek, B., 2001, How to Score and Interpret Single-Item Health Status Measures: A Manual for Users
of the SF-8 I Iealth Survey. QualityMetric Incorporated, Lincoln, RI.).
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3.2.2.1) Concentration indices to measure health inequality
a) Criteria for a measure of health inequality
The concentration index is a common measure of inequality in health and health care first
introduced by Wagstaff et al. (Wagstaff et aI., 1989). Concentration curves plot the cumulative
proportion of the population, usually ranked by some measure of socio-economic status, against
the cumulative proportion of health as measured by a continuous cardinal measure of health
such as the SF8. The concentration index can have a maximum value of +1 and a minimum
value of -1, and is calculated as twice the area between the concentration curve and the diagonal
(van Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003). If the concentration curve falls on the diagonal (or the
index is equal to oy then everyone in the population enjoys the same health, regardless of their
socio-economic status. If the curve falls below the diagonal (or the index is greater than 0), then
inequalities exist that favour the rich. The closer the index tends to +1, and the further the curve
from the diagonal, the more unequal the distribution of health. Similarly, a curve lying above
the diagonal (or an index of less than 0) indicates health inequal ities that favour the poor and the
more the index tends towards -1, the more unequal the distribution of health (KooIman and van
Doorslaer,2004).
Aside from having the advantage of both visual and numerical expression, the concentration
index meets three important criteria for a measurement of inequality Le. "i. it takes account of
the socio-economic dimension of inequality in health (unlike the gini coefficient for example); ii.
it reflects the experience of the entire population rather than two extreme groups on the socio-
economic scale (e.g. income quintile 5 versus income quintile 1) as is the case in range
measures (e.g. rate-ratios), and iii. it is sensitive to changes in the population across
socioeconomic groups." (pg 204 Wagstaff et aI., 1991)
In Chapter 4, the SF8 is the measure of self-assessed health (SAH) used to calculate the
concentration index. Social economic status (SES) is measured by individual income, which is
measured as the individual's share of household income Le. total household income is divided
equally between all adults in the household.
b) Standardisation versus sub-group analysis
For the purposes of this study, standardisation of the self assessed health measure attempts
to control for biological differences in health that would be unalterable regardless of socio-
economic status. As such, standardisation of health measures is most usually done by age and
gender (Kakwani et aI., 1997).
* The norm is based on the 1998 general US population (Ibid.).
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Standardisation can be done using direct or indirect methods. The direct method requires
the use of grouped data to derive average age and gender specific illnesslhealth for each socio-
economic category. These averages are then applied to the age and gender structure of the
population (Kakwani et aI., 1997). The indirect method can be applied to individual data
whereby rates for a study population are based on a standard population i.e. each person in the
study group takes on the average health score of a person of the same age and gender in the
standard population (Diaz, 2002; Kakwani et aI., 1997; StataCorp, 2003a). In Chapter 4, we
apply the indirect method of standardisation to facilitate analysis at the individual level. As is
the convention, the analysis is standardised by age and gender. We also standardise by
race/population group to acknowledge that the two population groups in this sample may face
different health risks. The data are standardised using a convenient regression equation such as
that commonly used to calculate the Relative Index of Inequality (Macken bach et aI., 1997; The
World Bank, 2005).
Diaz argues however, that the use of any standardisation method will disguise potential
demographic (i.e. non-biological) effects. She proposes that the standardisation procedure be
replaced with the calculation of concentration indices for homogenous population groups. As
such, the analysis in Chapter 4 is presented in both standardised and unstandardised form, by
demographic group (Diaz, 2002).
3.2.2.2) Regression analysis of health need
Given the nature of the mental and physical SF-8 scores used as a measure of health need, it
is possible to treat them as continuous variables. As such, they can be used as the dependent
variable in a simple linear regression. However, as this dataset has both time and case
dimensions, it is necessary to estimate a model appropriate for such panel data. When selecting
a longitudinal model for panel data, it is necessary to consider whether a fixed effects, between
effects or random effects model is more appropriate.
a) Fixed effects
"The fixed effects model assumes that differences across units can be captured in
differences in the constant term" (pg 287 Greene, 2003). Fixed effects models thus control for
omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time i.e. they allow for
variation between cases over time but do not allow for variation within cases over time (Data
and Statistical Services, 2006 (Last accessed: 12110/2006); Greene, 2003). These models
assume that the independent variable is fixed, although it may be stochastic (Greene, 2003;
Newsom et aI., 2005). The results from fixed effects models can only be generalised to cases
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were the independent variables have the same (or very similar) values as they do in the applied
model (Newsom et aI., 2005) ..
b) Between effects
This form of model takes the mean of each variable for each case over time and runs the
regression on this reduced dataset. This model is seldom used in practice however it is an input
into the random effects model explained below (Data and Statistical Services, 2006 (Last
accessed: 12110/2006)).
c) Random effects
The key benefit of random effects models is that they allow time-invariant variables (such
as gender) to be included amongst the regressors (Yaffee, 2005). Random effects models are
also more appropriate if the investigator wishes to make inferences beyond the particular values
of the independent variable used in the study (Newsom et aI., 2005). Finally, random effects
models allow variation both between and within cases over time and have a random constant
term (Greene, 2003). STATA 's random effects estimator is a weighted average of fixed and
between effects estimation (Data and Statistical Services, 2006 (Last accessed: 12/10/2006».
3.2.2.3) Selecting a Model
a) Hausman's specification test for the random effects model
The Hausman test is used to establish whether the fixed or random effects model is more
appropriate for a given panel. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the
efficient random effects estimators are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects
estimator. If the p-value is insignificant, then one should use the random effects model. If the
p-value is significant, the fixed effects model should be used (Data and Statistical Services,
2006 (Last accessed: 12/10/2006»).
b) Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test
The Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier is a test for random effects. The null
hypothesis is that Var(v[i]) = 0 and the statistic is given by:
1= T * [Sm=lm=M [Sn=ln=m-l [rmn2]] [1]
where rmn2 is the estimated correlation between the residuals of the M equations and T is
the number of observations. It has a chi-squared distribution with M(M-l )/2 degrees of freedom
(StataCorp, 2003b). As such, it tests whether the dependent variable y is heteroskedastic as a
function of regressors X. If it is, that suggests use of GLS or SUR estimation in place of OLS
i.e. a random effects model should be used. The Breusch and Pagan test statistic is always non-
negative. Large values of the test statistic reject the hypothesis that y is homoskedastic in X
(Moffatt, 2004).
c) Modelling options in STATA
STATA has a number of options for modelling panel data. The command 'xtreg' fits cross-
sectional time-series regression models. This command can fit fixed-effects (within), between-
effects, and random-effects (mixed) models as explained above. It can also fit population-
averaged models. 'Xtreg' uses the common form;
y[i,t] = a + B*x[i,t] + u[i] + e[i,t] [2]
The form of estimator used is determined by the option specified. If no option is specified,
the GLS random-effects estimator is assumed. Using the command 'xttestO', after running the
regression presents the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier described above
(StataCorp,2003b).
3.2.2.4) Selecting independent variables
A review of the literature on Self Rated Health scales has suggested a number of health
score determinants (see for example (Craig, 2005; Crossley and Kennedy, 2002; Lindeboom and
van Doorslaer, 2004». These determinants include age, level of education, individual income,
household income, ethnicity, and gender. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, health status is analysed by
demographic group, including ethnic/population group, to establish whether or not significant
variation exists. Scatter plots are also used as a descriptive tool to validate the selection of
independent variables and to inform the choice of functional form.
3.2.3) ESTIMATING HEALTH EXPENDITURE
Chapter 7 of this thesis uses regression analysis techniques to analyse the determinants or
predictors of total health expenditure. Health expenditure as measured in this study is a limited
dependant variable in that, despite being continuous for much of its distribution, it has a mass of
observations at zero. The most common techniques for modelling data of this type include the
two-part model, the Tobit model and the sample selection model. However, these models are
conventionally used to model instances where zero expenditure 'implies no care seeking. In this
study however, there are some instances where health service users claimed to incur zero costs.
The Heckman model is an appropriate specification for such sample selection data as it can
accommodate zero expenditure among users who did not pay for utilisation, quite separately
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from non-users of health services who did not spend as a result (Sigelman and Zeng, 1999).
This is the methodology adopted in this study.
3.2.3.1) The Heckman Model
The sample selection process underpinning the Heckman model is specified as follows:
...
Zj = "~ii'+ Ji;
)'; = Xi {J + €; observed only if _i< ... 0+t .7
[3]
[4]
In this case then, Yi is total health expenditure and it is observed only if z, - health service
use - is positive, This separates out the 'true' zeros in our distribution from our non-users,
allowing explicitly for the different processes that may determine use versus non-use and
positive versus zero expenditure amongst users. An attempt to ineasure total health expenditure
using simple OLS estimation on data of this kind would result in biased estimators.
The Heckman estimator is thus based on the conditional expectation of the observed y as
follows, where the final phrase, A(-WY), is known as the inverse Mills ratio:
[5]
This equation implies that when the error terms of equations [3] and [4] are correlated, xp
will not be the conditional expectation of y as y is affected by variables in both the selection and
regression equations. As such a change in x has a compound effect on Y through both the
selection and regression equations and the coefficients can therefore not be interpreted as simple
OLS coefficients. However, if the error terms of equations [3] and [4] are uncorrelated then a
simpler two part model can be applied, with the second part of the model interpreted as a simple
OLS estimator. STATA provides a measure of this correlation in the form of the rho statistic
which, when multiplied by the adjusted standard error for the regression equation (reported by
STATA as sigma), provides the estimated selection coefficient (reported by STATA as lambda).
If lambda is significant, this justifies the use of the Heckman model over the simpler two step or
OLS approach (Sigelman and Zeng, 1999).
If lambda is significant, it is necessary to transform the coefficients before interpreting their
effect on y. This is done by calculating the average selection or truncation effect, measured as
multiplying the inverse Mills ratio (lMR) by the estimated selection coefficient lambda. The
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product of the IMR and lambda is then multiplied by the coefficients of the model to adjust for
the selection effect (Greene, 2003; Sigelman and Zeng, 1999).
Few post-estimation procedures are necessary for the Heckman model as specified in this
thesis. The standard output provided by STATA gives much of the information required to
evaluate the model. STATA fits regression models with selection using either Heckman's two-
step consistent estimator or full maximum likelihood (StataCorp, 2003b). For the purposes of
this study we utilise the full maximum likelihood approach with robust standard errors and
adjustment for clustering at the individual level. The robust standard errors are generated using
STATA 's 'robust' command, while the adjustment for clustering is conducted using the
'cluster' command and the person code as the household reference point. STATA does not
provide the facility to estimate Heckman as a random effects panel model and, as such, the
Heckman model is run as a pooled model i.e. cross-sectional model.
3.2.4) MODELLING THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH SERVICES
In Chapter 7 of this thesis, regression analysis is used to analyse the demand for, and use of,
health services. A panel data technique appropriate for binary categorical dependent variables
i.e. the random effects probit, is applied to the use versus non-use case. A negative binomial
model, a count model, is then used to estimate the number of visits to any provider. In all
instances, there is reason to believe that the models estimated in Chapter 7 may be prone to
endogeneity. As such, testing and appropriate corrections are made where needed. Finally, as
these estimation techniques are computationally intensive, item non-response and attrition over
the course of the model can negatively affect the stability of the models in the first instance, and
may result in sample selection bias in the second instance. These problems are discussed in
more detail below, as is the rationale for the recommended solution Le. to impute missing data.
3.2.4.1) The Random Effects Probit
The random effects probit model is designed to cope with qualitative or categorical
dependent variables and panel data with multiple individuals and multiple time periods. In a
panel dataset such as the one used for this study, we have observations for our dependent
variable Yu, where the i subscript refers to the observations for a given individual and t denotes
the observation for the particular time period. The dependent variable (y) may be health service
use or provider choice. The findings of both are presented and discussed in Chapter 7. There
are two sources of variability in a model of this nature Le. variability within observations for an
individual, known as the fixed effects component, and variability between individuals. The
observations for an individual are believed to be correlated over the course of the panel
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(Arulampalam, 1998; Hardin, 1997).
In this study, each week of the diary placement is a discrete time period. As such there are
250 individuals in the sample, each of whom participated in eight diary placement periods of
one week over the course of the study. The probit models estimated in this thus chapter take the
following form:
[6]
Where ;=1,2,...,250, t=1,2, ...,8, and Vit = a, + Uit
y« = 1 ifYit* > 0 and = 0 else,
where, y* denotes the unobservable (latent) variable e.g. the demand for health services or the
probability of becoming a health service user, y is the observed outcome e.g. health service use,
x is observable time-varying and time-invariant (fixed effects) vector of strictly exogenous
characteristics which influence y*, ~. is the vector of coefficients associated with the x, aj
denotes the individual specific unobservable effect and the Uit is a random error (adapted from
(Arulampalam, 1998)).
In STATA (Version 9), the likelihood function of the random effects probit is calculated by
adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature. For this calculation, the default number of integration
points is twelve. Increasing the number of integration points increases the accuracy of the
quadrature approximation. The accuracy of the approximation is tested after every probit
specification to test whether amending the quadrature by increasing the number of integration
points would make a statistically significant difference to the model. The number of integration
points is increased where appropriate.
The independent variables used in the analyses below are either suggested generally in the
literature or are suggested in the preceding chapters of this thesis.
3.2.4.2) The Negative Binomial Model
The analysis of the number of visits to any health service provider requires the use of a
count model. Two commonly used count models are the Poisson model and the negative
binomial model. The Poisson model requires the mean and the variance of the distribution to be
equal. When this is not the case, the distribution is said to display over dispersion. When this
occurs, the Poisson estimates will be inefficient, biasing the standard errors downwards and
inflating the z values of coefficient estimates. The negative binomial model is used to estimate
count models when there is over dispersion in the Poisson distribution. When there is no over
dispersion, the estimates for the negative binomial model will be equal to those from the
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Poisson model. When over dispersion is present, only the negative binomial model will be
efficient and unbiased. The negative binomial distribution is given by:
r(y+ a-1)( 1 )a-1( )>'PI1ylx)= Y!r(a-1) a~tl a}+l
Where y is the number of counts and a is an ancillary parameter that measures the degree of
[7]
over dispersion in the model. If a=O then the negative binomial distribution reverts to the
Poisson distribution, wherein ).. is both the mean and the variance of the distribution (Ender,
2006)
For the purposes of the estimation in Chapter 7, the negative binomial is estimated twice,
once as a panel model without correction for zero inflation and once as a cross-sectional model
with correction for zero inflation. In the panel model, the number of visits in each week
contributes to the total count for that week and as such the visit count for any individual will
vary from week to week over the course of the panel. The panel model is estimated for the full
sample and as such, suffers from zero inflation which may result in biased estimators. To
correct for the problem of zero-inflation without limiting the sample to users only and thus
introducing the problems associated with truncation, we then run the model again as a zero-
inflated negative binomial model. This model adjusts for zero inflation by explicitly modelling
the zero inflation within the overall specification Le. by modelling the count model as a two part
model as follows:
if
if
> o
o
[8]
if
if
YiT
J'it
> o
o
n1u = T}Oi + 1JliOu +Cit
Where Un indicates whether or not a person i is a service user in time t, y« is the visit count
for individual i at time t, and mit is the latent demand process that underlies the number of visits
for individual i in time t (Kreuter et aI., 2000).
,This method provides unbiased, consistent estimates for the count model. However, this
method is not available for panel data analysis in STATA or any comparable statistical package.
It is thus necessary to run this iteration as a cross-sectional model for the panel as a whole Le.
with only one time period, counting the total number of visits over all eight weeks of the
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diary placement. A Vuong statistic is used to compare the zero inflated negative binomial
m~del with the standard negative binomial. Although the estimates from the zero inflated
model will be unbiased, by creating a cross-sectional model we unavoidably loose the value of
the panel data and the variability of service use over time and, as such, the findings of both
models are presented in Chapter 7 and the similarities and differences discussed.
3.2.4.3) Testingfor Endogeneity
The independent variables of the random effects probit and negative binomial models are
required to be strictly exogenous. Evidence from earlier chapters and the wider literature raises
the possibility that health status may be endogenous to health service use and provider selection.
Similarly, the quality of health service providers may be endogenous to provider selection.
In the analysis in Chapter 7, the Durbin- Wu-Hausman (DWH) augmented regression test
established whether or not these variables introduced endogeneity into the models of service use
and provider choice. The test is conducted by using an auxiliary or predictor regression to
calculate the residuals of each potentially endogenous independent variable as a function of all
exogenous variables. These residuals are then used as an independent variable in a regression of
the original or main model e.g. the model of service use (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). If
the coefficient of the residual variable is significantly different from zero in the main model,
then the variable in question is considered to be endogenous to that specification.
The most common solution to this problem is the use of instrumental variable regression
techniques to control the endogeneity. However, this option is not available when estimating
the demand for health using a categorical (or non-linear) dependent variable such as use versus
non-use or provider choice, or for count models using panel data. However, the instrumental
variable approach can be simulated by using the predicted rather than the observed values of the
endogenous variable and ensuring that at least one exogenous variable is contained in the
auxiliary model of the endogenous variable but not in the main model of demand (Gold and
Wooldridge, 1995). This method is applied in Chapter 7 where appropriate.
3.2.4.4) Imputing missing values
Over the eight week period of the study, the attrition rate amongst participants was 18%
with most attrition happening in the first or last week of the placement. As indicated in Table
3.4, small number of participants missed a week or more of the diary and then rejoined in
subsequent weeks. Attrition varied significantly by gender, population group and age with
females having a higher attrition rate than males (p<O.05), 'and Black! African respondents
having a higher attrition rate than Coloured respondents (p<O.OI). The youngest age
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category i.e. 15-29 year olds had the highest attrition rate and the rate of attrition declined with
age (p<O.OI for the 15-29 category compared with the 20-29 category, and p<O.OI for the 15-29
category compared with all other categories). This non-random general attrition results in an
unbalanced panel.
An unbalanced panel can cause inconsistent estimators and sample selection bias. The
problem can be easily corrected with first differencing methods or a series of selection equations
if the estimation method is a linear panel model and attrition is an absorbing state i.e. once
participants have left the sample in any time period they do not return. However, in the case of
Chapter 5, the methods used are either non-linear or count models and attrition is not an
absorbing state. Modelling attrition as an absorptive state i.e. treating any respondents who
'drops-out' in a single time period as a permanent drop-out, regardless of whether or not they
rejoined the sample in subsequent weeks, would result in a significant loss of data that may
prohibit much of the analysis or at least make these computationally intensive models unstable
with a sample of this size. Inverse probability weighting is a complex alternative method that
can be applied to non-linear models under certain restrictive assumptions however, this method
will not solve the problem for the count models in Chapter 5 (Gold and Wooldridge, 1995).
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As such, the analysis in this thesis uses imputation to balance the panel. Values that are
missing either due to attrition or item non-response are imputed by age, gender, ethnicity and in
some cases, household income. Although imputation is not without its drawbacks, this method
solves the problems of the unbalanced panel, item non-response and low sample bases that
result in potentially unstable models of behaviour amongst sub-populations. Imputation also
has the benefit of being a relatively simple and transparent procedure. Summary variables for
all imputed variables are provided before and after imputation in the findings of Chapter 4 to 7
to maximise that transparency.
Imputation was done using STATA (Version 9). STATA organizes the cases by patterns of
missing data so that the missing-value regressions can be conducted efficiently using a limit of
31 independent variables. As mentioned previously, age, gender, ethnicity/population group
and household income were used as independent variables for the missing value regressions.
3.2.5) A GENERAL CHALLENGE TO THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMETRICS IN HEALTH
Jones argues that we cannot identify pure causal effects from empirical data "because the
"counterfactual" can never be observed." (Jones, 2000) Possible solutions to this problem
include identifying the average causal effects calculated with sample data. Experimental
designs may offer an alternative to observational data but are seldom used in practice. When
using observational data such as the data used in this study, care should be taken to correct for
problems of non-random selection and measurement error that may introduce bias. Three
alternative estimation strategies are commonly used to estimate these treatment effects (Jones,
2000; Mullahy and Manning, 1996 );
1) Longitudinal data provide the opportunity to control for unobservable
individual effects that are constant over time.
2) Instrumental variables may be used to purge bias.
3) Control function or selection model approaches to correct for selection bias.
In this study, longitudinal data is used to control for unobservable individual effects that are
constant over time. Where necessary, the instrumental variable approach is appropriately
adapted to purge bias. Finally, the three step approach to estimation detailed above should
correct for any possible selection bias without the need for an explicit control function. Where
the panel is unbalanced and a risk of sample selection bias occurs, imputation is used to address
the problem rather than selection equations.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
INTEGRATING PERCEIVED NEED INTO
THE DEMAND FRAMEWORK
1) INTRODUCTION
Although not explicitly incorporated into the economic model of demand, perceived health
need will affect whether or not health seeking takes place and, if it does, what form that health
seeking may take. Some studies incorporate this framing into their analysis by running models
conditional on ill health (for example Dzator and Asafu-Adjaye, 2004), others run demand
models amongst health service users only (such as De Vos et aI., 2005), while still others
incorporate perceived need into the demand model as an independent variable (for example Gao
et aI., 2001).
The latter strategy leads to a potential specification problem as the endogeneity of health
status is an often cited source of bias in studies of demand for curative health services. A
significant body of literature demonstrates that self rated health measures vary systematically by
socio-economic status, gender and age, amongst other factors (see for example Charasse-Pouele
and Fournier, 2006; Eriksson et aI., 2001; Needham et aI., 2001). If some perceived notion of
poor health is a necessary precursor to many forms of health seeking, this raises the possibility
that health seeking also varies systematically along these lines. If for example, poorer people
are less likely to consider themselves in ill-health and to seek care (or more likely to delay
health seeking), this bias may contribute to inequities in positive health outcomes. This in tum
may bias cost effectiveness as poorer individuals may be more likely to suffer adverse health
outcomes thus raising the cost per positive outcome for these groups. This in turn may bias
concomitant supplier-side resource allocation decisions if these groups are perceived to be
'more expensive' to treat. From the users or patients perspective, if perceptions of ill health and
resultant health seeking vary systematically across groups, some will benefit disproportionately
from health expenditure as illustrated in Castro-Leal et aI.'s benefit incidence analysis of public
spending in several African countries (Castro-Leal et aI., 2000) .. Spending on the poor will only
benefit them if they are accessing the services purchased or provided by the State on their behalf
(Castro-Leal et aI., 2000; Sahn, 2000; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003).
This chapter extends the standard methodology for estimating and analysing health need in
a number of ways. Firstly, the use of the SF8 questionnaire to quantify self-assessed health
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allows a more disaggregated measure of health status than more commonly obtained from
binary measures or, five point 'wellness' scales from single wellness questions. As a multi-
attribute measure, the SF8 is also less prone to cut point shift (or scale of reference bias), index
shift and other forms of reporting heterogeneity (Groot, 2000; Lindeboom and van Doorslaer,
2004; Shmueli, 2003f. Importantly, the scoring of the SF8 is not based on provider preferences
and as such there is little overlap between this discussion and the discussion regarding patient
preferences in Chapter 5 of this thesis (Brazier et aI., 2002). Secondly, the bias in health
seeking caused by systematic variation in self reported or perceived ill health is explored using
the quantitative data and possible exogenous factors causing the bias are discussed. Thirdly, the
qualitative data provide an opportunity to explore how patients arrive at their health status
evaluations. And finally, the lag between the perception of ill health and any use of health
services is explored qualitatively.
Data are derived from a study set in four high TB prevalence communities in Cape Town,
South Africa. The qualitative data are drawn from eight focus group discussions amongst TB
affected and unaffected adults. Weekly health diaries were used to collect quantitative data
from all adult members of 144 households over an eight week period. Self reported health
status was collected weekly using the SF8 protocol, which measures both mental and physical
,dimensions of health. The study is deliberately conducted in an urban setting to control for the
constraints on health seeking imposed by supply shortages or severe geographic barriers to
treatment access. The methods used to analyse the qualitative and quantitative data presented in
this chapter were described in detail in Section 4 of Chapter 3.
2) QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
2.1) THE SF-8 MEASURE OF HEALTH STATUS
Self assessed health status was measured using the SF-St Health Survey with a one week
recall period as described in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 3. The applicable questions were asked
every week for the full eight week cycle. The SF-8 values are calculated using norm-based
scoring methods. This method allows meaningful comparison between scales within and
between studies (Ware et aI., 2001) .
• This will be discussed in considerable detail in the final section of this chapter.
t The SF8 uses the best item measuring each of 8 health domains in the longer SF-36 Health Survey. Average scores
based on the SF-8 measures are unbiased estimates of SF-36 scores for the same measure (\Vare, J.E., Kosinski, M.,
Dewey,J.E. and Gandek, B., 2001, How to Score and Interpret Single-Item Health Status Measures: A Manual for Users
of the SF-8 Health Survey. QualityMetric Incorporated, Lincoln, RI.).
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2.1.1) OVERVIEW OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH
The domain and summary scores for all participants over all weeks of this panel are
provided in Table 4.1 below. The SF8 norm is weighted to achieve a normal distribution with a
mean of 50. As expected then, the means of the health scores in this study are all close to 50.
There also appears to be sufficient variation around the mean to facilitate analysis. The highest
variation occurs around the means of the summary scores. Table 4.1 also indicates however,
that there are missing observations for both the domain and summary scores as the complete
dataset should have 2000 observations for each. Missing domain scores may be the result of
item non-response or respondent attrition over the course of the panel as presented in Table 3.4
in the previous chapter. Missing summary scores are the result of missing domain scores Le. if
a score for any domain for any individual is missing, the summary score for that individual will
be missing. As much of the analysis in this chapter is conducted by demographic group, these
missing values are unlikely to create significant bias in the findings. There is also no empirical
need, as there is in Chapter 7 of this thesis, to impute the missing values to ensure the
robustness of applied econometric models. That said, there may be some unobserved
heterogeneity across groups that would result in bias and this has not been corrected in the
analysis that follows,
Table 4.1: SF8 Domain and Summary Scores for the Total Population
SF-8 Healtb Scores for tbe Total Population
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
General Health 1780 49.10 9.79 22.81 59.45
Physical Functioning 1780 48.09 8.70 21.46 54.05
Role Physical 1779 47.49 8.95 23.01 53.98
Bodily Pain 1779 53.33 9.62 25.45 60.77
Vitality 1778 53.24 9.53 28.14 61.83
Social Functioning 1780 49.15 8.64 23.44 55.25
Mental Health 1779 49.82 9.35 21.4 56.79
Role Emotional 1780 46.56 8.09 21.66 52.42
Physical Summary Scale 1775 49.89 10.45 11.22 67.27
Mental Summary Score 1775 50.67 10.57 11.33 65.41
The summary scores in the preceding table have not been adjusted for biological differences
in age and gender, or the different health risks faced by the high TB prevalence population
groups in our sample. The scores are then standardised using the indirect convenient regression
method described in Section 4.2.2. of Chapter 3. These regressions are simple linear regressions
of age, gender and population group on the average physical and mental health scores
respectively. The health score used is a single summary score for each individual Le. each
person's scores for' the eight week period are averaged to provide a single physical health
measure and a single mental health m~asure for the total period of the diary placements.
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Table 4.2 below summarises the results of the physical health regression. This regression
indicates that females have worse health physical scores although this difference is not
statistically significant. Statistically significant predictors of physical health are age and
population group. Each additional year of age reduced the predicted physical health score by
0.21. Respondents who classified their population group or ethnicity as Coloured, Indian or
White all had significantly better physically health scores than respondents who classified their
population group or ethnicity as Black! African (the omitted category).
Table 4.2: Standardisation regression for the physical health score
Dependant Variable: Average Physical Health Score*
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 241
Model 3807.09 5 761.4 F( 5, 235). = . 15.51
Residual 11533 235 49.08 Prob> F = 0
Total 15340.09 240 63.92 R-squared = 0.25
Adj R-squared = 0.23
RootMSE = 7.01
Coe! Std. Err. t P>t [95% Con! Interval]
Female -lAO 1.00 -lAO 0.16 -3.37 0.57
Age -0.21 0.03 -6.24 0.01 -0.28 -0.14
Coloured 7.11 0.99 7.22 0.01 5.17 9.06
Indian 8.76 4.11 2.13 0.03 0.67 16.85
White 6.11 3.01 2.03 0.04 0.17 12.04
Constant 55.15 1.43 38.54 0.00 52.33 57.97
By comparison, Table 4.3 summarises the results of the mental health regression. Unlike
the physical health' score, gender is a statistically significant predictor of mental health with
females having lower scores that their male counterparts. Age and population group are also
significant predictors of mental health. Each additional year of age reduced the predicted
physical health score by 0.12. Coloured, White and Indian respondents have higher predicted
mental health scores than Black! African respondents (the omitted category).
* 'Gender' and 'population group' are modelled as dummy variables and the base categories for these variables are
'male' and 'Black/African respectively.
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Table 4.3: Standardisation regression for the mental health score
I Dependant Variable: Average Mental Health Score I
Source SS df MS Number of = 241
obs
Model 3561.78 5 712.4 F( 5, 235) . = 14.26
Residual 11735.82 235 49.94 Prob > F = 0
Total 15297.59 240 63.74 R-squared = 0.23
Adj R-squared = 0.22
RootMSE = 7.07
Coe! Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Female ~2.18 1.01 -2.16 0.03 -4.16 -0.19
Age -0.12 0.03 -3.42 0.01 -0.18 -0.05
Coloured 7.41 0.99 7.46 0.01 5.46 9.37
Indian 8.09 4.14 1.95 0.05 -0.07 16.26
White 9.96 3.04 3.28 0.01 3.97 15.94
Constant 52.76 1.44 36.55 0.01 49.92 55.60
These simple regression equations were used to predict health scores for each individual in
the dataset. The standardised health measures were calculated by taking an individual's actual
health score, subtracting the predicted value for someone of that age, gender and population
group, and adding the difference to the mean health score for the population.
The standardised and unstandardised scores for the total population and for different
demographic groups are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below. A significance test for the
equality of means was calculated on selected pairs i.e. males versus females, Black/African
versus Coloured etc. Among the unstandardised physical health scores:
• Males have significantly higher mean scores than females.
• Black! African respondents have significantly lower means scores than Coloured
respondents.
• These differences hold when gender and population group are combined i.e.
Black/African Males have significantly lower mean scores than Coloured
males, and Black/African females have significantly fower mean scores than
Coloured females.
• The differences between the means of successive age groups are not statistically
significant. However, respondents in the 18-29 age category have a
significantly higher mean score than those in the 40-49 category (p>O.I) and
those in the 50+ age category (p>O.OI). Similarly, respondents in the 30-39 age
category have significantly higher mean scores than those in the 50+ category
(p>0.05).
Unsurprisingly, as standardisation is designed to correct for demographic differences in
population composition, the standardised physical health scores analysed by demographic health
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group exhibit no significant differences between the means of selected pairs.
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PHYSICAL HEALTH
Unstandardised Values
Demographic Group Obs Mean Std. Median Significance test P>z
(n) Dev. for equality of
means (z)
Total 241 49.61 7.99 52.19
Male 72 51.29 7.03 53.60 2.29 0.022
Female 169 48.89 8.29 51.14
Black! African 133 47.24 8.85 49.12 -5.73 0.002
Coloured 99 52.70 5.63 54.19
Male Black! African 33 49.52 7.53 52.67 -2.15 0.032
Male Coloured 37 53.10 6.30 54.82
Female Black! African 100 46.49 9.15 48.47 -5.28 0.000
Female Coloured 62 52.46 5.23 53.53
18-29 years 90 51.32 6.24 52.86 0.80 0.424
30-39 years 54 50.32 7.74 52.62 1.04 0.298
40-49 years 44 48.62 8.36 51.59 0.99 0.322
50+ years 53 46.80 9.75 49.22
Standardised Values
Demographic Group Obs Mean Std. Median Significance test P>z
(n) Dev. for equality of
means (z)
Total· 241 49.61 6.93 50.38
Male· 72 49.61 6.47 50.31· 0.00 1.000
Female* 169 49.61 7.14 50.38
Black!African* 133 49.61 8.00 50.43 0.00 1.000
Coloured" 99 49.61 5.39 50.38
Male Black/African" 33 50.83 7.18 51.79 1.40 0.162
Male/Co loured" 37 48.63 5.83 49.76
Female Black! African" 100 49.21 8.25 49.58 -0.94 0.347
Female/Co loured" 62 50.19 5.07 50.82
18-29 years" 90 49.59 6.08 50.13 -0.27 0.779
30-39 years" 54 49.90 7.06 50.83 0.62 0.535
40-49 years* 44 49.03 6.84 50.82 -0.52 0.603
50+ years" 53 49.83 8.29 51.94
Among the unstandardised mental health scores the findings are much the same:
• Males have significantly higher mean scores than females.
• Black! African respondents have significantly lower means scores than Coloured
respondents.
• Black! African Males have significantly lower mean scores than Coloured
males, and Black! African females have significantly lower mean scores than
Coloured females.
• There are no statistically significant differences between the means of the
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different age categories.
Again, in the standardised mental health scores there are few significant differences
between the means of difference demographic groups. However, after the standardisation
procedure, respondents aged 50 years and older have higher mean mental health scores than
respondents aged 40-49. This is despite the fact that mean scores decrease with each successive
age group up to this point.
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MENTAL HEALTH
Unstandardised Values
Demographic Obs (n) Mean Std. Dev. Median Significance test P>z
Group for equality of
means (z)
Total 241 50.35 7.98 52.54
Male 72 52.60 6.70 54.61 3.16 0.003
Female 169 49.39 8.31 51.96
Black/African 133 47.33 8.24 49.29 -7.14 0.000
Coloured 99 54.01 6.00 55.56
Male Black/African 33 50.26 7.03 52.06 -2.76 0.006
Male Coloured 37 54.59 5.93 55.83
Female 100 46.37 8.41 47.68 -6.40 0.000
Black/African
Female Coloured 62 53.66 6.06 55.42
18-29 years 90 50.86 6.80 52.33 0.14 0.889
30-39 years 54 50.68 7.78 53.72 1.18 0.238
40-49 years 44 48.49 10.09 51.18 -1.17 0.242
50+ years 53 50.69 8.10 53.12
Standardised Values
Demographic Obs (n) Mean Std. Dev. Median Significance test P>z
Group for equality of
means (z)
Total· 241 50.35 6.99 51.49
Male· 72 50.35 6.30 50.95' 0.00 1.000
Female" 169 50.35 7.28 51.79
Black/African" 133 50.35 7.77 51.46 0.'00 1.000
Coloured" 99 50.35 6.10 51.58
Male 33 51.64 6.69 52.97 1.55 0.121
Black/African"
Male/Coloured" 37 49.28 5.97 50.76
Female 100 49.92 8.08 50.93 -0.95 0.342
Black/African"
Female/Co loured" 62 50.98 6.14 52.47
18-29 years" 90 50.61 6.53 51.53 0.01 0.992
30-39 years" 54 50.60 6.51 51.69 1.60 0.110
40-49 years" 44 48.13 8.35 49.88 -2.15 0.032
50+ years" 53 51.50 6.80 51.87
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2.1.2) SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITY OF HEALTH NEEDS
For the purpose of this analysis, a concentration index is calculated for each summary health
measure. As discussed in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter 3, the concentration index provides a
measure of absolute and relative dispersion ranging from zero to positive (or negative) one, with
zero representing perfect equality and positive (or negative) one representing perfect inequality
favouring the rich (poor).
As before, both the standardised and unstandardised scores are calculated. The
unstandardised concentration indices for physical and mental health are 0.039 (a = 0.005,
t=7.25, p<O.Ol) and 0.044 (a = 0.005, t=8.59, p<O.Ol) respectively, indicating some inequality
of health distribution that favours wealthier groups even within these relatively poor and
homogenous communities. Similarly, the standardised concentration indices for physical and
mental health are both 0.015 (a = 0.005, t=2.99, p<O.Ol and a = 0.005, t=2.83, p<O.Ol for
physical and mental health respectively). Again, this indicates inequality of health distribution
that favours wealthier groups. Un surprisingly, this inequality is less than that observed with the
unstandardised scores. The difference between the standardised and unstandardised scores for
the total population is significant at the 99% confidence level.
The concentration curves for the total population are illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2
below. The graphs on the right illustrate the unstandardised scores, while those on the left
illustrate the standardised scores.
Figure 4.1: Concentration Curves for Physical Health
.2 A ~ ~
Cum. Pop. Prop.
1-- Cum. Pop. Prop. -- Cum. Prop. of Physical Health I
(* denotes Standardised)
.2 A ~ •
Cum. Pop. Prop.
1 __ Cum. Pop. Prop. -- Pro;. of Physical Health· I
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Figure 4.2: Concentration Curves for Mental Health
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To corroborate these findings, household income was then used to divide the sample into
socio-economic quintiles. As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, mean health scores improve with
household income. The improvement in the mental health summary scores is slightly greater
than the improvement in the mean physical health scores.
Figure 4.3: Summary Health Scores by household income:
Summary Health Scores by Household Income
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2.2) DETERMINANTS OF PERCEIVED NEED
The aim of this section is to understand the determinants of perceived health need. The
summary scores for physical and mental health are used as continuous dependent measures of
perceived health need for this purpose as they incorporate all domains of the SF8 in a
parsimonious manner. These summary scores are not standardised for this analysis. Section
4.2.2 in Chapter 3 described the methods of analysis used here in some detail. With reference to
that discussion then, the analysis below uses a linear random effects panel model. The use of
the random effects regression method is justified by the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier
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test that was run after each regression.
While physical and mental health constituted the dependent variables in each respective
regression model, the following variables were incorporated as potential determinants of
perceived ill-health: age, education, individual income, household income, household
crowding, coverage by private medical insurance (medical aid), ethnicity and gender. All of
these data were collected from respondents directly with the exception of the crowding measure.
Household crowding is a ratio calculated by dividing the number of household members by the
number of rooms in the household. The selection of these independent variables was based on a
review of the literature on self rated health scales and the use" of scatter plots as described in
section 4.2.2 of Chapter 3. The scatterplots revealed individual and household income to be
highly correlated and as such, individual income was omitted from the analysis in favour of
household income. The independent variables are summarised in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Summary Of Independent Variables Used To Predict Physical And Mental Health
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VALUES FOR N MEDIAN MEAN STD MIN. MAX.
NAME CATEGORICAL DEV.
VARIABLES
age Age at last - 250 35.5 36.78 14.38 18 74
birthday in years
female Categorical Male=O,Female=1 250 1 0.7 0.46 0 1
variable for
female
black Dummy variable Black=1 if respondent 240 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
for population identifies themselves
group identified as Black/African,
as Black!African Black=Oif respondent
identifies themselves
as Coloured, Black=.
if respondent
identifies themselves
as White or Indian.
medaid Coverage by Medaid=1 if covered, 247 0 0.26 0.44 0 1
medical aid or Medaid=O if not
insurance covered
edyears Education in - 250 10 9.88 2.7 1 16
years
shareofhhinc Per capita - 246 566.67 1189.99 1482.70 0 8500
household
income (in ZAR)
crowding A ratio - 144 1 1.24 0.97 0.14 6
calculated by
dividing the
number of rooms
in a house by the
number of
household
members.
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Separate regressions were run on the physical and mental health summary scales and both
are presented in Table 4.7 below. The models were estimated using a stepwise technique which
ensures that the addition of each successive independent variable adds to the Wald statistic and
increases the R-squared statistic i.e. improves the explanatory power of the model. The signs of
variables in preceding specifications did not change with the addition of new variables. The
addition of the last four variables in Table 4.7 added little to the explanatory power of the model
however, as they did make a positive contribution and their inclusion made sense from a
theoretical perspective, they were retained.
In both models, the Wald chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of
the regressors are all zero, indicating the models' overall statistical significance. Similarly, in
both cases, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects indicated that
the random effects model is appropriate for both the physical and mental health models (p<O.OI
in both cases). Sigma_u and sigma_e give the standard deviation of the common residuals (u.)
and the unique residuals (ei) respectively. Rho gives the proportion of the unexplained variance
due to differences among units i.e. differences among the individuals. Both models are
strongest at fitting the variation around the means between individuals and weakest at
explaining the variations around the means within individuals over time. This is unsurprising as
many individual level explanatory variables such as age were fixed for the period of the study.
Table 4.7: Random Effects GLS Regression of Physical and Mental Health
PHYSICAL HEALTH MENTAL HEALTH
REGRESSION REGRESSION
b t b t
Age -0.19*** _(-5.352 -0.09* (-2.31)
Household Income (log) 1.70** (2.84) 1.76** (2.83)
Crowding -1.40* _(-2.492 -0.84 (-1.44)
Covered ~ medical aid/ insurance 0.27 _(0.2!) 0.03 10.0~
Years of Education 0.21 (1.05) 0.30 _(1.44)
Black/ African -1.70 1-1.1~ -2.47 (-1.66)
Female -0.97 1-0.971 -1.93 (-1.88)
Constant 44.87*** (8.49) 40.76*** _(7.46)
I Model Statistics I
R Squared: within 0.00 0.00
between 0.33 0.29
overall 0.17 0.15
Wald Chi-S_g_uaredTest 100.461 *** 87.373***
Sigma u 5.909 6.134
Sigma e 7.699 7.846
Rho (fraction of variance due to 0.371 0.379
u D
No of groups 226 226
Ave. no of observations per group 7.3 7.3
No. of cases 1656 1656
..
Srgnificant predictors (*forp<.05, **for p<.OI, and ***for p<.OOI):
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In the physical' health regression only age, the log of household income and the log of
crowding are statistically significant predictors of self-assessed health. Household income has a
positive effect on self-assessed health while crowding and age' both have a negative effect on
self assessed health. Age has a greater effect on the physical health summary scale than it does
on the mental health summary scale.
In the mental' health regression only age and household income have a statistically
significant impact on self-assessed mental health. Interestingly, crowding was statistically
significant until the addition of the gender dummy variable 'female'. Possible interaction terms
were investigated but found not to be significant.
3) QUALITATIVE FINDINGS
While the quantitative data enable the analysis of need by demographic group and the
possible predictors of mental and physical health need, the qualitative data provide an
opportunity to explore more broadly the determinants of health needs, the factors that may
influence that determination and how perceptions of health need may interact with service
use/non-use generally. The process of establishing need from the patient's perspective is also
explored.
3.1) ESTABLISHING A NEED FOR HEALTH CARE
3.1.1) MONITORING
Some level of 'health monitoring' seemed to occur on an almost continuous basis. The
illness narratives emerging from the focus groups described both internal and external
monitoring i.e. monitoring of self by self, and monitoring of self by others. This monitoring
process can be split into two forms, namely ongoing monitoring, and event based monitoring.
a) Ongoing Monitoring:
Some amount of monitoring appeared to occur fairly consistently over time. Ongoing
monitoring tended to focus on the comparison of health states at various times or on the
comparison of health states against the states of others at a single time point. Ongoing
monitoring appeared to be subconscious until an anomaly was identified.
"Sometimes I could hardly take a bucket and fetch water from the tap outside
[as I normally do). " Group 6, Female, TB affected
b) Event Based Monitoring:
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Event based monitoring tended to be more deliberate than ongoing monitoring but the two
forms of monitoring did interact:
• Events could serve to corroborate ongoing monitoring as in the following
example where ongoing monitoring identified a persistent cough and weight
loss, while the comments from others regarding that weight-loss acted as the
event that corroborated the respondent's own monitoring and, in this case,
sparked health seeking:
o Need identified by on-going monitoring: HI had a persistent cough, I
sweated heavily and I was losing weight at an alarming speed. "
o Event(s) that corroborate monitoring: H[Myboyfriend] could see that I
was losing weight and people in my neighbourhood were also
commenting on thin I had become. " Group 6, Female, TB affected
• Events could spark conscious ongoing monitoring: For example, a workplace
fire caused one respondent to monitor vigilantly for a period after the fire
• Events could confuse ongoing monitoring: The respondent who experienced the
fire attributed her TB symptoms to the fire.
The self centred monitoring process may have highlighted a potential heath problem but, as
is discussed later in this section, there was usually a need for confirmation and this extended the
monitoring to an available evidence base. Figure 4.4 illustrates how the conceptual realm
appeared to interact iteratively with an evidence base in participants' illness narratives. The
diagram shows how this interaction was facilitated by factors such as an expectation of social
support if one could verify one is truly 'ill'. Similarly, stumbling blocks could also interfere
with the interpretation of evidence, particularly if that evidence was not physical evidence.
3.1.2) A GENERAL DISTRUST OF SELF~ASSESSED NEED
All group participants were asked to recall their last illness experience. In half of the groups
this was most likely to be their TB experience. In the other half, this experience varied from
benign 'flu' type illnesses to acute appendicitis and kidney stones. In all groups and across all
illness, respondents struggled to identify the point at which they were ill enough to warrant a
consultation with a medical professional if help was sought. The extract below is taken from a
focus group discussion amongst women from Mitchell's PlainiOostenberg who had been
affected by (or were currently affected by) TB. This woman was suffering from undiagnosed
TB.
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"Moderator: You were in and out of hospital with your baby. The doctor there
told you that you had a bad cough. You knew that you were coughing. Tell me
about that. Did you know you were ill?
Respondent: I didn't know. Didn't think of that. Just thought it was a cough.
Moderator: You didn't tell anyone that you had this bad cough?
Respondent: No. They heard, but they didn't take notice. Didn't think of TB.
Moderator: It took a doctor to tell you that you were ill.
Respondent: Yes." Group 5, Female, TB affected
Even participants who claimed to know their symptoms were serious ignored the symptoms
if they were similarly ignored or unnoticed by surrounding family and friends. The rationale for
this behaviour was complex but appeared to relate to a general distrust of ones own judgement.
Self-assessment of health need was seen to lack objectivity and as such, methods were
introduced to test the validity of a needs assessment. These methods commonly included
seeking validation from a second person, comparing ones health at different points in time and
testing ones ability to complete a routine task. In short, respondents interacted with an available
evidence base, often through a series of facilitating factors and stumbling blocks. This process
is illustrated in Figure 4.4 later in this chapter.
3.1.3) HOW SICK IS SICK?
The key area of uncertainty pertained to the question: 'how sick is sick?' When is one sick
enough to be exempt from one's usual responsibilities and when is one sick enough to warrant
seeking 'outside' help? The discussions strongly indicated that malaise did not necessarily
imply sickness, although it may have sparked the monitoring described above. When symptoms
matched those of a known illness this may have been taken to indicate actual sickness but this
wasn't always the case, as was borne out in the case of the cough ing mother with her baby
quoted above. On the other hand, incapacitating pain or significant blood letting usually did
signify sickness.
"[After being kicked in the side] I got home, then I urinated, passed blood. I
didn't know then, I then thought it's perhaps [something wrong] or so, [so I
told my Aunt that my] urine is reddish, she said I must urinate again and then
she rushed me to the Day-Hospital and from there they sent me to Groote
Schuur." Group 3, Male, not TB affected
The crux was objectivity, the more objective the indicator or signal, the more likely the
person was to attribute it to illness and not to flawed monitoring. Validation of an indicator
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or signal by a third party greatly increased its objectivity and this tended to place greater
importance on physically visible/noticeable signals such as 'thinning', sweating and coughing as
illustrated in earlier quotes from the discussions and those presented below.
"I was very tired and my mother. saw that I was sweating. She took me to the
doctor. She saw that I was sleeping a lot. If I wake I was full of sweat. "
Group 7, Male, TB affected"
"Moderator:
Respondent:
thought of it.
What made you think that you were ill?
I didn't think that I was ill. I was very frustrated Never
Just angry towards everybody. My mother told me that
something was wrong with me. I was losing weight and I [had been] quite fat.
My mother told me to go to the hospital.
Moderator: Let us go back to the beginning. You said you didn't know that
you were ill, but your mother told you that you were different.
Respondent: I was stubborn then. I didn 't want to listen to her.
Moderator: What did you think - why did you lose weight?
Respondent: I didn't eat a lot - I felt sick every time.
Moderator : You were sick and you vomited blood. [Respondent had
mentioned this earlier]
Respondent: Yes. I coughed a lot and then I vomited.
Moderator: You didn't think that you were ill?
Respondent: No
Moderator: Your mother told you in the end.
Respondent: Yes, she told me to go. I went to the day hospital first and they
sent me to the clinic. " Group 5, Female, TB affected
Conversely, contradiction of a physically obvious signal sparked a search for a narrative to
explain the signals. This narrative mayor may not have involved illness as a root cause. If it
did involve illness as a root cause, further validation was sought. The role of these narratives is
discussed further in the next section of this chapter.
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Figure 4.4: Monitorin to establish health need
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3.2) RATIONALISING THE NEED FOR HEALTH CARE: ROLE OF THE NARRATIVE
3.2.1) HOW I GOT SICK IS AS IMPORTANT AS THE FACT THAT I DID GET SICK
An illness narrative refers to the story of a single illness episode. Generally, participants
described an illness including details about its symptoms, causes and cures. They may have
been influenced by some professional opinion but this was not always the case and, where a
professional opinion was integrated, it was always interpreted and adapted to form a coherent
part of the total narrative complementing rather than supplementing lay theories.
The male groups tended to share personal narratives but were less likely to share the
narratives of a third party. By comparison, the female groups tended to be equally comfortable
sharing their own illness narratives and the narratives of friends and families. The female
groups tended to make extensive use of third party narratives both as a tool for explaining and
as a source of 'evidence'.
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Respondent explaining why some people die of TB when the group has agreed
that the illness is curable and therefore not a source of fear: "Because you
sometimes go to a doctor and he fails to detect TB. In the meantime it is
causing ruin inside your body. Some people find out too late that they have TB,
when their lungs are ravaged. If that's the case then your chances of staying
alive are almost nil. You stay alive for only a very' short time" Group 6,
Female, TB affected
Respondent explaining how alcohol abuse contributed to her uncle's illness:
H ••• my uncle was an alcohol abuser. He would leave the house in the
morning without eating to go and drink, come lunch time, his plate will be there
for him to eat, he will come in and not touch a thing, 'he would want more of
this alcohol. He would leave and come back very late when we were already
asleep and not take the supper plate. He would wake up in the morning, feeling
sick as hell, he would want nothing but water and eventually, a piece of meat
and my understanding is, you cannot take proteins on an empty stomach hoping
to fill you in and it would the road to drink again. This went on and on for
years and he eventually became a sick person because of alcohol abuse. I
think, alcohol suppressed his appetite and he got thin and it was said he had
TB, flu or just coughing as though that was normal, but it was not, he was
abusing the alcohol." Group 2, Female, not TB affected
These illness narratives played a number of important roles in health seeking. Individuals
learned about 'effective' behaviour from the illness narratives 'of others, and their own illness
narrative had an important role in establishing any level of 'responsibility' for an illness. The
personal narrative usually sought to explain how and why the respondent fell ill. This learning
fed into future illness identification and strategy development, despite the fact that the accuracy
of these narratives' and concomitant attributions varied greatly § • The narratives served to
establish whether the illness was the 'fault' of the respondent or whether it was caused by
factors beyond any reasonable notion of control. Obviously this tended to bias the narrative as
there was an incentive to ensure that the illness was not the respondent's fault (or that it is not
perceived to be so.)
§ Accuracy in this sense is determined by how well the patient's initial symptom attribution matched a medical
professional's diagnosis and successful treatment of the illness.
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Respondent explaining why it is not her cousin's fault that she contracted
arthritis when arthritics were accused by this group of being a 'lazy lot':
"Respondent: Okay, let's say it's more common with the aged, the obese aged
who used to work as domestic servants. Most of their lives they were doing
people's laundries and washing mountains of dishes. So, water penetrated
their bones. A cousin of mine who worked as a domestic most of her adult life
is crippled with arthritis
Moderator: Is it cause by constant handling of water?
Respondent: That's what she said, that the years of washing dishes in the
'kitchens' were coming back to haunt her. I don't know. Sometimes a washing
machine would break and she'd have to wash laundry by hands. We wash
laundry by hand but it hasn't afflicted usyet." Group 6, Female, TB affected
Respondent explaining how he contracted TB from the dust at work:
"Respondent: ...we worked on machines. We had to grind the machines but
they never gave us protective masks. I told the guys that we had to talk to the
supervisor, because you should have a mask if you work with dust. You have to
drink milk every day - they have to give you a litre of milk every day.
Moderator: Is that a fact, if you work with dust and things like that [you
will contract TB]?
Respondent: Yes. Even if you paint too.
3.2.2) PARTICIPANTS FELT A RESPONSIBILITY TO AVOID ILLNESS
"I had to help my mother. I got ill and I couldn't help her anymore. I just
wanted to sleep. I couldn't do the work anymore.". Group 5, Female, TB
affected
Respondents expressed a sense of responsibility to avoid sickness through prevention.
Prevention generally involved scanning for risk factors and taking necessary preventive action.
Failure to avoid preventable illness may have incurred blame or censure. In the case of the TB-
affected participants, this censure appeared to take the form of social exclusion albeit of a
temporary nature. Once someone was on treatment or obviously returning to full health by
gaining weight for example, they were generally accepted back into their social circle.
"Moderator: From the common and rare illnesses, which ones would you
would be blamed ifyou caught any them?
Respondent: AIDS.
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Respondent: TB.
Moderator: Would they say the same about TB, that you are to blame?
Respondent: They would because you did not treat yourself or did not take
precautions.
Respondent: It can happen, we have a child at home that is into eating iced
blocks, we always warn him, always give her a bit of a slap because she is
always eating it, whether it is cold or warm she is into it, whenever she gets
sick, we always say it is herfault, we always say, it is her doing. It is the same
with a person that drinks, wanting very cold beers all the time, eventually, when
I get ill, I will be told, it is because of the very cold beers that you insist on
drinking.
Moderator: Referring to TB?
Respondent: It is the same, you would be exposed to cold and they will say, it is
because of your self-exposure to cold that you have TB" Group 4, Male, not
TB affected
Avoiding blame therefore seemed to require either a successful illness-avoidance strategy or
a narrative to attribute 'fault' elsewhere (beyond the control of the patient) as is illustrated in the
following quotation. Failure to manage either of these two strategies often resulted in
significant delays in communication and treatment seeking - particularly amongst men.
"When I went back to the clinic I was told I had TB. I didn't understand why I
could get it because I always keep warm and all that. I was told that it was
because of the fire I'd been involved in and because of the fumes I'd inhaled.
That's how I discovered I had TB. I then began taking TB treatment." Group
6, Female, TB affected
Quick/effective recovery was another common way to minimise blame but it appears that
this strategy could be problematic for those affected by chronic illnesses;
"Arthritis sufferers tend to be a ICL"}' lot" Group 6, Female, TB affected
Blame wasn't the only reason why respondents avoided illness, searched for an illness
narrative and tried to effect a rapid recovery. In many cases these strategies simply aimed to
limit personal suffering and/or the narrative was devised to reduce worry amongst family
members particularly. In these instances, the illness was attributed to a benign cause. Any real
fear that the illness may have been serious (or that the symptoms had a 'serious' underlying
cause), as is the case with TB, resulted in delays in communication.
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"I was scared to tell mom because I didn't want to worry her." Group 6,
Female, TB affected
3.2.3) HOW DID RESPONDENTS ACTIVELY AVOID ILLNESS?
The following diagram illustrates how respondents attempted to prevent illness.
Respondents identified risk factors and actively developed strategies to avoid illness. This was
done by learning from the illness narratives of others, adopting 'conventional' wisdom (or at
least considering it), applying the tenets of any relevant formal learning and also by applying the
lessons of experience. Once an avoidance strategy was adopted, it was evaluated and adjusted
accordingly - particularly if the respondent fell ill, signalling a possible failure of the prevention
strategy.
Figure 4.5: Preventin health need
3) Evaluate and
adjust those
strategies 1) Identify riskfactors
Even before the sick role
is taken on, there is a
responsibility to actively
avoid the role through
prevention.
2) Develop
strategies
to reducel
avoid
risk factors
At the start of each discussion, group participants were asked what made people sick and
what kept people healthy. The most commonly identified risk factors for illness (across all
groups), included smoking, alcohol, drugs, poor diet, direct contact with an infected person
(including sharing a cigarette or drinking glass), unprotected sex, airborne sickness and
occupational and industrial risks (particularly air pollution). Poverty, overcrowding and poor
sanitation (dirty communal taps, blocked drains and uncollected refuse) also featured commonly
as causes of illness but were more frequently mentioned by respondents from
KhayelitshalNyanga.
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Predictably, unprotected sex was seen as a risk factor for AIDS and airborne sickness as a
risk factor for TB. Many respondents also saw smoking as a direct cause of TB. Failing to
complete a course of treatment or failing to take medication as directed were risk factors
mentioned only by TB-affected respondents.
"Moderator: Does smoking make us sick?
Respondent: Yes.
Respondent: Weget TBfrom smoking.
Moderator: How can smoking ...
Respondent: From smoking we get TB.
Moderator: Smoking gives you TB? How does that happen?
Respondent: The cigarette smoke. In your lungs, yes. It affects your lungs.
Moderator: Smoke affects your lungs.
Respondent: More Cancer than TB, man. Cancer." Group 3, Male, not TB
affected
There were a number of gender differences in the perception of risk factor. Female
participants appeared to take greater personal responsibility for exposing themselves to risk
factors and were more likely to mention stress as a source of illness. The following quote
demonstrates how male participants seemed to place responsibility for certain risk factors in the
hands of others:
"Respondent: And not being taken care of
Moderator: Not being taken care of in which way?
Respondent: Like if you're unwell and people in your household are not
taking good care of you.
Respondent: Not eating healthyfood, for example
Respondent: Not being taken good care of in terms of the food you eat. "
Group 8, Male, TB affected
This did not apply to all risk factors and male respondents were likely to take personal
responsibility for excessive drinking as a potential risk factor. In so doing however, male
respondents placed less emphasis on avoiding blame in their narratives and more emphasis on
exploring the reasons/causes of the illness:
"Respondent: Yes. Like I was drinking too much, very cold beers
Moderator:. Very cold beers
Respondent: As a result I contacted TB." Group 8, Male, TB affected
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The most notable and consistent gender difference in risk factors for illness was the role of
prisons. As mentioned in earlier chapters, prison was a recurring theme in the males groups but
was almost never mentioned in the females groups. Prison spells interrupted treatment and
seemed to be a source of infection although respondents did not explicitly identify prisons as a
risk factor for initial infection:
"Respondent: [Wjhile I was still getting my treatment I went back to jail
because I'd been out on parole. In jail I reported that I've been taking
treatment for TB and so I continued with treatment. They phoned Nyanga and
found out from them what medication I was taking. But I was later transferred
to Voorbergjail but there Iwasn't getting any TB treatment
Moderator: Did you not tell them you were taking medication for TB?
Respondent: I did but they ignored me. So my illness went untreated
Moderator: Which prison were you in before?
Respondent: Pollsmoor - that's where I was getting treatment. When I got
transferred I didn't get any. That is why when I got out TB was still with me"
Group 8, Male, TB affected
As pe~ceptions of risk factors varied by TB status and gender, so too did they vary by
ethnicity. In particular, respondents from KhayeltishalNyanga identified HIV /AIDS as a risk
factor for illness (particularly TB) and were more likely to mention overcrowding as a cause of
ill health.
4) DISCUSSION
This chapter explored patients' assessments of their own ill health and their perceived
'need' for health services. The standard methodology for estimating and analysing health need
uses five point scales of self reported general health to measure patient's perceived health.
Aside from the fact that these scales cannot differentiate between mental and physical
dimensions of health, they are prone to cut point shift, index shift and other forms of reporting
heterogeneity which can significantly bias secondary analysis". In this chapter, the SF8 was
used to address these shortcomings. Systematic variation in health need and inequality in the
distribution of need have also been explored using the quantitative data while the analysis in this
chapter used the qualitative data to explore how patients arrive at their determination of health
•• For an applied study that illustrates the impact of this bias in South Africa, see Case, A. and Deaton, A, 2006. Health
and wellbeing in Udaipur and South Africa, Research Program in Development Studies and Center for I IeaIth and
\,('c1lbeing, Princeton University, Princeton NJ 08544.
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need, and how this process of determination may delay health seeking or the initiation of a
'demand process'.
As there is little overlap between the findings from the quantitative and qualitative datasets
in this chapter, data from the qualitative dataset are primarily used to clarify and extend the
findings from the quantitative analysis. The key findings are summarised below, drawing on
findings from other studies to add clarity or context. The literature is also used to highlight
potential limitations of the methods used in this analysis, and to clarify potential concerns
regarding their interpretation or application.
4.1) SELF RATED HEALTH AS A MEASURE OF NEED
"Individuals make judgements about their health against. prevailing implicit
standards of what it is tofeel well. " (pg 13 Eisenberg, 1977)
The first point of discussion is whether self assessed health (SAH) measures such as the SF8
are indeed appropriate and accurate measures of health need. Even if agreement could be
reached on an appropriate definition, the measurement of 'true' health and concomitant health
need will always be complicated by the fact that it is largely unobservable. Certainly the quote
from Eisenberg and Kleinman above suggests that the subjective nature of SAH may lead to
temporal instability of a measure with little grounding in actual health need (Eisenberg, 1977).
By this reasoning, actual health need is unobservable even to the individual under study and to
some extent this is borne out in the findings from the qualitative data analysis of this study. For
instance, participants may have suspected the need for health (or health care) but were reluctant
to trust their judgement unless presented with evidence such as an objective indication of need
or validation from a third party. The findings from this study also suggest however, that while
there may be considerable uncertainty about health need, and while that uncertainty may be
underpinned by the unobservable nature of much health need, individuals will take significant
steps to correctly and timeously identify health need.
There is a significant body of literature that supports the use of SAH as an accurate and
stable measure of health need. The main argument used to. validate this association is the
relationship between SAH and mortality. Idler and Benyamini reviewed 27 studies from North
America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Hong Kong, Israel and Australia all linking SAH
with mortality and concluded that SAH was "an independent predictor of mortality in nearly all
of the studies, despite the inclusion of numerous specific health status indicators and other
relevant covariates known to predict mortality." (pg 21 Idler and Benyamini, 1997). Burstrom
and Fredland further concluded that, in Sweden, poor self rated health was a strong predictor of
subsequent mortality in all population subgroups studied (Burstrom and Fredlund, 2001).
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Other studies from the United States similarly show that SAH is an accurate predictor of
morbidity (Connelly et aI., 1989; Okun et aI., 1984), and that patients use assessments of both
physical and mental health to determine health need (Connelly et aI., 1991). In Botswana, self
rated health was found to be significant predictor of diagnostic delay in TB patients (Steen and
Mazonde, 1998). Frankenberg and Jones expressly set out to establish whether the same
relationship between' SAH and mortality existed in low income settings. They use data from
Indonesia to test the hypothesis and found that the relationship held in that setting (Frankenberg
and Jones, 2004). The measure of SAH used in all of these studies was a single general wellness
question.
Although SAH may be an appropriate and largely accurate measure of health need, it is
frequently subject to reporting heterogeneity Le. variation in SAH across demographic groups
for a given level of true health (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004; Shmueli, 2003). When
using single item measures of SAH, it is not possible to distinguish reporting heterogeneity from
variation in true health. However, when using a multi-attribute indicator such as the SF8 which
covers 8 health domains tt, Shrnueli argues that it is possible to construct a measure of true
health. He utilises three multi-attribute SAH measures to construct 'true' health without
reporting heterogeneity and his findings rest on the assumption that the composition of three
multi-attribute models does indeed measure 'true' health. His analysis concludes that men tend
to' report higher levels of both mental and physical health on the SF36 scale, and older
respondents tend to. report higher mental health scores for the same level of true health. This
implies that the distribution of health need as measured by SAH will be sensitive to the sample
used. For this and other reasons the sample is detailed fully in, Chapter 3 and a summary table
of relevant variables was included again in the earlier sections of this chapter.
By comparison however, Lindeboom and van Doorslaer warn of reporting heterogeneity
due to potential cut-point shift and index shift when SAH is measured by a single wellness
question only. Even with a single question measure of SAH, they provide evidence for
reporting heterogeneity for age and gender only and warn that any heterogeneity may be more
pronounced for comparisons across cultural groups. They do not find similar heterogeneity for
income, education or language. Groot similarly argues that adaptation behaviour and different
scales of reference can bias single question SAH. He finds this most marked by age and
disability and recommends normalizing by age to correct for both forms of heterogeneity
(Groot, 2000). Lindeboom and van Doorslaer argue however, that a multi-attribute index of
health such as the McMaster Health Utility Index would represent a more valid and reliable
general health measure than a single SAH question (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004). This
tt Schmucli's point is made regarding the SF36 measure and not the SFS, however the principle holds for both scores.
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assertion would apply equally to the SF8 as a multi-attribute measure of SAH that is scored
using weights from a different survey on a different sample. Although this does not invalidate
Schmueli's findings, it does suggest their implications may not be material to the analysis in this
study. However, as Schmueli's analysis cannot be replicated with the data from this study and
his findings cannot be refuted entirely, the findings discussed below are tempered with reference
to his conclusions.
Aside from cut-point shift, index shift and other forms of reporting heterogeneity, another
potential limitation of SAH was identified in a recent study using Australian data. Crossley and
Kennedy warn that repeated measurements of SAH using a single 'general health' five-point
scale with the same population may suffer from ordering effects if patients assess their health
with measurement error and then revise these estimates on subsequent questioning as they
'learn' about their health status. In their study, this learning was attributed to the SF36 survey
which was asked of respondents between the first and second application of the single general
health question. They propose that the detailed SF36 questionnaire 'taught' respondents about
their health and particularly about the domains of health collected by the SF36 questionnaire
(Crossley and Kennedy, 2002). In this study however, no single illness question is applied and
the same multi-attribute or multiple domain health questions are used throughout. Thus
respondents are 'taught' about the domains of their health from the outset, reducing or even
eliminating any ordering effect comparable to that identified in the Crossley and Kennnedy
study. No studies have found ordering effects with the SF8 or. SF36 questionnaires and in this
study individuals measures of health status appear to fluctuate from week to week rather than
converging on a single point - suggesting that this data is not prone to a systematic ordering
bias that teaches respondents about their health and allows them to converge on some newer and
more accurate measure health.
4.2) VARIATION IN PERCEIVED ILL HEALTH
Quantitative analysis of the unstandardised mental and physical and mental health scores
revealed gender and ethnic differences in perceived ill-health, with women and Black/African
respondents reporting significantly greater average ill health. Average physical health
decreased with age while there was no significant increase (or decrease) in mental health need
by age. Levels of perceived health also improved with increases in household income. The
regression analysis of physical and mental health utilising the longitudinal data found that age,
household income and crowding were all significant predictors of SAH. However, age had a
greater effect on physical health than mental health, the effect of household income on SAH was
slightly greater for mental health and crowding similarly had a greater effect on mental health
than physical health. Insignificant predictors of SAH in the regression analysis included
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medical aid/insurance coverage, population group, financial situation, years of education and
gender. It is likely however, that the insignificant predictors of SAH are in fact significant
predictors of health service use conditional on SAH. This hypothesis will be explored further in
Chapter 7.
The unstandardised SAH scores reveal both biological and demographic differences in
health scores and as such these differences should be seen as inequalities rather than remediable
inequities. By comparison, the standardised scores revealed only one significant difference in
health need by demographic group as the oldest age group (50+) exhibited lower mental health
needs than those in younger age groups. These scores attempt to remove, or control for,
biological differences in need but in so doing also remove many demographic Le. non-
biological differences in need (Diaz, 2002).
The qualitative findings also identified gender differences in health need as women were
more likely to take personal responsibility for exposing themselves to health risks and more
frequently cited stress as a determinant of poor health. This seems to support the assertion of
Benyamini et al. that, when studying SAH, it is important to attend to the full illness-wellness
continuum (Benyamini et aI., 2000). Stronks et al. also highlight the role of psychosocial
stressors linking SES and SAH (Stronks et aI., 1998) and this theme is explored in Section 2 of
this chapter, where inequality of health need is discussed in detail, In this study however, men
were only likely to take responsibility for excessive alcohol intake as a risk factor and they were
less likely to develop an illness narrative to avoid blame for their illness.
Differences in health need by demographic group have been identified in a number of other
studies, most of which used a single question health status measure. In South Africa, Charasse-
Pouele and Fournier found that Black/African and White respondents faced different health
risks. They also found that females had greater health need while education reduced health need
(Charasse-Pouele and Fournier, 2006). Studies from other settings yielded similar findings. In
Sweden, van Doorslaer and Gertham found that older age, functional limitations and/or high
blood pressure increased mortality risk, while higher income and education decreased mortality
risk (van Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003) In Brazil, Diaz found that women consistently
considered themselves to have greater health need than men. (Diaz, 2002). In Canada, van
Doorslaer and Jones similarly found that women and higher age groups reported greater health
need (Doorslaer and Jones, 2003) Again in Sweden, Eriksson et al. found that heath need
increased with age and although they found that women consistently rated their health poorer
(and needs greater), this finding was more marked amongst the youngest age categories in the
study (18-44 years) (Eriksson et aI., 2001).
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McIntyre et aI. also identified geographic variation in deprivation and correlated ill health in
South Africa (McIntyre et aI., 2002). In Lebanon, Khawaja and Mowafi found similar
geographic variation in SAH and also concluded that cultural capital, group membership and
social support were negatively associated with general and mental health need (Khawaja and
Mowafi, Unpublished draft). These findings highlight the limitations of this study, which did
not address these issues.
Importantly, the qualitative findings in this chapter highlight that in this population at least,
needs determination is not an exact science for the observer or the study subject. Among group
participants, health monitoring was iterative - seeking events, corroboration or objective
evidence to validate potential health needs. Even once a need was identified it frequently
required justification and/or explanation to ensure that the sufferer was not blamed for the
illness and received support in any health seeking efforts.
4.3) SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITY OF HEALTH NEED
In this chapter, the inequality of health need is measured using a concentration index.
Wagstaff et aI. argue that only the concentration index and the slope index of inequality are
likely to present an accurate picture of socioeconomic inequalities in health (Wagstaff et aI.,
1991). The concentration indices for this study reveal statistically significant socio-economic
inequality for both physical and mental health, and significant differences in socio-economic
health inequality by demographic group. The physical health concentration indices for the total
sample are 0.039 and 0.015 for the un standardised and standardised scores respectively. The
mental health concentration indices for the total sample are 0.044 and 0.015 for the
unstandardised and standardised scores respectively.
Although common in studies from industrialised countries, few studies from low and middle
income countries have used indices of SAH for analysis comparable with that conducted in this
chapter. Diaz calculates a comparable SAH concentration index for Brazil of 0.086 for the total
study population. She also identified demographic differences in inequality, which increased
with age and were larger for women on average (Diaz, 2002). Other studies in low and middle
income countries tend to focus on indices of service use or of clinic health outcomes. As an
example of the former, Hidayat et al. calculated concentration indices of public and private
outpatient care use in Indonesia. The mean concentration index for public outpatient care use
was 0.0206 and the mean index for private care use was 10.10211(Hidayat et aI., 2004). As an
example of the latter, Zere and McIntyre calculate three concentration indices under-five child
malnutrition for the Western Cape in South Africa. The index for stunting was 0.273,
underweight was 0.274 and wasting was 0.123 (Zere and McIntyre, 2003). Although the
findings from these studies are not directly comparable with the findings from this chapter,
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they do assist in providing a scale of reference for the relative size of concentration indices. In a
slightly different manner Wagstaff corroborated the finding of this chapter that inequality exists
among the poor. He used concentration indices to measure the inequality of health subsidies in
Vietnam and co-operative medical scheme coverage in China, drawing attention to inequalities
between poor and less poor people within poor areas in those settings (Wagstaff, 2005).
By providing that scale of reference, international comparisons assist in the interpretation of
the concentration indices (Cl) for this study. However, it has been argued that the interpretation
of the Cl is not intuitive i.e. what constitutes a large or small Cl and how much health (or health
care) should be transferred from one person to another to remove socioeconomic inequality?
Addressing this criticism directly, KooIman and van Doorslaer use a linear redistribution
scheme and Blackburn's lump sum distribution to show how a Cl can be translated into a
percentage redistribution required to eliminate income inequality - but not necessarily to obtain
perfect equality of SAH (KooIman and van Doorslaer, 2004). In Chapter 9 of this thesis we use
this methodology to inform the policy recommendations stemming from this study. Wagstaff
warns however, that concentration indices embody "one specific set of value judgements" but
argues that health inequalities can be measured in such a way as to take into account
policymaker's attitudes towards inequalities (Wagstaff, 2002).
A complete discussion of the mechanisms through which income inequality relates to health
inequality falls outsides the bounds of this dissertation. However, the main arguments in this
substantive literature are summarised here for purposes of completeness. The first, very general
argument is that poverty causes ill health and ill health maintains poverty. The mechanisms
through which this cycle occurs are summarised in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Cycle of health and poverty
Characteristics
of the poor
-Inadequate ~rvice unlzauon,
unhealthy sanlt:ilry and d\etary
practices, etc.
_____ ..__... Poor health outcomes
-Ill-health
- Malnutrition
- High fe(t;~ty
_____ .._. Diminished income
-lo~~ ofwages
- Costs of health care
- Greater vulnefability
to catastrophic IllnM~Caused by:
- Lack of income knowledge;
- Poverty in communit'f social norms.
weuk institutions and infrastructure,
bJd e'1vironment;
- Poor health provlsion - inaccessi~e.
lacks key inputs, irrelevant servict>s, 10\'1'Quail¥,
- Exdoded from health flOunce system-
limitt'd insurance, copayrnents
Source: (Wagstaff, 2002) pg 98
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Wagstaff also provides a detailed conceptual framework to explain why socioeconomic
inequalities in health tend to disadvantage the poor as discussed in Chapter 2. He explains how
the inequality between determinants, and the extent to which determinants impact the poor, vary
significant between countries and between measures of health outcome (Wagstaff, 2002). Craig
similarly argues that the association between income inequality and health is context (or place)
specific (Craig, 2005).
More recently, Adams et al. exploited panel data to study the causal links between SES and
health in an elderly North American population. That study found no direct causal link from
SES to mortality and to incidence of accidents and some acute conditions, controlling for initial
health conditions. They did find some association between SES and the incidence of gradual
onset health conditions, "due either to causal links or to persistent unobserved behavioural or
genetic factors that have a common influence on both SES and innovations in health" (pg 3
Adams et aI., 2003) However, the study has come under criticism for the imposed assumption
that the relationship between SES and heath status is constant over time (Poterba, 2003).
Although there is considerable evidence on the extent and causes of socioeconomic health
inequality, Wagstaff also argues that too little is known about the effectiveness of policies
intended to combat socioeconomic inequality in health (Wagstaff, 2002).
4.4) LOCA TING HEALTH NEED WITHIN A BROADER DISCUSSION OF DEMAND FOR
HEALTH
"Ideally, health needs should arouse a proportionate and appropriate demand
for health care, which can then be supplied in a systematic way. In real life, this
desirable process is distorted by faulty perception of actual need; by failure of
even perceived need to generate demand, while at the same time demands are
made which bear little relation to need; and finally by the inappropriateness of
some service provision to either need or demand. " (pg 3 Black, 1983)
The analysis in this chapter has furthered the understanding of health need in the study
communities. The individual process of determining health needs exhibited by study
participants has also highlighted how social context can affect the initiation of health seeking
behaviour by influencing the determination of need. The qualitative data has clearly illustrated
patient's reliance on external sources of information and reference, which in tum indicated how
information asymmetry between the patient and their reference group may exacerbate the
patient's imperfect information regarding their health state and delay effective treatment
seeking. Formally, the patient doesn't know;
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• That their capacity to benefit'! from the consumption of health resources is positive
• What is their optimal consumption point; and
• What' goods' make up that bundle Le. clinic services versus private doctor visits.
The findings from this chapter also suggest that the complex process of determining health
need may exacerbate unmet need in the study population. For example, needs may be unmet
because the patient's monitoring does not 'agree' with the assessment of others, a factor
unrelated with supply. The findings from this chapter thus begin to inform the relationship
between the use of health services and a patient's capacity to benefit from treatment - a
relationship that will be explored further in Chapter 7.
Finally, the findings from this analysis emphasis that, in this setting, people are active health
seekers who expressed a sense of responsibility to reduce any imperfect information that might
lead to an illness experience. The process of health seeking is often initiated before an illness
event occurs through the accumulation of health-related information for future potential
illnesses, although 'inaccurate' narratives perpetuate ineffective health seeking behaviour.
Health seeking behaviour and particularly the impact of health need on health service use will
be formally explored in the Chapter 7.
~ Matthew was the first to define health need in terms of the capacity to benefit from treatment rather than the size of
the health problem (Matthew, G.K., 1971, Measuring need and evaluating services. In: G. McLachlan (Ed.), Portfolio for
Ilealth. Oxford University Press, London.). McGuire also introduced a capacity to benefit curve in his discussion of
supplier induced demand (McGuire, T.G., 2000, Chapter Nine: Physician Agency. In: A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse
(Eds.), I Iandbook of I Iealth Economics. Ilandbooks in Economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 347-407.) This theory was
briefly outlined in the literature review in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
FORMULATING THE CHOICE SET
1) INTRODUCTION
According to Neoclassical utility theory, individuals are assumed to be able to rank bundles
of commodities according to the satisfaction they yield in order to maximise the utility of their
consumption. This chapter analyses the formation of patient preferences and explores the
factors that may affect the composition and ranking of consumption bundles or choice sets. In
particular, the analysis considers how perceived quality, fear of community sanction, illness
type, the awareness of different providers and even the potential mismatch of supply with
perceived need may affect the composition and ranking of those bundles.
Although working primarily within the cognitive bounds of utility theory, the discussion
also extends beyond this construct to explore alternative theories regarding strict optimisation.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Neoclassical theory has long been criticised for assuming that
individuals are hyper-rational. New Institutional Economics (NIE) proposes that strict
optimisation and full information are replaced with the concept of satisficing using less than full
information. This chapter considers the merits of this NIE contribution in the context of health
seeking by describing common strategies for satisficing e.g. the use of opinion leaders, and
considering how the household and community context of care seeking may affect service
utilisation. This discussion will inform the manner in which health service bundles are
formulated and ranked in practice.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of utility theory and its application in the analysis
of health markets. The quantitative dataset is then analysed for findings pertaining to the
awareness of health service providers, provider use versus non-use, perceived quality of service
providers in the general sense and any illness-specific health service utilisation. Analysis of the
qualitative data follows a similar flow; however, the concept of quality in this context is
analysed, as are the reasons for provider preference. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the main findings, triangulating the analysis from the qualitative and quantitative data sets and
making reference to findings from other studies. Where appropriate, the discussion draws on
both emerging and established theories to highlight any points of divergence or convergence,
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and to identify methods that may assist in the construction of an analytical model in Chapter 7.
As described in Section 4.1 of Chapter 3, the qualitative data are drawn from eight focus
group discussions amongst TB affected and unaffected individuals from two communities i.e.
OostenberglMitchell's Plain and Khayelitsha/Nyanga. All focus group participants from
OostenberglMitchell's Plain described their ethnicity or population group as 'Coloured', while
all participants from Khayelitsha/Nyanga described themselves as 'Black/African'. The focus
groups were further segmented by gender.
The quantitative data are drawn from health diaries and survey-based interviews conducted
in the same two communities, but not necessarily with the same participants. Although the
participants in the quantitative data collection were more heterogeneous than those participating
in the focus group discussions, the majority of respondents from OostenberglMitchell's Plain
described their population group or ethnicity as 'Coloured', and the majority of participants
from KhayelitshalNyanga described their population group or ethnicity as 'Black/African'
1.1) HO\V IS UTILITY THEORY USUALLY APPLIED TO HtALTH MARKETS?
The demand for health services is a derived demand. Individuals do not derive positive
utility from health services per se, but from the health benefits those services can confer. Health
economists commonly argue that the observed utilisation of health services is equivalent to the
revealed preferences for health service consumption. If individuals are consuming a particular
bundle, that consumption bundle (or combination of price and quantity) must necessarily be on
their demand curve.
The demand curve for health services is underpinned by the assumption that an individual is
maximising their utility subject to some constraint (usually budgetary). The demand function is
the loci of tangents between a series of constraint functions and utility functions. For any given
utility curve, the point of tangency with the budget constraint will be determined by the slope
and intercept of the constraint. This optimisation problem is commonly formalised as follows:
max U = rex,Y)
S.t. Px(X) + Py(Y) s I
In this specification, U denotes utility, which is a function of the consumption of two goods
X and Y. Px is the price per unit of good X and P, is the price per unit of good Y. The
constraint states that the expenditure on X plus the expenditure on Y cannot exceed the
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individual's income (I).
The slope and intercept of the budget constraint are assumed to vary with changes in income
and changes in the prices of goods in the consumption bundle. As changes in prices impact on
real income, they have an income and/or substitution effect. These effects are usually quantified
by using either the Slutsky or Hicksian decomposition methods (Griffiths, 2002). The Slutsky
Theorum states that the substitution effect will always be positive for a fall in price, although if
goods are perfect complements there will be no substitution effect. The direction of the income
effect is determined by the nature of the good in question Le. positive for normal goods,
negative over certain income ranges for inferior goods, and zero if the goods are perfect
substitutes. Perfect substitutes and complements are extreme cases and will not be discussed
further in this thesis. The budget constraint is discussed further in Chapter 6, however, the
direction of the income and substitution effects is a function of the shape of the utility curve -
the focus of this chapter.
The starting point for the optimisation problem then, is the measurement of preferences.
Preferences determine choice sets i.e. bundles of goods that yield an equal level of utility. This
is expressed by the indifference curve or a series of indifference curves denoting different levels
of utility obtained from different bundles of goods. Within the neoclassical paradigm, there are
three main approaches to the measurement of preferences. The first is the cardinal approach,
which involves asking individuals how much utility they derive from a particular good and
aggregating this across all goods. Demand is then calculated on the assumption that people
consume the combination of goods that maximises total utility. Studies using the cardinal
approach are rare in the health context and, as such, this method is not discussed further in this
chapter. The second and more common approach is the ordinal approach. According to this
method, individuals are asked to quantify the relative utility derived from consuming one good
versus another. This results in a basket of goods (or a choice set) that is assumed to be
complete, reflexive and transitive i.e. individuals must be able to strictly and consistently rank
the goods in their bundle. The final approach is the revealed preference method. This requires
the observation of individuals' actual consumption decisions given different prices and/or
incomes (Griffiths, 2002). As before, completeness, transitivity and reflexivity are required if
preferences are to be characterised by a utility function. While the weak and strong axioms of
revealed preference require a unique choice set or consumption bundle at each budget, the
generalized axiom of revealed preferences "allows for flat spots in the indifference curves that
generate the observed choices "(pg 133) (Varian, 1992). If preferences are additionally convex
and monotonic, the utility function will generate downward sloping demand curves (Andreoni,
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1990).
This chapter uses modified applications of both ordinal theory and the revealed preference
approach to derive preferences and understand choice sets. The revealed preferences approach
is the method most commonly used in health economics either implicitly through studies of
utilization (Ahmed et aI., 2000; Makinen et aI., 2000), or explicitly through attempts to test the
theory using survey data (Harris and Keane, 1998; Leonard et aI., 2002). This study uses
quantitative and qualitative data on health service usage to measure revealed preferences. This
analysis goes beyond the existing literature as we are able to probe the reasons for these
preferences and any systematic variations within and between demographic groups.
The ordinal approach underpins many economic evaluation studies, particularly those on
willingness to pay for health services (Donaldson, 2001; Gibb et aI., 1998; Phillips et aI., 2002).
In this study, the qualitative data allows us to explore the relative utility derived from
consuming one good versus another. Although utility cannot be quantified using the
methodology applied in this study, we are able to probe possible reasons why certain health care
providers deliver higher levels of utility. Finally, we are able to consider whether the 'choice
set' is indeed complete, reflexive and transitive for health seeking in this setting.
2) QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
The primary quantitative data collection is described fully in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3. That
discussion explains that before commencing with the Health Diary data collection, study
participants were asked to complete an Introductory Health Survey (see Appendix 2). This
survey aimed to collect baseline information on awareness, perceptions and past usage of
service providers. The Introductory Health Survey also contained a section designed to elicit
preferences for health service providers based on disease specificity, and asked for the reasons
for those preferences. A total of 250 individuals completed the Introductory Health Survey and
these data are used below to explore the non-price determinants of demand and the composition
of the choice set in the study setting.
2.1) A\VARENESS AND USAGE OF SERVICE PROVIDERS'
Assuming that respondents cannot include in their choice set a provider of which they are
unaware, we begin with an analysis of provider awareness.
Respondents were asked which service providers they knew of or had ever heard of and
128
responses were captured on a detailed list that differentiated between provider type and sector.
Any providers mentioned but not listed were captured using an open ended 'other' field.
Unprompted, 90.4% mentioned public/government clinics as demonstrated in Table 5.1. On
average, each respondent was spontaneously aware of approximately 4 providers. This is a
relatively small subset of the possible list of providers available to the respondents. It is
difficult to see how choice sets can be considered complete if, for example, 1 in 4 respondents
are not spontaneously aware of public hospitals and a similar number are not spontaneously
aware of private doctors. This is discussed further later in the chapter.
Table 5.1: Awareness of Health Service Providers (N=250)
Health Service Provider Frequency Percentage of respondents
mentioning this provider
Health facility provided by employer 10 4.0%
Other private health service provider 5 2.0%
Other public sector provider 14 5.60/0
Pharmacy/chemist 76 30.4%
Private clinic 57 22.8%
Private doctor/specialist 183 73.2%
Private hospital 75 30.00/0
Public/government clinic 226 90.4%
Public/government hospital 186 74.4%
Spiritual or alternative healer 23 9.20/0
NGO 1 0.4%
Traditional healer 35 14.0%
Respondents were then asked which service providers they had personally ever used. They
were prompted with a list that included the options 'other' and 'none'. The following table
illustrates that public/government clinics and private doctors/specialists were the most
commonly used providers. Pharmacies and public/government hospitals were also commonly
used. On average, respondents have ever used 2 different service providers, approximately half
of the providers of which they were spontaneously aware.
able 5.2: Past Usage of Health Service Providers (N=250)
Health Service Provider Frequency Percentage of respondents
mentioning this provider
Health facility provided by employer 11 4.4%
None 4 1.60/0
Other private health service provider 12 4.8%
Other public sector provider 7 2.8%
Phannacy/chemist 101 40.4%
Private clinic 37 14.8%
Private doctor/specialist 149 59.6%
Private hospital 54 21.6%
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Public/government clinic 160 64.0%
Public/government hospital 92 36.8%
Spiritual or alternative healer 15 6.0%
TAC treatment action campaign 1 0.4%
Traditional healer 6 2.4%
To simplify the analysis, the health service providers listed above were combined during
data analysis to form three categories: public service providers, private service providers and
alternative service providers. These are grouped as follows:
• Public service providers: Public/government hospitals, public/government
clinics and other public/government sector providers.
• Private service providers: Private clinics, private doctors/specialists,
private hospitals, pharmacies/chemists and other private health service
providers.
• Alternative service providers: Traditional healers and spiritual or
alternative healers.
Employer provided services were omitted from this analysis as they are deemed to be
distinct from the other forms of service provider and were only used by 11 respondents. Using
these category definitions, the following summary statistics are derived:
• 74.8% of respondents had ever used a public service provider,
• 660/0 of respondents had ever used a private service provider,
• 8% of respondents had ever used an alternative service provider,
• Amongst those who had ever used a public provider, 59.9% had ever used a
private provider.
• Amongst those who had ever used a private provider, 67.9% had ever used
a public provider.
These may be considered an individual's revealed preferences. The impact of income and
pricing on these choices is discussed in Chapter 6, which focuses on the budget constraint.
The high level of private provider usage is significant in these relatively poor urban
communities. While the impact of price and income determinants of usage is discussed in
Chapter 6, we explore possible non-price determinants in this chapter. The similarly high levels
of reported 'cross-usage' i.e. usage of both private and public providers is particularly
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interesting and will be explored further in the ensuing discussion. The key questions regarding
this cross-usage are: What factors determine which providers are used (and in which order)?
Are different providers used for different illness or are different providers used for the same
illness? Each of these questions has a direct impact on the formation of the preference set and
particularly on the transitivity and reflexivity of the set. The quantitative analysis below, and
the qualitative data analysis that follows, goes some way towards addressing these questions.
2.2) PROVIDERS THAT RESPONDENTS \VOULD NEVER USE
Respondents were asked which health service providers they would never consider using
and why. Respondents were read a comprehensive list of possible providers and were given the
opportunity to list any other providers not mentioned on the list. The reasons for non-use were
unprompted and captured on a pre-coded list generated from preliminary analysis of the focus
group data. Any reason given by a respondent but not provided on the pre-coded list was added
using open-ended fields and captured verbatim.
Although 19% said there was no provider they would never consider using, 64% would not
use a traditional healer and 48% would not use a spiritual or alternative healer. 31% of
respondents said they would not use at least one of the private health service providers
available. The main reason why some respondents would never consider using either of the
private providers is because it is 'too expensive'.
Tabl 5 3 U I he ea t service provt ers t at respon ents WOll never use =
Health Service Provider Frequency Percentage of
respondents
mentioning this
provider
Health facility provided by employer 1 0.4%
Other private health service provider 2 0.8%
Pharmacy/chemist 5 2.0%
Private clinic 27 10.8%
Private doctor/specialist 12 4.8%
Private hospital 30 12.0%
Public/government clinic 11 4.4%
Public/government hospital 12 4.8%
Spiritual or alternative healer 119 47.6%
Traditional healer 161 64.4%
None 47 18.8%
id h d Id (N 250)
Of those who would never consider using a traditional healer, 70% are female and 570/0
classified themselves as 'Coloured'. A lack of trust and perceived high risk are the main
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reasons why these respondents would never consider using a traditional healer. Within the
constraints of this dataset, there was no opportunity to explore what respondents meant by a
'risky' provider.
1( hi 5 4 Ra e .. easons respon ents wou never use a provt er =
Reason(s) why respondent would never consider using a Freq. Percent of
traditional healer respondents
citing this
reason
I do not trust this service provider 64 39.80/0
This is a risky provider 31 19.30/0
Against my beliefs / principles 27 16.8%
Would never need this provider 25 15.50/0
Bad reputation 23 14.30/0
Too expensive 10 6.20/0
It is not a specialised provider 7 4.3%)
Don't know/Don't see the use 4 2.50/0
The staff is poorly trained / not knowledgeable 4 2.5%
Dirty facilities 3 1.9%
Not interested/Not used to them! Personal Preference 3 1.90/0
Don't give a thorough examination 2 1.2%
Has poor equipment/no equipment 2 1.20/0
Have had a bad personal experience with 2 1.2%
They will not have the necessary drugs 2 1.2%
You will not have privacy 2 1.2%
Due to kidney problems must only get me 1 0.6%
Money making business 1 0.6%
Prefer a psychologist 1 0.6%
Who died and made them God 1 0.6%
Would not get the best service 1 0.6%
Would not solve a medical problem 1 0.6%
You will receive less attention at this 1 0.6%
d Id 'd (N 250)
There are similar differentials amongst those who would never consider using a spiritual or
alternative healer. Of these respondents, 660/0 are female and 67% classified themselves as
'Coloured'. The reasons why respondents would not consider using a spiritual or alternative
healer are varied. The most commonly cited reasons pertain to a lack of trust! perceived high
risk, failure to identify a potential need, lack of faith in these providers (or the concern that their
use would contravene their faith) and the perception that these providers have a bad reputation.
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1( hi 5 5 Ra e .. easons respon ents wou never use splntua a ternative ea er =
Reason(s) why respondent would never consider using a Freq. Percent of
spiritual or alternative healer respondents
citing this
reason
I do not trust this service provider 34 28.6%
Would never need this provider 24 20.2%
Against my beliefs/ principles 22 18.5%
This is a risky provider 22
18.5%
Bad reputation 21
17.6%
It is not a specialised provider 7 5.9%
Don't know/ don't see the use/ have no preference for them 6 5.0%
Too expensive 4
3.4%
The staff is poorly trained / not knowledgeable 2 1.7%
Dirty facilities 1
0.8%
Has poor equipment/no equipment 1 0.8%
Money making business 1 0.8%
Personal preference 1
0.8%
Prefer a psychologist 1 0.8%
They will not have the necessary drugs 1 0.8%
Who died and made them god 1 0.8%
Won't solve medical problem 1 0.8%
Would not get the best service 1 0.8%
You will not have privacy 1 0.8%
d Id I~ I h I (N 250)
2.3) PERCEIVED QUALITY OF PROVIDERS
The overall quality of health service providers was then rated on a 5 point scale, with
denoting 'very poor' and 5 denoting 'very good'. On average, private providers received higher
mean scores for overall quality than their public-sector counterparts. The standard deviation is
larger for public sector providers than their private-sector counterparts. Traditional healers
received the lowest score of any individual provider group.
Tab le 5.6: Quality rating/or each provider (N=250)
Health Service Provider Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Public/Government hospital 243 3.79 1.26 1 5
Public/Government clinic 243 3.19 1.28 1 5
Other public/government sector provider 171 3.53 1.06 1 5
Private hospital 216 4.51 .58 2 5
Private clinic 216 4.51 .58 3 5
Private doctor/specialist 244 4.62 .57 2 5
Other private health service provider 127 3.77 ·.93 1 5
Traditional healer 131 2.69 1.44 1 5
Spiritual or alternative healer 137 3.19 1.38 1 5
Pharmacy/ chemist 243 4.24 .72 1 5
Health facility provided by an employer 115 3.53 1.12 1 5
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2.4) RECOMMENDED HEALTH SERVICE PROVIDER USE
This section aims to establish which health service providers are seen as most appropriate
for different types of illness. The list of illnesses used attempts to capture a range of illness
'types' i.e. common, non-life threatening illnesses, potentially life threatening illnesses for
which there is a cure and for which there is currently no cure, acute health needs such as injury,
and for preventive care which is unlikely to offer immediate health benefits. Respondents were
thus asked which health service provider they would recommend to someone suffering from:
• Flu,
• TB or a persistent cough with blood,
• HIV (or someone who suspects they have HIV),
• An injury such as a stab wound or bum,
• Someone wanting to have their child immunized.
Respondents were only allowed to list one provider per illness; however, they were allowed
to give multiple reasons for selecting that provider. Any reasons or providers mentioned by
respondents that were not contained in the closed coded lists, were recorded verbatim and coded
during data capture. For each illness, respondents were allowed to recommend 'no provider'.
All analysis was run for the full sample before being segmented by gender and population
group. The z-test was used to test the hypotheses for differences between two means or
proportions. The z-test uses a standard normal distribution and in all cases the null hypothesis
stated that the proportions were equal Le. that any observed differences were due to chance.
Only those differences that were statistically significant at the 90% confidence level or above
are mentioned in the discussion below. Exact p statistics are provided for each pair of
proportions.
In general, we find that public clinics are the most commonly recommended providers for
all illnesses, followed by private doctors. Men are more likely to recommend public hospitals,
while women are more likely to recommend public clinics. Respondents who classified
themselves as 'Coloured' are more likely to recommend private doctors, while respondents who
classified themselves as 'Black/African' are more likely to recommend public clinics. We now
examine these recommendations by illness.
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2.4.1) PROVIDERS FOR FLU
Public clinics and private doctors are the most commonly recommended service providers
for flu. This is illustrated in the following figure:
Figure 5.1: Recommended service provider for flu
or alternative
1% Public/government
clinic
45%
Recommended service provider for flu
Other private
provider
1%
None
Pharmacy/chemist
18%
Public/government
hospital
3%
31% N=250
There are however, significant differences between population groups;
• 78% of BlackiAfrican respondents would recommend a public clinic, compared
to only 30/0of Coloured respondents (p<O.OI).
• 57% of Coloured respondents would recommend a private doctor, compared to
only 11% of BlackiAfrican respondents (p<O.OI).
• 35% of Coloured respondents would recommend a pharmacy/chemist,
compared to only 4% of BlackiAfrican respondents (p<O.Ol).
The main reasons for recommending a public clinic include the perception that it is closer to
home/convenient for transport (280/0), they are affordable (19%), there is more chance of seeing
a doctor (130/0), and they will have the necessary drugs (110/0).
The main reasons for recommending a private doctor/specialist include the perception that
they will give a thorough examination (230/0), that it is a specialised provider (210/0) and that
they will have the necessary drugs available (14%).
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2.4.2) PROVIDERS FOR TB OR A PERSISTENT COUGH WITH BLOOD
Public/government clinics are the most commonly recommended service providers for TB
or a persistent cough with blood, however, there are significant demographic differentials
between genders and high TB prevalence population groups;
• Women are more likely than men to recommend a public/government clinic at
70% and 59% respectively (p=0.07)
• Black/African respondents are much more likely than Coloured respondents to
recommend pUblic/government clinics at 810/0and 51% respectively (p<O.Ol)
• Coloured respondents are much more likely than Black/African respondents to
recommend private doctors/specialists at 29% and 3% respectively (p<O.Ol)
Figure 5.2: Recommended service provider for TB/persistent cough with blood
Recommended service provider for TB or a persistent
cough with blood
16%
Other public provider
1"10
Private hospital
1%
P ublic/government
hos pital
15%
Spiritual or alternative
healer
0%
Other private provider
0%
P ublic/govemment
clinic
67%
N=250
The most common reasons for recommending a publici government clinic include the
perceptions that they have good equipment/the right equipment (270/0), they will give a thorough
examination (17%), and there is more chance of seeing a doctor (150/0).
The main reasons for recommending a private doctor/specialist include the perceptions that
they will have the necessary drugs available (24%), that they will give a thorough examination
(21%), that it is a specialised provider (13%), and they will have good equipment/the right
equipment (11%). The presumption that private providers will have the necessary drugs is
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particularly significant as private providers may not treat TB in South Africa. They may
diagnose TB patients and may act as a DOTS observer but all medication must be obtained from
a public clinic. The implications of this are discussed further later in this chapter.
2.4.3) PROVIDERS FOR HIV
Once again, public/government clinics are the most commonly recommended service
providers for mv or people who suspect that they may have RIV. Respondents recommend
these clinics because they are perceived to be specialised providers (19%) who will give a
thorough examination (170/0) and whose staff are perceived to be more knowledgeable (11%).
Figure 5.3: Recommended service provider for HIV
Recommended service provider for mv (or people who
suspect they have HfV)
None
2% Other
Private doctor/specialist
18%
Private clinic
2% 13%
There are a number of both gender and population group differentials in the recommended
provider for HfV. Significant differences between genders include the following;
1%
lie/government clinic
61%
N=250
• ]9% of men would recommend a public/government hospital, compared to 10%
of women (p=0.07)
• 47% of men would recommend a public/government clinic, compared to 65%
of women (p=O.01)
• 25% of men would recommend a private doctor/specialist, compared to 15% of
women (p=0.05)
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Significant differences between the two high TB prevalence population groups include the
following:
• Only 5% of Black! African respondents would recommend a public/government
hospital, compared to 24% of Coloured respondents (p<O.OI)
• 790/0 of Black! African respondents would recommend a public/government
clinic, compared to 36% of Coloured respondents (p<O.OI)
• Only 6% of Black/African respondents would recommend a private
doctor/specialist, compared to 33% of Coloured respondents (p<O.O1)
• No Black!African respondents would recommend a private clinic, while 4% of
Coloured respondents would recommend this facility (p=O.02)
• 4% of Black/African respondents would recommend no provider at all, while
all Coloured respondents would recommend a health service provider of some
description (p=O.06)
2.4.4) PROVIDERS FORAN INJURY
Public/government clinics and hospitals are most commonly recommended for injuries.
Clinics are recommended because they are perceived to have good equipment! the right
equipment (21%), to be a specialised provider (17%) and to give a thorough examination (12%).
Hospitals are recommended because they are perceived to be closer to home (28%), to have
good equipment! the right equipment (18%), and to be a specialised service provider (11%).
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Figure 5.4: Recommended service provider for an injury
Private hospital
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As for the other illnesses mentioned above, women are more likely to recommend clinics
(63% compared to 480/0 (p=0.02)), while men are more likely to recommend hospitals (350/0
compared to 21% (p=0.02)). Black! African respondents are more likely to recommend clinics
(87% compared to 20% (p=O.OO)),while Coloured respondents are more likely to recommend
public hospitals (500/0 compared to 9% (p=O.OO)). Similarly, 140/0 of Coloured respondents
would recommend a private hospital compared to 1% of Black! African respondents (p=O.OO),
and 150/0of Coloured respondents would recommend a private doctor compared with 3% of
Black! African respondents (p=O.OO).
2.4.5) PROVIDERS FOR CHILDHOOD IMMUNISATIONS
The public/government clinic is again the most likely service provider to be recommended
for the provision of childhood immunisations. Clinics are recommended for this purpose as
they are perceived to be a specialised provider (24%), with whom respondents have had a
positive personal experience (16%). It is also perceived to be closer to home/more convenient
for transport (15%).
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Figure 5.5: Recommended service provider for childhood immunisation
Recommended service provider for child immunisation
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provider
1"10
There are fewer significant demographic variations in the provider recommended for
childhood immunisation; however, some differentials do exist:
Private
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8%
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• 7% of men would recommend a traditional healer, compared to only 1% of
women (p=O.02)
• No Coloured respondents recommended traditional heaiers, compared to 5% of
Black! African respondents (p=O.02)
• 5% of Coloured respondents would recommend private clinics while no
Black/African respondents would recommend these facilities (p=O.Ol)
3) QUALITATIVE FINDINGS
The focus group discussions offer an additional forum to explore the composition of
patients' choice sets. As in the quantitative dataset, participants were probed for their
awareness, usage and perceptions of health service providers .. The focus group methodology
also provided an opportunity to more thoroughly investigate the reasons behind provider
usage/non-usage and determinants of patient's preferences. As described in Chapter 3, which
outlined the study methodology in detail, findings were elicited inductively from the dataset
using modified grounded theory analysis. The findings relevant to our understanding of
140
preference sets are discussed in detail below.
3.1) AWARENESS OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
The focus grou~ participants were aware of a wide variety of service providers. Aided by
, the group dynamic, respondents mentioned most public and private provider types operating in
their areas including counsellors, church healing groups, traditional and other spiritual healers.
There was also some mention of providers that might not conventionally be considered 'health
service providers', such as Rastafarians. Similarly, social workers were commonly identified as
health service providers and appeared to play an important role in the illness-recovery process
by assisting with delivery of medication, application for grants while off work with an illness
and even assisting with childcare. Public clinics and private doctors appeared to be the
providers of which participants were most commonly aware. ,
The terminology used by participants differed from that used in the health literature and in
the quantitative data collection tool analysed above. Public providers were generally referred to
by facility type e.g. clinic or day hospital, while private providers were generally referred to by
designation or job description e.g. doctor. There was some confusion about the difference
between a clinic and a day hospital. Some participants contended that the terms were
synonymous while others that the two facilities offered different services. Amongst those who
differentiated between clinics and day hospitals, clinics were seen as more specialised providers
of services for babies and the TB affected. Day hospitals were seen as general primary service
providers and were perceived to be more crowded.
The words public, government or private were not used in common parlance. When
participants referred to clinics and day hospitals, they were referring to public facilities which
they described as largely nurse led. Alternately, when participants referred to 'Doctors', they
were referring to private providers - usually General Practitioners. If a public sector doctor was
consulted, this provider was explicitly referred to as 'the doctor at the clinic'. Usually however,
a consultation with a doctor or nurse at a clinic was simply described as seeing 'the clinic' or
'them at the clinic'. Tertiary hospitals were usually referred to by name, with Groote Schuur or
Jooste the most commonly mentioned. The following discussion uses the language of the
participants i.e. 'a doctor' refers to a private doctor unless otherwise specified, and clinics or
day hospitals are public facilities unless otherwise specified. Tertiary hospitals are referred to
by name where possible.
Doctors were seen by participants as a fairly homogenous group of providers, with no overt
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differentiation between doctors. Clinics and. day hospitals were differentiated on geographic
grounds and there appeared to be perceived differences in quality between clinics in different
areas. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.1 on provider quality. Hospitals
appeared to be seen as heterogeneous providers with Groote Schuur seen as a very high quality
provider while Jooste was seen as a low quality provider in general terms. Particular aspects of
provider quality, as described by participants, are discussed in more detail in Section '3.3.1, with
a focus on primary rather than tertiary services.
Awareness of the availability and general quality of providers was variably enhanced by
some awareness of the services offered by providers and the processes followed by each
provider. For example, some respondents knew that clinics had time slots for different needs
e.g. baby clinic, and social workers were known to provide assistance with disability grants.
However, this awareness was incomplete for most participants. There seemed to be some
confusion regarding which providers offered particular services, which services were offered at
specific times and what administrative steps to follow on entering a clinic or day hospital in the
public sector. For example, a number of participants visited private doctors when they
suspected they had TB and were unaware that private providers could not provide treatment for
TB. In another case, one participant took her baby to the clinic out of hours and was turned
away, causing her significant distress. Another respondent reported being ill-treated by staff
when she did not know whether to collect her medical file or simply proceed to the treatment
rooms to have stitches removed. These simple examples illustrate cases that were raised in
numerous instances in the data. This lack of detailed awareness was a significant source of
frustration to services users (and potential service users) and raised suspicion about the running
of services and lack of transparency. This suspicion underpinned a common criticism that
nurses favour some patients over others or are rude and abusive to patients. Staff attitudes are
discussed further in the section on provider quality.
3.2) USAGE OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Along with pharmacists, clinics and private doctors were the most commonly used
providers. Other providers that respondents frequently mentioned using included prayer healers
or church-based healers (amongst female respondent only), herbalists (amongst Black/African
respondents only), and tertiary hospitals both public and private. Hospitals were not only used
to provide in-patient services, they were also used for out-patient diagnostic testing such as x-
rays.
During the discussion, all participants were asked to outline the process of treatment
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seeking for their last illness episode. In the TB affected groups their last illness episode was
generally the onset of TB. In the other groups illnesses episodes varied significantly from
seasonal colds to acute appendicitis and injuries. Reported usage patterns for these illnesses
varied from the very simple, such as a single visit to a pharmacist, to the very complex
involving multiple visits to multiple providers. Some respondents chose to self-medicate with
home remedies or over the counter drugs kept in supply at home. Self-medication was most
common for flu-like symptoms and attempts at self medication were occasionally followed by a
visit to a service provider if a cure was not promptly forthcoming. Among those who sought
help from a service provider, the shortest chain of usage was a single visit to a single provider.
This provider was most commonly a chemist, clinic or doctor but was occasionally at a tertiary
public hospital (presumably the Accident and Emergency department for which no referral is
required), a spiritual healer or an herbalist. The longest chain of usage involved 10 visits to 8
different providers before a diagnosis was reached and appropriate treatment could commence.
Table 5.7 over the page details all reported chains for a single illness episode that involved
more than one provider. Each of these chains was mentioned by at least one respondent, while
some were reported by more than one respondent for similar or different illnesses. These chains
of usage cover the full spectrum of illnesses mentioned by the group participants.
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Although the usage sequences in Table 5.7 may appear random or haphazard, some
systematic variation in health seeking was evident. For example, chains of usage were much
simpler amongst participants not affected by TB. Amongst TB· affected participants, the chains
of usage were generally shorter and simpler amongst Coloured respondents from
OostenburglMitchell's Plain than Black/African respondents from Khayelitsha/Nyanga. Chains
involving treatment from prison facilities were only mentioned by male participants.
These chains of utilisation offer qualitative evidence that public and private services are
frequently used in conjunction with one another for a single illness episode. They also offer
evidence that public providers 'out of area' i.e. not servicing the respondents' community, are
deliberately sought out by patients who would have to lie about their address to receive care in
these facilities.
3.2.1) PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC SECTOR USAGE
In many instances, private health care providers were used to replace and/or supplement
public providers. However, public providers were also occasionally used to replace ineffective
private providers amongst TB affected participants.
In the groups not affected by TB, private or public providers were able to conduct both the
full diagnosis and treatment for a given illness episode. In these groups, public providers were
still the most common 'first choice' provider however, private chemists were often necessary to
supplement public services if drugs were not available.
"Moderator: [DJid you get medication when you were sick?
Respondent: I got them, to drink and I had to go and take tablets from the
hospital but as time went on, I stopped going there. I bought from the chemists
because at times, there were none at the hospital." Group 4, Male, not TB
affected
Private doctors or pharmacists were occasionally used as 'first choice' providers in these
groups, although this was more common amongst employed respondents and those covered by
family medical aid or insurance.
Amongst TB affected respondents, the pattern was markedly different. The protracted
nature of many of the diagnoses highlighted much more complex health seeking behaviour that
often involved multiple care seeking both within and between sectors. This is in part due to the
fact that private doctors may diagnose TB in South Africa but may not treat the disease. As
such, patients in the private sector must be referred to public clinics for treatment.
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R: I was coughing and my chest would hurt every time I did. I thought it
was just chest pains. I ignored them at first. I told them at home and they sent
me to a special doctor. He took some tests including a urine test but he
couldn't see anything wrong. But then the doctor sent me to a hospital in
Claremont. I was told topay RIOO.
A!: Whereyou had chest pains
R: Yes. I went back to the same special doctor and he diagnosed TB and
he sent me to the clinic where I go treatment
The quote above illustrates a simpler case of health seeking for TB when private providers
were involved. Of course some patients consulted public clinics as their first provider of first
choice and, if successfully diagnosed during that visit, only interacted with that one health
service provider (for diagnosis and subsequent treatment). Unfortunately, this was more
unusual. More commonly, private providers were used as 'back-up' to unsuccessful
consultations or slow diagnoses in the public sector, and to unsuccessful diagnoses with other
private doctors.
"[My illness] started in September. I had fever. I went to Hout Bay Clinic.
The doctor told me I had a cold, I'd caught one of theflu virus strains that were
sweeping the country. I was given tablets and he told me that if I didn't feel any
better I should come back. After a week I still felt the same. I started sweating,
shivering with cold andfeeling sharp pains. My chest hurt when I coughed and
at night I was sweating like a horse. I then went to a doctor and he examined
me. He said the clinic was right I did have a cold and that I must be handling
water a lot. He gave me tablets. I also told him I had sharp pain and that at
night I sweated. He gave me medication. I wasn't happy with the treatment
because I was still coughing. My mom advised me to visit my uncle in Nyanga.
I did eat but then I'd vomit. I was losing weight at an alarming rate. My uncle
sent me to another doctor in Nyanga. Thefirst time there was no improvement
and I went back. The second time he gave me an injection." Group 6, Female,
TB affected
Similarly public providers were used as 'back-up' to unsuccessful consultations in the
private sector. This was much more prevalent in the TB affected groups.
"Moderator: When were you diagnosed with TB?
146
Respondent: In October, after I've been to doctor after doctor. Mom advised I
go to a clinic. My sister was with me when I went to Nyanga clinic. They tested
me for TB and when I went back for the results they did tell me that I had TB
after all. They arranged everything for me and I go treatment." Group 6,
Female, TB affected
Public hospitals, particularly Groote Schuur, were used as a 'fail-safe'. They were
generally the 'last-choice' provider as patients had to be severely ill or injured and/or had to lie
about their address in order to be seen without a referral from a doctor or clinic. This is where
patients went when all other treatment seeking attempts had failed. However, patients spoke of
this consultation as the definitive consultation and there was a strong impression that if patients
could consult with Groote Schuur first, they would do so. There was a definite trust in this
establishment and respondents only spoke of 'successful' interactions with Groote Schuur.
Patients were occasionally referred to public hospitals by clinics or day hospitals, most
frequently for severe TB which required a period of in-patient care but also for other illnesses.
3.3) DETERMINANTS OF PROVIDER PREFERENCES AND USAGE
Determinants of provider usage seemed to involve two core processes. The first was the
decision to seek any care at all, i.e. is my illness 'serious' enough to warrant any attempt at
health seeking? The decision to seek care often generated - or was generated by - a working
hypothesis regarding the possible source of ill health. The second process was the decision to
seek care from a particular provider or set of providers.
The first decision to seek any form of care is not discussed further in this chapter. Instead,
this analysis focuses on those factors pertinent to the formation of the choice set. The preceding
discussion above offers some insight into which health service providers were included in
individuals' choice sets but it gives no insight as to why providers were used, why they were
used in the order they were used and how patients decide whom to see 'next'. This section
investigates the factors raised in focus group discussions that may impact this behaviour. We
find that provider choice is influenced by:
1) Aspects of perceived provider quality,
2) Perceptions of the level of privacy one might expectatJfrom a provider
3) The availability of the provider at the time of perceived need
4) The individual's working hypotheses regarding their illness
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5) Strategies used to overcome information shortages or asymmetries and
whether or not the patient is the sole decision-maker
6) Demographic factors - particularly ethnic and gender differentials
Each of these will now be discussed in more detail.
3.3.1) ASPECTS OF PROVIDER QUALITY
The focus group participants mentioned a number of provider characteristics used as metrics
of quality. These included waiting times, a provider's expected level of expertise, provider/staff
attitudes, the availability of medication and expertise at diagnosing and treating particular
diseases. It is unclear how these perceptions are formed but participants commonly cited
examples from their own experience to validate a judgement or statement. This suggests that, to
some extent at least, these perceptions were formed retrospectively based on experience.
However, a number of characteristics were stated as 'fact', such as the lengthy waiting times
anticipated at public clinics or day hospitals. These judgements mayor may not be supported
by examples from the respondent's own experience and they suggest that some perceptions
were formed prospectively by drawing on the experiences of others. Regardless of how these
perceptions were formed, they were clearly expressed and motivated in the data, and offer some
insight into why patients used the providers they used.
3.3.1.a) Waiting times:
Waiting times would normally be considered a price-related determinant of care seeking,
quantified as an opportunity cost either in terms of lost income or as actual time spent.
However, these data suggest that waiting times have a double burden, only one of which is the
opportunity cost. The additional burden of lengthy waiting times is the 'frustration factor'
related to fruitless or unpleasant waiting in an environment perceived to be hostile'.
Commonly mentioned sources of frustration or unpleasantness while waiting included the
'dirtiness' of facilities in which respondents were expected to wait and the (over)crowding of
waiting rooms. Both of these factors were identified as potential health risks or risks of
infection, and long waiting times were seen to extend exposure to these risks causing significant
discomfort.
t Perceived hostility will be discussed further in the section on 'Staff Attitudes'.
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Participants in most groups also expressed dismay that emergency cases appeared to receive
t
no priority in public clinics and day hospitals. Again, this was partly seen as a health risk as
patients who were obviously severely ill and feared to be infectious were left to wait alongside
patients with less severe ailments. This was also seen as source of anxiety amongst those who
found it difficult to witness a waiting patient 'obviously" in pain. In some instances,
respondents viewed themselves or their family members as the priority cases and, in these cases,
long waiting times were particularly unbearable.
Although there were gender, ethnic and other variations in perceptions of these factors - and
the extent to which they seemed to affect provider preference - they were raised in some way by
almost every group. Interestingly, respondents almost never complained about waiting for
successful health seeking episodes Le. those that resulted in a consultation with a provider,
preferably a doctor, and (usually) commencement of treatment that was both available and
perceived to be effective.
3.3.1.b) Provider/Staff Attitudes:
Poor staff attitudes were most commonly attributed to nurses at public clinics and day
hospitals. These varied from disinterest Le. ignoring a case that was (according to the
discussants) patently a priority or emergency case, to open hostility. Nurses were also accused
of favouring friends or popular community members, taking informal payments to move
patients up the queue and selling drugs 'through the back door' thus resulting in drug shortages
for bona fide patients.
KhayelitshalNyanga respondents in particular reported neglect, disrespect, hostility and
even physical aggression. There was the impression amongst respondents that this ill-treatment
was due to the patient's ethnicity and that, if they had taken along a so-called 'White' employer,
they would not receive this kind of treatment.
"Respondent: The maternity side is the worst.
Respondent: You can say that again.
Respondent: And people are beaten instead of being helped
Respondent: The other thing is that, you cannot get to any clinic you wish to, if
you are not staying around that area, you are not going to be accepted or
helped
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Respondent: If you need to go to a Wynberg clinic when you stay in Nyanga,
for them to accept you, is if you say you are working and staying there. You
have to lie and what else can you do because you are sick and you need help
then.
Respondent: Or you ask your madam {employer] to come with you and there
will be no questions asked." Group 2, Female, not TB affected
Seldom was a private provider accused of being in any way unkind or disrespectful, yet this
was a common theme when talking about public providers. .This characteristic set the two
providers apart. Again, Khayelitsha/Nyanga based respondents reported the worst treatment at
the hands of public service providers, particularly amongst non-TB affected individuals, and
were the most likely to seek care in the private sector.
Mitchell's PlainlOostenberg women reported receiving much 'kinder' care from clinic staff
on average than did KhayelitshaINyanga women. Although one group mentioned a need for
attitude change, this pertained to an instance of refusal to treat a sick child outside the hours of a
baby clinic. Mitchell's PlainlOostenberg respondents did exhibit frustrations with public
providers but these tended to stem more from long waiting times or shortages of medicines, than
hostile treatment by staff.
Respondent: They are far better than the people. The doctor is okay. The
doctor will only see you on a Thursday. The nurse is always there to help you.
If you have a problem - she is there to help you.
Moderator: They are nice to you at the clinic or hospital - more so than the
people in the street.
Respondent: Yes. They tell you to come close - not to move away. They care.
They use their own petrol to look for you if you do not pitch. The people out
there won't worry about you - if you go or not go to the clinic." Group 5,
Female, TB affected
These differences in perceived care might go some way towards explaining why women
from Mitchell's PlainlOostenberg didn't mention visiting private doctors whereas their
counterparts in KhayelitshaINyanga appeared to be as likely to consult a private doctor as a
public one. In fact KhayelitshaINyanga women seemed to persist with private doctors even if
those doctors failed to affect a cure.
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3.3.1. c) Availability of medication:
Public clinics and day hospitals were frequently accused of drug shortages. Some
discussants accepted this as a natural course of public service provision, supplementing public
drug supply with private chemists. Other respondents resented the shortages attributing them to
staff ineptitude or dishonesty e.g. drugs were being kept for 'favoured' patients, or sold for cash
to others as mentioned above.
Expected drug shortages seemed to be a material deterrent to public sector use. Patients
seemed more willing to contend with other quality shortfalls if they could be certain to receive
the necessary drugs at the end point. This relates to the 'fruitless' waiting discussed earlier.
3.3.1.d) A provider s expected level of expertise:
A provider's anticipated level of expertise is strongly linked with their designation. On a
number of occasions, discussants referred to the doctor as knowing the best because they are
'the one with the title'. There is little perceived variance in this expertise. Private doctors were
however, perceived to give a very thorough examination. The thoroughness of the examination
received in public clinics was never a point of discussion.
Variance in the expected level of expertise from a facility appeared to stem from the
likelihood of seeing a doctor. The title of 'nurse' was not imbued with any particular expertise
and feelings towards nurses were distinctly mixed - largely due to aggressive or rude treatment
that many patients reported receiving from nurses.
3.3.1. e) Expertise at diagnosing and treating TB:
Public providers, usually clinics or day hospitals, occasionally failed to diagnose TB at the
first opportunity. This was frequently attributed by respondents to false negatives in the sputum
test. Respondents did not make reference to 'false negatives' per se but to sputum tests which
said they didn't have TB arid then subsequent sputum tests or x-rays which confirmed that in
fact they did have TB. For example, the patient quoted in the following extract was in fact TB
affected. He was correctly diagnosed and treated some time later.
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[The doctor] gave me a bottle to spit in. I took it back to him on the 2rd and
the 23rd I had the results. It was negative - I didn't have TB. I went to my
aunt. It was during the holidays so I didn't work. I didn't have TB, but I got
worse and worse. I didn't know what was wrong with me." Group 7, Male,
TB affected
In some cases sputum tests could not even be conducted if the patient was unable to
generate sufficient sputum for the test. Although in the quote below x-rays were available, they
are not always offered and seemed to be more commonly provided for men than for women.
Public clinics did not seem to have a general/consistent strategy when faced with a patient who
could not generate sputum.
"Respondent: So I took [the x-rays] to the clinic in Nyanga East. The x-rays
said I had TB. Now, ...when I went to Nyanga East I had no sputum and they
said they couldn't treat mefor TB
Moderator: Oh, you have to have sputum?
Respondent: Yes. The TB was spreading at the time. I started treatment
only a month after I've been diagnosed with TB. I went to a private door - Dr.
Mbovane. I paid Rll0. He gave me a can with a chocolate flavoured
nutritional supplement. He took a sample of my sputum. He then told me to
take it to Nyanga." Group 8, Male, TB affected
Another commonly discussed reason for diagnostic delay in the public sector was the lack
of co-ordination between public sector providers.' Referrals from day hospitals or tertiary
hospitals to clinics were not managed smoothly and the receiving clinics seemed to frequently
question the referral and/or diagnosis, sending the patient away without treatment or referring
the patient on to another service provider. Referrals from clinic to clinic were similarly flawed.
This perpetuated multiple care seeking and delayed diagnosis and treatment.
"So mom took me to the clinic and I did a TB test. The Nyanga clinic sent me
to a 'day' (day hospital). The one in Gugulethu. I went to a day hospital and
they attended to me well. I've met a doctor and x-rays were taken. I was then
told to go to Nyanga. There was confusion about why I had to take the x-ray at
'day' in Gugulethu - 76. So I took them to the clinic in Nyanga East. The x-
rays said I had TB. Now, the was when I went to Nyanga East I had no sputum
and they said they couldn't treat mefor TB." Group 8, Male, TB affected
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The health system seemed to be more effective at diagnosing TB amongst Mitchell's
PlainiOostenberg TB sufferers. There were no stories of multiple care seeking before effective
diagnosis of pulmonary TB amongst the Mitchell's PlainiOostenberg TB affected women. This
could be because Mitchell's PlainiOostenberg women were unlikely to use private doctors, who
frequently failed to correctly identify TB (according to the illness narratives of their users).
However, this could also be due to a lower incidence of TBIHIV co-infection and fewer false
negatives from TB tests. Alternatively, doctors may be more vigilant about looking for TB
amongst Mitchell's PlainiOostenberg patients. In fact, these discussions suggest that Mitchell's
PlainiOostenberg respondents may have been receiving 'better' care from public providers in a
number of ways. That said, less common forms of TB are slower to be diagnosed amongst all
ethnic groups as the following quote illustrates;
"fVe went to 'Site B' [clinic]. She took me to the doctor who treats her. Iwas
then to No. 29 - Emergency. I was given an injection and I felt better. I was
then given tablets to take home. Later that day the stomach ache came back
with a vengeance. My mom bought me END fruit salts but they didn't help.
The next day I went back to Site B. The doctor said I should be sent to Jooste
[hospital] because he doesn't know what's wrong with me. My mom went back
home to fetch a duvet while I waited for an ambulance to take me to Jooste. I
was then taken there. They couldn't help me either. My mom was told to go
home as they were going to take care of me. It was a weekend and they were
concentrating on accident victims. I was told to get out of my bed. I told them I
couldn't, I could hardly stand.
I was then told that there were people with gunshot wounds, whatever and I
was told to get out of bed anyway. I then asked to phone my mom as I was not
being treated very well, so that she could come and fetch me. She told me she
couldn't and she was just working there as a casual worker or something. I'm
not sure what. I spent the night sitting on a chair. The next morning I saw a
man I know and I asked him to give me money to phone home. In fact, I asked
him to phone mom himself because I couldn't stand. So mom came and I told
her what happened. She demanded to know why I could be treated that way. I
then went back home. My boyfriend suggested to mom that I be taken to Groote
Schuur as I was in a lot of pain. I was admitted and they operated on me. It
was then discovered that I had stomach TB." Group 6, Female, TB affected
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3.3.2) PERCEIVED LEVEL OF PRIVACY ONE MIGHT EXPECT ATIFROM A PROVIDER
'Public' and 'private' providers were associated with differing degrees of confidentiality.
Private providers were not necessarily seen as private sector providers but as confidential
providers. Conversely, public providers were not necessarily government provided services but
were 'open' services which could be accessed by all members of the public i.e. for public use,
and where one's treatment and diagnosis would similarly be in the public domain.
"Respondent: The public is like the hospital and clinic - everybody is going
there. People know that they can go there if they have a problem.
Moderator: Everybody can go there.
Respondent: Yes, but if it is private - you want to keep it for yourself, then
you will go to someone that will keep it between you and him." Group 7, Male,
TB affected
"Moderator: What is the difference between public health services and
private health services?
Respondent: The private is something you do on your own and public is
something you do infront of others... " Group 5, Female, TB affected
Respondents, particularly those from KhayelitshalNyanga, repeatedly mentioned a
reluctance to visit local TB clinics because neighbours would see them walking to the clinic
regularly and 'draw their own conclusions'. According to the participants, those conclusions
would most likely be that the individual has HIV /AIDS and not TB because of the high
prevalence of both diseases and the similarity of the visible symptoms (extreme weight loss
particularly).
Although TB was considered common in both communities, there was a marked difference
in the way it was viewed. In the groups from Khayelitsha/Nyanga, TB was synonymous with
HIV /AIDS. There appeared to be two primary reasons for this close association. The first was
the shared symptom of weight-loss mentioned earlier.
"Respondent: These days thefirst thing that comes into p~ople 's minds if they
see you losing weight is that you've got AIDS. Only if you tell them you've got
TB will they even consider it. A man in my neighbourhood is dying of AIDS,
they'll say .
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Respondent: If you lose weight you're said to be HIV positive JJ Group 8,
Male, TB affected
The second reason for the close association between these two diseases was the high rate of
observed co-infection in this community.
"Moderator: Why else do people suspect that when you say you have TB
you've got AIDS?
Respondent: Because HIVIAIDS does sometimes show up as TB. When you
go for a TB test they might also suggest you take an HIV test as well, that is, if
you don't mind ... Most people I know who have AIDS were also diagnosed as
having TB. JJ Group 6, Female, TB affected
Despite the close association between the two diseases, TB carried less stigma than HIV.
TB was considered curable and one would not always be blamed for contracting or spreading
TB.
"Moderator: Do people regard TB with the same contempt they do AIDS?
Respondent: No
Respondent: TB used to be held in contempt but these days AIDS is what
people regard with distaste
Respondent: Yes,AIDS is now the greatest evil
Respondent: For example ifyour brother has got TB and after a long time of
staying in the same house you find that you have it too you are not gonna froth
in the mouth blaming him for infecting you. You readily accept that it's in the
family. But if you were to reveal to your boyfriend that you were HIV positive
he might pack his bags and runfor the hills or he might beat you to a pulp, call
you names
Respondent: Or accuse you of infecting him if you were not using a
condom. JJ Group 6, Female, TB affected
"Moderator: Is TB the same as any other sickness?
Respondent: Yes, in that it is curable if it's just TB and nothing else. JJ
Group 6, Female, TB affected
Unfortunately, while TB was differentiated from HIV /AIDS in theory, respondents from
KhayelitshaINyanga were loath to believe that TB was only TB until there was physical
evidence such as weight gain once treatment had commenced. Even those affected by TB were
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sceptical of other TB sufferers as the quote below illustrates.
"Nonceba knows she's HIV positive but she's leading people to think she has
TB." Group 6, Female, TB affected, from the personification game.
Among respondents from this community then, TB necessarily implied HIV and sufferers
expected to be sanctioned for the 'bad' behaviour that resulted in infection. This had
implications for health seeking behaviour as respondents seemed to avoid seeking help for TB
in public clinics, which ironically were the most likely institutions to correctly diagnose the
disease and the only institutions capable of correctly treating the disease.
By comparison, there was no spontaneous link between TB and HIV in the groups from the
Mitchell's PlainiOostenberg community, TB affected or otherwise. Respondents from this
community were more likely to seek help in public clinics.
3.3.3) THE AVAILABILITY OF THE PROVIDER AT THE TIME OF PERCEIVED NEED
A less explicit determinant of provider choice pertains to the availability of a provider at the
time of need. One respondent visited a private doctor rather than a pharmacist because the
doctor was closer to his home. He claimed that he would have visited a pharmacist rather than a
doctor if the same illness episode had started during a working week rather than while he was
on his annual leave. Other respondents mentioned selecting pharmacists because the later
opening hours meant they were available when advice was needed. Similarly, self-medication
appeared to be a fairly common way of 'holding out' until a provider was available, although
this was more common amongst respondents who subsequently attended public providers.
Implicit in the discussion was the use of tertiary hospitals for 'illnesses' occurring at night
because of their availability. These cases were not common but were mentioned mainly by
male participants when relating narratives of injury or violence. One must assume that these
respondents visited the accident and emergency departments at these hospitals, which are open
24 hours and do not require a referral. All other hospital departments require a referral from a
clinic or doctor.
3.3.4) THE INDIVIDUAL'S WORKING HYPOTHESES REGARDING THEIR ILLNESS
3.3.4.a) Differences in health seeking between TB affected and unaffected
individuals
Elements of the preceding discussion have already highlighted some differences in health
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seeking between TB affected and unaffected respondents. Privacy was more of a concern for
respondents who suspected that they had TB. Diagnosis, and hence treatment, also appeared to
be slower for TB affected respondents resulting in more complex 'usage chains' or larger
consumption bundles.
In addition to these factors, the process of TB treatment appeared to alter perceptions of
public health providers. TB affected respondents were less critical of public health service
providers, even though they remained aware of the shortcomings in the system. TB affected
persons were also more aware of the role of clinics as service providers to adults.
"[C[linics are most beneficial to all of us, people who are unwell. You don't
need to have money to go to the clinic and you do get help from them, even if
sometimes they tell you to come back the next day." Group 6, Female, TB
affected
"The doctor will write down what I should get, I get to their dispensary, there is
none. I will be told to come back the next day, it is the same day all the time.
As a person that is not okay health-wise, I should have all the patients, go and
check and see if I cannot get any. Sometimes, you get to the doctor's room and
you are coughing, before he or she can say anything, she tells you, there are no
cough mixture. You get to the clinic on Friday, you do not get what the doctor
said you should have and that means, having to wait until Monday. You are in
pain, you need something but you have to wait for Monday". Group 2, Female,
not TB affected
3.3.4.b) Tuberculosis and state benefits or grants
While unemployed and receiving TB treatment, many respondents reported receiving a
health grant of R700 per month. This suggests that if TB affected patients were not dependent
on their families, they became dependent on the state. While R700 is likely to be significantly
less than a salary from formal employment (the minimum wage ·is approximately double this), it
is notable that many of the TB affected respondents were not employed when they fell ill and
that the R700 grant would probably have increased their income significantly. At no point was
this presented as a 'positive side' to TB or an incentive to fall (or remain) ill, but the need for
this grant did influence health seeking behaviour when TB was suspected, as public providers
were viewed as more likely to recommend the patient for a grant than a private provider.
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"The advantage here [at a public provider] is that if you 've got TByou can get
treatment and you can also get health grant from a public hospital whereas
privates never help you with it. But then you can bribe a doctor to write that
you have an illness that qualifies you to get health grant. But in most cases it's
public health service providers that give you a recommendation to get health
grant. " Group 6, Female, TB affected
The quotation above suggests that the possibility of a health grant may have affected
provider choice. However, it did not appear to act through the budget constraint but rather
through the choice set i.e. consideration of which provider was likely to yield the maximum
utility.
3.3.5) OVERCOMING INFORMATION SHORTAGES OR ASYMMETRIES
As mentioned in an earlier section, participants were asked to recall their last illness
experience. In half of the groups this is most likely to be their TB experience. In the other half
of the groups this experience varied from benign 'flu' type illnesses to acute appendicitis.
In almost every instance, the respondent developed a working hypothesis regarding the
cause of their illness but they commonly lacked confidence in the accuracy of this self-
diagnosis. The working hypothesis was a key input in the development of a health seeking
strategy but this too appeared to require validation and/or guidance. This self-doubt appeared to
be due, in part at least, to uncertainty regarding the type of ·services provided by particular
providers (information asymmetry). Information shortfalls i.e. information held neither by
patient nor provider, also played a role usually through misdiagnosis of TB.
To overcome these information asymmetries and shortages, methods were frequently
introduced to test the validity of a working hypothesis and the appropriateness of the planned
health seeking strategy. These methods included seeking validation from a secondary person
(such as the neighbour in the case above) or visiting different health service providers until the
working hypothesis matched some professional input - or significant relief from the symptoms
was achieved.
3.3.5.a) Advice/information support networks
The attribution of symptoms to a working hypothesis was commonly 'tested' on female
family members first. Mothers, sisters and aunts were usually the first to hear about symptoms
and fears. As such female family members, particularly mothers, played a central role in
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guiding health seeking behaviour. In fact they often acted as the first health service provider;
'prescribing' traditional remedies, over the counter medication kept in the home or even left-
over antibiotics from courses not completed by other family members.
"Respondent: I told my mother, "Mom, I don't feel well." [Sihe asked what
was wrong and I explained and she asked why and then I explained that my
nose was running, my chest was sore. Then she said that perhaps I had a
cold ...and then she gave me antibiotics to drink." Group 3, Male, not TB
affected
Female family members guided illness attribution, where to seek help and when to return
for further assistance if relief from symptoms was not achieved. They also assisted with
adherence to medication. If the reaction from this first channel of communication was not
negative, other family members in the household were usually informed.
"Yes, [my family] were supportive, very supportive. I went to mom when I first
went to the hospital to see what was wrong and also 'when I went to get the
results she was with me. I was still working at the time. She was the one who
took my letter of resignation to work. To this day she ensures that I take my
tablets." Group 6, Female, TB affected
During the discussions, the only male figure to play a significant role in assisting or
informing health seeking was the boyfriend or partner in those cases where respondents were
co-habiting. In rare instances, uncles were named as the payers for health services but it was
never clear how the uncles came to know of the illness. The role of payer is discussed further in
Chapter 6 on the Budget constraint.
"Moderator: You told your boyfriend only and no one else?
Respondent: Yes, he is the one that I know here in Cape Town." Group 2,
Female, not TB affected
Advice/information support networks varied from very informal conversations with a
neighbour, to much more formal consultations with health service providers.
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"So, I took the tablets from Thursday to Sunday without seeing any
improvement in my condition. A neighbour said, Bongiwe, why don't you go
and see if you don't have TB because your cough does seem rather suspect. I
asked her when they do TB tests at the clinic and she said any day of the week.
So, on Monday I visited the clinic." Group 6, Female, TB affected
The content of advice or information ranged from treatment options as in the quote above, it
assisted in the development of the treatment narrative by posing possible explanations for the
cause of illness, it helped to rationalise the duration of the illness and even provided reassurance
that the sufferer was entitled to take on a 'sick role'.
Despite the important role that these advice/information support networks appeared to play,
there was some variation in the extent to which individuals used this resource to overcome
information asymmetries. For example, men .were more likely to delay any form of
communication. Although some men reported being active health seekers, the delays in
communication more commonly led to delays in treatment seeking as there was no female
family member encouraging and/or directing treatment seeking.
"Respondent: It was October last year. Just finished working. I got home
and brought up bloodfor a whole week, but I didn't worry to go to the hospital.
Moderator: Did you tell anyone?
Respondent: No
Moderator: Why not?
Respondent: I didn't tell anyone. Kept it for myself. That was December
last year - the Thursday Ifelt bad and I decided to go to the day hospital.
Moderator: Did you decide yourself to go to the day hospital?
Respondent: Yes, but I didn't get that far. I slept the Friday the whole day
and I went to the hospital at 5hOO... Group 7, Male, TB affected
Other individuals seemed concerned that the risks of seeking advice may outweigh the
benefits. Respondents had little control over communication within the family, particularly
when symptoms were observable, but control over communication with outside individuals was
strictly controlled. The family occasionally colluded to maintain the privacy of the patient -
particularly by sending respondents to visit providers out of the area - but again, obvious
symptoms (such as significant weight loss or coughing) complicated efforts' to maintain privacy.
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"He could see that I was losing weight and people in my neighbourhood were
also commenting on thin I had become." Group 6, Female, TB affected
Although privacy was often protected for its own sake, in the case of TB there was a
concern that 'the community' would not believe the illness attribution. The results from the
personification exercise illustrated how some feared that neighbours would not believe TB was
the cause of the symptoms and would spread the belief that HIV/ AIDS was the root cause. This
fear was more specific to the KhayelitshalNyanga respondents. Amongst Mitchell's
Plain/Oostenberg respondents, there was a greater fear of social exclusion if neighbours knew
that someone in the household was suffering from TB.
"Moderator: Will Charles tell his neighbour that he thinks he has TB?
Respondent: No, not to the neighbours. He won't tell everybody.
Moderator: Why not?
Respondent: Because people make as if it very bad, but its not really.
Moderator: What about TB - why don't you tell everybody that you have
that?
Respondent: Because people think TB is a very dangerous disease. This is
why you don't tell everybody. You will tell some of your friends, but not all.
There are certain people that don " worry - they will tell everybody." Group 7,
Male, TB affected
3.3.5.b) Multiple care seeking from different providers or iterative preference
set formation
The group discussions identified a number of drivers of multiple care seeking behaviour in
which information shortages or asymmetries played a role. To facilitate the discussion, these
factors have been divided into 'patient driven factors' and 'supplier driven/institutional factors'
although there is considerable overlap between the two categories.
Patient- driven factors:
Some respondents engaged in multiple care seeking behaviour if they failed to recover from
an illness episode or if their working hypothesis was not corroborated by a professional opinion
(and a cure was not immediate).
Delays in treatment seeking at the outset often exacerbated the severity of an illness, thus
necessitating either "additional visits before a cure could be effected, or masking the true cause
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of the illness (as was the case in the quote below). Delays in treatment seeking at the outset also
increased impatience for a diagnosis when healthcare was sought. This impatience then
frequently resulted in multiple care seeking behaviour; for example, while patients were waiting
for test results, they needed some immediate relief from symptoms which they obtained from a
different provider. Some respondents even consulted a second doctor while still waiting for test
results from the first doctor.
"I first fell ill last year at work. I work for a company that deals with
chemicals. ...1 was working at night and I felt pain which I ignored It was in
this shoulder. The pain continued for two weeks. I was now avoiding sleeping
on this side. Now I became alarmed I sweated at night and I have to have a
towel right next to me so that when I woke up I'd wipe the sweat off my body.
...Thepain moved from the shoulder to my chest. I ignored it still. I really got
alarmed when the chest pains became worse. I was a supervisor at work. One
of my Coloured colleagues rushed me to a doctor in Langa. The doctor asked if
I'd ever had TB before. All he gave me were pain~illers. They must have
worked because I felt better. Then it struck again in September. The doctor I
went to diagnosed TB. He took a sample of my sputum and the results came
backpositive. I was sufferingjrom TB." Group 8, Male, TB affected
Hedging one's bets by using more than one provider did not appear to be very common
practice but it was raised indirectly in the discussions. Spiritual healers appeared to be the most
common form of 'complementary healer,' and these were strictly used in addition to Western-
style clinical health service providers.
"They [spiritual healers} see through the spirits, just like in the olden days of
Jesus when followers of his, were given a vision. You get to these people and
they tell you, you have this headache, before you even tell them what the
problem is". Group 2, Female, not TB affected
The use of spiritual healers appeared to be more acceptable to all ethnic groups than the use
of traditional healers and herbalists. Even in the KhayelitshalNyanga groups, which arguably
have an historic culture of traditional medicine, traditional healers were spoken of with some
scepticism.
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Supplier driven! Institutional factors:
The most common supplier-driven factors behind multiple care seeking pertained to
referrals (or institutional arrangements that prevented certain institutions assessing or treating
patients). For example, private doctors may not treat TB patients in South Africa, nor may
public day hospitals. Treatment must be provided by specialised public TB clinics. Patients
seeking treatment for suspected TB seemed largely unaware of this constraint.
"My mom suggested that I go back to the hospital. The doctor told me these
were TB symptoms that I was describing. He wrote a letter which I had to take
to my nearest clinic". Group 6, Female, TB affected
"I went to the day hospital first and they sent me to the [TB} clinic". Group 5,
Female, TBaffected
If suppliers failed to correctly diagnose an illness such as TB, this often left patients with
little choice but to seek help again until correctly diagnosed and treated.
Respondent: So mom took me to the clinic and I did a TB test. The Nyanga
clinic sent me to a 'day' [day hospital}. The one in Gugulethu. I went to the
day hospital and they attended to me well. I've met a doctor and x-rays were
taken. I was then told to go to Nyanga. There was confusion about why I had
to take the x-ray at 'day' in Gugulethu - 76...So I took them to the clinic in
Nyanga East. The x-rays said I had TB. Now, when I went to Nyanga East I
had no sputum and they said they couldn't treat mefor TB.
Moderator: Oh, you have to have sputum?
Respondent: Yes. The TB was spreading at the time. I started treatment
only a month after I've been diagnosed with TB. I went to a private door - Dr.
Mbovane. I paid Rll0. He gave me a can with a chocolate flavoured
nutritional supplement. He took a sample of my sputum. He then told me to
take it to Nyanga. Then the results confirmed that I had TB. I then saw a
doctor and I started treatment
Medicine and staff shortages also caused institutions to refer patients elsewhere, thus
extending the process of health seeking (and potentially widening the choice set).
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"Sometimes you go to the clinic and they don't have everything and they send
you to the day hospital. Sometimes you have to wait for long. You have to
wait 2 to 3 hours." Group 1,Female, not TB affected
In the case of TB, multiple care seeking is entrenched in the system of diagnosis and
directly observed treatment even if the patient attends the correct clinic and TB is suspected.
The results of the sputum test cannot be given on the same day and as such patients are required
to return for a second visit to collect their results. Thereafter, most patients are required to visit
the clinic daily until their treatment is complete. These arrangements were reflected in many
respondents' illness narratives.
"I went to the day hospital because of this pain. I am always sick - so 1 went
to the day hospital. They took x-rays. They saw there was something wrong.
They sent me to the clinic. 1 had to go and spit. 1 went there. The one was
negative and the one was positive. They said I had to go back the Wednesday.
I did go back and the doctor told me that they were going to put me on pills.
Even if the one is negative and the other one positive. They gave me 5 purple
pills. I had to go there to have those every morning. That is a 6-month
treatment. Have to go therefrom Monday to Friday." Group 5, Female, TB
affected
3.3.6) ETHNIC AND GENDER DIFFERENTIALS
3.3.6.a) Ethnic differences in choice set formation and care seeking
When talking about TB particularly, female respondents from Khayelitsha/Nyanga tended
to focus more on the weight loss symptom of TB whereas their Mitchell's PlainlOostenberg
counterparts seemed to focus more on the coughing and chest pain. This may be due to the
close association between HIV and TB among KhayelitshalNyanga respondents, and the
relationship between thinning and HIV that reinforces this relationship. Whatever the case,
these visible symptoms appeared to impact variably on health set formation and choice set
selection.
Traditional healers were only mentioned by, or in relation to, Khayelitsha/Nyanga
respondents but both Khayelitsha/Nyanga and Mitchell's PlainJOostenberg respondents
mentioned spiritual and prayer healers. There appeared to be little or no stigma around prayer
healing and it was seen as supplementary to medicinal/western treatment, not as a replacement.
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Herbalists were also mentioned by both ethnic groups, although the Mitchell's PlainJOostenberg
groups referred to 'Rastas' i.e. Rastafarians providing the herbs rather than a 'herbalist' per se.
"Respondent: The Blacks believe in a sangoma. That is traditional.
Moderator: Is that public or private?
Respondent: That is private.
Respondent: With them it is very private.
Respondent: Thepriest can bepublic as well. Somebody that can pray for you.
Moderator: How do theyprovide health care services?
Respondent: Theypray for you.
Respondent: Some of them are like doctors themselves -they will mix different
ointments to give to you." Group 2, Female, not TB affected
3.3.6.b) Gender differences in choice set formation and care seeking
Prison was a recurring theme in the male groups that was never mentioned in the female
groups. Prison influenced health seeking behaviour by diagnosing and providing treatment (it
was the only provider available to inmates), while also being responsible for interrupting
treatment either at the point of interment, during moves between prisons and/or at the point of
release. Inmates appeared to have little choice in the health seeking decisions made for them
while incarcerated and their choice set was thus limited during their period of interment. On
release however, treatment provided (or not provided) in prison affected subsequent health
seeking as the quotes below illustrate.
"... they moved me from one jail to another and in this newjail they said this
could not be TB, because I just finished my treatment. I said I can't
understand this, but something is wrong. After three months I got out of jail
again and I went back to the clinic. I was right - I had TB again. This time it
was in a more serious degree. I had to get injections for 2 months." Group 7,
Male, TB affected
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"But while I was still getting my treatment I went back tojail because I'd been
out on parole. In jail I reported that I've been taking treatment for TB and so I
continued with treatment. Theyphoned Nyanga and found out from them what
medication I was taking. But I was later transferred to Voorbergjail but there I
wasn't getting any TB treatment. I [told them about my TB] but they ignored
me. So my illness went untreated." Group 8, Male, TB affected
In general, females seemed to be more effective monitors of their own health and were more
sensitive to small changes in capacity/wellness. Males by comparison tended to be less
effective monitors, requiring more obvious and objective evidence before an illness episode was
identified. Both genders tended to be dependent on female family members (usually the
mother) to guide health seeking but this was more pronounced amongst women. There were a
number of instances when men claimed to identify a set of symptoms, decided they needed
treatment and went off to seek that treatment. There were no cases of women having done this
without seeking the advice, support or validation of a third party.
"Moderator: Whenyou were sick, was there someone that told you to do this
and that? How did you know that this is the process to take?
Respondent At that time, I could tell that I was not feeling alright. I am
supposed to be in charge of my own life, taking care of it." Group 4, Male, not
TB affected
As mentioned in the discussion on information asymmetries, this particular difference in
male/female health seeking behaviour often resulted in men delaying treatment for longer than
women as they were less likely to receive validation and prompting to seek help.
Women tended to be more aware of the role of clinics as health service providers, whereas
men associated clinics with babies and children. Although this association with children also
held with some women, they were more likely than men to seek help at a clinic first if accessing
the public sector. When accessing public services, men usually visited a day hospital first.
Clinics were also associated with TB, but only by TB affected persons. Amongst both genders
there was considerable confusion about the role of the clinic versus the day hospital and the
difference between the two providers.
"Moderator: So a day hospital is accessible to everybody. What then is a
Clinic, if you've got to describe that?
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Respondent: [A clinic isfor} bab [ies]," Group 3, Male, not TB affected
"Moderator: What is the difference between a day hospital and a clinic?
Respondent: The clinic is for the smaller children
Respondent: The hospital is for adults.
Respondent: You get your pills from the day hospital.
Moderator: But you say you go to the clinic for your pills.
Respondent: Only for the TB pills. Not for anything else." Group 5, Female,
TB affected
"Moderator: Would you say a doctor, a hospital, a clinic is the best for TB
patients? Which one offers the best treatment?
Respondent: Clinics! (CHORUS)
Moderator: Clinics. What's a clinic?
Respondent: A day hospital." Group 6, Female, TB affected
Interestingly, more men reported receiving x-rays for TB diagnosis than women. This may
be related to their health seeking behaviour if day hospitals are more likely to conduct an x-ray
while clinics only conduct sputum tests.
Women seemed more likely to self treat illnesses. Self treatment usually involved home
remedies and seldom involved Chemist-bought medicines. The primary motives seem to be
saving money and saving time.
"Respondent: I just mixed vinegar and fish oil and drank that. It didn't help.
Respondent: I also tried fish oil." Group 5, Female, TB affected
"In last year I had the flu. I had lemon and two Disprins and flu ... "Group 1,
Female, not TB affected
"Some people use self-medication. They don't like to ·go to the doctor all the
time, because it is quite expensive if you don't have medical aid. You don't
have access to any other medical scheme. If you have to go to the doctor every
time and the doctor prescribes medication - you might as well do' it yourself.
Go to the pharmacy and these are my symptoms - do you have anything for
me? It is quicker that way and it is cheaper also. " Group 1, Female, not TB
affected
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Men were only likely to self treat if prompted and guided by a female family member. The
exception to this rule was treatment for injuries, which featured much more strongly as a theme
in the male groups. Males appeared comfortable self treating injuries for which they were
unlikely to seek formal care unless absolutely necessary.
"Respondent: My girlfriend's niece's boyfriend, threw a brick on me. I had
blood all over my face. I was scared to be stitched and I never went to the
hospital. I treated myself.
Moderator: What did the people say at your home?
Respondent: I treated myself." Group 4, Male, not TB affected
4) DISCUSSION
This chapter analyses the formation of patient preferences and explores the factors that may
affect the composition and ranking of preference sets. The analysis goes beyond the existing
literature as we are able to probe the reasons for these preferences and any systematic variations
within and between demographic groups. We find that, in this setting, the choice set is highly
sensitive to aspects of provider quality, the perceived level of privacy one might expect from a
provider, the availability of the provider, the individual's working hypothesis regarding their
illness, strategies used to overcome information shortages and demographic factors such as
gender and ethnicity (or population group).
We also find that, far from being complete at the outset, asymmetric information or
information gaps result in preference sets that are formed dynamically during the health seeking
process. The strategies used to fill these information gaps and/or shortcut the decision making
process also impact materially on the formation of the preference set. Respondents commonly
behave as satisficing rather than optimising actors, using short-cuts to information and acting on
less than full information.
The other neoclassical assumptions of transitivity, reflexivity and completeness appear to be
frequently violated. In addition, assumptions regarding rationality are called into question as
individuals bypass providers with the capacity to treat TB, in order to attend more expensive
providers who do not have the faci lities to treat the disease. These apparent departures from
accepted theory prompt the discussion below of alternative methods that may be more
appropriate for the modelling patient preferences in health markets.
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Data from the qualitative dataset is used to triangulate and elucidate findings from the
quantitative analysis. In this section we look at key points of convergence or divergence
between the two datasets, drawing on findings from other studies to add clarity or context.
4.1) A\VARENESS AND THE 'COMPLETE' CHOICE SET
The majority of respondents participating in both the qualitative and quantitative datasets
were aware of public clinics, public hospitals and private doctors. While the quantitative dataset
collected unprompted awareness of health service providers, the group discussions provided the
opportunity for participants. to 'prompt' one another. Unsurprisingly then, the list of known
providers collected during the group discussions was much more extensive than that collected
using the quantitative instrument. The qualitative data generated a list of providers that
extended beyond the pre-coded list in the quantitative instrument, including providers such as
'Rastafarians' and social workers amongst others. By comparison, respondents in the
quantitative dataset were, on average, aware of only 4 providers on the pre-coded list. Even
amongst the most commonly known service providers, 26% of respondents did not
spontaneously mention an awareness of public hospitals and 27% of respondents did not
mention private doctors/specialists. We have already mentioned that individuals can only
consume from amongst the providers they know of and the apparent divergence in the findings
from the two data sources raises the question of how a "complete" preference set is defined. Is
it best reflected by the pre-coded list of all conventional health service providers detailed in the
quantitative research instrument, the truncated list of providers of whom the quantitative
respondents were spontaneously aware, or the extended list of providers (including some
unconventional health service providers) generated by the focus group participants?
Varian defines the assumption of completeness as follows; "For all x and y in X either xzy
or y~ or both" (pg 95 Varian, 1992). In this definition, X is the set of possible consumption
bundles and both x and yare unique bundles within that set. Varian's text states that "X is the
nonnegative orthant of It "(pg 94) however, no definition of Rk is proffered. He does state
however, that 'specific' consumption sets may be used, thus leaving the theoretical concept of
completeness open to some interpretation. The empirical application of the concept offers little
more guidance and DeShazo et al. contend that ''few tasks in empirical modelling require as
much subjective judgment or involve as much uncertainty as specifying the designated choice
set" (pg 2 DeShazo and Fermo, 2002). Haab similarly expresses concern that researchers
typically assume the individual's choice set to be the same as the set of alternatives provided in
the survey instrument (Haab and Hicks, 1997).
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Understanding what comprises a complete choice set is not a trivial issue as
misspecification in empirical models can bias estimates. Thankfully, tests for the
misspecification of choice sets do exist. DeShazo et al. frames the problem by distinguishing
those goods that are subject to discrete choice, from a numeraire good which contains
substitutes omitted from the designated choice set. They then develop a test of choice set
misspecification that determines whether the analyst-selected choice set "mistakenly assigns
relevant substitutes to the numeraire good". An error of this kind would misrepresent the
degree of substitutability between goods (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002). Desposato addresses the
, case where, unbeknown to the analyst, choices are excluded from the choice set. For example, a
tertiary hospital (public or private) may be excluded from a patient's choice set if they do not
have a referral or live out of area, but this exclusion may be unknown to the researcher. He
refers to this phenomenon as 'unobserved choice set variation' and proffers a method to correct
for the resultant bias in standard choice models, as well as estimating both the predictors of the
choice set components and the predictors of selection from the available options (Desposato,
2005). The difference between the choice sets in the qualitative and quantitative data, and the
insights into choice set formation provided by the qualitative data analysis suggest that
unobserved choice set variation may impact materially on any analysis of health service use in
this setting.
4.2) PUBLIC SERVICE USAGE AND THE IMPACT OF QUALITY
Public clinics were used by a larger percentage of the quantitative sample population than
any other service provider and were the most commonly recommended service provider for all
illnesses listed in the survey. This is despite the fact that these service providers received a
lower quality rating than their private counterparts. A price/quality trade-off may go some way
to explaining this phenomenon but it fails to fully explain the complex tradeoffs observed in the
qualitative dataset where, for example, some individuals were prepared to visit public clinics out
of area but not those in their immediate vicinity, or some used private providers for certain
illness episodes (despite the price) and public providers for others. These and other variations
suggest that any price/quality trade-off is 'framed' within the' complex context of health seeking.
It also suggests that quality is multi-dimensional and that certain quality-related attributes may
be more important than others within a specific decision frame. For example, the focus group
respondents appeared willing to contend with rude or aggressive treatment by staff if they can
be sure of a successful diagnosis and the availability of the necessary medication at the end of
the visit.
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Of all the quality-related criteria, the availability of medication and the correct equipment to
conduct diagnostic tests appeared to be the most influential non-price determinants of service
use among the focus group respondents. In the quantitative dataset, public clinics were most
commonly recommended as they were perceived to be specialised providers who would give a
thorough exam, while private providers were most commonly recommended because they were
perceived to be specialised providers who would give a thorough exam and would have the
necessary drugs. Public clinics were seldom recommended because they would have the
necessary drugs and even in the case of flu, only 11% of respondents expected that they would
have the necessary drugs. The focus group participants also expressed considerable concern
about the availability of drugs in public clinics. This concern, as with a number of other
quality-related issues, appeared to be' more adamantly expressed by participants from
Khayelitsha/Nyanga. The available data are unable to definitively clarify whether this
perceived variation is geographic or ethnic but, in the case of staff attitudes at least, respondents
attributed the 'poorer' treatment to their ethnicity rather than their locality.
As mentioned in the literature review in Chapter 2, the empirical literature offers little
consensus regarding the appropriate measure of service quality. Haddad argues that the quality
of public services in developing countries is frequently neglected and that, while some attention
may be given to technical aspects of quality, the interpersonal elements of quality tend either to
be ignored or underestimated by health service planners (Haddad and Fournier, 1995). At the
extreme, some authors have indeed chosen to ignore quality or to assume it is uniform across
services (Dor et aI., 1987; Grootendorst, 1995; Sauerborn et aI., 1994). While this method
would constitute a significant oversight in light of the findings in this chapter, other authors
have used measures of quality that would be appropriate to this study. In fact drug availability
seems to be one of the most commonly used measures of quality in empirical studies § •
Similarly, Bolduc (Bolduc et aI., 1996) utilised community dummy variables to capture the
differences in quality of care received by communities - a method worth testing in the context
of this study where dummy variables for population group, community and gender may go some
way towards understanding the impact of variation in perceived quality on demand. The
literature also offers some corroboration of the apparent illness specific variation in the
'sensitivity' to provider quality i.e. the extent to which a quality related concern will prevent
health seeking at a particular facility. At least two studies have identified illness-specific
variation in the willingness to pay for transport to a health facility (Kloos, 1990; Stock, 1983).
§ A more complete discussion of the quality variables used in other studies is provided in the literature review in Chapter Two
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Aside from these applications of quality in the empirical literature, the review in Chapter 2
also highlighted potential concerns about the endogeneity of quality (Akin et aI., 1985; Bitran,
unpublished drafta). Bitran argues that quality affects consumption decisions, while Akin
proposes that perceived quality is endogenous to the consumer. The findings from this study
suggest that perceived quality in this context is not entirely endogenous, but is largely
determined by observable provider characteristics. This is tested further in the empirical model
presented in Chapter 7.
Finally, the applied literature provides some insight into the reasons why individuals were
prepared to visit public clinics out of area but not those in their immediate vicinity. In these
instances a price quality trade-off should not be required as both clinics are provided by the
public sector suggesting equivalent quality, and both clinics would be free at the point of use
thus ensuring that the only cost differential is the transport cost. Of course there is some
evidence in the findings that levels of quality are not perceived to be equal across all public
clinics and insofar as this holds true, the additional cost of transport may simply be the price
respondents are willing to pay for higher levels of quality". However, Leonard et al. 's study of
health seeking in rural Tanzania also identified patients 'bypassing' high quality providers in
favour of low quality providers out of area. As in this study, they conclude that patients apply
various measures of quality to health service providers and exhibit an understanding of the
relative importance of each measure for the illness that they suffer. Generally, Leonard et al.
observe that "patients seek facilities that provide high quality consultations and prescriptions,
are staffed by more knowledgeable physicians, and are better stocked with basic supplies.
Patients avoid facilities that use injections too liberally or over-prescribe medication" (pg 441
Leonard et aI., 2002).
4.3) CROSS USAGE OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
High levels of 'cross-usage' Le. usage of both public and private providers were observed in
both the quantitative and qualitative datasets. As mentioned in the quantitative analysis section,
this poses questions regarding the selection of providers i.e. what factors determine which
providers are used (and in which order)? Are different providers used for different illnesses or
are different providers used for the same illness? These questions are dealt with in detail in
Section 3.3 of this chapter. This section thus focuses on the uses of different providers for
different illnesses, versus the use of different providers for the same illness.
00 Price related determinants of demand are discussed in more detail in Chapter Six
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Both the quantitative and qualitative datasets suggest that, in general, different providers
were used for different illnesses. From the quantitative data for example, 31% of respondents
would recommend a private doctor or specialist for suspected influenza, while only 8% of
respondents would recommend this provider for childhood immunisations and 9% would
recommend this provider for an injury. Similarly, 25% of respondents would recommend
public hospitals for and injury compared with 3% for influenza. A similar pattern was observed
in the qualitative data where, for example, public clinics were seen to provide services for
babies.
However, we also observe that different providers are used for the same illness. In the
quantitative data for example, 31% of respondents would recommend a private doctor/specialist
for influenza and 450/0 of respondents would recommend a public clinic for influenza. This is
further reflected in the illnesses narratives of the focus group participants where, in a number of
instances, public clinics and private doctors were consulted for the same illness episode. It is
therefore unclear whether these goods are strict complements or substitutes in the economic
sense.
Generally, all of the factors that impact on general provider use will also influence illness-
specific provider choice. However, particular facets of illness-specific provider choice help to
explain the apparent dilemma observed above. We have already mentioned that respondents
seemed to apply various measures of quality to health service providers and exhibit an
understanding of the relative importance of each measure for their suspected illness. This, as
well as a simple price/quality trade-off, goes some way towards explaining why different
providers are used for different illnesses but fails to explain why different i.e. public and private
providers" are used by the same individuals for the same illness episodes. To understand why
in some instances different providers were used for the same illnesses, we need to summarise
the findings from the TB affected and unaffected groups separately.
In the groups not affected by TB, public providers were the most common 'first choice'
provider but private providers - particularly private chemists - were commonly used to
complement the public clinic visit. This was usually due to poor drug availability at the clinic, a
phenomenon that was frequently anticipated but did not (in many cases) prevent the clinic visit
from taking place. From the outset, many respondents expected to use the private pharmacy as
a compliment to the clinic visit for a single illness episode.
tt TIlls section deals only with cross-usage of the public and private sectors. Other chains of multiple care seeking are dealt with in
Section 3.2 of this chapter
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Amongst TB affected respondents, the cross-usage of public and private health service
providers is much more complex and appears to be driven by two key factors; the need for
privacy on the part of the patient and/or failure to diagnose' TB on the part of the service
provider (public or private). These findings relate particularly to the process of diagnosis and
the use of both private and public services to obtain that diagnosis, as TB treatment cannot take
place within the private sector in South Africa.
4.3.l) PRIVACY AS A DETERMINANT OF CROSS SECTOR USE
This is not the only study to highlight patients' concerns with privacy when health seeking
for suspected TB. Lonnroth's study of health seeking behaviour for TB in Vietnam identified a
number of reasons why patients chose to use private TB care rather than the National TB
Control Programme where, according to the authors, an 'excellent prospect' of a cure is
provided free of charge. In that study, private services were preferred because they offered
flexible diagnostic procedures, no administrative procedures to establish eligibility for
treatment, flexible drug regimens, unsupervised treatment, no official registration and no tracing
of defaulters and the reduced 'threat to personal integrity' (Lonnroth et aI., 2001). Long further
identified gender differences in the need for privacy in Vietnam, with men more concerned
about the economic implications of TB infection, and women more concerned about the social
consequences of TB infection (Long et aI., 2001). A study among TB affected patients in South
India identified the perceived persistence of TB stigma even after treatment (Rajeswari et aI.,
2005).
Privacy as a determinant of care seeking behaviour also features in studies of other health
problems. In Vietnam, a study of gender differences in perceptions of STDs highlighted the fact
that men expressed embarrassment about telling their partners while women expressed fear of
the social and physical consequences of an STD (Go et aI., 2002). A quantitative study of
patients at HIV testing locations in San. Francisco highlighted the fact that most respondents
preferred HIV tests that were accurate and timely, private and anonymous (Phillips et aI., 2002).
A qualitative study amongst the elderly in North America highlighted concerns regarding
privacy, and ethnic variation in those concerns, as a determinant of service use (Bradley et aI.,
2002). These examples are by no means exhaustive but they. do highlight the importance of
privacy as a determinant of provider use for diseases that may carry social stigma. This is
particularly relevant in light of the finding in this study that private providers are literally
defined as providers giving privacy, while public providers are open to all and offer no similar
attraction. It is also relevant due to the very close association of TB with HIV amongst
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participants from KhayelitshalNyanga, and the consistent fear that accompanied any discussion
of HIV. Finally, this finding is particularly relevant as TB and HIV, the two diseases most
likely to require privacy in the context of this study, are the least likely to be effectively treated
by private providers. It is this last point that explains why treatment seeking for TB in the
private sector frequently leads to 'cross-use' of public and private providers rather than a simple.
increase in the use of private providers only.
4.3.2) PROVIDER FAILURE AS A DETERMINANT OF CROSS USE
This study has identified numerous instances when both public and private providers failed
to diagnose TB at the first opportunity. Failure by a public provider either resulted in further
treatment seeking at a different public provider or further treatment seeking at a private
provider. Similarly, when private providers failed to diagnose TB, patients sought help from
different private providers or public providers. Occasionally, failure by a private provider
would result in a repeat visit to that same provider. As private providers are unable to treat TB
in South Africa, a successful diagnosis in the private sector was seldom the definitive diagnosis
as patients had to be referred across to the public sector where diagnostic procedures were
usually begun from 'scratch' (with the same likelihood of failure as the initial attempt to obtain
a diagnosis).
A number of other studies have attributed diagnostic delay for TB to similar provider
failures. Pronyk's study in South Africa's rural Northern Province attributed a significant
period of diagnostic delay to the failure of recognised clinical services Le. public clinics, to
identify TB. He found that those exhibiting a conventional ris~ profile for TB were diagnosed
more quickly by health services, while women remained undiagnosed for longer than men
(Pronyk et aI., 2001). Although the gender differences in this study were less marked, there did
appear to be significant differences in the delay of TB diagnosis between communities.
Pronyk's findings regarding the 'conventional risk profile' combined with the longer history of
TB in the Mitchell's PlainlOostenberg communities may go some way towards explaining this
variation as members of these communities may be considered the conventional sufferers of TB
and doctors may therefore be more likely to promptly diagnose the problem amongst patients
from this community.
In a study of health seeking for TB in Vietnam, women were identified as more likely to
visit private practitioners and practice self medication before visiting public services, while men
tended to go directly to public services (Johansson et aI., 2000)~ Similar gender differences are
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observed in this study, however the role of prisons is the most significant gender difference in
care seeking for TB. Although the role of prisons impacts more directly on multiple-care
seeking within the public sector than on care seeking between sectors, it is important to note that
internment, movement between prisons and even release from prison can interrupt TB
treatment. This is highlighted as a priority for consideration in Chapter 9 which considers
policy recommendations from this study.
4.3.3) IMPLICATIONS OF CROSS USE
Aside from the economic cost of cross sector use, which will be discussed in more detail in
the next chapter, using both private and public services for a single illness episode can have
numerous implications. When services are used as complements, the implications appear to be
less serious. This type of cross sector use did not seem to significantly delay health seeking or
negatively affect health outcomes amongst respondents not affected by TB. One might argue
however, that the necessity of this form of service use could exacerbate health inequalities as the
poorest and/or sickest groups would be the least able to purchase medicines from separate
private chemists after a lengthy visit to a public clinic. This raises the question of 'necessity'
i.e. to what extent did patients visit private chemists because the drugs were entirely unavailable
in the public sector. The findings suggest that much of this treatment seeking behaviour was
viewed as 'necessary', however, in a few instances the drugs were simply not available at the
time the patient was, visiting the clinic and patients were unwilling to return at a later time when
staff claimed the medication would be available.
The cross sector usage for TB diagnosis has more critical implications for effective TB
treatment. The diagnostic delays resulting from cross sector use appear to be significant, and
attempts to refer patients between sectors (and even within sectors) are largely ineffective. The
implications of this cross sector usage were more strongly identified by respondents from
KhayelitshalNyanga than those from Oostenburg/Mitchell's Plain. Respondents from
KhayelitshalNyanga were more likely to initiate treatment seeking for suspected TB with a
private provider, and private providers were more likely to misdiagnose TB than public clinics.
This finding is corroborated by other studies. Needham et al. found that, in Zambia, visiting
a private doctor for suspected TB was significantly associated with diagnostic delay. They also
concluded that centralised public services and a lack of integration between public and private
providers contributed to diagnostic delay (Needham et aI., 2001). Similarly, a study of the
beliefs and experiences of TB patients in rural South Africa highlighted the need for traditional
and western health workers to collaborate in the treatment of TB to minimise diagnostic delay
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(Edginton et aI., 2002). Outside of the African context, Aljunid points out that while the private
sector delivers a significant proportion of healthcare in Asia, there is little published information
on the interactions between these providers (Aljunid, 1995). This is thus highlighted as an area
of need for future research and policy consideration.
4.4) PREFERENCE SETS ARE FORMED DYNAMICALLY DURING HEALTH SEEKING
Aside from the particular aspects of cross sector use discussed in detail above, the
qualitative data also highlighted numerous other instances of multiple care seeking within and
between sectors. Many of the focus group participants claimed to visit multiple public primary
care providers or multiple private primary care providers for a single illness episode and a
similar phenomenon was observed in the quantitative diary data. One of the key drivers of this
process appeared to be information shortages and asymmetries. For instance, patients only had
a working hypothesis regarding their illness with which to decide their health seeking strategy.
This was compounded by the fact that patients' information regarding the services offered by
different providers was often incomplete. Even when that information was complete providers
frequently failed to meet even reasonable expectations of care by 'missing' diagnoses or failing
to have stocks of the necessary drugs for treatment. The focus group participants in this study
commonly attempted to limit uncertainty by referring to opinion leaders - usually the senior
female member of the household - lending weight to the hypothesis that health seekers value
the accumulation and weighing of information, and that they satisfice rather than strictly
optimising utility.
The uncertainty that characterises heath seeking in this study has also been observed in
other applied studies. Salaniponi et al. collected quantitative data on care seeking for TB from
Government hospitals in Malawi. After the first provider contact, 79% of respondents in their
study required one or more additional contacts before a successful diagnosis was achieved
(Salaniponi et aI., 2000). Needham et al. conducted a series of indepth interviews with TB
affected patients in Zambia and concluded that diagnostic delay was significantly associated
with more than six health seeking encounters prior to diagnosis (Needham et aI., 2001). In their
study of treatment seeking for malaria in Tanzania, Oberlander and Elverdan conclude that
"therapy is best viewed as a process in which beliefs and actions are continuously debated and
evaluated throughout the course of treatment" (pg 1352 Oberlander and Elverdan, 2000).
In this sample population at least, multiple providers were selected on the basis of multiple
attributes - each of which may have had a different weighting for different individuals, or for
the same individual at different points in time (or for different episodes of illness). This raises
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doubts about the transitivity, reflexivity and even the consistency of these preferences sets
although theory may not be strictly violated because of the weaker axiom of revealed
preferences that allows for 'flat spots' on the utility curve (Griffiths, 2002; Varian, 1992). This
finding regarding unstable or variable preferences is not unique to this study and, in the
following quote Slovic identifies it as a key theme:
"One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research
during the past 2 decades is the view that people's preferences are often
constructed in the process of elicitation. This concept is derived in part from
studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation often
give rise to systematically different responses. These ''preference reversals"
violate the principle of procedure invariance that isfundamental to theories of
rational choice and raise difficult questions about the nature of human values.
If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how
can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist? Describing and
explaining such failures of invariance will require choice models of far greater
complexity than the traditional models". (pg 364 Slovic, 1995)
Aside from raising the challenges of measuring apparently 'changing' preferences, the
literature also identifies potential solutions. Gul and Pesendorfer have constructed a model of
revealed preference theory that allows for changing preferences (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004).
This model is particularly useful in explaining health seeking as an iterative process. Similarly,
decision field theory provides a method of analysis which allows for apparent violations of the
general axiom of revealed preferences by modelling decision making as a dynamic rather than
static process (Busemeyer and Diederich, 2002).
Multi-attribute utility theory provides another framework with which to formalise these
findings. This theory is based on expected utility theory, which states that if an appropriate
utility is assigned to each possible consequence and the expected utility of each alternative is
calculated - then the expected utility of an event is the sum of utilities of the payoffs multiplied
by their probabilities. In this framework then, expected rather than actual utility is maximised.
Instead of reflexivity, this theory assumes preference and utility independence. Tradeoffs
between attributes are thus explicitly measured (Ananda and Herath, In Press).
Zanakis et al. compare several methods for solving multi-attribute decision making
problems (MADM) when different techniques may yield different results for the same
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problem. The authors define MADM as one class of multiple criteria decision making models
in which a limited number of pre-specified, discrete alternatives require "inter or intra-attribute
comparisons, involving implicit or explicit tradeoffs"(pg 507-508). The authors found that the
number of alternatives increased the divergence of findings between methods and that the
distribution of the criterion weights affected the various methods differently (Zanakis et aI.,
1998).
This brief foray into decision field theory is not intended to provide a detailed overview of
the methods available but simply to indicate that although health seeking in this study appears to
be an iterative process involving complex tradeoffs between providers attributes, this finding
can be accommodated within a significant and growing body of theory.
4.5) IS PATIENT BEHAVIOUR INDETERMINATE?
In conclusion then, juxtaposing the tenets of traditional Neoclassical Utility Theory
alongside the findings from the primary research in this study, we see points of disjuncture. It is
difficult to incorporate the selection of goods on the basis of their intrinsic value(s) or
characteristics, and the idea that each good may have multiple characteristics and hence joint
outputs. These data suggest that health service providers are valued as the sum of their multiple
characteristics, and that those characteristics may yield different levels of utility (or have a
different preference rank); depending on the illness for which the patient is seeking help.
New Institutional Economics provides indeterminate theories of satisficing and ad-hoc
game theoretic models that can be optimised but can only be applied to a restricted set of health
seeking problems. The question then arises whether any general theory of consumption exists
that is both determinate and appropriate to the consumer behaviour observed in these data.
Section 4.1 of Chapter 2 describes the Lancaster model as an alternative to traditional utility
theory that is potentially determinate and able to cope with the identified traits of health seeking
behaviour. Applying this structure to the observed data then, patients would rank provider
characteristics such as privacy, drug availability, staff attitudes etc rather than ranking
providers. This ranking would be required to have the properties of completeness, transitivity
and reflexivity. Providers would then be ranked indirectly as a function of the characteristics
with which they are associated. Lancaster's model can cope with r characteristics, m activities
and n goods. As such, it can accommodate multiple providers, with multiple characteristics and
health seeking for multiple illnesses. It does however require that the characteristics possessed
by a good are the same, and in the same quantity for all consumers. The only element of
personal choice is thus the choice and ranking of characteristics and not the allocation of
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characteristics to goods. This model, as with the traditional model, is also a utility maximising
model with no explicit accommodation of satisficing strategies. While it is conceivable that
patients would have more information about the characteristics they would prefer from a
provider than their preference for the provider itself, it is less conceivable that they may be able
to assign those characteristics accurately to a provider and hence to consume the bundle of
goods that would yield the utility maximising collection of characteristics.
It is worth noting however, that this chapter has succeeded only In describing the
characteristics space in which utility maximisation, or satisficing, may take place. In so far as
we can apply Lancaster's general theory of consumer behaviour to the consumption of health
services in this market then, patient preferences may not be indeterminate. To reach a definite
conclusion however, requires some examination of the goods space, the related budget
constraint and the structure of the matrix B. The next chapter in this thesis initiates an
exploration of the budget constraint and the goods space, beginning - as this chapter has done -
within the framework of Neoclassical Utility Theory.
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CHAPTER SIX.:
PRICE AND INCOME CONSTRAINTS TO
HEALTH SEEKING
1) INTRODUCTION
Within the neoclassical framework individuals are seen as utility maximisers. The
assumption of non-satiation implies that the consumption of more is always preferred to the
consumption of less. What prevents an individual from consuming infinite amounts of a
preferred utility bundle is the budget constraint or budget line. The budget line is a frontier
separating the affordable from the unaffordable. It limits choice due to scarcity using a
monetary denominator. Even when health services are free at the point of use, some financial
limitation on consumption will usually apply as users pay for transport to reach a facility, or
forego income while attending the facility. In this respect, the budget line is more an accounting
phenomenon than a behavioural entity. It simply limits the quantity of goods purchased to the
income (or financial resources) of the purchaser (Griffiths, 2002).
This chapter extends the existing literature by contextualising health expenditure within a
broader framework of health seeking behaviour. After brief consideration of the way in which
budget constraints are commonly applied to health seeking, the analysis begins with an
inductive approach to the measurement of cost, allowing the relevant direct and indirect costs to
be identified by patients. The qualitative data in particular provide an opportunity to probe
whether individuals feel they have a choice in, or control over, their total health expenditure.
Expected prices are compared with actual expenditure and coping strategies are explored in
those instances where health expenditure may have exceeded or strained household resources.
Finally, we consider the level at which the financial aspects of health seeking are decided i.e.
individual versus household versus extra-household. These data provide an opportunity to test
the assumption that health expenditure decisions are taken at the household, rather than
individual level.
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1.1) HOW BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ARE USUALLY APPLIED TO HEALTH SEEKING
Health economists commonly argue that the observed utilisation of health services is
equivalent to revealed preferences for health service consumption. If individuals are consuming
a particular bundle, that consumption bundle (or combination of price and quantity) must
necessarily be on the demand curve and must therefore be a point of tangency between the
budget constraint and the utility curve (Griffiths, 2002).
Despite being referred to as an accounting phenomenon, definitions of price and income are
open to some discussion. The ambiguity of these definitions stems largely from the behavioural
dimension of the constraint function in an applied setting. For example, should prices include
only direct prices or should indirect prices also be included? If so, which indirect prices should
be included and how should they be quantified? Similarly, should expected or actual prices be
the metric of interest (assuming less than full information)? As far as income is concerned,
should we use only individual income or assume that health services are consumed from
household resources or even extra-household resources?
McIntyre et at. and Russell both provide detailed overviews of health expenditure studies,
identifying direct and indirect costs commonly used to quantify the economic consequences of
ill health (McIntyre et al.,2006; Russell, 2004). They conclude that the direct cost method is
more consistently applied, albeit with some variation in the recall period. In addition, while all
studies included in Russell's review included some measure of medical costs, some studies
excluded non-medical costs such as travel costs or the cost of special food to aid recovery.
Examples of direct medical costs commonly include user fees (or the price of traditional or
private care), drug costs, informal payments and payment for diagnostic tests among others
(Bolduc et aI., 1996; Ellis et aI., 1994; Hotchkiss et aI., 1998; Mariko, 2003). Expected, rather
than actual, prices are the most correct metric to use (Knowles, 1995) although actual prices are
often used in their stead (Lavy and Quigley, 1993).
Indirect costs commonly enumerate the cost of productivity losses and the opportunity costs
of care seeking. McIntyre et al. conclude that the treatment of indirect costs is heterogeneous,
with some studies enumerating productivity loss only as the number of days off work due to ill
health, while other studies also include the loss of productive life due to premature death
(McIntyre et aI., 2006). Studies of service use, rather than the economic consequences of health
seeking, frequently reduce any productivity loss of ill health to include only the travel and
waiting times attributable to a particular instance of health seeking, not accounting for any
additional productivity loss due to ill health (Chawla and Ellis, 2000; Dow, 1996; Gertler and
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Van der Gaag, 1990; Lavy and Quigley, 1993). Russell's review corroborates this finding and
comments that the greatest source of variation in these and similar studies lies in the methods
used to value productive time lost and the unit of analysis i.e. expressing costs per episode
versus per month etc. He also notes that no studies included in his review attempted to quantify
the costs of "sufJering, grief, or social exclusion arisingfrom illness" (pg 148 Russell, 2004).
As previously mentioned, the budget constraint is determined by the price of goods and the
income of the purchaser. The discussion above indicates that the 'price' of health services
usually incorporates both a direct and indirect cost. Turning to the other half of the equation
then, in applied health demand studies income is most usually captured by a measure of
household consumption or expenditure. Measures of household income are also used, albeit
less frequently (Dow, 1996). Some studies also collect data on remittances, or inter-household
transfers, in order to reflect the financial support provided by extended families in many
contexts (Wiseman et aI., 2005). However, this practice is by no means the norm and, even
when used, may not accurately measure the resources available to the extended family network
through irregular inter-household transfers. Household, rather than individual or extra-
household income/expenditure is thus the common measure of the financial resources available
for health seeking (Alderman and Gertler, 1989; Ellis et aI., 1994; Gertler and Van der Gaag,
1990). Russell argues that this perspective is preferred as decisions regarding treatment and
coping strategies are taken at the household level and illness costs fall on caregivers as well as
the sick (Russell, 2004).
1.2) DATA
As in previous chapters, the exposition begins with an analysis of the quantitative data.
This analysis uses data from all three primary quantitative surveys described in Chapter 3 i.e.
• The Introductory Household Survey, from which we obtained information
about individual and household income, grants, regular intra- and inter-
household transfers and the Medical AidlInsurance coverage.
• The Individual Health Survey, from which we obtain information about
expected prices.
• The Weekly Health Diary, from which we obtain ~ctual heath expenditure
over the period of the study.
This is followed by the qualitative data analysis with data drawn from the focus group
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discussions also detailed in Chapter 3. The qualitative data provide an opportunity to explore
the composition and impact of indirect costs as well as coping strategies when direct and
indirect costs exceed or strain household resources. It is these data that allow us to explore the
level at which financial decisions pertaining to health seeking are made i.e. individual,
household or extra-household. The methods used in this chapter are described in Sections 4.1
and 4.2 of Chapter 3.
2) QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
In this section, data from the Introductory Household Survey, the Introductory Health
Survey and the Weekly Health Diary are used to analyse the resources available for health
seeking i.e. individual income and household income. We also provide an analysis of expected
prices before calculating actual health expenditure. The analysis of health expenditure is
divided into direct and indirect costs to facilitate the exposition. These are then combined to
express total costs as a proportion of household income. As the same individuals completed the
Introductory Health Survey and the Weekly Health Diary, these data sets were merged to
facilitate analysis. The Introductory Household Survey was analysed separately and tables
based on data from this survey are clearly identified in the text.
2.1) FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR HEALTH SEEKING
This element of the analysis quantifies the potential financial resources available for health
seeking i.e. individual income, household income and extra-household resources where
applicable. Of course, health seeking is not the only likely drain on these financial resources,
which must provide for other needs such as food, housing, education etc.
2.1.1) INDIVIDUAL INCOME
Three forms of individual income were collected in the Introductory Household
Questionnaire Le. remittances, grants and employment income. Data on remittances were
collected for all household members while data on grants and employment income was only
collected for household members aged 10 and over. Employment was defined for respondents
as any work for payor family gain, including payment in kind such as food or housing.
Employment income was described as 'take home pay', inclusive of overtime, allowances and
bonus payments. The recall period was the previous month.
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2.1.1.a) Remittances
7.6% of all household members claimed to receive remittances and 82% of all respondents
receiving remittances were female. The mean remittance received was R385.22 (£27.11) and
the standard deviation was R692.44 (£48.73). The wide dispersion in the data may be due to an
outlier as one respondent claimed to receive a monthly remittance of over R4000 (£281.47).
Removing the outlier in the data significantly impacts the distribution of the data as the mean
drops to R293.78 (£20.72) and the standard deviation to R311.47 (£21.95).
Despite the fact that 82% of respondents receiving remittances were females, there was a
difference in the mean remittance received by men and women. As demonstrated in the graph
below, among the 45 individuals receiving positive remittances men received an average of
R410.62 (£28.89) while women received an average ofR268.51 (£18.89) per month.
Figure 6.1: Remittances by Gender Among Those Receiving Positive Remittances (N=45)t
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There is a similar differential in the mean level of remittances received by respondents
describing themselves as Coloured versus those describing themselves as Black! African.
Coloured respondents receive a mean remittance of R390.00 while their Black/African
counterparts receive a mean ofR168.75 per month. Statistical significance of these differences
• All currency conversions are calculated at an exchange rate of £1 =£14.21, the live mid-market exchange rate on 12/10/2006
(XE.com, 2006 (Last Accessed 13/10), The Universal Currency Converter (Website). www.xe.com.)
t Source: Introductory Household Survey
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has not been determined due to the small sub-sample of individuals receiving positive
remittances i.e. 18% of the total sample of individuals reported receiving positive remittances.
2.1.1.b) Receipt of Government Grants
Receipt of government grants was relatively low with only 6.97% of all respondents
claiming to receive any form of grant from the government. 8.5% and 4.8% of female and male
respondents respectively, claimed to receive a grant. Old age pensions were the most
commonly received grants as shown in the following table. Significance tests have not been
calculated on these differences due to the small sample bases .
Table 6.1: Receipt of Government Grants by Gende
Government grant Gender of Household Member (Q1.S)
(Q1.19)
Male Female Total
Old age pension 4 11 15
Column % 1.9 3.8 3.0
Disability pension 3 3' 6
Column % 1.4 1.0 1.2
Child support grant 0 4 4
Column % 0 1.4 0.8
Other government grant 3 7 10
Column % 1.4 2.4 2.0
No government grant 199 268 467
Column % 95.2 91.5 93.0
I Total 209 293 S02
I Column % 100 100 100
Amongst the high TB population groups, 9.5% of Coloured respondents and 4.2% of
Black! African respondents received any form of grant from the government. As before, old age
pensions were the most commonly received grant as demonstrated in the table below. Again,
significance tests have not been calculated on these differences due to the small sample bases.
t Source: Introductory Household Survey
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Table 6. §2: Receipt of Government Grants b)'_Population Group'
Government grant High TB Prevalence Population Groups
(Q1.19) Black! African Coloured Total
Old age pension 6 9 15
Column % 2.5 3.72 3.1
Disability pension 3 2 5
Column % 1.3 0.83 1.0
Child support grant 0 4 4
Column % 0 1.65 0.8
Other government grant 1 8 9
Column % 0.4 3.31 1.9
No government grant 230 219 449
Column % 95.8 90.5 93.2
I Total
1
240 1 2421 482
1: Column % 100 100 100
2.1.1.c) Employment Income
53% of respondents claimed to have worked for any form of payment in the last 12 months
and mean individual monthly employment income was R1249.39. However, individual
employment income varied significantly ** by gender and population, with females and
respondents describing their population group as Black! African, earning less on average than
males and those describing their population group as Coloured! These data are summarised in
the table below.
Tabl 63 1 divid I E I 1 tte n IVI ua mptoyment ncome
Summary Statistics for Individual Income (in ZAR)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total sample 494 1249.39 2402.64 0 17001
By population group:
Black! African 237 390.64 789.22 0 5000
Coloured 237 2087.31 3104.47 0 17001
By Gender:
Male 205 1734.99 2916.45 0 17001
Female 289 904.92 1889.43 0 16000
§ Source: Introductory I louse hold Survey
•• Significance in this case is calculated using the z-test for the difference of means at the 99% confidence level.
tt Source: Introductory Iiousehold Survey
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2.1.2) HOUSEHOLD INCOME
2.1.2.a) Calculating Monthly Income
Monthly household income was collected by asking the household respondent to specify the
amount of money the household received in a typical month from all household members,
including all earnings, pensions, grants and so on. Using this metric, the mean monthly
household income for the total sample of households was R4855.67 and, as with individual
income significant differences existed between population groups. In this dataset, language is
used as a proxy for population group as population group was not collected at the household
level. It is likely that Xhosa households are most likely to classify themselves as Black! African,
while the English and Afrikaans households in this sample are most likely to classify
themselves as 'Coloured'.
Table 6.4: Household Incomelt
Summary Statistics for Household Income (in ZAR)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total sample 141 4855.67 5556.65 0 27501
Main household language
English 34 8307.91 5621.01 0 19001
Xhosa 70 1698.29 2330.39 50 18740
Afrikaans 37 7656.78 6480.64 50 27501
2.1.~.b) Household crowding
Household crowding is presented here as an alternate measure of household resources. If
household income was to be shared by a larger number of household members, there may be
fewer resources to meet individual health needs.
The mean number of household members per household was 4.2. There was no significant
variation in household size by main household language (a proxy for population group). The
mean number of rooms per household is 4.3 however, for this variable there is significant
variation by language group. English and Afrikaans speaking households have a mean of 5.3
and 5.5 rooms respectively while Xhosa speaking households have an average of 3 rooms per
household.
These data were used to create a measure of crowding which calculated the number of
people per room in a household. The mean crowding ratio was 1.2 people per room. Xhosa
speaking households had the highest mean level of crowding at 1.7 people to a room compared
to 0.75 and 0.84 in English and Afrikaans speaking households respectively. Although this
'density' factor does not reflect on the stretching of a household's financial resources, it may
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reflect exposure to .pathogens Le. more crowded living conditions facilitate the spread of TB
bacilli. The limitations of these data however, do not allow the corroboration or rejection of this
possibility.
2.1.2.c) Medical Aid Coverage§ §
In the sampled populations, coverage by medical aid/insurance was approximately 230/0,
compared to a national average of 14.9% (Statistics South Africa, 2003). However, there was a
gender disparity in medical aid/insurance coverage with women less likely to be covered by
medical aid/insurance. 58.5% of those not covered by medical aid/insurance were female.
Similarly, 26.8% of men in the sample were covered by medical aid/insurance, compared to
19.9% of women. These differences are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
Figure 6.2.' Medical A id Coverage by Gender'"
male female
Covered by medical aid or medical insurance (01.28)
Graphs by q1.S gender of the household member
Not covered by medical aid or medical insurance (01.28)
N-597
Differences in medical aid/insurance coverage are even more marked between the high TB
prevalence population groups. As Figure 6.2 shows, 41% of Coloured respondents are covered
by medical aid/insurance compared with 4% of Black/African respondents. These differences
are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
:l=f: Source: Introductory Household Survey
§§ In South Africa, medical insurance is more commonly referred to as Medical Aid. The coverage of these policies varies
from full coverage of all health expenditures, to coverage of costs associated with hospitalization only .
••• Source: Introductory Household Survey
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Figure 6.3: Medical Aid Coverage by Population Group
Black/African Coloured
4.04%
95.96%
Covered by medical aid or medical insurance (01.28)
Graphs by High TB Prevalence Population Groups
Not covered by medical aid or medical insurance (01.28)
N=576
2.1.3) EXTRA-HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES
Each week during the data collection, individual respondents were asked to enumerate their
income from work or trading, pensions, unemployment benefits, disability grants, child welfare
grants, income from savings and 'other' sources. Over the course of the diary studies, all
respondents reported receiving income from 'other' sources in at least one week. Of these
contributions to household resources (and considering only the largest additional source), 79%
were considered gifts, 13% were considered loans and 8% were considered remittances. 62% of
these payments came from persons living outside the household. The most common payers
include relatives (often distant), friends and boyfriends. These data suggest that extra-
household resources increased the total financial resources potentially available for health
seeking.
2.2) DIRECT COSTS OF HEALTH SEEKING
The following analysis shows the expected price of health care consumption. Actual prices
paid for medical care are then analysed, including diagnostic tests and drugs where relevant.
Finally, travel costs are incorporated as direct costs of care seeking.
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2.2.1) EXPECTED PRICE OF A PROVIDER CONSULTATION
In the Introductory Health Survey, all respondents were asked how much they would expect
to pay for a consultation with each of a list of providers. Transport costs and drug costs were
explicitly excluded for clarity. These expected costs thus represent only a proportion of
expected direct costs.
Table 6.5 below summarises the amounts that the diary participants expected to pay for a
consultation with each of the service providers listed in the survey. On average, a private doctor
was expected to charge over six times more than a government clinic. Interestingly, public
clinics were not expected to be free at the point of use although they were expected to be the
'cheapest' health service provider. Traditional healers were expected to cost more than private
doctors. There is a high incidence of missing data on the expected prices of Traditional Healers,
Spiritual Healers, Private Clinics and Private Hospitals. This may reflect lower levels of
interaction with these providers.
TahIe 6.5: Expected Price of a Consultation (N=250)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Public/Government Hospital 226 R46.94 R 107.97 0 1000
Public/Government Clinic 224 R 15.06 R 32.91 0 250
Private Hospital 181 R 173.11 R 307.97 0 3000
Private Clinic 177 R 155.85 R 308.42 0 3000
Private Doctor/Specialist 235 R 95.61 R 81.41 0 1000
Traditional Healer 82 R 108.38 R 178.50 0 800
Spiritual Healer 103 R 35.40 R 103.54 0 800
Pharmacy/Chemist 182 R44.34 R 57.16 0 500
2.2.2) OVERVIEW OF DIRECT HEALTH EXPENDITURE
Approximately 31% of respondents consulted a health service provider at least once during
the period of the health diary placement. Approximately 40% of first consultations resulted in
at least one further consultation and almost 5% of initial consultations resulted in more than 5
repeat consultations (to the same or different service providers). Interestingly, a certain
'determination' factor seems to emerge; up to the 6th visit, the probability of an additional
consultation increases with each successive revisit to a provider. After 6 visits, the sample sizes
become too small for reliable analysis. This pattern may indicate a dynamic commitment
problem i.e. once patients have invested in the initial visit, the only way to recoup that
investment is to keep seeking help until cured. Non-price determinants of multiple-care seeking
were discussed in considerable detail in the previous chapter.
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Overall, there were 324 episodes when at least one health service provider was consulted.
For each consultation, respondents were asked to specify the amount spent on the consultation,
the amount spent on travel to the visit and the amount spent on drugs or medicines. The
following tables are calculated only for those respondents who visited at least one service
provider during the diary placement period.
Table 6 6 Average lreel ea I xpen iture
Overview of Direct Health Expenditure (in ZAR)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Direct health expenditure 324 90.75 266.36 0 4100
Transportation costs 324 12.48 51.16 0 600
Consultation costs 324 45.33 239.17 0 4000
Drug Costs 324 32.94 80.62 0 770
D' R I hE d'
Consultation costs comprised approximately 50% of average direct health expenditure,
while drug costs comprised approximately 36% and travel costs approximately 14% of average
direct health expenditure (Table 6.7). Gender differences in drug costs are significant at the
90% confidence level, with men having paid significantly more for drugs than women. No
other significant gender differences in direct costs were observed. Differences in direct
costs/expenditure by population group as shown in Table 6.7 were however, more marked.
Overall differences in direct costs by population group are significant at the 90% confidence
level, as are differences in transportation and consultation costs. Differences in drug costs are
significant at the 95% confidence level, with respondents classifying their population group as
Black! African having spent significantly less on drugs than those classifying themselves as
Coloured.
t: hI 67 A D R I hE d h Ponulati Ga e verage irect ea t xpen iture 'Y p ation roup
Direct Health Expenditure by Population Group
Population Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Direct health expenditure Black!African 208 65.37 147.77 0 1040
Coloured 97 138.41 427.36 0 4100
Transportation costs Black/African 208 15.30 63.01 0 600
Coloured 97 7.13 12.73 0 80
Consultation costs Black!African 208 23.55 86.47 0 1005
Coloured 97 87.15 412.37 0 4000
Drug costs Black!African 208 26.52 86.57 0 770
Coloured 97 44.13 64.75 0 360
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2.2.3) INDIRECT COSTS OF HEALTH SEEKING
The only indirect cost enumerated in the survey was waiting time. Respondents were asked
how long they spent waiting at each provider visited that week. These waiting times are
summarised below. The longest average waiting time was observed for traditional healers,
public clinics and other public sector providers, while the shortest waiting time was observed
for pharmacies or chemists.
11. hI 6 8 A W( .. 11' b P ida e verage 'atttng ime 'Y rovt er
Average waiting time per provider (in hours)
Provider Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Public/government hospital 30 2.8 3.0 0 9.8
Public/government clinic 106 4.1 5.4 0 45
Other public sector provider 5 4.2 3.7 0 9.8
Private hospital 14 2.8 3.2 0 9.8
Private clinic 7 3.5 3.2 0 9.8
Private doctor/specialist 78 2.3 4.1 0 28.8
Traditional healer 6 4.8 3.7 0.3 9.8
Spiritual or alternative healer 30 2.8 3.2 0 16
Pharmacy/chemist 107 0.7 1.3 0 5.8
Health facility provided by employer 2 2.0 2.1 0.5 3.5
Other private health service provider 11 1.7 2.5 0 7.5
Health treatment/advice from a friend 67 2.9 6.6 0 45
There was no variation in average waiting times by gender however, respondents who
identified themselves as 'Black/African' waited significantly longer on average than
respondents who identified themselves as 'Coloured' (p=O.05).
11. hI 6 9 A Wt" 11' hD hi Ga e .. verage . 'atttng tme 'Y emograp. le roup
Average waiting time by demographic group (in hours)
Demographic group Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Male 71 2.0 2.4 0 10.6
Female 253 2.0 4.0 0 45
Black/African 208 2.9 4.3 0 45
Coloured 97 0.5 1.1 0 8
The waiting time was converted to a monetary equivalent using an opportunity cost method.
As data were available on .both individual and household incomes, the opportunity cost of
waiting times could have been calculated on an individual or household basis. The individual
method biases against those whose work tasks may not generate income directly (e.g. women
and the elderly) but whose activities are important for the generation of income by other
household members. As such, a household income method is utilised here.
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The household income method adopted in this analysis takes the total monthly household
income and divides it by the total number of household members over the age of 18. This cut-
off age reflects the age of legal consent and the age at which most South Africans would have
completed their schooling. It is reasonable to assume that respondents above this age are
expected to contribute either to the household income or to the running of the household. This
method assumes that all household members over the age of 18 contribute equally to the earning
power of the household as a unit.
Each individual's share of household income is reduced to an hourly equivalent and then
multiplied by the reported waiting time in hours. The hourly equivalent is calculated by
assuming a 30.5 day month, with 22.S working days and 8 hours of work per working day. As
expected, there was little variation by gender but significant variation by population group
(p=O.OS). The population group differential may stem from significant variation in household
income by population group i.e. so-called Black! African households earned significantly less
than their Coloured counterparts without having significantly fewer household members. As
such, the opportunity cost of their time would be significantly less per hour.
Table 6.10: Opportunity Cost of Waiting Time by Demographic Group
Opportunity cost per hour by demographic group
Demographic group Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Male 71 4.7 5.6 0 27.8
Female 250 4.6 7.1 0.1 47.2
Black!African 208 1.7 2.9 0 27.8
Coloured 96 9.9 9.0 0.5 47.2
2.2.4) TOTAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE
Total health expenditure is calculated as the direct cost of the consultation, drugs and
transport, plus the indirect cost of the waiting time. Using this metric, direct costs of care
seeking comprise 71% of total costs on average, while indirect costs comprise 29% of total costs
(Table 6.11).
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1( hi 6 11 D' dl di c RI' 1( IR IhEa e irect an n rect osts e ative to ala ea I xpen iture
Overview of Health Expenditure
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total health expenditure 324 95.09 266.70 0 4100
Direct health expenditure 324 90.75 266.36 0 4100
Opportunity cost of waiting time 321 4.38 10.92 0 122.23
Direct health expenditure as a proportion of total 302 71% 0.40 0 1
expenditure
Opportunity cost of waiting time as a proportion of total 300 29% 0.40 0 1
expenditure
Calculating total health expenditure by population group then, we observe that there were
significant differences in total health expenditure (p<O.10), direct expenditure as a proportion of
total expenditure (p<O.05) and opportunity cost i.e. indirect expenditure as a proportion of total
expenditure (p<O.05). Respondents identifying themselves as Black/African spent less on
average than those describing themselves as Coloured, however the indirect opportunity cost of
waiting time comprised a significantly greater proportion of total health expenditure for
Black/African respondents. There were no statistically significant differences in total health
expenditure by gender (Table 6.12).
1( hi 6 12 C RI' 1( IR IhE bPI . Ga e osts e alive la ala ea I xpen iture ty opu ation roup
Health Expenditure by Population Group
Population Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total health expenditure Black!African 208 69.57 148.97 0 1062.57
Coloured 97 143.68 427.10 0 4100
Opportunity cost of waiting time Black!African 208 4.20 7.26 0 62.5
Coloured 96 5.33 16.82 0 122.23
Direct health expenditure as a proportion Black!African 200 650/0 0.41 0 1
of total expenditure
Coloured 87 820/0 0.35 0 1
Opportunity cost of waiting time as a Black!African 200 35% 0.41 0 1
proportion of total expenditure
Coloured 87 18% 0.35 0 1
2.2.4.a) Expenditure by Socio-Economic Status
To facilitate analysis by socio-economic status, household income was used to calculate
income quintiles. Table 6.13 demonstrates that mean total health expenditure increased for
higher quintiles of household income. Conversely, waiting times decreased for higher quintiles
of household income. This may be indicative of increased private sector use by higher income
households.
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Table 6.13: Health Costs by Income Quintile
Expenditure, Waiting Time and Opportunity Cost by Income Quintile
Average Total Health Expenditure
Income Quintlle Ohs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
One (lowest) 106 52.04 98.86 0 700
Two 63 67.03 123.17 0 708.33
Three 60 84.53 209.68 0 1062.57
Four 57 124.52 155.34 0 830
Five (highest) 34 132.37 141.19 0 485
Average Waiting Time
One 106 2.68 3.65 0 28.75
Two 63 3.12 ·5.91 0 45
Three 60 1.97 2.48 0 9.75
Four 57 0.35 0.77 0 3
Five 35 0.74 1.67 0 8
Average Opportunity Cost
One 106 0.82 0.61 0 2.53
Two 63 1.40 0.79 0.51 4.17
Three 60 3.27 1.26 1.38 6.25
Four 57 9.23 .7.17 3.15 30.56
Five 35 16.85 9.48 5.00 47.22
The following graph is a concentration curve of total health expenditure amongst users of
health services (including those who did not have to pay for the services they used). The graph
indicates for instance, that 60% of the population accounts for 40% of the total expenditure.
Figure 6.4: Concentration curve of Total Health Expenditure
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To calculate total health expenditure as a proportion of monthly household income it was
necessary to transform individual health spending into a household level variable. This was
done by adding the health expenditures for all participating household members over the course
of the diary placements. As the length of the diary placement was 8 weeks, this total figure was
halved to obtain an estimate of total monthly health expenditure. This was then calculated as a
proportion of monthly household income and the summary statistics for this figure are
summarized in the table below. On average, total monthly health expenditure comprises 14% of
monthly household income. There is a significant difference between population groups
however, with Black! African households spending an average of 250/0 of monthly household
income and Coloured households spending an average of 2% of monthly household income
(p<0.10). Health spending by Black! African households would be considered catastrophic by
this metric (Russell, 2004). Calculating similar proportions using only direct health spending
yields little difference in the findings.
Table 6.14: Health expenditure as a proportion of household income
Total monthly health expenditure as aproportion of total monthly household income
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min . Max
Black!African 71 0.25 1.19 0 9.73
Coloured 63 0.02 0.06 0 0.44
Total 140 0.14 0.85 0 9.73
Table 6.15: Total monthly health expenditure as a proportion of total monthly household
income
Direct monthly health expenditure as a proportion of total monthly household income
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Black!African 71 0.25 1.18 0 9.66
Coloured 63 0.02 0.06 0 0.43
Total 140 0.13 0.85 0 9.66
2.2.4.b) Predictors of health expenditure
As described in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, the Heckman model is used to analyse the
determinants of health expenditure in the study population. As mentioned in that chapter, total
health expenditure is a limited dependent variable that suffers from sample selection bias i.e.
despite being continuous for much of its distribution, it has a mass of observations at zero and
positive expenditure is determined by health service use. The Heckman model can
accommodate zero expenditure among users who did not pay for that utilisation, quite
separately from non-users of health services who did not spend. It can also accommodate the
fact that some variables will impact expenditure through their impact on service use. The
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specification below is generated using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure with
robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the household level.
As explained in Chapter 3, the Heckman model consists of a selection and regression
equation where the independent variables in the selection equation are expected to affect the
probability of health service use but not the total health expenditure itself. This selection
equation is very basic compared with the more detailed demand model constructed in Chapter 7
however, this reduced model of utilisation is appropriate for the current purpose as applied on
pooled data. The independent variables used in the regression and selection models are
described and summarised in Table 6.16 over the page.
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As Table 6.16 illustrates, a number of variables have missing values, particularly the
expected price of a consultation at private hospital, the expected price of consultation at a
private clinic, the expected price of a consultation at a pharmacy, the quality of a private clinic,
the quality of a private hospital, physical health and mental health. These observations may be
missing due to attrition or item non-response. Although the Heckman model used in this
chapter is being run on a pooled sample, the random effects panel models used in the next
chapter are computationally intensive models that use a large number of degrees of freedom in
the calculation process and will drop an individual from the dataset entirely if the values for any
variable at any time point are missing. As such, these missing values can have a significant
destabilising effect on the models and two choices are thus presented to the analyst: drop the
variables with high numbers of missing values from the specification altogether, or impute the
missing values and continue to use the variables in the specifications. Imputation is likely to
have a lesser effect on the models than the omitted variable bias caused by dropping the
variables altogether. As such, missing values for price and quality were imputed by age gender
and population group. The health status variables were similarly imputed by age, gender,
population group and household income. The new summary statistics for the imputed variables
are reported in Table 6.17.
Table 6.18 summarises the results of the Heckman model. The Wald chi-squared test
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors are all zero, indicating the
model's overall statistical significance. A t-test on the statistical significance of lambda rejects
the null hypothesis of no selection effect and confirms that the estimated selection coefficient is
significant. This indicates that the Heckman model is the appropriate specification for the
current purpose and that the coefficients must be adjusted for the selection effect before they are
interpreted. The negative sign on the selection coefficient indicates that observed health
expenditure is biased downwards by the selection effect and that an individual with sample
average characteristics spends less on health than an individual with population average
characteristics. The sample consists only of those who have used health services while the
population consists on both users and non-users of health services. This may suggest that the
average service user is more likely to use public services which are free at the point of use and
are possibly located close to home, thus avoiding both the costs of consultation and the costs of
transport. The public provider accessed by the average user may also have sufficient drug
stocks to provide drug treatment without requiring the patient to pay for drugs from a private
chemist. This may also indicate barriers to accessing 'quality' public care if the total sample
does not have an equal probability of using these services and hence spending less on health.
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The variables in the selection equation are not interpreted as this is not intended as a
comprehensive model of service utilisation but rather a control on selection bias in total health
expenditurell". As such, the emphasis is placed on the significant predictors of total health
expenditure in the expenditure equation. These significant predictors include age, access to
extra-budgetary funds from outside the household, and the expected price of a consultation at a
pharmacy. Age has a positive but diminishing effect on total health expenditure in the sample
population (p<O.OI), increasing total expenditure by an average of R14.30 (£1) per year.
Access to extra-budgetary funds also has a positive effect, increasing expenditure by
approximately R47.l8 (£3.33) on average (p<O.I). Finally, the expected price ofa consultation
with a pharmacy has a positive effect on total expenditure with a high expected price predicting
higher total health expenditure (p<O.I).
Table 6.18: Regression Analysis olTotal Health Expenditure
HECKMAN MODEL OF HEALTH EXPENDITURE
Expenditure equation: Total Health Expenditure (incl. Waitinf! Time)
b t
Age at last birthday 14.30*** (3.10)
Age in years squared -0.16*** (-3.06)
Log of Household Income 15.86 (1.22)
Crowding 7.58 (0.53)
Covered by medical aid/insurance 2.79 (0.06)
Years of Education -1.10 (-0.28)
Black! African 4.70 (0.13)
Financial situation 19.17 (1.48)
Female 9.58 "(0.30)
Received Extra-budgetary Funds from Outside the Household 47.18* (1.87)
Participates in community savings scheme 7.73 (0.34)
Receives remittances 53.60 (1.37)
Expected price of consultation at a public hospital 0.08 (1.24)
Expected price of consultation at a public clinic -0.00 (-0.33)
Expected price of consultation at a private hospital 0.17 (0.97)
Expected price of consultation at a private clinic -0.20 (-1.08)
Expected price of consultation at a private doctor 0.26 (0.85)
Expected price of consultation at a pharmacy 1.03* (1.77)
Overall quality expected from a public hospital -0.11 (-0.01)
Overall quality expected from a public clinic 6.04 (0.84)
Overall quality expected from a private hospital -15.47 (-1.16)
Overall quality expected from a private clinic -21.58 (-1.28)
Overall quality expected from a private doctor 3.85 (0.27)
Overall quality expected from a pharmacy 8.73 (0.69)
Constant -359.15 (-1.82)
Selection Equation: Used a health service provider in the last week
Age at last birthday -0.04· (-1.71)
Age in years squared 0.00 (1.58)
Female 0.24* (1.69)
Crowding -0.19*** (-3.17)
Years of Education 0.04* ( 1.68)
ttt For a full analysis of health service use see Chapter Seven of this thesis
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Black/African 0.25* (1.74)
Mental Summary Measure -0.02*** (-3.47)
Physical Summary Measure -0.06*** (-9.96)
Constant 2.77*** (4.36)
Diagnostic statistics
Wald Chi-Squared Test 34.12
LR test 2.251
Rho -0.18
Sigma 127.43
Lamda -22.81
No. of cases 1660
No. of cases 1660
The regression specified above was estimated using a bottom up or simulated stepwise
approach. This helped to identify the effect of each successive independent variable on the
regression as a whole. Independent variables were added in the order that they appear in the
table above. Each successive variable reduced the adjusted standard error of the expenditure
equation, without impacting on the significance of the overall estimation.
Interestingly, the log of household income was a significant indicator of total health
expenditure (p<O.05) until the addition of the medical aid variable at which point neither
household income nor medical aid were significant indicators of total health expenditure
suggesting multicollinearity. Furthermore, while household income was a significant predictor
of service expenditure, crowding was not a significant indicator of service use. With the
addition of the medical aid variable into the regression/expenditure equation, crowding becomes
a significant predictor in the selection equation (p<O.O1).
Despite the use of the stepwise approach and the inclusion of all variables one might expect
to impact total health expenditure, the adjusted standard error of the expenditure equation
remains large. This, problem does not appear to be remediable but the inefficiency of the model
is noted, as is the limitation in its explanatory power that results
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3) QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
This section considers insights from the group discussions that inform the way in which the
budget constraint i.e. price and income considerations, may impact health seeking behaviour.
As mentioned in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the focus group discussions were allowed to flow
naturally with the assistance of a discussion guide to ensure that all major points were covered.
Comments regarding health expenditure were raised during a broader discussion of participants'
last illness episode::t. Respondents generally mentioned what aspects of care seeking required
out of pocket payments, and whose money was used to meet those payments. The actual
amounts paid were mentioned in most instances.
The analysis follows a similar structure to the quantitative data analysis, considering both
direct costs and indirect costs. This section extends the quantitative data analysis by providing
more detail on expected direct costs. Indirect costs are also analysed further to identify
productivity losses aside from the cost of waiting times that may impact on individual or
household resources. Before concluding the analysis of costs, the unexpected or uncertain
nature of health costs is considered. This is followed by a detailed analysis of coping strategies
that gives some insight into whether health care is consumed out of individual, household or
extra-household resources and how households survive if and when those resources are
exceeded. The qualitative data provide an opportunity to explore how basic and additional
resources are mobilised.
3.1) DIRECT COSTS
The most common direct costs for health seeking as mentioned by respondents during the
discussion were provider fees (or consultation costs), drug costs and transport costs.
3.1.1) CONSULTATION COSTS
Focus group participants displayed a ready familiarity with service prices in both the private
and public sectors. They appeared to recall both the cost of their last provider visit and how that
cost was met. Only when a medical aid company met the cost was an individual unaware of the
price of services and these instances were rare.
These respondents expected that a visit with a private general practitioner would cost
between RIOO-RI20. While fees for primary care in the public sector were not considered the
norm, the quote below shows that, if a fee was paid, it was approximately R8. The reported fee
itt The full discussion guide is provided in Appendix 1
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for a tertiary hospital stay in the public sector was variable within a narrow bound and the
quoted figures ranged between R53 and R80. Only one respondent was hospitalised in a private
hospital. This was for an appendectomy and it was paid for by his parent's medical aid so the
respondent was not aware of the cost.
"Moderator: [D]id you pay fees when you went to the [private] doctors?§§§
Respondent: Yes,nu 0
Moderator: Whopaid?
Respondent: I did
Moderator: [And did you have topay ...] At the clinic?
Respondent: I didn 'Ipay a cent
Respondent: Groote Schuur [the tertiary public hospital] sent me an
account but I guess that's because I slept there for a month
Moderator: OK Did you settle the account?
Respondent: Yes. Mom went 10 them and asked to pay the money in
instalments until it was paid up." Group 6, Female, TB affected
"Moderator: Is it notfree now, the public side?
Respondent: It isfree but they sometimes ask whether you have ajob or not.
But if you're unemployed they help you anyway. The clinic I used to go to
that's here in town used to charge me R8. " Group 8, Male, TB affected
Another direct cost mentioned in one group was the cost of interest payments on unpaid
bills in the public sector. This was mentioned in reference to hospital bills particularly and is
not given further attention here due to the focus on care seeking for primary services. There
were no instances in which respondents mentioned leaving private sector bills unpaid.
3.1.2) DRUG COSTS
Although respondents did not mention paying for drugs at clinics, drug shortages frequently
forced patients to purchase drugs from private pharmacies or chemists. In those instances when
respondents were prepared to return to a clinic multiple times before obtaining the required
medication no direct cost appears to have been incurred, however it is likely that a larger
indirect cost will have been incurred and this is discussed in more detail in the next section.
Patients who felt they had little choice but to purchase the medication at a private chemist
incurred a direct cost for the medicines purchased.
§§~ This quotation has been re-ordered to facilitate understanding out of context.
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"Moderator: On that note, what can you tell me about medication at these
[public clinics/day hospitals]?
Respondent 1: There are none. The doctor will write down what I should get,
I get to their dispensary, there is none. I will be told to come back the next day,
it is the same all the time.
Respondent 2: Sometimes, you get to the doctor's room and you are coughing,
before he or she can say anything, she tells you, there are no cough mixture.
You get to the clinic on Friday, you do not get what the doctor said you should
have and that means, having to wait until Monday. You are in pain, you need
something but you have to wait for Monday.
Moderator
medication?
Respondent:
Is that a common problem? Clinics running short of
Very much so". Group 2, Female, not TB affected
"Moderator:
Respondent:
[Name], did you get medication when you were sick?
I got them, to drink and I had to go and take tablets from the
hospital but as time went on, I stopped going there I bought from the chemists
because at times, there were none at the hospital." Group 4, Male, not TB
affected
A number of participants spoke of private doctors dispensing drugs directly; in fact this
seemed to be considered the norm. When respondents spoke of the fee for a private
consultation, the fee was a single fee that generally included the medication. Respondents did
not distinguish between the consultation cost and drug cost in these instances, both services
were considered a single package with a single fee. When sharing the experience of their last
illness, respondents who used private providers and obtained medicines from those providers
directly reported paying fees ranging from RIIO-RISO.
"Moderator: So the Doctor gave you medicine and you took it?
Respondent: Yes
Moderator: Did you have topay for it?
Respondent: Yes, you pay for it, yes. You pay 150 orsomething and he gives
you that "dinguses" [generic] medicine." Group 3, Male, not TB affected
TB affected respondents only reported receiving their medication from public clinics. No
mention was made of paying for these drugs in any of the groups.
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3.1.3) TRAVELCOSTS
Walking was the most common mode of transport for accessing public clinics even when
severely ill. If respondents were particularly weak they would have a family member - usually
a mother or sister ., accompany them for the journey. These companions were more common
for male than female participants.
"Moderator: How do youfeel about the pills and the injections?
Respondent: It isfor your own best health. Not a problem to me. I walked
to the clinic". Group 5, Female, TB affected
"Respondent: [Myfamily] took it well. They support me. Infact, when I was
really ill my elder sister used to accompany me to the clinic. Nyanga clinic is
quite a distance from where I live and there were times when I could hardly
walk." Group 8, Male, TB affected
"Respondent: [My sister] took me to the clinic in Nyanga. Samples of my
sputa were taken. I couldn't walk. She had to carry me on her back. My pants
would slide to thefloor, I was that skeletal." Group 8, Male, TB affected
Ambulances were also frequently used, particularly by TB-affected participants before their
first successful diagnosis, but also but other participants. Ambulances transported patients to
day hospitals, tertiary hospitals and were also used by clinics to transfer patients if referred
between public providers (most commonly from primary to tertiary).
"Respondent: I coughed a lot ... My aunt and cousin went to phone the
ambulance. They took me to the day hospital and they took x-rays of my lungs.
Group 5, Female, TB affected
"Moderator: Who took you?
Respondent 1: The ambulance.
Respondent 2: I was in the yard I couldn't get up. The ambulance came and
they picked me up - put me in the chair." Group 7, Male, TB affected
Other forms of transport mentioned by participants included taxis, public transport (buses)
and family members with cars. Less commonly mentioned forms of transport included paying a
neighbour or other person to provide a lift, or using clinic run transport servicesl". Paid
•••• Clinic run transport services were only mentioned by one group. This did not appear to be a widely available or
widely utilized service.
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neighbours were almost exclusively used as a means of getting to tertiary hospitals rather than
primary care providers.
"If my sister couldn't [walk] with me she'd give me a taxi fare. I could get a
taxi just next to my place. Thefirst weeks I couldn't even walk up the stairs. I
had to use a wheelchair." Group 8, Male, TB affected
Walking, public ambulances close family members with cars and clinic supplied
transportation were the only forms of transport that did not necessarily incur a direct cost.
Although all other forms of transport would have incurred a cost, and respondents did speak of
that cost in broad terms, the exact sum of that cost was seldom if ever mentioned.
3.2) INDIRECT COSTS
The indirect costs of care seeking mentioned by the group participants pertained primarily
to time spent accessing services and productivity losses (either at home or at work).
Respondents did not mention time spent travelling to service providers however waiting times
were a dominant theme. All respondents mentioned some productivity loss even for the most
minor illness if they were unable to perform their usual household chores or responsibilities.
TB affected respondents reported significant productivity losses as most lost or left their jobs
when they were diagnosed with TB.
Interestingly, indirect costs were not incurred only by the patient or sufferer. Frequently,
other household members would accompany the health seeker to a service provider, visit the
service provider in place of the patient to collect chronic medicines (particularly TB
medication), take on the domestic tasks that the sick person was unable to perform, take on the
role of full time carer or even 'subsidise' the illness financially. These roles were normally
taken on by a female family member, usually a mother or a sister.
Each indirect cost, and the implications for both patient and carer, is discussed in more
detail below.
3.2.1) WAITING TIMES
Waiting times have already been given some attention in the previous chapter, when
unpleasant or frustrating waiting was discussed in considerable detail. In this section, we
restrict the analysis to the duration of waiting and the burden of waiting on a carer where
appropriate.
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Most respondents complained about lengthy waiting times in public clinics and day
hospitals both for their own general illnesses and when they had to visit clinics with, or on
behalf of, others. The impact of waiting times on carers accompanying respondents during an
illness episode was not mentioned.
"Respondent 1: If you go to the day hospital you have to sit and wait for 3 to 4
hours. Then they still show you away because you might not have enough
money or the doctor can't see you.
Respondent 2: Sometimes you might sit there Jor the Whole day. Last time I
had to spend 5 hours in that queue.
Respondent 3: You are sometimes very ill and then you have to sit there and
wait for your turn.
Respondent 4: I had to collect the old lady's pills. I didn't go myself-only
had to go andfetch the old lady's pills. I have to get someone to look after her.
I couldn't believe my eyes - it was 3hOOin the afternoon - I had to leave
without the medicine. I had to leave the next morning at 5hOOto get her
medicine. They only gave me some oj the pills when I got there." Group 1,
Female, not TB affected
TB-affected respondents had the additional cost of waiting for medication daily for the full
duration of the treatment. However, this was not always perceived as a burden as respondents
seemed aware that this was their only hope of treatment and that they would not have to pay for
the treatment. This regular waiting only became 'problematic' for respondents when the drugs
were not ready or available at the times specified for collection. TB affected respondents who
were too ill to collect their own medication would attempt to enlist the help of others to collect
the medication.
USa my boyfriend went with me to the clinic and I was diagnosed with TB. He
was very supportive, encouraging me to take"treatment. When I couldn't go to
the Centre myself he'd go and Jetch my treatment from [the clinic] himself.
Sometimes 'I would ask someone who was going to the Centre to get my
treatmentfor me." Group 6, Female, TB affected
3.2.2) JOB LOSS
Actual job loss was only mentioned by those respondents affected by TB however almost
all respondents in any form of employment were concerned about - or affected by - temporary
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absence from work for health seeking. In the latter case, respondents sought to minimise the
impact of health seeking on their work by using service providers who were available out of
work hours e.g. chemists rather than doctors or clinics.
"Respondent: Yes and besides, when I'm working, I can't take off. I don't
want to stay out of work.
Moderator: So you would have gone to the Chemist, because he would have
given you a "Quickfix"
Respondent: Yes, he would have given me something good. I don't know, I
really don't know why that always happens, but the Chemist will give me
something.
Moderator: And it will befixed?
Respondent: And yes, he'll tell me, "Okay, this is more expensive, but this will
help you very quickly. "
Moderator: And that means you're not taking offwork?
Respondent: Yes and that I can do after work. Like if I get at home, I get at
home say round about 7 or 6." Group 3,Male, not TB affected
With the exception of only one respondent, every TB affected participant in employment
left that employment when they were diagnosed with TB. In some instances the employer
initiated the split however, in the majority of instances there seemed to be an acceptance that
you could not work while on medication. This was largely attributed to the fact that medication
needed to be collected daily. The one respondent who was able to/chose to stay in formal
employment during his TB treatment had his treatment brought to him daily by community care
workers - he was the only person to mention receiving such care. Most of these participants
believed they would be able to return to work on completion of the treatment.
"Moderator: Didyou work before you got sick?
Respondent: I am a brick-layer.
Moderator: And now?
Respondent 1: I can't get work. The doctor told me that I am not allowed to
work - the dust - the cement dust is very dangerous. I can't work now.
Moderator: Did you still work at that stage?
RespondentZ: Yes. That is before I went to the doctor." Group 7, Male, TB
affected
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"Moderator: You worked at that stage. What happened at work?
Respondent: When I heard that it was positive they told me to go for an
injection. I must be there every day.
Moderator: Did it take up all your time? Did you have to leave work
because of this?
Respondent: I didn't work therefor long - say about a month.
Moderator: You don't earn any money now?
Respondent: No." Group 5, Female, TB affected
"Respondent: Yes, they were supportive, very supportive. I went to mom
when Ifirst went to the hospital to see what was wrong .and also when I went to
get the results she was with me. I was still working at the time. [My mother]
was the one who took my letter of resignation to work. To this day she ensures
that I take my tablets." Group 6, Female, TB affected
3.2.3) OTHER PRODUCTIVITY LOSSES
The most common form of productivity loss ,due to all illnesses was the inability to take on
normal household responsibilities. In these instances, inter- or intra-household substitution of
labour frequently took place to ensure tasks were completed. This responsibility for this
substitution most commonly fell on female household members, particularly sisters and
mothers. In some instances however, the role fell onto a male partner (or in one instance a
brother) who would take on the respondent's domestic tasks.
"Moderator: What did you do at home then - what was your job?
Respondent: I had to help my mother. I got ill and I couldn't help her
anymore. Ijust wanted to sleep. I couldn't do the work anymore.
Moderator: Anyone else helped you?
Respondent: My mother did - she was always there for -me." Group 5,
Female, TB affected
"Moderator: OK Wereyou still able to keep doing household chores?
Respondent: No. In the first weeks I felt weak and I vomited all the time
even though I wasn't eating anything. The tablets also did make me throw up.
But I gradually felt better
Moderator: Who was doing your chores then?
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Respondent: My sister did." Group 6, Female, TB affected
As mentioned in the section on waiting times above, many respondents were accompanied
to a health service provider by a family member. Again this family member was usually female
i.e. a sister or mother, but occasionally partners filled this role for female respondents. Male
respondents were more likely to be accompanied than female respondents but some female
respondents did mention receiving assistance. These companions would also have incurred
productivity losses such as time away from their own domestic responsibilities or even time
taken off work.
"Respondent: [My auntie] rushed me to the Day-Hospital andfrom there they
sent me to Groote Schuur." Group 3, Male, not TB affected
"Moderator: [Your mother] went with you?
Respondent: Yes, she did We went to 'Site B'. She took me to the doctor
who treats her." Group 6, Female, TB affected
Aside from intra- or inter-household labour substitution and providing
companionship/assistance during the health seeking event, family members also frequently
acted as carers. This role entailed collecting medication, ensuring medication was taken
correctly and providing general domestic and nursing assistance such as feeding and bathing.
Again, the role of carer most commonly fell to female family members.
"Moderator:
Respondent:
Moderator: .
Respondent:
Do you go to/etch the pills?
No, my mother gives it to me. I am at home now.
Your mom has to give you the pills. You are not working now?
No." Group 7, Male, TB affected
"Moderator: And what did the people at home say, did they care?
Respondent: They did, they were worried. My granny fetched her sister to
come and help with looking after me. They both took care of me." Group 4,
Male, not TB affected
3.3) UNEXPECTED COSTS
Information asymmetry or shortages appear to play an important role in determining both
the direct and indirect cost of care seeking. Although most respondents had some expectation of
the cost of a single visit to anyone provider, they seldom knew how many visits, to which
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providers, would be required to effect a cure. In the groups not affected by TB, private or
public providers were able to conduct both the full diagnosis and treatment. In those groups,
public providers were still the most common 'first choice' provider, however, private chemists
were sometimes necessary to supplement public services if drugs were not available. ,
"Moderator: [Djid you get medication when you were sick?
Respondent: I got them, to drink and I had to go and take tablets from the
hospital but as time went on, I stopped going there. I bought from the chemists
because at times, there were none at the hospital." Group 4, Male, not TB
affected
Among TB affected respondents the pattern was markedly different. The protracted nature
of many of the diagnoses highlighted much more complex health seeking behaviour that often
involved multiple care seeking both within and between sectors. This has already been
discussed in some detail in the previous chapter on preference set formation. An additional
point relevant to this chapter however, is that each of these visits will have incurred some form
of direct or indirect, cost. As such, TB affected respondents appeared to face larger and more
uncertain costs than respondents seeking care for other general illnesses.
3.4) COPING STRATEGIES
In general, respondents appeared to seek help until a successful diagnosis or treatment was
obtained. This section of the analysis considers how the expenses of that treatment seeking
behaviour related to available financial resources. There is a particular emphasis on coping
strategies in those instances where health seeking may have strained or exceeded household
resources. Ethnic and gender differences in coping strategies are also briefly explored.
Common strategies for coping with health expenditure included negotiating prices (or
avoiding payment), trading service quality for a lower price and drawing on extra-household
resources. Aside from these factors, which are discussed in more detail below, provider choice
was also influenced by whether or not an employer or other unrelated third party was footing the
bill. However, the low incidence of formal employment in, all groups made it difficult to
explore this phenomenon thoroughly and it receives no further attention in this chapter.
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3.4.1) MANIPULATING PRICES
Evidence from these discussions suggests that means testing tttt was seldom formally
applied in the public sector. Respondents referred to public services as 'free' services. This
was in spite of respondents' employment status and likely eligibility to pay for services. Where
payment was requested by public service providers, respondents commonly resisted meeting
those payments.
"Respondent: They [i.e. the public clinic] insisted that I pay. I told them that if
they do not want to help me, they can say so. They treated me.
Moderator: And what about your eye operation [at a public hospital}?
Respondent: I did not pay. We heard last year that we were not supposed to
pay. My sister in-law has high blood [pressure] and what have you and she
goes and never pays at the clinic. For the fact that I go to the clinic, it means I
do not have money because if I had, I would have gone to see a private doctor
and pay the R100 or R120. We did not get along with the sisters when they say
I should pay because I do not have, they insist that one pays." Group 4, Male,
not TB affected
By comparison with the public sector, prices in the private sector were seen as fixed and
non-negotiable.
"You pay a doctor's fee whether you like it or not." Group 6, Female, TB
affected
3.4.2) THE PRICE/QUALITY TRADE-OFF
User fees were the most commonly cited difference between public and private health care
providers. The quote below demonstrates how group participants explicitly considered the cost
of services when assessing their service access options.
"Ifyou have the money you can go to a private doctor but if you don't have the
money then you should go [to the public clinic]." Group 1, Female, not TB
affected
tttt Aside from particular groups that are exempt from paying user fees, such as pregnant women, public service providers should
conduct means tests to determine patients' eligibility to pay. In practice however, means tests are seldom conducted and most services
are free at the point of use.
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Although public providers were seen as lower quality providers,U:: group participants were
prepared to compromise on service quality in order to reduce the direct cost of care seeking.
Interestingly, participants seemed prepared to absorb higher direct costs in order to defray
higher indirect costs as the following quote demostrates.
"Respondent: But I'd say the reason private health service providers are
expensive is because they are more knowledgeable about illnesses. You also
find that private health service providers help more than clinics. Not all clinics
make people better. At some clinics you arrive at 5:00 in the morning and wait
the whole dayfor help. You leave without getting any. So, sometimes you go to
a doctor because they give you better care there" Group 6, Female, TB
affected
3.4.3) EXTRA-HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES AND SUPPORT NETWORKS
While avoiding payment for services and accepting lower levels of quality may have
affected the prices that group participants faced, these strategies did not affect the financial and
other resources available for health seeking. Available resources were most commonly
expanded by intra-household substitution and temporarily increasing the effort of existing
household members, or drawing on extra-household resources.
Respondents across all groups described some form of a sick role either for general
illnesses, injuries or TB. Whatever forms the sick role took, it appeared to be facilitated by a
number of support networks. The networks or support systems described during the group
discussions provided four commonly mentioned forms of support Le. financial, practical,
advice/ information and emotional support. This discussion focuses only on those forms of
support that impacted on a household's ability to cope with the direct and indirect costs of care
seeking, either by providing 'income' through financial support or by helping to lower the
'price' of care seeking. The financial and practical support networks described by group
participants served these functions.
Financial support networks were both formal and informal. Common examples of informal
financial support include the lending of money between family members and the provision of
food and accommodation. Lending of money is most commonly done through direct payments
to service providers. Although this is referred to as 'lending,' there seemed to be little
expectation that this money would (or indeed should) be repaid. As these payments were
@ See the extensive discussion on service quality in Chapter 5.
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irregular and were commonly considered hypothecated, they may not be captured by household
surveys collecting data on remittances or inter-household transfers.
KhayelitshalNyanga women in particular reported ready and repeated consultation with
private providers. This was despite the fact that most of the respondents from these areas were
unemployed. It seemed acceptable for relatives to pay the bill for private providers and in fact
relatives were the ones suggesting, prompting and encouraging the use of these providers.
Khayelitsha/Nyanga men also reported higher usage of private providers than their Mitchell's
Plain/Oostenberg counterparts although there was some reported use of private providers
amongst Mitchell's Plain/Oostenberg men. This explains how some poorer respondents coped
with the high direct costs of care seeking.
Family members (both in the household and outside the household) were the most common
source of this support.
"My family has been really supportive. In fact, I get financial support from
them. My nephew inquires when 1 will be going for treatment and he gives me
money." Group 8, Male, TB affected
"Moderator: ...and did you have to pay for the medication?
Respondent: Yes.
Moderator: And where did the money comefrom?
Respondent: From my mother". Group 3, Male, not TB affected
Financial support from state institutions also played a role, most commonly in the form of
free access to health services (Le. no user fees§§§§), and social grants. Employer-provided
benefits, particularly medical aid (insurance), were mentioned by the few respondents in
permanent formal employment but these respondents were in the minority.
§§§§ In theory, public services are automatically free only to pregnant women and children under 6 years of age. All other patients should
be means tested. Although some respondents did report paying user fees (particularly for hospital services), the majority claimed that
their lack of employment exempt them from paying fees. There was considerable resistance to the payment of fees in the public sector
and there is some question about the effective administration of the means test.
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"Respondent: [Sister], to us clinic is the most helpful service of them all
because some of us wouldn't be aware of their illness if there were no clinics
because we can't afford to visit doctors as most of us are unemployed. Clinics
have been very helpful to us. We get given tablets for free and you get them
anytime. Besides, every Tuesday you get bread with peanut butter or
margarine or bread rolls. We also get fruit, sometimes eggs. At other times
people are given clothes. You are also able to speak to your doctor so that he
recommends a health grant for you if you don't have ajob.
Moderator: How much is this health grant?
Respondent: R700, for us invalids. So clinics are most beneficial to all of
us, people who are unwell. You don't need to have money to go to the clinic
and you do get helpfrom them, even if sometimes they tell you to come back the
next day" Group 6, Female, TB affected
Practical support networks usually assisted with chores and daily functioning, the collection
of medication and transport as mentioned in the section on the indirect costs of care seeking.
Again, immediate family members (living within the household) were the most likely to provide
this type of support but one group did mention the role of NGOs. These support networks
helped to reduce or to spread the indirect costs of health seeking; particularly the cost of
transport to the facility, the cost of a care giver at home and the opportunity cost of time spent at
the facility. Of course in those instances where the 'carer' accompanied the patient to clinic
visits, they actually increased the total burden of the waiting time as both individuals would
have incurred productivity losses.
Advice/information and emotional support networks did not have an obvious impact on the
direct or indirect costs of care seeking, except in the instances where they guided care seeking
and may have reduced the costs of multiple care seeking. Table 6.19 over the page summarises
the manner in which financial and practical networks support the sick role. These support
networks have the effect of making the 'hard budget constraint' less binding.
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11. bl 6 19 P . dba e atient support systems mentione )Y group participants
Common Family Friends! NGOs and similar State
types of Neighbours! institutions
support Community
Financial 1) Sharing social grants - Provision of social
support 2) Sharing employment grants (disability
income and pension)
3) Loans
4) Out of pocket
payments for healthcare
Practical 1)Child care 1) Transport 1) Child care Home care,
support 2) Accommodation 2) Advice on 2) Home based particularly
3) Food effective care care and deliver of delivery of
4) Employment seeking medication medication by
5) Collection of social or clinic
medication workers.
6) Ensuring medication
is taken
7) Taking over chores
8) Nursing
Stigma or perceived stigma appeared to playa role in limiting access to support networks
and thus limiting available coping strategies. For example, if respondents did not want to be
seen attending clinics (usually TB clinics) they are unlikely to ask a neighbour for a lift to the
clinic or to use public transport to the clinic. In the following quotation, some perception of
stigma appears to increase the indirect costs of treatment seeking by increasing the walk to the
clinic among TB affected patients.
"Moderator: You say some doesn't want to go [to the TB clinic] because
they are shy.
Respondent 1: Yes. Some will walk in a different direction - so the people
don't know they are going to the clinic.
Respondent 2: People are very shy.
Moderator: What happens if they don't go?
Respondent 1: They will get worse. Some of them die." Group 5, Female, TB
affected
During the personification game respondents frequently mentioned that the TB sufferer
would not tell his/her neighbours and that it would be their 'secret'. The result in the
personification game was common across all groups, not just the TB affected groups.
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3.4.4) GENDER DIFFERENCES IN COPING STRATEGIES AND EXPENDITURE
3.4.4.a) Delays in treatment seeking
In general, females seemed to be more effective monitors of their own health and were more
sensitive to small changes in capacity/wellness. Males by comparison tend to be less effective
monitors, requiring more obvious and objective evidence before an illness episode was
identified. This particular difference in male/female health seeking behaviour seemed to result
in men generally delaying treatment for longer than women.
"Respondent: It was October last year. Just finished working. I got home
and brought up bloodfor a whole week, but I didn't worry to go to the hospital.
Moderator:
Respondent:
Did you tell anyone?
No
Moderator: Why not?
Respondent: I didn't tell anyone. Kept it for myself. That was December
last year - the Thursday I felt bad and I decided to go to the day hospital.
Moderator:
Respondent
Did you decide yourself to go to the day hospital?
Yes ... " Group 7, Male, TB affected
3.4.4.b) Informal care and self treatment to 'save' money
The women in these focus groups appeared more likely to self treat illnesses. Self treatment
usually involved the use of homemade remedies (honey, lemon juice etc), over the counter
medication kept on hand in the home and, less frequently, medicines purchased from chemists.
The primary motive for women seems to be saving money and time i.e. reducing direct and
indirect costs.
"Some people use self-medication. They don't like to go to the doctor all the
time, because it is quite expensive if you don 'I have medical aid ... If you have
to go to the doctor every time and the doctor prescribes medication - you might
as well do it yourself. Go to the pharmacy and these are my symptoms - do
you have anything for me? It is quicker that way and it is cheaper also. "
Group 1, Female, not TB affected
As mentioned in the previous chapter, male participants were only likely to self treat if
prompted and guided by a female family member. The exception to this rule regards injuries,
which featured much more strongly as a theme in the male groups. Males appeared comfortable
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self treating injuries for which they were unlikely to seek formal care unless absolutely
necessary. Their primary motive for self-treatment appeared to be avoidance of treatment
perceived to be unpleasant rather than avoidance of expense.
"Respondent: My girlfriend's niece's boyfriend, threw a brick on me. I had
blood all over my face. I was scared to be stitched and I never went to the
hospital. I treated myself.
Moderator: What did the people say at your home?
Respondent: I treated myself." Group 4, Male, not TB affected
3.4.4.c) JVomen more likely to be the payers for direct costs
Interestingly, women were more likely to be the payers for health services for both male and
female group participants. It was not clear in every instance whether the funds were coming out
of the women's own resources, out of communal financial resources or from extra-household
resources that had been mobilised or the purpose. It was clear however, that these female
payers were able to make the decisions about this spending.
"Respondent 1: Yes. Mom went to them and asked to pay the money in
installments until it was paid up
Moderator: Until it was paid
Respondent 1: Yes, mom made a deal with them
Moderator: OK. Who else paid?
Respondent 2: I paid the private doctor I consulted in Nyanga" Group 6,
Female, TB affected
Although less common, males did play a role in paying for the direct costs of health
seeking. Uncles and nephews were mentioned as an extra-household payer, meeting the cost of
the payment with the provider directly or through a senior female household member.
"Respondent 1:My uncle sent me to another doctor in Nyanga." Group 6,
Female, TB affected
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4) DISCUSSION
The qualitative' and quantitative evidence presented in this chapter suggest that, in this
setting at least, individuals give some consideration to direct prices, indirect prices and income
when seeking health care. Direct costs included consultation, drug and transport costs while
indirect costs included waiting time, job losses and other productivity losses. Respondents did
seem to consider both direct and indirect costs of care seeking, as well as their available budget,
before seeking care. However, this behaviour was not uniform across population groups groups,
within population groups or across illnesses. The following discussion highlights the
differences in this decision-making behaviour, while also triangulating the findings from the
qualitative and quantitative data analysis. All findings are contextualised within the literature
on health seeking, while the broader discussion is framed within relevant theories on the topic.
4.1) SUMMARY OF DIRECT COSTS
Although respondents appeared to have a 'realistic' expectation of direct prices Le. the
prices they expected to pay approximated the prices actually. paid for a single consultation,
respondents did not commonly know the quantity of services required to affect a cure and as
such could not accurately estimate the total direct cost. As such, respondents in both the
qualitative and qualitative datasets were ill equipped to anticipate direct health expenditure and
to adjust consumption accordingly.
The question also arises whether knowing the likely direct expenditure for an episode of ill
health would indeed enable respondents to adjust consumption. Certainly in the qualitative
data, respondents seemed to feel they had little choice regarding the total quantity of services
consumed. Instead of reducing quantity, the more common strategy to reduce direct
expenditure was to. substitute lower quality services for higher quality services. This was
highlighted in the analysis of coping strategies.
However, this price quality trade-off was not applied by all respondents and the qualitative
data indicated that Black/African respondents were more likely to pay for private health services
than their Coloured counterparts. This appears to contradict the findings of the quantitative
data, which showed that Coloured respondents incurred higher average direct expenditure on
health. Aside from the fact that TB-affected respondents constituted 50% of the qualitative
respondents and a very small minority of the quantitative respondents, a number of other factors
may explain this contradiction. Firstly, Black/African respondents may be more willing to pay
for private care when TB is the suspected cause of ill health. This is corroborated by the finding
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in Chapter 5 that TB affected respondents prioritised privacy when seeking care for suspected
TB and that private providers offered higher levels of perceived privacy. Secondly, Coloured
respondents' average expenditure may be affected by outliers in the quantitative data.
In their review of the economic consequences of paying for health services, McIntyre et al.
speak of the "forced use of private providers due to poor quality of publicly funded services
such as unavailability of essential medicines"{pg 2). This casts the price/quality trade-off in a
slightly different light, by suggesting that patients may actually feel they have no choice but to
pay more (or to pay something) for a minimum level of quality.
Perhaps the most striking finding regarding direct costs is the ethnic or population group
differences in direct costs as a proportion of household resources. On average, Black/African
households spent 25% of household income on direct health expenses while Coloured
households spent an average of 2% of their household income on direct health costs. Health
spending was thus catastrophic for these Black/African households where catastrophic health
expenditure is defined as 10% of household income or above (Russell, 2004). This may reflect
the study's focus on poor urban communities with endemic TB and, in the case of the
B lack/African communities, high HIV prevalence. In their study of health care expenditure,
Makinen et al. estimated that direct health expenditure as a proportion of household income was
4.9% for South Africa as a whole - although their study included only medical expenses and not
transport costs (Makinen et aI., 2000). These findings reinforce the regressive nature of direct
costs (Russell, 2004).
4.2) SUMMARY OF INDIRECT COSTS
In general, the focus group respondents were more sensitive to direct than indirect costs -
often substituting higher indirect costs to reduce direct costs by even a small amount. However,
the most significant finding regarding indirect costs is that they are grossly underestimated in
the quantitative dataset. Waiting times of the patient alone frequently represent only half the
cost of waiting times to the household as patients are often accompanied by a female family
member. Aside from waiting times, the qualitative data suggests that carers and other family
members also incur significant other productivity losses. Even focussing the analysis on the
patient alone, the quantitative dataset fails to quantify the productivity losses of ill health
outside of the health seeking episode. Similarly, the consequences of job loss are not explored.
That said, even by the conservative measure of indirect cost proffered in the quantitative
dataset, indirect costs vary significantly between population groups. Black/African respondents
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have higher waiting times and, although those waiting times are valued at a lower cost, they
constitute a higher proportion of total expenditure on health. Although no significant gender
differences in indirect costs were observed in the quantitative dataset, inclusion of 'carer time'
in the calculation of indirect cost is likely to create significant gender differences. The
qualitative data highlighted the fact that female household members are most likely to take on
the role of carer and to compensate for the productivity loss to the household of a sick
individual. This finding is corroborated by Attanayake et al. who concluded that women were
more likely to take on the role of carer in their study of the household costs of malaria morbidity
in Sri-Lanka (Attanayake et al., 2000).
Notably, Attanayake et al. highlight the concern that different methods for measuring of
indirect costs can have significant implications for findings. Their call for further
methodological research in this area is seconded by this dissertation (Attanayake et aI., 2000).
4.3) DO INDIVIDUALS CONSUME OUT OF INDIVIDUAL, HOUSEHOLD OR EXTRA-
HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES?
As mentioned in the introduction, Russell proposes that "the household is the preferred unit
of analysis for assessing the costs of illness because decisions about treatment and coping are
based on negotiations within the household' (pg 147 Russell, 2004). The findings of this study,
and particularly the qualitative data analysis, are consistent with the notion that household
decision making regarding health seeking is a more common phenomenon than individual
decision-making for this purpose.
However, while decision making may occur at the household level, the physical provision
of resources (financial and labour) frequently took place at an extra-household level in this
study. This has direct implications for the measurement of the budget constraint and
emphasises the need for quantitative studies to collect data on inter-household transfers.
Collecting data on remittances - where these are defined as regular and predictable payments to
an individual or household - will not capture the ad hoc transfers more commonly used to meet
health payments. They will also fail to capture the value of labour transfer between households.
The quantitative dataset for this study attempts to capture infrequent financial transfers
between households and these should be appropriately incorporated into the demand model
constructed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. Unfortunately, the quantitative dataset fails to capture
labour transfer between households.
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4.4) COPING STRATEGIES AND THE MEDICAL POVERTY TRAP
Choice of provider aside;···· multiple care seeking incurs multiple costs and even a single
instance of health seeking can create unexpected costs. The budget constraint as an accounting
frontier may be hard to estimate when one cannot anticipate the likely costs of a treatment
seeking episode - or series of treatment seeking episodes. The question therefore arises, if these
costs (or the probability of these costs) are not built into the ex ante budget constraint, how do
patients cope with the resultant problems of scarcity and what is the likely implication for the
structure of the budget constraint? Three options are possible:
1. The initial budget constraint includes a variable that captures the probability of
additional expenditure.
2. Each successive step in the healthcare consumption strategy is seen as a discrete
purchase decision with its own budget constraint. Each successive budget
constraint would be affected by the outcome of the preceding point of consumption
(e.g. available financial resources will shrink with each successive point of
consumption).
3. The decision to finance a health seeing strategy is seen as a single purchase decision
regardless of the number of interim steps or unanticipated costs. The initial strategy
for this singular purchase is entered into with some consideration for a budget
constraint that excludes unexpected costs. Each successive point of consumption is
seen as 'mandatory' and patients do not feel they have a choice in the purchase
decision. The budget constraint is not reconsidered. Instead, patients must respond
to the unexpected cost by findings ways to increase their income in the short term.
The income might be increased by increasing the size of the available financial pot
(perhaps by calling on more distant family members), or by reducing other demands
on that financial pot.
Evidence from the focus groups suggests that the third model is the most appropriate for this
study. Once a health seeking strategy has commenced respondents would continue to seek
advice or care until an effective treatment was obtained. There were no instances of health
seeking ending abruptly because the successive step in the 'consumption chain' was seen to be
too expensive. Similarly, respondents did not appear to factor unexpected costs into their
treatment seeking strategies at the outset. Instead, the burden of unexpected costs was generally
compensated for during or after the health seeking event.
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Aside from the burden of unexpected costs, this study also found that even potentially
expected costs can' strain household resources and that this is seldom sufficient to dissuade
health seekers from accessing services entirely. Evidence from the quantitative dataset
succinctly corroborates this argument. According to these data, 59% of respondents had ever
used a private provider. This was despite the fact that only 53% of respondents claimed to have
worked for any form of payment in the last 12 months and private providers charge user fees.
One might argue that private sector use occurred during some preceding period of employment
however, given those levels of unemployment, only 4.4% of the sample claimed that they would
never consider using a private doctor because they are too expensive. Similarly, 4.8% of the
sample claimed that they would never consider using a private doctor/specialist. Of these, 92%
claimed the provider was too expensive, while 8% claimed they did not trust the provider and
8% claimed they would never have a need for this provider. If less that 5% of the sample would
never consider using either of these providers, we can deduce that perceived costs (direct and
indirect) seldom result in the elimination of consumption from anyone provider. It is more
likely that the impact is more subtle, reducing consumption rather than removing it or forcing
household to mobilise extra resources to meet these costs. This further reinforces McIntyre et
al.'s concern regarding 'forced' utilisation of private service providers (McIntyre et aI., 2006).
The findings above suggest that health expenditure is likely to strain or even exceed
household resources, and this in turn raises the question: how do households cope? The
qualitative data for this study have identified a number of coping strategies including intra-
household labour substitution, drawing on extra-household resources to increase income and
offset productivity losses, manipulating prices by avoiding payment or negotiating reduced
payment, and trading off quality for price. The analysis also identified the range of networks
that supported these common coping mechanisms and highlighted the concern that stigmatised
illnesses (such as TB) may reduce care seekers access to support.
Russell categorises coping strategies into those that mitigate direct costs, those that mitigate
indirect costs and those that prevent or manage costs (Russell, 2004). This study has identified
strategies in each of these categories that are generally consistent with the findings of similar
studies in the broad literature on economic burden of illness and coping. For example
Sauerborn et al. conclude that "intra-household labor substitution was the main strategy to
compensate for any labor lost due to illness" (pg 291 Sauerborn et aI., 1996) and Gertler and
Gruber reach a similar conclusion (Gertler and Gruber, 1997). As far as the mobilisation of
networks is concerned, Cattell highlights the mediating role that social networks can play, while
..... The choice of providers was discussed in more detail in Chapter 5
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expressing some concern that ''perceptions of inequality could be a source of social capital as
well as demoralization" (pg 1501 Cattell, 2001).
Coping strategies identified by others studies but not clearly or commonly present in this
study include delays in obtaining medication (Barnett, 2001), seeking financial assistance from
GPs (Barnett, 2001), diversifying productive and reproductive activities (Rakodi, 1995),
avoidance of fee charging service providers (Mbugua et aI., 1995), sale of assets (Sauerborn et
aI., 1996) and insuring to smooth health spending (Gertler and Gruber, 1997).
Finally, Whitehead and Diderichsen express some concern that coping strategies can lead
households into a medical poverty trap. They highlight untreated morbidity, reduced access to
care, long term impoverishment and irrational drug use as the main effects of the medical
poverty trap (Whitehead and Diderichsen, 2001). Although the duration of this study was
insufficient to prove long term impoverishment, the high levels of health spending identified in
this study raise the possibility that Black! African households in this setting may already be in -
or at least vulnerable to - a medical poverty trap.
4.5) FINDINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Section 4.1 of Chapter 2 described a model referred to as the soft budget constraint. In that
discussion SBC syndrome is credited with the following behavioural effects:
• A reduced incentive to minimise costs (or maximise profits)
• Reduced responsiveness to changes in the prices of inputs and outputs
• The inflation of demand for inputs that have a price of zero (or for which
actors can avoid payment)
A number of participants in this study exhibited little incentive to minimise costs or respond
to differences in the price of different health services, if not to changes in the price of any single
health service provider. However, there is no evidence that this resulted in the inflation of
demand for health services that individuals expected to be free at the point of use. Conversely,
there is some evidence that the demand for private care i.e. fee-for-service care for which
payment could not easily be evaded, was inflated beyond the level one would expect to observe
if patients consumed only out of individual or household income ttttt. As this latter observation
is consistent with the broader theory of the SBC, the model appears to warrant further
investigation and a more fonnal application to the demand for health services.
ttttt The determinants of provider choice are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF THE
DEMAND FOR HEALTH ·SERVICES
1) INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to draw together the findings from the analyses in Chapters 4 to 6
to construct an econometric model of demand that reflects the features of health seeking
behaviour that were observed in earlier chapters. Particularly, the specifications in this chapter
will aim to incorporate the following potential determinants of demand:
• The impact of perceived health need on demand identified in Chapter 4
• The formation of the choice set and the iterative nature of care seeking
described in Chapter 5
• Health service users may be users of multiple health services including private
and public services as discussed in Chapter 5
• The constraints to health seeking analysed in Chapter 6
• Extra-budgetary contributions to health expenditure identified in that Chapter 6.
In addition, by allowing mental and physical health status to fluctuate over time along with
health seeking behaviour, this analysis attempts to capture the fact that provider use, the choice
of a particular provider and even the number of visits to any provider are framed within a
dynamic context as described in Chapter 5, which outlined the monitoring process and
highlighted a general distrust of self-assessed need. That changing context of health seeking
may well impact on the ordering of preferences of, for example, low cost over low quality thus
impacting on the ultimate observed behaviour.
Demand has been modelled in a number of ways in the empirical literature using alternative
specifications of the dependent variable. For example, some researchers aimed to predict
medical expenditure (see for example Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004), others to predict discrete
provider choice (such as Bolduc et aI., 1996) and still others to measure the frequency of visits
to any provider (for example Deb and Trivedi, 2002). A full review of this literature is provided
in Chapter 2. In this chapter, demand is specified in three stages. Firstly, the analysis predicts
the likelihood of becoming a user of any service provider in the study setting, compared with
being a non-user, using illness as an explanatory or' independent variable rather than modelling
usage conditional on ill health. Then, the chapter analyses the number of visits to any provider.
Finally, provider choice is modelled among service users only. Provider choice is not
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specified as a multinomial model but rather as a set of binary choices as the choice of provider
is not mutually exclusive in this dataset. This is a key departure from the conventional
empirical literature and an attempt to capture multiple care seeking i.e. to allow respondents to
make multiple visits to multiple providers.
Health expenditure is not modelled due to the absence of user fees in public clinics which
may bias the analysis and would certainly reduce the meaningfulness of the specification. As
the conventional nested model specification cannot cope with the combination of continuous
and discrete dependent variables necessary for the analysis in this chapter, the methods used in
this chapter merely approximate the nested specification by appropriately limiting the
estimating sample and explicitly discussing potential interaction between the models.
Aside from the choice of dependent variable, there has been considerable discussion in the
literature regarding the statistical and econometric techniques used to estimate demand. This
discussion has highlighted a number of common challenges to that estimation and these
generally include identification, misspecification, multicollinearity and simultaneity. For
particular forms of demand specification, the independence of irrelevant alternatives can also
prove to be an overly restrictive property. Most of these challenges are easily corrected,
however, one common misspecification and a related case of simultaneity are often overlooked.
Specifically, many models fail to include an effective measure of perceived health, resulting in
omitted variable bias. Those models that do include a measure of perceived health often fail to
correct for the resulting endogeneity of its inclusion. This dissertation considers the impact of
these shortcomings on applied demand models and the secondary effects of solutions commonly
applied outside the health literature. The relevant challenges to this application of econometrics
in health are discussed further in the next section of this chapter.
The empirical literature has also identified a number of likely predictors of health service
demand or heath seeking behaviour. For clarity, these are divided here into characteristics of
the choice and characteristics of the chooser. Characteristics of the choice commonly used in
demand models include the quality of care or some component of service quality such as drug
availability (see for example Mariko, 2003; and Sahn et aI., 2003), the direct price of service use
(see for example Chawla and Ellis, 2000; and Lavy and Quigley, 1993), travel time or distance
to the facility (see for example Audibert, 1982; and Dow, 1996) and waiting time (see for
example Ellis et aI., 1994). Previous chapters in this dissertation have also suggested a number
of additional choice variables, including the expected level of privacy at a provider and the
expectation that a provider will have the correct diagnostic equipment. Characteristics of the
chooser used in other studies commonly include age, gender, wealth or income, membership of
a savings scheme and illness type, symptoms or severity (see for example Akin et al., 1986;
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Bolduc et aI., 1996; and Hotchkiss, 1993). Additional individual or household level variables
identified in earlier chapters of this thesis include the perceived stigma of a suspected illness,
access to extra-budgetary funds from outside of the household and available strategies/networks
to ameliorate information shortages.
As far as the determinants or predictors of demand are concerned, this analysis departs from
conventional empirical analysis in a number of ways. Firstly, the multiple dimensions of
quality discussed in earlier chapters are included in the specification. Secondly, the expected
privacy of a provider is included as an independent variable. Finally, only the ex-ante
determinants of choice are used where possible. For example, the baseline perceptions of
quality collected before health seeking takes place, are used as determinants of demand rather
than perceptions of quality collected post utilization or supplier-provided data on quality that
may not impact on ex-ante user perceptions. This strategy is motivated largely by the findings
from earlier chapters which suggest that patients formulate their health seeking strategies on the
basis of ex ante expectations formed on the basis of imperfect information. This is further
motivated by the findings of Hanson et al. who found that interaction with a provider
systematically changed the expectations of that provider - usually resulting in a positive bias in
expectations (Hanson et aI., 2004). In short, this chapter attempts to more accurately capture the
latent, unobserved demand that underlies observed service utilisation.
Where possible, the independent variables suggested in the earlier analysis are included in
the models specified in this chapter. However, in some cases, variables or likely predictors
suggested by the qualitative data are not quantified or measured in the survey data. In these
cases either a suitable proxy is used or the variable is not included in the model. Variables for
which no data was collected and no suitable proxy can be constructed include expected waiting
times, ex ante expectations of staff attitudes and the suspected illness for which health seeking
takes place. The implications of this limitation will be discussed further in the final section of
th is chapter.
As in previous chapters, data are derived from a study set in four high TB prevalence
communities in Cape Town, South Africa. Weekly health diaries were used to collect
quantitative data from all adult members of 144 households over an eight week period. Self
reported health status was collected weekly using the SF8 protocol, which measures both mental
and physical dimensions of health. The study is deliberately conducted in an urban setting to
control for the constraints on health seeking imposed by supply shortages or severe geographic
barriers to treatment access.
The findings in this chapter draw solely on the primary quantitative data, although the
analysis of that data, and particularly the selection of independent or predictor variables is
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informed by earlier analysis of the qualitative dataset. The methods of analysis are discussed in
detail in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. The findings are presented with a section for each model
specified i.e. use versus non-use, the number of visits to any provider and provider choice.
Finally, the discussion section draws together the main findings, contextualises them within the
results of earlier chapters and positions them within the broader literature on the empirical
estimation of demand for health in South Africa and other developing countries.
2) QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
2.1 DEMAND FOR HEALTH SERVICES: THE PROBABILITY OF ANY SERVICE USE
This section presents the findings from the estimation of service use, unconditional on
illness. In this model service use is defined as at least one visit to any health service provider in
each week over the period of the diary placements. As such, the dependent variable for service
use is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent did use at least one provider and equal to
zero if they did not use any provider. This may vary between weeks for a given respondent, for
example a respondent using at least one service provider in week one would be a service user
(equal to one) in week one, but in week two they may not visit a service provider and as such
their user variable for that week would be equal to zero. The observed component of the
dependent variable is health service use however, the probability of becoming a service user is
the unobserved latent variable.
The independent variables used in this analysis are summarised in the Table 7.1. For
clarity, they are divided into individual level variables for which each observation is particular
to an individual in the sample, household level variables for which the same value has been
assigned to each member of the household, and provider related variables Le. expected price and
quality for which there is one observation for each individual in the dataset for time period one.
The individual and household level variables are characteristics of the chooser, while the
provider related variables are characteristics of the choice. The provider related variables were
collected in the Introductory Health Survey and are therefore static over the course of the panel.
Some individual and household characteristics, such as gender and population group are also
invariant over the course of the panel and as such there will only be one observation per
individual. Where the observations vary across the panel there is one observation per individual
per time period. There is a small risk of clustering at the household level, which would have the
effect of underestimating the standard errors of the coefficient estimates. However, with an
average of only two respondents per household in a sample of 144 households, this effect is
unlikely to be significant.
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As Table 7.1 illustrates, a number of variables have missing values particularly: the
expected price of a consultation at a private hospital, the expected price of consultation at a
private clinic, the expected price of a consultation at a pharmacy, the quality of a private clinic,
the quality of a private hospital, physical health and mental health. These observations may be
missing due to attrition or item non-response (see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 for detailed attrition
rates). As mentioned previously, random effects panel models are computationally intensive
models that use a large number of degrees of freedom in the calculation process. Individuals are
dropped from the dataset entirely if there are missing values for any variable at any time point.
High numbers of missing values can thus destabilise a panel model and the analyst must either
drop all variables with high numbers of missing values or impute the missing values and
continue to use all necessary variables in the specification. As imputation is likely to have a
lesser effect on the specification in this chapter than the omitted variable bias caused by
dropping the variables altogether, the missing values for price and quality were imputed using
models that incorporate variation by age, gender and population group. The health status
variables were similarly imputed using models that incorporate variation by age, gender,
population group and household income. The summary statistics for the variables that include
imputed values, are reported in Table 7.2 below. These can be compared with the data
presented in Table 7.1 above.
Table 7.2: Summary of Imputed Variables
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VALUES FOR N MEDIAN MEAN STD MIN. MAX.
NAME CATEGORICAL DEV.
VARIABLES
eprice _privhosp Expected price of a - 250 115.74 164.68 265.48 0 3000
consultation at a
private hospital
eprice _privclin Expected price of a - 250 100 150.46 263.07 0 3000
consultation at a
private clinic
eprice _pharm Expected price of a - 250 35.56 44.61 49.20 0 500
consultation at a
pharmacy
equal_ privhosp Expected quality at Very poor= 1, 250 4.6 4.5 0.5 2 5
a private hospital Poor=2, Neither
good nor bad=3,
Good=4, Very
good=5
equal_ privclin Expected quality at Very poor= I , 250 4.6 4.5 0.5 3 5
a private clinic Poor=2, Neither
good nor bad=3,
Good=4, Very
good=5
Pcs_8 Physical Health - 200 52.5 49.9 9.9 11.2 67.3
Index 0
Mcs_8 Physical Health - 200 52.6 50.6 10.1 11.3 65.4
Index 0
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The results of the random effects probit model of health service use versus non-use is
presented in Table 7.3. These show that, in this sample, there are six statistically significant
predictors of service use i.e. gender, crowding, mental and physical health, the receipt of extra-
budgetary funds from outside of the household and the expected price of a private doctor.
Female respondents have a higher predicted likelihood of becoming a service user while higher
levels of crowding within the household decrease the probability of a household member
becoming a user' of any health services. Individuals with better physical and mental health are
less likely to be health service users although the coefficient for physical health is more than
three times the coefficient for mental health, suggesting that physical health has the greater
impact on the likelihood of health service use. The receipt of extra-budgetary funds from
outside of the household increases the likelihood of become a service user, while the expected
price of a private doctor reduces the likelihood of becoming a user of any service (although the
coefficient for this variable is approximately zero). Physical and mental health were tested for
endogeneity in this model and were found not to be endogenous in this case. No correction was
thus required.
In this model, the Wald chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of
the regressors are all zero, indicating the model's overall statistical significance. Sigma_u gives
the standard deviation of the common residuals (ui), while rho gives the proportion of the
unexplained variance due to differences among units i.e. differences among the individuals.
The likelihood ratio test of rho concludes that the rho statistic is significantly different from
zero. A quadrature check revealed that the results of this model were nearly invariant to the
number of quadrature points used. This indicates that the results are stable and can be
interpreted with confidence.
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Table 7.3: Random effects probit of health service use
RANDOM EFFECTS PRO BIT ESTIMATION OF SERVICE USE
b t
Age at last birthday -0.00 (-0.32)
Female 0.29* (1. 76)
Per Capita Household Income 0.00 (0.29)
Crowding -0.18** (-2.14)
Covered by medical aid/insurance -0.17 (-0.66)
Years of Education 0.03 (0.82)
Black! African -0.09 (-0.33)
Financial situation 0.16 (1.65)
Mental Summary Measure -0.02*** (-3.16)
Physical Summary Measure -0.07*** (-11.18)
Received Extra-budgetary Funds from Outside the Household 0.52*** (3.18)
Participates in community savings scheme 0.11 (0.69)
Receives remittances 0.21 (0.98)
Expected price of consultation at a public hospital 0.0002 (0.39)
Expected price of consultation at a public clinic 0.0003 (1.07)
Expected price of consultation at a private hospital 0.001 (1.54)
Expected price of consultation at a private clinic -0.00 I (-1.34)
Expected price of consultation at a private doctor -0.003* (-1.77)
Expected price of consultation at a pharmacy -0.0007 (-0.45)
Overall quality expected from a public hospital -0.06 (-0.84)
Overall quality expected from a public clinic -0.06 (-0.93)
Overall quality expected from a private hospital 0.07 (0.39)
Overall quality expected from a private clinic -0.29 (-1.52)
Overall quality expected from a private doctor 0.04 (0.28)
Overall quality expected from a pharmacy 0.15 ( 1.35)
Constant 2.89** (3.13)
Test Statistics
Insizzu (Constant) -1.10*** (-3.78)
Wald Chi-Squared Test 227.97***
LR test 35.35***
Rho 0.25
Sigma u 0.577
No. of cases 1552
No. of grOUPS 194
Log likelihood -474.27
Significance: • p<O.lO ••• p<O.05 •••• p<O.Ol
2.2 ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF VISITS TO ANY PROVIDER BY ALL
RESPONDENTS
In this section we construct a model to predict the number of visits to any provider. At the
outset, the number of visits is allowed to vary for each time period in the dataset and a random
effects count model is used. This model is run for the total sample with the risk of bias due to
zero-inflation. The variable used to measure the visit count for this estimation is summarised in
the Table 7.4 below.
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Table 7.4: Summary of weekly visit counts
vARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION OBS MEDIAN MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX
visitcount Number of visits to 2000 0 0.27 0.91 0 12
any provider in a
one week period
A cross-sectional zero-inflated negative binomial is then specified to correct for the
potential bias caused by zero inflation, without introducing additional bias through truncation as
would occur if the panel model were restricted to users only. To facilitate this specification, the
number of visits to any provider is calculated first on a weekly basis and then the total for each
week is summed for the full eight week period of the diary placement. This treats the panel as a
cross sectional study with a single time period. The measures for physical and mental health are
similarly adapted by creating a single variable for each representing the mean value over the
eight week diary placement period for anyone individual. Table 7.5 summarises these new
variables. This analysis is again run for the full sample.
Table 7.5: Summary of variables used to predict the number of vis its
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION OBS MEDIAN MEAN STD. MIN MAX
NAME DEV.
totvisits Total number of visits to any 250 1.00 2.29 3.94 0 23
provider over the 8 week period
avgpcs Average physical health over 250 51.84 49.64 7.92 23.91 63.70
the 8 week period
avgmcs Average mental health over the 250 52.38 50.37 7.91 21.97 64.40
8 week period
2.2.1) THE RANDOM EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL
The results of the random effects negative binomial model without correction for zero
inflation are presented below. This model demonstrates that gender, physical and mental health,
receipt of extra funds and the expected price of a private doctor are all significant determinants
of the number of visits to any provider. Significantly, these findings almost exactly match the
predictors of service use versus non-use presented in the previous section. Only crowding is a
significant predictor of service use but not of the number of visits to any provider as measured
by this model. This strongly suggests that the model is suffering from zero-inflation and that
the measurement of the number of visits to any provider is being dominated by the likelihood of
any service use.
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Table 7.6: Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression of the Number of Visits to Any Provider
RANDOl\1 EFFECTS NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NO. OF VISITS
Without correctionfor zero inflation
b t
Age at last birthday -0.00 (-0.56)
Per Capita Household Income 0.00 (0.17)
Crowding -0.19 (-1.62)
Covered by medical aid/insurance -0.38 (-0.96)
Years of Education 0.04 (0.89)
Black! African -0.09 (-0.24)
Financial situation 0.21 (1.65)
Female 0.45* (1.94)
Physical Summary Measure -0.07*** (-12.27)
Mental Summary Measure -0.03*** (-4.73)
Received Extra-budgetary Funds from Outside the Household 0.59*** (3.32)
Participates in community savings scheme 0.28 (1.24)
Receives remittances 0.23 (0.79)
Expected price of consultation at a public hospital -0.00 (-0.15)
Expected price of consultation at a public clinic 0.00 (0.92)
Expected price of consultation at a private hospital 0.00 (1.06)
Expected price of consultation at a private clinic -0.00 (-0.85)
Expected price of consultation at a private doctor -0.00* (-1.69)
Expected price of consultation at a pharmacy -0.00 (-1.11)
Overall quality expected from a public hospital -0.08 (-0.96)
Overall quality expected from a public clinic .-0.12 (-1.47)
Overall quality expected from a private hospital 0.04 (0.15)
Overall quality expected from a private clinic -0.46 (-1.83)
Overall quality expected from a private doctor 0.24 (1.31)
Overall quality expected from a pharmacy 0.20 (1.35)
Constant 4.00** (3.18)
Test Statistic
Ln rho (Constant) 1.64*** (7.12)
Ln sigma (Constant) 0.54* (2.15)
Wald Chi-Squared Test 312.81***
LR test vs pooled 66.13***
Rho 5.18
Sigma u 1.72
Log likelihood -797.85
No. of cases 1552
No. of groups 194
Significance: *p<O.lO. ** p<O.05. **. p<O.Ol
According to the results of the Durbin- Wu-Hausman Augmented regression test, physical
and mental health are not endogenous to the count model of provider visits. The model is
significant overall and the likelihood ratio test of the model versus a pooled specification
indicates significant individual level heterogeneity and the appropriateness of the random
effects specification. However, as mentioned previously, zero-inflation may bias the estimators.
As such, we now present the results of a zero inflated negative binomial model of the number of
visits to any provider.
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2.2.2) THE ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL
This zero-inflated negative binomial model is run as a cross sectional specification for
which the dependant variable is the total number of visits over the full eight week placement
period. The significant predictors of service use presented earlier in this chapter are used as
predictors of zero inflation in this model i.e. gender, crowding, mental and physical health,
receipt of extra-budgetary funds and the expected price of a private doctor.
The results of the zero-inflated negative binomial model are presented in Table 7.7. These
findings indicate that physical health is a significant predictor of zero inflation i.e. respondents
with better physical health are more likely to be 'true' zeros and not to have latent or
unobserved demand. With this correction, the significant predictors of the number of visits to
any provider are quite different from the predictors of service use versus non-use and the
predictors of the count model without correction for zero-inflation. The following variables all
significantly predict the number of visits to any provider in the zero-inflated negative binomial
model:
• Higher per capita income predicts a higher number of visits although the coefficient
is approximately zero as the model is capturing the effect of a RI increase in
income.
• Higher levels of household crowding predict a lower number of visits
• Coverage by Medical Aid/Insurance predicts a lower number of visits
• The poorer the perceived financial situation of the household, the higher the number
of predicted visits
• Higher average mental health over the eight week period predicts a lower number of
visits
• Receipt of extra-budgetary funds from outside the household predicts a higher
number of visits
• The higher the expected price of a private clinic, the lower the predicted number of
visits (although the coefficient is approximately zero)
• The higher the expected price of a private doctor, the lower the predicted number of
visits (although the coefficient is approximately zero)
• The higher the expected quality of a private clinic, the lower the predicted number
of visits
• The higher the expected quality of a pharmacy, the higher the predicted
number of visits
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Table 7.7: Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Regression
CROSS SECTIONAL NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL
With Correction70r Zero Inflation
b t
Age at last birthday 0.01 (0.90)
Per Capita Household Income 0.00* (1.78)
Crowding -0.26** (-2.28)
Covered by medical aid/insurance -1.05** (-2.59)
Years of Education 0.03 (0.66)
Black! African -0.24 (-0.62)
Financial situation 0.25* (1.96)
Female 0.07 (0.31 )
Averaze physical health over the eight week period -0.02 (-0.77)
A veraae mental health over the eight week period -0.06*** (-2.72)
Received Extra-budgetary Funds from Outside the Household 1.27*** (4.40)
Participates in community savings scheme 0.09 (0.40)
Receives remittances 0.30 (0.99)
Expected price of consultation at a public hospital 0.00 (0.57)
Expected price of consultation at a public clinic 0.00 (0.44)
Expected price of consultation at a private hospital 0.00 (1.67)
Expected price of consultation at a private clinic -0.00* (-1.91)
Expected price of consultation at a private doctor -0.00* (-1.75)
Expected price of consultation at a pharmacy -0.00 (-0.19)
Overall quality expected from a public hospital -0.06 (-0.73)
Overall quality expected from a public clinic -0.01 (-0.14)
Overall quality expected from a private hospital -0.01 (-0.06)
Overall quality expected from a private clinic -0.43* (-1.74)
Overall quality expected from a private doctor 0.25 ( 1.48)
Overall quality expected from a pharmacy 0.36** (2.54)
Constant 2.71 * (2.05)
Inflate (Probit model)
Female -0.36 (-0.54)
Crowding -0.54 (-1.14)
Average physical health over the eight week period 0.73*** (2.97)
Averaze mental health over the eight week period 0.01 (0.15)
Received Extra-budgetary Funds from Outside the Household 1.92 ( 1.83)
Expected price of consultation at a private doctor 0.00 (0.38)
Constant -41.76** (-3.07)
Test Statistics
Inalpha (Constant) -0.48* (-2.23)
McFadden's R2 0.18
McFadden's Adj R2 0.09
Maximum Likelihood R2 0.51
Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.52
LR Chi-Squared Test 90.48***
LR test of alpha 0 70.74***
Log likelihood -316.72
Vuong test of zinb vs. standard negative binomial 3.13
No. of cases 194
Nonzero obs 107
Zero obs 87
i . , . * < ** *.*S 'gnificance: p 0.10,. p<0.05, p<O.OJ
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The significant likelihood ratio (LR) test of alpha rejects the null hypothesis of no over
dispersion, indicating that the zero inflated negative binomial regression improves goodness-of-
fit over the equivalent zero inflated Poisson model. The Vuong test statistic of 3.13 is greater
than 1.96, suggesting that the zero inflated negative binomial regression is preferred to the
equivalent negative binomial regression model (without zero inflation). The LR Chi-squared
test shows that the model is significant over all.
2.3 PROVIDER SELECTION BY HEALTH SERVICE USERS
This section presents the findings from the estimation of provider choice by respondents
who used any health service provider during the diary placement period. Provider choice is not
mutually exclusive in this dataset as data was captured on all health visits taking place in each
week and respondents could have used more than one provider type in any week. As such,
provider choice cannot be modelled using a multinomial specification without limiting the
analysis to either the first or last visit and thus losing the information regarding multiple patient-
provider interaction. A series of random effects binomial probits is therefore used to model:
• The choice of a public service provider versus any other provider
• The choice of a private service provider versus any other provider
• The choice of a pharmacy versus any other service provider
In anyone week of the placement then, a respondent might be a public service user, a
private service user, neither or both. A respondent's status as the u,ser of a particular type of
service may also vary between the weeks of the diary placement. If for example, a respondent
visited a health service provider (or a number of heath service providers) in week one, but did
not visit a health service provider of any kind in week two they would be considered a service
user in week one but not in week two. Similarly, if a respondent visited a private provider
(only) in week three and a public provider (only) in week four, they would be considered a user
in both weeks but a private user in week three and a public user in week four.
In these models, a public service user is defined as such if they used any public service
provider at least once during the week of the diary placement. Similarly, private and pharmacy
users are defined as such if they used any private service provider or a pharmacy at least once
during any given week of the diary placements. As such, the dependent variable for public
service use is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent did use at least one public service
provider and equal to zero if they did not use any public service provider. The observed
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component of the dependent variable is public, private or pharmacy service use while the
probability of becoming a public, private or pharmacy service user is unobserved. The use of
'other' service providers is not analysed separately as these providers are considered too
heterogeneous for any meaningful estimation.
As in the earlier specifications in this chapter, provider choice is modelled as a function of
individual, household and provider-related characteristics i.e. characteristics of the choice and
characteristics of the chooser. Most of these variables were summarised previously in Table
7.1. The independent variables used in this analysis but not used earlier in the chapter are
summarised in Table 7.8. All new variables used in this estimation are provider related
variables. However, as the survey did not include a question asking respondents which provider
they would associate with privacy or with a thorough examination (for example), it was
necessary to construct a proxy indicator for these variables. These proxy variables are
constructed from the final section of the Introductory Health Survey where respondents are
asked which providers they would recommend for a series of illnesses and why. If a provider
was recommended for the treatment of any of these illnesses because of a given characteristic,
then the expectation of the provider meetinglhaving that characteristic would equal one for that
provider. Otherwise, the expectation of the provider having that characteristic would equal
zero.
Given the nature of the data, these constructed variables are likely to underestimate the
extent to which a provider is associated with a given characteristic. This effect can be
illustrated using a simple example: When asked which provider they would recommend for the
treatment of flu, a respondent answers 'a private doctor'. When asked why they would
recommend this provider, the respondent answers 'because they will have the necessary drugs'.
Although the provider is recommended because they will have the right drugs, this does not
necessarily mean that the private doctor is not also associated with high levels of patient
privacy. The respondent may simply not consider privacy to b~ an important factor in provider
choice for flu. This downward bias in the 'association factor' of these variables is somewhat
mitigated by the spread of diseases for which respondents are asked to recommend a provider.
These include suspected flu, TB, HIV, injury and childhood immunisation. Continuing the
example then, the respondent in question may not recommend a private provider for flu because
of privacy, but privacy may be a more important provider selection criterion for TB and/or HIV.
If the respondent recommends a provider for reasons of privacy for any of these diseases, then
the privacy variable for that provider (and that respondent) will equal one. These variables do
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not vary with time as they are expected characteristics that precede any health seeking during
the diary placement period.
2.3.1) PUBLIC SERVICE CHOICE
Physical health, mental health and the expected quality of service providers were all tested
for endogeneity in the models of provider choice. Although the expected quality of a public
clinic and a public hospital were not found to be endogenous to public service choice, both
physical and mental health were found to be endogenous (p<O.O1 in both cases). This was
corrected using the modified instrumental variable approach described in Chapter 3 and detailed
below.
The first step of the instrumental variable approach requires that at least one variable which
significantly predicts the endogenous variable in the auxiliary regression, be excluded from the
main model i.e. if the number of independent variables in the auxiliary regression equals N, then
the number of independent variables in the main regression should equal N-I. The omitted
variable must be exogenous to the main model. In the auxiliary regression for physical health,
age and mental were the only significant predictors of improved health (p<O.OS and p<O.O1
respectively). Omitting mental health from the main regression of public service choice was
likely to introduce significant omitted variable bias into the model and would not meet the
requirement that the omitted variable be exogenous to the main model. As such, age was
selected as the variable for omission.
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In the auxiliary regression for mental health there were a number of significant predictors
including whether or not a respondent identified themselves as Black/African (p<O.O1), the
perceived financial situation of the household (p<O.OI) and the physical health of the respondent
(p<O.O1). Physical health had already been shown to be endogenous to public service choice and as
such this could not be a candidate for omission. There was also a reasonable expectation, based on
the theory and the earlier findings in the qualitative data analysis, that population group/ethnicity, the
expected price of a consultation and the financial situation in the household may all be significant
exogenous predictors of public service choice and, as such, their omission would be likely to cause
omitted variable bias. At the risk then of introducing omitted variable bias into the equation, the
perceived financial situation of the household was omitted as the effects of this bias would be more
easily predicted than the effects of omitting the ethnicity/population group variable. For example,
one might expect the coefficients of per capita income to be inflated due to the omission of perceived
financial situation variable. However, as the following regression results show, omitting the
perceived financial situation of the household has little or no impact on the coefficients of any of the
independent variables. This suggests that any omitted variable bias introduced is negligible.
The second step of the instrumental approach requires the use of the predicted rather than
observed values for the endogenous variable in the main regression equation. The predicted values
of the endogenous variable are obtained from the auxiliary regression, which must contain all likely
predictors of the endogenous variable and all likely predictors of the dependent variable for the main
regression i.e. public provider choice in this case.
The models of public service choice with and without correction for endogeneity are shown in
Table 7.9 below. Before correction for endogeneity, ethnicity i.e. whether or not a respondent
identifies themselves as Black!African is the only significant predictor of public service choice.
Black/African respondents are more likely to select public services. Ethnicity remains a significant
predictor of public service choice after correction for endogeneity, albeit with a smaller coefficient.
The quadrature checks reveal that the results of both models are nearly invariant to the number
of quadrature points used. This indicates that the results are generally stable and can be interpreted
with confidence. Similarly, the Rho statistic in both models suggests that there is significant
individual level heterogeneity in the specifications. However, the Wald chi-squared test for both
models cannot reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the regressors are all zero (i.e.
p>O.I). As such we cannot have confidence in the overall statistical significance of either
specification, the implications of which are reviewed in the discussion section.
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Table 7.9: Random effects probit of public service use
RANDOM EFFECTS PROBIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE CHOICE AMONGST USERS
Without Correction/or With Correction/or
Endogeneity Endogeneity
b t B t
Age at last birthday 0.00 (0.18) - -
Per Capita Household Income -0.00 (-0.30) -0.00 (-0.13)
Crowding 0.07 (0.30) 0.06 (0.25)
Covered by medical aid/insurance -0.73 (-0.96) -0.71 (-0.93)
Years of Education 0.02 (0.30) 0.00 (0.06)
Black! African 1.68*** (2.61) 1.31** (2.50)
Financial situation -0.21 (-0.96) - -
Female 0.45 (1.20) 0.46
(1.21 )
Physical Summary Measure -0.01 (-0.66) - -
Mental Summary Measure 0.01 (0.89) - -
Received Extra-budgetary Funds from Outside the -0.29 (-0.91) -0.31 (-0.91 )
Household
Participates in community savings scheme 0.20 (0.60) 0.27
(0.77)
Receives remittances 0.01
(0.03) 0.16 (0.33)
Expected price of consultation at a public hospital 0.00 (0.80) 0.00 (0.86)
Expected price of consultation at a public clinic -0.01 (-1.50) -0.01
(-1.59)
Overall quality expected from a public hospital -0.03 (-0.25) -0.07
(-0.54)
Overall quality expected from a public clinic 0.17 (1.36) 0.19
(1.46)
Expected price of consultation at a private doctor 0.01 (1.66) 0.01
(1.60)
Privacy expected from any public service provider -0.23 (-0.43) -0.17
(-0.31)
Expect drugs to be available at any public service 0.09 (0.28) 0.06 (0.19)
provider
Expect equipment available at any public service -0.30 (-0.89) -0.41 (-1.26)
provider
Thorough exam expected at any public service -0.09 (-0.25) -0.22 (-0.65)
provider
Predicted physical health - - 0.02 (0.75)
Predicted mental health - - -0.02 (-0.96)
Constant -2.36 (-1.37)
-2.30 (-1.37)
Test Statistics
Insig2u (Constant) -0.26 (-0.50) -0.26
(-0.49)
Wald Chi-Squared Test 22.83 22.82
LR test of rho=O 11.84*** 11.90***
Rho 0.434 0.434
Sigma u 0.876 0.876
Log likelihood -142.28 -142.56
No. of cases 259 259
No. of Groups 107 107
* p<O.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.O1
. . •SIgnificance. p<O.IO.· p<O.05 •••• p<O.OI
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2.3.2) PRIVATE SERVICE CHOICE
As before, health status and service quality were tested for endogeneity in the model of private
provider choice. The expected quality of a private hospital, clinic or doctor was not found to be
endogenous to the main model i.e. the estimation of private provider choice. Similarly, physical
health was not endogenous to private provider choice although mental health was and as such, the
necessary corrections were required.
In the auxiliary regression for mental health, the following significant predictors of mental
health were identified:
• Ethnicity (whether or not a respondent identified themselves as Black! African
(p<0.05))
• The perceived financial situation of the household (p<0.05)
• Physical Health (p<O.O1)
• Participation in a community savings scheme (p<O.l 0)
• The expected quality of a private hospital (p<0.05)
• The expected quality of a private clinic (p<O.OI)
• The expected quality of a private doctor (p<O.O1)
For consistency and to reduce the impact of potential omitted variable bias, the perceived
financial situation of the household was again selected for omission from the main model when
correcting for the endogeneity of mental health. As for the model of public service use, the
predicted value of mental health replaced the observed values of mental health in the main
regression i.e. the model of private service choice. As before, this predicted measure of mental
health is derived from auxiliary regression equation.
The estimations of private service choice with and without correction for endogeneity are
presented in Table 7.10. Before correcting for endogeneity, per capita monthly household income,
ethnicity, physical and mental health, participation in a community savings scheme, the receipt of
remittances and the overall quality expected from a private doctor are all significant predictors of
private service use. After correction for endogeneity however, only the following variables
significantly predict the likelihood of using a private provider;
• Higher levels of per capita household income predict a higher likelihood of
private service use (although the coefficients for this variable are
approximately zero)
• Participation in a community savings scheme Increases the predicted
likelihood of private service use
• The receipt of remittance increases the predicted likelihood of private service
use
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• The higher the expected quality of a doctor (overaII) the higher the predicted
likelihood of private service use
Table 7.10: Random effects probit of private service use
RANDOM EFFECTS PRO BIT OF PRIV ATE SERVICE CHOICE AMONGST USERS
Without correction/or With correctionfor
endos eneity endog eneity
b t b t
Age at last birthday -0.01 (-0.57) -0.00 (-0.19)
Per Capita Household Income 0.00** (2.08) 0.00** (2.32)
Crowding -0.26 (-1.15) -0.24 (-1.12)
Covered by medical aid/insurance 0.34 (0.63) 0.16 (0.29)
Years of Education 0.02 (0.27) 0.02 (0.29)
Black! African 1.33* (1.88) 0.66 (1.14)
Financial situation -0.21 (-1.00)
Female -0.46 (-1.26) . -0.32 (-0.93)
Physical Summary Measure -0.03** (-2.54) 0.00 (0.09)
Mental Summary Measure -0.03*** (-2.80)
Received Extra-budgetary Funds from Outside the 0.19 (0.60) 0.25 (0.79)
Household
Participates in community savings scheme 0.72* (2.00) 0.89* (2.10)
Receives remittances 0.72* (1.82) 0.73* (1.95)
Expected price of consultation at a private hospital 0.00 (0.81 ) 0.00 (0.75)
Expected price of consultation at a private clinic -0.00 (-0.35) -0.00 (-0.28)
Expected price of consultation at a private doctor 0.00 (0.30) 0.00 (0.26)
Overall quality expected from a private doctor 0.54* (1.92) 0.74* (1.81 )
Overall quality expected from a private hospital -0.50 (-1.33) -0.20 (-0.47)
Overall quality expected from a private clinic 0.29 (0.71) -0.09 (-0.19)
Overall quality expected from a public clinic -0.16 (-1.41 ) -0.19 (-1.51)
Privacy expected from any private service provider -8.16 (-0.00) -7.65 (-0.00)
Expect drugs to be available at any private service 0.29 (0.53) 0.32 (0.60)
provider
Expect equipment available at any private service -6.78 (-0.00) -6.91 (-0.00)
provider
Thorough exam expected at any private service 0.15 (0.42) -0.00 (-0.00)
provider
Predicted mental health -0.09 (-1.33)
Constant 0.02 (0.01) 0.30 (0.16)
Test statistics
Insig2u (Constant) -0.81 (-1.24) ..0.95 (-1.34)
Wald Chi-Squared Test 37.33** 37.16**
LR test of rho=O 5.43** 4.25**
Rho 0.31 0.28
Sigma u 0.67 0.62
Log likelihood -120.99 -125.27
No. of cases 288 288
No of groups 121 121
Significance: • p<O.lO .•• p<O.05 .v- p<O.Ol
The Wald chi-squared test for both models indicates that they are significant overall. The
LR test of rho also indicates that there is significant individual level heterogeneity in the model.
The quadrature checks indicate that both models are largely invariant to the quadrature of
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the adaptive Gauss-Hermite procedure used to fit both models. As such, the model is generally
stable and can be interpreted with confidence. However, some caution should be shown when
interpreting the coefficients of the level of privacy expected from a private provider and whether
or not a provider is expected to have the correct equipment as these two variables are sensitive
to the quadrature, despite attempts to increase the number of integration points from the default
of twelve, to twenty.
2J.3) PHARMACY SERVICE CHOICE
Neither health status nor expected service quality were found to be endogenous to the model
of pharmacy choice amongst users and no correction was thus needed. However, the only
significant predictor of pharmacy choice is the respondent's age. Younger members of the
sample population have a higher predicted likelihood of using pharmacy services.
Table 7.11,' Random effects probit of pharmacy use
RANDOM EFFECTS PROBIT OF PHARMACY CHOICE AMONGST USERS
b t
Age at last birthday -0.04** (-2.79)
Per Capita Household Income -0.00 (-0.66)
Crowding -0.08 (-OJ3)
Covered by medical aid/insurance 0.53 (0.92)
Years of Education -0.08 (-1.10)
Black!African -0.77 (-1.19)
Financial situation -0.10 (-0.45)
Female -0.03 (-0.07)
Physical Summary Measure 0.00 (0.31)
Mental Summary Measure 0.01 (0.93)
Received Extra-budgetary Funds from Outside the Household 0.08 (0.22)
Participates in community savings scheme -0.21 (-0.61)
Receives remittances 0.66 (1.49)
Expected price of consultation at a pharmacy 0.00 (0.94)
Overall quality expected from a pharmacy 0.17 (0.75)
Expected price of consultation at a private doctor 0.00 (0.75)
Overall quality expected from a public clinic -0.06 (-0.55)
Expect drugs to be available at a pharmacy 0.50 (0.92)
Constant 1.02 (0.59)
Test Statistics
lnsiazu (Constant) -0.06 (-0.12)
Wald Chi-Squared Test 22.22
LR test of rho=O 15.46***
Rho 0.49
Sigma u 0.97
Lo_g_likelihood -145.98
No. of cases 287
No. of groups 120
Significance: • p<O. 10, •• p<0.05, ••• p<O.OI
249
As with the predicted choice of public providers, a problem is once again presented by the
overall insignificance of the estimation. This is despite the fact that the LR test of rho indicates
significant individual level variation within the model and the quadrature check indicates that
the model is stable and can be interpreted with confidence. The implications of this are
discussed in the next section.
3) DISCUSSION
3.1 KEY FINDINGS
3.1.1) HEALTH SERVICE USE (VERSUS NON-USE)
The findings of this chapter are consistent with the findings from earlier chapters. In the
analyses presented above, use (versus non-use) is predicted by gender, crowding, mental and
physical health, the receipt of extra-budgetary funds from outside the household and the
expected price of a consultation with a private provider. Although the findings with respect to
gender and perceived health are unsurprising, a number of discussion points stem from the role
of the crowding variable, the receipt of extra-budgetary funds and the expected price of
consultation with a private provider.
The crowding variable is a ratio of the number of people per room in a household and, all
else constant, a higher ratio reduces the likelihood of service use. Two primary hypotheses may
explain this finding. The first is that more crowded households may have greater competition
for resources in the same way that they have greater competition for physical space within the
household. These resources may include informational resources among others and earlier
chapters have shown how informational resources can be particularly important in guiding and
initiating health seeking behaviour. The other household resources for which there may be
greater competition are financial resources and this leads to the second hypothesis i.e. that, in
these relatively poor, homogenous communities, household crowding is a more sensitive
measure of relative poverty than is household income. There is also some correlation between
household crowding and household income (r=-0.33, p<0.05), although this correlation is not
high enough to raise significant concerns about multicollinearity in the model.
If these hypotheses hold true, then poverty does indeed act as a barrier to care in this setting
both by limiting access to guidance regarding appropriate health seeking behaviour, and by
limiting access to financial and other household resources that may facilitate health seeking.
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The receipt of extra-budgetary funds from outside the household positively predicts service
use. Earlier analysis of constraints to health seeking and possible coping mechanisms suggested
that individuals were not constrained by the financial resources of the household and that the
costs of health seeking commonly exceeded household resources in this sample. This raised
some discussion of possible coping strategies and evidence from the group discussions
suggested that accessing extra-household resources may be one such strategy. The findings in
this chapter thus reinforce the role of that strategy in facilitating health seeking behaviour and
overcoming financial constraints to health seeking however, an additional dimension is added
i.e. that the possible access to extra-budgetary funds is considered before health seeking takes
place. As such, this is not simply a post hoc coping strategy once household budgets have been
exhausted, but an antecedent of health seeking behaviour.
Finally, the expected price of a private provider negatively predicts health seeking from any
service provider. This suggests that if an individual believes they cannot afford to see a private
doctor, they would prefer not to see any provider at all. This again reinforces earlier findings
that respondents are prepared to pay for private services or for transport to reach public services
outside of their immediate residential area. The primary reasons for this behaviour proffered in
earlier chapters included poor perceptions of the quality of local public services and the desire
for privacy when care seeking for particular diseases (such as TB). These findings are not borne
out in the empirical analysis presented above, however this may be due to the manner in which
these variables are measured in the quantitative dataset. As mentioned earlier in this chapter,
only a very general measure of quality was collected in the survey. All other dimensions of
quality raised in the group discussion, such as the expected thoroughness of the exam or the
availability of drugs, were not collected directly and had to be measured with a proxy variable
for the purposes of the analysis above. The same is true for the variable measuring the expected
privacy at a particular provider. Measurement error in the independent variables biases the
coefficient towards the null hypothesis of no effect. The proxy variables used in this analysis
will thus tend to underestimate the extent to which a provider is associated with a characteristic.
This may explain why these characteristics are not significant determinants of use overall.
3.1.2) THE NUMBER OF VISITS TO ANY PROVIDER
In the count model not corrected for zero inflation, the predictors of the number of visits to
any service provider are the same as those for use versus non-use discussed above. Only
crowding is a significant predictor of use but not of the number of visits to any provider. These
findings are likely to be biased by the zero inflation.
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By comparison, in the model corrected for zero inflation, the number of visits to any
provider is predicted by per capita household income, crowding, medical aid/insurance, the
perceived financial situation of the household, mental health, the receipt of extra-budgetary
funds, the expected price of a private clinic and doctor, and the expected quality of a private
clinic and pharmacy .. Physical health is a significant predictor of zero inflation but not of the
number of visits to any provider.
Crowding and the receipt of extra-budgetary funds are likely to affect the number of visits
to any provider through mechanisms similar to those described above. These two variables will
not be discussed further here, nor will the expected price of a private clinic which is likely to
impact the number of visits through the same mechanism as the expected price of a private
doctor. However, the other findings warrant some discussion.
Per capita household income positively predicts the number of visits to any provider
although the coefficient for this variable is approximately zero. This suggests that while income
is not a predictor of use versus non use as an absolute entity, higher levels of income can enable
more extended health seeking or higher quantities of consumption.
Interestingly, coverage by medical aid or insurance has a negative predictive effect on the
number of visits to any provider. Patients covered by medical aid would not have to pay user
fees to private providers' as these fees are generally met in full by the third party payer or
insurer. As such, these individuals may be more likely to use private services based on earlier
qualitative evidence that private providers are generally preferred to public providers and
quantitative evidence that private providers receive significantly higher ratings of overall
perceived quality. While a higher rating of perceived quality may not necessarily be indicative
of higher levels of technical quality at private providers, the finding that medical aid coverage
reduces the number of visits to any provider raises the possibility that private providers do in
fact offer better technical quality, which reduces the number of return visits to a provider
required before a cure is realised.
According to the analysis in this chapter, households that perceive themselves to be in a
poorer financial situation are likely to have higher numbers of visits to any provider. A number
of factors may be driving this relationship, the most obvious being pessimism, greater health
need of poorer households not captured by the SF8 index, the purchase of low costilow quality
services or delays in treatment seeking that exacerbate illness.
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• Pessimism relates to the possibility that individuals who rate the financial situation
of their household poorly may also take a pessimistic view of their health and as
such, may be more likely to seek care. This is supported by the concurrent finding
that poor mental health is also a significant predictor of higher numbers of visits to
any provider although physical health is not.
• The link between poverty and health need has been widely expounded in the
literature (see for example Holtgrave and Crosby, 2003; and Zere and McIntyre,
2003». In this dataset, perceived physical and mental health are considered to be
proxy variables for perceived health need and household income is positively
correlated with both physical health (37%) and mental health (41%). The perceived
financial situation of a household also has a 63% correlation with monthly
household income (p<0.05). However, that correlation is not consistent or
significant for all income quartiles. There is no significant correlation between the
perceived financial situation and household income in the poorest quartile and
although there is a significant correlation between household income and the
perceived financial situation of the household in the wealthiest quartile, that
correlation is lower than the mean at 36% (P<O.05) As such, while the poorer
financial situation of a household may exacerbate health need and thus increase the
number of visits to a service provider over any given period, the perceived financial
situation of the household should not be read as a direct proxy for relative financial
poverty. That said, physical health is not a significant predictor of the number of
visits to any provider although it is a predictor of zero inflation. Although the
regression analysis attempted to control for health need by including the SF8
summary scales as independent variables, the SF8 may not capture all dimensions
of health need.
• Poorer households may only be able to afford lower cost services. If low cost
providers are also providers of low technical quality then numerous follow up visits
to a provider may be necessary before a cure can be realised. As this dataset only
contains an ex ante expectation of overall perceived provider quality rather than an
ex post evaluation of technical provider quality, we do not have the means with
which to test this hypothesis. Even if some attempt were made to collect
respondent perceptions of technical quality, it should be noted that technical quality
can be difficult for patients to measure.
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• Members of poorer households may feel forced by economic hardship to delay
health seeking with its associated costs until illnesses are more severe. More severe
illnesses may be more resistant to treatment or may create a sense of urgency that
drives multiple care seeking if a cure is not promptly realised. This may drive up
the number of visits to a provider. The correlation between the financial position of
the household and the severity of the illness as captured by either mental or physical
health has already been mentioned however, this correlation alone does not serve as
unequivocal proof of this hypothesis.
Analyses in earlier chapters suggested that, while the lack of objective evidence of ill health
(usually physical evidence) might delay the initiafion of treatment seeking, once health seeking
had commenced, subsequent iterations of health seeking faced lower constraints than did the
initial consultation. Particularly? subsequent iterations may have required less reinforcement
from external sources once suspected ill health had been 'validated' at the outset. This
argument is corroborated by the findings in this chapter, that physical health is a predictor of
zero inflation but not of the number of visits to any provider i.e. once health seeking is initiated,
poor mental health is the only significant predictor of additional visits.
The expected quality of a private clinic and pharmacy have opposite signs in the findings
. presented in this chapter. While the expected quality of a private clinic negatively predicts the
number of visits to any provider, the expected quality of a pharmacy positively predicts the
number of visits to any provider. Although the reason for this difference is not entirely clear, it
may be attributable to the difference in the services and a possible link with technical quality.
For instance, if the overall quality expected from a private clinic increases the likelihood of
visiting that provider, and that provider offers a high level of technical quality, then subsequent
visits to that or any other provider may not be necessary. Similarly, as treatment from a
pharmacist relies largely on self diagnosis or on diagnosis by a pharmacist without recourse to
diagnostic tests, this consultation may offer lower levels of technical quality and as such, require
further visits before a cure can be realised. The evidence regarding provider choice is examined
further in the next section.
3.1.3) PROVIDER CHOICE
The analysis of service choice revealed that different variables predicted the use of different
services. The findings regarding the choice of provider present a more complex picture than
those for service use (versus non-use) or the number of visits to any provider. The primary
concern is that the models of public service choice and pharmacy use are not significant
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overall. Although this characterisation of provider choice is informed by the discussion of
choice set formation in Chapter 5, this finding suggests that the variation in the sample, or in the
users of these services as represented by this sample, is insufficient for a modelling exercise of
this nature and may indicate that in fact this is not an appropriate characterisation of the
provider choice problem in a multiple use dataset. This is supported by the fact that, in each of
these specifications, only one significant predictor of provider choice was found. Only
ethnicity/population group predicts public service use with Black! African respondents more
likely to use public services than their Coloured counterparts. By comparison, pharmacy use
was predicted only by age, with younger respondents more likely to choose pharmacy services.
Although the findings for public and pharmacy choice were not significant overall, the
findings for private service choice were significant. Generally the predictors of private service
use are financial or quality related. Financial predictors increasing the likelihood of private
service choice include capita income, participation in a community savings scheme and the
receipt of remittances. Similarly, the higher the expected quality of a private doctor overall, the
higher the predicted likelihood of private service usage. These findings are unsurprising and
support the findings from earlier chapters. They suggest that price is a potential barrier to care
in the private sector and that individuals make a conscious cost-quality trade-off when electing
to use private providers. The findings also suggest that private health care is a normal good as
demand increases with income.
3.2 THE ROLE OF HEALTH STATUS IN PREDICTING USE, QUANTITY DEMANDED AND
PROVIDER CHOICE.
The analyses presented above clearly illustrate the different roles of mental and physical
health in predicting health seeking behaviour. For instance, although both physical and mental
health are both significant predictors of service use versus non-use, the coefficient for the
physical health variable is more than three times the size of that for the mental health variable.
When modelling the number of visits to any provider, physical health was a predictor of zero
inflation but not of the number of predicted visits to a provider. Mental health by comparison
did not account for zero inflation but did account for the number of visits to a provider. As such
it appears that physical health plays the more significant role in initiating health seeking
behaviour while mental health plays the more important role in shaping that behaviour, and
particularly the quantity consumed once treatment seeking is initiated. That said, neither
physical nor mental health were significant predictors of service choice once the choice models
had been corrected for the endogeneity of perceived health.
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The significance of these health status variables in the regressions of service use detailed in
Chapter 5 suggests that their omission would result in omitted variable bias. The likely result of
this bias is uncertain but may result in inflated coefficients for other variables that positively
predict use or the number of visits to a provider. For instance", if one population group under
study is more prone to poor mental or physical health then the coefficient for that population
group variable might be biased upwards. More concerning however, is how this bias might
affect the analysis of socio-economic status and health seeking behaviour. We have already
reported how monthly household income is correlated with mental and physical health, and that
the perceived financial situation of the household is correlated with household income. Poorer
households by either measure have poorer perceived health. By omitting a measure of health,
the coefficients for these measures of poverty are likely to be biased upwards as they capture not
only the effects financial status but also the effects of health status. Although we have not tried
to estimate the price or income elasticity of demand in this study, it is clear that any bias in the
coefficient of household income or expenditure is likely to bias the findings regarding demand
elasticity, potentially resulting in falsely inflated measures of income elasticity of demand in
particular.
Although the omitted variable bias caused by the omission of a health status variable has
been overcome in this chapter, the inclusion of a mental and physical health variable introduced
endogeneity into the models of provider choice presented above i.e. health status was not
independent of provider choice and may even have been be correlated with unobservable
variables in the error term. This form of endogeneity will not necessarily affect the consistency
of the coefficients in the model but will increase the standard errors, thus increasing the chance
of a type II error i.e. accepting a null hypothesis that is in fact false. This was borne out in the
findings where the uncorrected models had more significant predictors of service choice than
did those corrected for endogeneity. Correcting for this endogeneity however, may have
introduced additional concerns regarding omitted variable bias. For instance, where physical
health was endogenous, age was omitted from the main regression and where mental health was
endogenous, the perceived financial situation in the household was omitted from the main
model. However, any concerns regarding possible bias may be allayed by the fact that the
coefficients of the main model corrected for endogeneity did not differ significantly from those
in the model before the correction. One would expect the coefficients to change in the presence
of omitted variable bias as the remaining (correlated) variables 'pick up' the effect of the
omitted variable. In fact, the only significant change between the corrected and uncorrected
specifications is in the size of the standard errors, which is a direct result of the correction for
endogene ity.
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3.3 CONTEXTUALISING THESE FINDING \VITHIN THE APPLIED LITERATURE
3.3.1) THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH IN SOUTH AFRICA
Only one other study has attempted to empirically estimate the demand for health services
in South Africa. Havemann and van der Berg constructed a multinomial logit using data from
the 1993 Living Standards Measurement Survey (Havemann and van der Berg, 2003). The
1993 LSMS data is arguably the most complete dataset for the specification of demand for
South African health services at the national level. The sample base is substantial and the
questionnaire collects some information on pricing, travel time and provider quality. However,
it is very dated in the South African context where significant restructuring of the health sector
has taken place since Parliament passed a White Paper on Health in 1994 that aimed to
reallocate significant portions of funding from tertiary to primary care, improve staffing in the
public sector and improve the equity of health service distribution among other aims (National
Government of South Africa, 1997).
The Haveman and van der Berg study cited above uses cross sectional data and the analysis
concerns only the last (i.e. most recent) visit to a health service provider. The authors reduce
the number of treatment categories i.e. the categories of the dependent variable, to four
including; self treatment, primary care, private care and hospital care. By their definitions, the
category 'primary care' in fact refers to primary public care in their analysis while private care
refers to primary or tertiary private care. The independent variables were divided into three
categories; respondent characteristics, factors related to care and the nature of the illness.
Respondent characteristics included household income, race (or population group), location
(province, metropolitan, former homeland) and whether or not the household had any insurance
(as a proxy for medical aid cover). Factors related to care included time to get to the provider,
price of the consultation (grouped into five categories) and the time to get treatment. Nature of
the illness included duration and type (i.e. serious, flu or tuberculosis). The study found that
private care was a normal good and public primary care was an inferior good. These findings
were used to advocate for mechanisms to make the private sector more affordable, thereby
increasing usage of the sector and (in theory) reducing the burden on the public sector.
In the Haveman and van der Berg study age, gender and the cost of medicine were not
found to be statistically significant (Havemann and van der Berg, 2003). This is not entirely
consistent with the findings from this study i.e. that gender is a significant predictor of service
use (versus non use) and that age is a significant predictor of pharmacy choice amongst users of
any service. The dataset for this study does not contain information on the expected cost of
medicine however, the expected price of a consultation with a private provider is a significant
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predictor of the use of any service, the number of visits to any provider and the choice of a
private provider among service users.
As previously mentioned, the Haveman and van der Berg analysis did use some indicators
of illness type and severity but did not use a detailed measure of health status per se. As such,
the probability of becoming sick is omitted from their analysis, The findings presented in this
chapter suggest that this may be a material oversight as household income may have a more
significant impact on the likelihood of becoming ill than it does on the use of services when ill.
As such, their conclusions regarding the impact of household income on pricing, which drive
their conclusions regarding the type of good each provider constitutes, may in fact be biased.
Of the illness-type variables used in the Haveman and van der Berg analysis, only flu and
TB were found to influence provider choice, with TB sufferers more likely to choose state
hospitals above other types of care (Havemann and van der Berg, 2003). In 1993, the notion of
the 'day hospital' for outpatient primary (and minor tertiary) care was in its infancy which may
explain this finding. However, this behaviour was not corroborated by the focus group findings
presented in Chapter 5 of this study, where patients claimed to visit clinics or day hospitals first,
turning only to hospitals such as Groote Schuur if they failed to receive effective treatment at
the primary provider. Unfortunately the quantitative data collected in this study and analysed in
this chapter does not include information on disease type and as such, we can draw no empirical
conclusions regarding the impact of illness type of service use or choice in this chapter.
3.3.2) THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH IN OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRY SETTINGS
A number of other studies have attempted to empirically estimate the demand for health
care in developing country settings. A complete review of these studies is presented in Chapter
2, while the studies cited in this section constitute only the more recent empirical analysis of
demand in developing country settings. Although different functional forms, and indeed
different choice sets, limit direct comparisons between these studies and the findings presented
in this chapter, some attempt is made here to position the findings in this chapter alongside
common findings in other settings.
A number of studies identified quality of services as a determinant/predictor of service use
or selection. In Tanzania, Leonard et aI. found that patients sought care from facilities offering
high quality consultations, prescriptions and staff, with better stocks of basic supplies. They
also found that the importance of each of these elements of quality differed by illness and that
patients appeared to understand the relative importance of each aspect for a suspected illness
(Leonard et aI., 2002). Also in Tanzania, Sahn et aI. found that the quality of services as
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measured by the quality and availability of staff, drugs and the general clinic environment had
significant effects on the demand for services (Sahn et aI., 2003). A study set in Bamako, Mali,
extends this analysis by segmenting quality into structural, process, and outcome components.
Structural components include the availability of drugs, staff, equipment etc, while process and
outcomes variables capture the processes followed by practitioners to effect a cure, and the
treatment outcome. The author concludes that omitting the process aspects of quality from the
demand model will bias the estimated coefficients for the price of services and for some of the
structural quality variables (Mariko, 2003). In Nigeria, Akin et al. found that three significant
aspects of exogenous provider quality collected from a provider survey including per capita
health expenditure (by service providers), drug availability and the interviewers' assessment of
the physical condition of the facility predicted provider choice(Akin et aI., 1995). Conversely,
Hodgkin's study of newborn delivery in rural Kenya found that the distance to a facility and
whether or not a household member has insurance were important predictors of the use of
formal care. This author argued that improvements in quality at existing facilities where
unlikely to impact the use of those services (Hodgkin, 1996). The models presented in this
chapter include both a general quality variable and variables that attempt to capture the
structural aspects of quality such as drug availability, equipment etc. As such, these findings are
unlikely to suffer from omitted variable bias that may impact on the price coefficient for
services. However, the role of quality was not significant in all of the findings presented.
Quality was only a predictor of private provider choice and of the predicted number of visits to
any provider. This may be partly attributable to the limitations of the structural quality variables
and this is discussed further in the next section.
A number of demographic attributes were also found to influence the demand for services.
In their study of the use of postnatal care service in Bangladesh, Chakraborty et al. conclude that
the mother's age at marriage and the husband's occupation both had a significant and positive
impact on care use (Chakraborty et aI., 2002). In Bolivia, Li found that education was an
important determinant of the demand for care and that certain ethnic groups were more likely to
self treat than seek formal care (Li, 1996). In this chapter, female respondents were more likely
to use any health service, Black! African respondents were more likely to use public services
than their Coloured counterparts and age was a significant, negative predictor of pharmacy use.
Findings regarding the impact of price on demand for care vary. Mariko concludes that, .
price only has a minor effect on service use in Bamako, Mali (Mariko, 2003). Similarly, Chawla
and Ellis conclude that an increase in formal user charges had an insignificant effect on service
use in Niger. although they attribute this to greater positive effect of simultaneous
improvements in quality that dominate any reduction in use caused by the introduction of
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fees (Chawla and Ellis, 2000). Mocan et al. also found that the price elasticity of demand for
medical care in China was low, although they conclude that elasticity is higher for poorer
households (Mocan et aI., 2004). In urban Bolivia, Li concluded that the demand for medical
care was responsive to price changes but that price elasticities were generally very low. As with
Mocan et aI., price elasticity of demand was found to be higher for poorer households (Li,
1996). In Egypt, Nandakumar found that a significant proportion of the poor opted to use fee for
service private providers despite government provision of service free at the point of use.
Conversely, in rural Tanzania, Sahn et al. find that the own price elasticities of demand for all
service are high, although they conclude that overall demand for care would be less elastic due
to high levels of substitution between public and private serviced (Sahn et aI., 2003).
Although the price elasticity of demand cannot be formally calculated using the data from
this study, the findings in this chapter suggest that demand may be price-sensitive as the
expected price of a private doctor is a significant negative predictor of the use of any service,
while the expected price of a consultation at a private doctor and/or clinic is a significant
negative predictor of the number of visits to any provider. That said, households that receive
remittances or participate in community savings schemes are more likely to use private services
and this may explain how households with little or no regular income are able to afford private
fees. The fact that the higher expected price of a private doctor is not a significant positive
predictor of public service use suggests that these services are not substitutes. Instead these
services appear to be compliments as the demand for both goes down when the expected price
of private care goes up.
3.4 SHORTCOMINGS OF THIS ANALYSIS
This analysis has attempted to move forward the methods of demand specification by more
explicitly representing the latent, unobserved demand function that underlies observed use.
However, the potential for these efforts to significantly impact the findings and applicability of
empirical demand models is limited by the methods available for this specification. For
example, the analysis of provider choice presented here does explicitly allow for patients to be
users of both public and private services. This is more conceptually appropriate to the study
data than conventional models that analyse only the last visit to a provider or a single visit to a
provider thus ignoring the iterative nature of health seeking. However, while the analysis in this
chapter allows respondents to use more than one provider, we are unable to explicitly model the
interaction between these visits including the ordering, time between visits or how the outcome
of one visit may affect the likelihood and nature of the next visit.
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Similarly, although this analysis can incorporate changes in health for different individuals
over multiple health time periods an additional dimension of the analysis is missing. Findings
in earlier chapters suggest that these changes in health need to be placed in the context of a
particular suspected illness as, for example, a change in health due to suspected TB might
impact an individual's preferences differently from a change in health due to injury. The
differences in these changes in preference may in turn significantly impact health seeking
behaviour as measured by these empirical models. Unfortunately the primary quantitative data
collected for the purposes of this study did not collected information on the nature of the
suspected illness or symptom attribution and as such, this hypothesis cannot be tested
empirically. This hypothesis is however, informed by the qualitative data analysed in earlier
chapters of this thesis. It is recommended that future quantitative studies of this kind attempt to
collect data on suspected illness or symptom attribution, although this data may only be
analysed descriptively due to the limitations of existing empirical methods.
As mentioned in the previous section, the structural elements of quality such as drug
availability were captured by proxy variables constructed after the completion of data
collection. The variable for privacy was constructed in the same way. As such, these measures
may lack the variation one might expect to see if the data had been collected expressly for this
purpose. It is this lack of variability that may place a downward bias on these coefficients and
increases the likelihood excluding a variable that is in fact significant. Failure to include the
variables at all however, may have resulted in more serious omitted variable bias as discussed in
earlier sections of this chapter. Future studies of this type should consider collecting
quantitative data on general provider-attribute association, as well as the disease specific
attribution collected in this study and used informatively in the descriptive analyses presented in
earlier chapters.
Other variables that future studies should consider collecting include quantitative data on ex
ante expectations of waiting times and staff attitudes which would be more likely to accurately
predict health seeking behaviour than would the ex ante data on waiting times and staff attitudes
collected in this study. In this study, these predictors of health seeking behaviour have only
been analysed with the use of qualitative data and these variables could not be included in the
empirical models presented in this chapter.
Finally, although not strictly a shortcoming of this study, it is important to note that the
models presented in this chapter require a dataset collected expressly for the purpose of this
specification. Many of the variables used in the analysis are unlikely to be contained in larger,
readily available datasets from routinely conducted surveys such as the DHS. This limits
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the extent to which analysis of this kind can be conducted without significant funding for
primary data collection. In addition, the breadth of the findings from the earlier chapters that
drew on both primary qualitative and quantitative data cannot be fully replicated with the
empirical models presented here. As such, the collection of detailed quantitative data and the
specification of complex empirical models is unlikely to substitute for complementary
qualitative and quantitative data collection that enables the triangulation and expansion of
empirical findings.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
DISCUSSION
1) INTRODUCTION
This thesis aimed to make a contribution both to the economic theory of demand for health
and the empirical application of that theory. The discussion in Chapter 2 acknowledged that
there will always be a tension between the need to construct a conceptual or empirical model of
behaviour that accurately reflects reality in all its complex fluidity, and the need to construct one
that is tractable, measurable, quantifiable and relatively easily applied. This chapter will
consider the extent to which this study has achieved its aim of exploring that tension and
improving our understanding of demand and its determinants in the developing country context.
A review of the contributions to theory will be followed by a broad overview of the findings,
relating those findings to the stated objectives of the study. These findings will serve as the
foundation for the policy recommendations presented in the next chapter. This chapter ends
with a comment on the validity of the findings and the limitations of the study.
2) CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC THEORY
Chapter 1 stated that the primary aim of this study was to understand the determinants of
treatment seeking behaviour and examine whether the complex and dynamic determinants of
treatment seeking behaviour observed through qualitative and quantitative empirical research
could be incorporated into and improve existing demand models. A secondary purpose of the
research was to inform debates about how to improve people's effective use of health care (TB)
services
Both the introductory chapter and the subsequent literature review in Chapter 2 explained
how, according to neoclassical economic theory, price influences the quantity demanded i.e. the
higher the price the lower the quantity demanded, individuals are assumed to have full
information and to behave according to the axioms of rational behaviour, health needs are only
incorporated implicitly insofar as they impact on the formation of the preference set and the
social context of health seeking is largely omitted from the framework.
Chapters 4 to 6 of this thesis interrogated discrete facets of neoclassical demand theory
using the primary data. This revealed that any attempt to explain the findings using neoclassical
theory would result in significant omissions. For instance, in the setting of this study it was
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clear that the law of demand did not operate entirely as expected, as discussed in Chapter 6.
Furthermore, individuals neither had full information nor did they behave according to the
standard axioms of rationality as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The assessment of health needs
was discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and the impact of need on care seeking was measured in
Chapter 7, concluding that not only did perceived need impact demand, but perceived mental
and physical need affected demand for different services differently. As such, any theoretical
construct of demand should explicitly incorporate an assessment of need. Finally, the social
context of health seeking also seems to have a significant effect on the determination of health
needs, the formulation of the choice set and even the extent to which price and income act as
constraints to health seeking. As such, while it is understood that a model is intended to be an
abstraction and a simplification of reality, this level of abstraction and simplification is likely to
impact materially on the estimation of demand by any model based on these tenets.
The study also aimed to examine the appropriateness of other theories that may be better
suited to the realities of care seeking in complex settings. New Institutional Economics (NIE)
and Lancaster's adaptation of Neoclassical Theory were highlighted as potentially useful
theoretical frameworks. NIE, and particularly principle agent theory, has already been used in
other studies to explain patient/provider interactions and supplier induced demand. That said, it
has not yet been used to explain health seeking generally in a setting such as this. This study
focussed on the principles of satisficing and bounded rationality offered by NIE and three
questions were explored. Firstly, did satisficing (or bounded rationality) appear to take place
i.e. did individuals value information collection and processing costs highly and thus aim to 'do
well enough' without full information rather than maximising their utility with full information?
Secondly, if satisficing did appear to happen, what form did it take? Finally, what would this
mean for our understanding of the demand for health services? Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated
that satisficing did indeed take place. Individuals were uncertain even as to the extent of their
health need and as such, the demand decision, the formation of the choice set and the weighing
up of constraints to health seeking involved a number of heuristics and decision making
strategies that would fall well short of hyper-rational utility maximisation with full information.
Satisficing frequently involved the dynamic formation of preference sets over a protracted
period of health seeking, very often resulting in care seeking from more than one provider for a
single illness episode and a greater financial burden of care seeking overall. Individuals clearly
acted on less than full information and would even incur significant costs to bypass effective
providers i.e. providers with the capacity to treat TB, in order to consult providers who did not
have that capacity as discussed in Chapter 5.
A significant criticism ofNIE however, is the fact that its theories are largely indeterminate.
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Although Lancaster's adaptation of Neoclassical Theory still relies on the premise of objective
or hyper-rationality i.e. strict utility maximisation with full information, it has the benefit of
being determinate and still potentially offering some advantages over conventional neoclassical
theory. Lancaster's theory has not yet been applied to demand in this manner and as such, this
investigation was highly exploratory. The data did however, enable an investigation into
whether it was more appropriate to define a preference set for demand as a ranked list of
providers as per neoclassical theory, or a ranked list of provider characteristics as per
Lancaster's theory. Chapter 5 outlines how patients are in fact more likely be able to rank the
characteristics of a health care provider given a particular illness context, than to rank providers
themselves. By defining the preference set as a list of characteristics rather than providers,
patient behaviour also no longer appeared to violate the principles of completeness, transitivity
and reflexivity. Unfortunately this study did not formally investigate which characteristics
would be strictly attributable to which providers and as such, it is not possible to specify a
Lancaster model within the bounds of this data. However, there is sufficient evidence to
indicate that this approach has potential outside the domain of willingness to pay, and this is
thus highlighted as an area for future work.
3) CONTRIBUTION TO THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC
DEMAND THEORY
The extent to which this study achieves the five objectives laid out in Chapter 1, illustrates
the contribution to the empirical application of demand. In short, through the analysis of
applied primary data, Chapters 4 to 7 presented a detailed critical examination of the
composition and use of economic demand models in the market for health services. In so doing,
this thesis has considered how health seekers identify their health need, how they formulate the
choice set for health care provision and how their budget constraint acts on the actual
consumption of health services. These components were then combined in an attempt to extend
the standard empirical demand model and estimate it econometrically using multiple regression
analysis. These specifications compared the determinants of use versus non-use, with the
determinants of the quantity consumed and the choice of provider amongst users.
Each of the preceding chapters incorporated a detailed discussion of the findings particular
to that area of analysis, including discussion of any particular methodological limitations. All
findings were contextualised within the general literature review presented in Chapter 2 of this
thesis, as well as the applied literature relevant to particular findings or methods of analysis.
The aim here is to review briefly each objective to provide an overview of the findings across
chapters and to examine the extent to which the primary aim of the thesis has been achieved.
To this end, each section will conclude with a brief overview of the variables derived from the
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data that were distinct from those typically modelled by economists, identifying those selected
for the demand modelling exercise in this study. The discussion of Objective Five in Section
3.1.5 will then consider the success with which these variables were integrated into the model
and whether their inclusion, and other changes to the structure of the model, made a significant
difference to the final results.
3.1) MEETING THE STATED OBJECTIVES
3.1.1) Objective One: To understand how individuals assess their need for
health care and identify the primary factors that impact that perceived need.
Chapter 4 discussed the integration of perceived health need into the demand framework.
This discussion spanned the quantitative measurement of health status and perceived need, and
the qualitative establishment of need for care and the rationalisation of that need. In addition,
the chapter contained a detailed discussion of self rated health as a measure of perceived need,
variation in perceived ill health, the socioeconomic inequality of health need and the location of
health need within a broader concept of demand.
The measurement of health need was conducted in a number of ways in this thesis. In the
quantitative data analysis, health need was assumed on the basis of ill health as measured by
relatively low physical and mental health scores. Although respondents themselves provided
the data on their own physical and mental health from which these indices were derived, they
were never explicitly asked whether or not they considered their ill health to constitute a health
'need'. Instead, the qualitative dataset attempted to collect data on the determination of health
need and the point at which ill health (either mental or physical) constitutes a health need, and
the point at which that health need generated a concomitant demand for health services in any
form. This analysis was greatly facilitated by the use of a multi-attribute measure of perceived
ill-health that generated a sensitive, normalised index.
The qualitative data analysis highlighted a number of characteristics of health need in this
context. Primarily however, patients distrusted their own interpretation of health need i.e. they
themselves were unsure when physical or mental ill health constituted a need as such. As a
result, objective signals of ill health that could be validated by other sources or compared across
time periods (for example), were more likely to be identified as a health need. This
phenomenon was described in detail in Chapter 4 and validated by the quantitative analysis of
health service use in Chapter 7, where physical health had a larger effect on the likelihood of
health seeking than did mental health - although both mental and physical health were
significant predictors of the likelihood of care seeking.
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The quantitative analysis identified a number of other factors impacting the perception of
need including gender and ethnic differences in perceived ill-health, with women and
Black/African respondents reporting significantly greater average ill health. Average physical
health also decreased with age, while physical and mental health improved with increases in
household income. Regression analysis found that age, household income and crowding were
all significant predictors of SAH. The qualitative findings also identified gender differences in
perceived health need. Importantly, the qualitative findings highlighted the idea that needs
determination is not an exact science for the observer or the study subject. Among group
participants, health monitoring was iterative - seeking events, corroboration or objective
evidence to validate potential health needs. Even once a need was identified it frequently
required justification and/or explanation to ensure that the sufferer was not blamed for the
illness and received support in any health seeking efforts. This issue was also identified under
Objective Four as discussed in Section 3.1.4 ..
Finally, analysing the inequality of health need required the use of the quantitative ill health
variables and the imposition of the assumption that this ill health did indeed reflect health need.
This assumption appeared to be justifiable in light of the qualitative findings, which suggested
that there was a strong correlation between ill health and health need although no consistent
criteria could be applied to determine when that illness constituted a need. Health inequality in
this thesis was calculated using a concentration index. The unstandardised concentration index
of physical health for the sample was 0.039 and the standardised concentration index was 0.015.
The unstandardised concentration index of mental health for the sample was 0.044 and the
standardised concentration index was 0.015. The literature shows how these concentration
indices can be used to calculate the lump sum or linear distributions required to obtain health
equality by socio-economic group (KooIman and van Doorslaer, 2004). However, as this study
is based a sample of two urban communities which constitute the poorest segment of the
national population, it makes little sense to suggest redistribution from one less poor group to a
more poor group in order attain equality.
The literature review in Chapter 2 and the discussion in Chapter 4 have already identified
how some conventional economic demand models have attempted to integrate perceived need
through the use of simplistic univariate scales. The literature intended to improve the use of
those scales by reducing the impact of cut-point shift and other forms of bias does not address
the individual's uncertainty about their health state that is pervasive in these findings. The
multi-attribute indicator of need used in the demand model generated by this study is more
robust to these levels of individual uncertainty. In addition, while most conventional demand
models use static cross-sectional methods that fail to account for treatment seeking behaviour as
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an iterative process - driven in part by that individual uncertainty - the use of panel data
methods in this study go some way towards addressing this shortcoming and measuring changes
in health state over the period of data collection. Whether or not the panel data methods and
inclusion of a multi-attribute measure of need made a significant difference to the findings of
the model are discussed further in Section 3.1.,5.
3.1.2) Objective Two: To explore how individuals formulate their choice set
when seeking healthcare and which service providers are likely to be included
or excluded from the choice set under different conditions.
In this setting, the choice set is highly sensitive to aspects of provider quality, the perceived
level of privacy one might expect from a provider, the availability of the provider, the
individual's working hypothesis regarding their illness, strategies used to overcome information
shortages and demographic factors such as gender and ethnicity (or population group).
Asymmetric information or information gaps result in preference sets that are formed
dynamically during the health seeking process. The strategies used to fill these information
gaps and/or shortcut the decision making process impact materially on the formation of the
preference set and unobserved choice set variation may impact materially on any analysis of
health service use in this setting.
From the data it appears that, in the sample population, price/quality trade-off is 'framed'
within the complex context of health seeking, wherein quality is multi-dimensional. Of all the
quality-related criteria, the availability of medication and the correct equipment to conduct
diagnostic tests appeared to be the most influential non-price determinants of service use among
the focus group respondents. In the quantitative dataset, public clinics were seldom
recommended because they would have the necessary drugs and even in .the case of flu, only
11% of respondents expected that they would have the necessary drugs.
Despite low expectations of drug availability, public clinics were, used by a larger
percentage of the quantitative sample population than any other service provider and were the
most commonly recommended service provider for all illnesses listed in the survey. However,
high levels of 'cross-usage' i.e. usage of both public and private providers were observed in
both the quantitative and qualitative datasets and provider choice appeared to differ by TB
status. In the groups not affected by TB, public providers were the most common 'first choice'
provider but private providers - particularly private chemists - were commonly used to
complement the public clinic visit. Amongst TB affected respondents, the cross-usage of public
and private health service providers is much more complex and appears to be driven by two key
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factors: the need for privacy on the part of the patient and/or failure to diagnose TB on the part
of the service provider (public or private).
The cross sector usage for TB diagnosis has critical implications for effective TB treatment.
The diagnostic delays resulting from cross sector use appear to be significant, and attempts to
refer patients between sectors (and even within sectors) are largely ineffective. The
implications of this cross sector usage were more strongly identified by respondents from
KhayelitshalNyanga than those from OostenburglMitchell's Plain. Respondents from
KhayelitshalNyanga were more likely to initiate treatment seeking for suspected TB with a
private provider, and private providers were more likely to misdiagnose TB than public clinics.
Cross sector usage is closely related to another care seeking phenomenon identified in the
study: multiple care seeking i.e. visiting more than one provider for a single illness episode.
Chapter 5 presented a detailed discussion of multiple care seeking and its determinants. The
critical points worth revisiting are that:
• There are many drivers of multiple care seeking.
• Black/African respondents from KhayelitshalNyanga are likely to visit
more providers before being put onto TB treatment.
• The primary reasons for this protracted care seeking include;
o failure to diagnose TB on the part of health care providers, and
o patients' tendency to visit private providers who are unable to treat TB.
This study identified numerous instances when both public and private providers failed to
diagnose TB at the first opportunity. Failure by a public provider either resulted in further
treatment seeking at a different public provider ·or further treatment seeking at a private
provider. Similarly, when private providers failed to diagnose TB, patients sought help from
different private providers or public providers. Occasionally, failure by a private provider
would result in a repeat visit to that same provider.
The role of privacy was interesting in this study with private providers perceived to offer
privacy and respondents incurring considerable expense to secure that privacy, particularly
when care seeking for TB. This is not the first study to highlight patients' concerns with
privacy when health seeking for suspected TB but it is the only study to do so in this setting.
In the model generated by this study, attempts were made to include a range of quality
dimensions as predictors of demand. Similarly, ethnicity was used as an explanatory variable in
an attempt to incorporate cultural difference in care seeking behaviour. Finally, cross use and
multiple care seeking behaviour are explicitly analysed by using alternative formulations of the
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dependent variable and running multiple iterations of the model with appropriate specifications.
However, with the available data there was no way to incorporate potentially important
dimensions of interpersonal quality into the model and privacy was incorporated using only a
very simplistic measure of the variable. The merits and relative success of these efforts are
considered at greater length in Section 3.1.5.
3.1.3) Objective Three: To investigate price and income constraints to
health seeking generally, and health seeking from particular providers, to
understand the composition and role of the budget constraint.
Chapter 6 investigated price and income constraints to care seeking. A number of
interesting points emerged including:
1) Unit price versus total cost of care seeking
2) Direct versus indirect costs of care seeking and
3) The impact of catastrophic health expenditure
Each of these is briefly reviewed below.
Individuals appeared to consider direct prices, indirect prices and income when seeking
health care. However, although respondents appeared to have a fairly accurate expectation of
direct unit prices, they could not accurately estimate the total direct cost. However, even if they
could estimate direct costs, the question arose whether they would adjust their consumption
accordingly as respondents seemed to feel they had little choice regarding the total quantity of
services consumed. Instead of reducing quantity, the more common strategy to reduce direct
expenditure was to substitute lower quality services for higher quality services. This was
highlighted in the analysis of coping strategies in Chapter 6 where it was also noted that this
price quality trade-off was not applied by all respondents and the qualitative data indicated that
Black/African respondents were more likely to pay for private health services than their
Coloured counterparts.
Direct costs were not the only cost of health seeking, although the focus group respondents
were more sensitive to direct than indirect costs, often substituting higher indirect costs to
reduce direct costs by even a small amount. Black/African respondents had longer waiting
times, which also constituted a higher proportion of total expenditure on health. However, the
most significant finding regarding indirect costs is that the waiting times of the patient alone
represent a small proportion of total indirect costs as carers and other family members, usually a
female family member, also incur significant waiting time and other productivity losses. The
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inclusion of 'carer time' in the calculation of indirect costs is likely to highlight significant
gender differences in indirect costs of care seeking.
Although the analysis in Chapter 6 of ,this thesis did not find significant variation in total
health expenditure within the sample population, there were significant differences in direct
health expenditure as a proportion of household income. On average, Black/African households
spent 25% of household income on direct health expenses while Coloured households spent an
average of 2% of their household income on direct health costs. Direct health spending was
thus catastrophic for these Black/African households, where catastrophic health expenditure is
defined as 10% of household income or above (Russell, 2004).
Indirect health expenditure further exacerbated both the negative economic impact of health
seeking for Black/Africa respondents and the inequality between Black/African respondents and
their Coloured counterparts. Black/African respondents had higher waiting times and, although
those waiting times were valued at a lower cost, they constituted a significantly higher
proportion of total expenditure on health. This conclusion was reached despite the likely
underestimation of indirect costs by current quantitative data collection methods that commonly
focus on the waiting times and productivity losses of the patient, and neglect to collect data for
the primary carer. Although no significant gender differences in indirect costs were observed in
the quantitative dataset, inclusion of 'carer time' in the calculation of indirect costs is likely to
create significant gender differences. The qualitative data highlighted the fact that female
household members are most likely to take on the role of carer and to compensate for the
productivity loss to the household of a sick individual.
Aside from the obvious impact of catastrophic health ·spending at the household level, there
is also reason to believe that catastrophic health spending may impact extended family networks
over multiple households. Substantial qualitative evidence is proffered to this extent and in the
regression analysis of private service use presented in Chapter 7, the receipt of remittances is a
significant predictor of private service use. Consistent with the observation by McIntyre et al.
(McIntyre et aI., 2006) that the poor qual ity of public health services can result in the ''forced
use of private providers ", Chapters 5 and 6 presented evidence that patients in the study setting
may actually feel they' have no choice but to pay more (or to pay something) for a minimum
level of quality. Although there is evidence of a price/quality trade off as discussed in Chapter
6, it is important to note that in this quantitative study population, less that 5% of the sample
would never consider a private providers suggesting that perceived costs (direct and indirect)
seldom result in the elimination of consumption from anyone provider. It is more likely that
the impact is more subtle, reducing consumption rather than removing it or forcing household to
271
mobilise extra resources to meet these costs. This further reinforces McIntyre et al. 's concern ..
However, while spending on private service providers, privately purchased drugs and
transport costs for out of area public and private service providers may be one driver of
catastrophic health expenditure, it is by no means the only one. Multiple care seeking both
within and between sectors effectively multiplies the cost of health seeking and the consequent
burden on household, and extra-household, resources. Evidence from the focus groups
presented in Chapter 6 suggests that once a health seeking strategy has commenced, respondents
would continue to seek advice or care until an effective treatment was obtained. There were no
instances of health seeking ending abruptly because the successive step in the 'consumption
chain' was seen to be too expensive. Similarly, respondents did not appear to factor unexpected
costs into their treatment seeking strategies at the outset. Instead, the burden of unexpected
costs was generally compensated for during or after the health seeking event.
Of course this raises the important question of how this burden is mitigated. Again, the
qualitative data findings presented in Chapter 6 identified a number of coping strategies
including: intra-household labour substitution, drawing on extra-household resources to increase
income and offset productivity losses, manipulating prices by avoiding payment or negotiating
reduced payment, and trading off quality for price. The analysis also identified the range of
networks that supported these common coping mechanisms and highlighted the concern that
stigmatised illnesses (such as TB) may reduce care seekers access to support.
In short then, high direct and indirect costs of health seeking drive catastrophic health
expenditure among the poorest population groups and this effect is further exacerbated by
multiple care seeking both within and between sectors. Addressing these phenomena is no
simple task but a number of strategies may make a positive impact and these are discussed
further in the next chapter.
This analysis suggests the inclusion of extra-household resources as a potential predictor of
demand in the model generated by this study. Although the receipt of regular inter-household
transfers are sometimes included in comparable analyses the receipt of irregular income is
seldom included, partly because of the difficulty in collecting such data using cross-sectional
household surveys.
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3.1.4) Objective Four: Toprobe the potential influence of the household,
community and broader social setting in the individual assessment of need, the
formation of the choice set and the impact of price and income constraints on
health seeking.
Due to its multifaceted nature, this objective was addressed as a theme running through
Chapters 4 to 7, rather than as a distinct chapter in its own right. As such, the preceding
discussion has already touched on the manner in which the broader social context of care
seeking can impact the determination of health need, the selection of health service providers
and the manner in which price and income act as constraints to health seeking.
In short then, sampled individuals needed validation of health need before that need would
translate into concomitant health seeking behaviour. They were more likely to get social
validation of health need if the symptoms of illness were physical and thus observable. The
flipside to this is that observable physical symptoms were more likely to carry a fear of stigma
for illnesses such as TB. This may have strategically impacted the selection of health service
providers into the choice set as individuals sought to minimise their exposure to the community
by paying private providers or seeking care outside of their local community. Of course this
extended health seeking behaviour carried a higher price and again the broader social context of
care seeking played a role as individuals in the study setting frequently drew on extra-household
resources to fund the substantial direct and indirect costs of care seeking.
Integrating broader community level variables into the demand model posed the greatest
challenge of this study. The inclusion of variables such as ethnicity, access to extra-household
resources and perceptions of provider privacy all represent an attempt to integrate the social
context of treatment seeking behaviour into the formal model. However, as discussed at the
conclusion of the next section, the greatest contribution of this analysis has arguably been less in
the impact on the specific formulation of the model and more in the interpretation of that
model's predictions.
3.1.5) Objective Five: To develop an econometric model of health seeking
behaviour
In Chapter 7 an econometric model of health was constructed that included all of the
conventional expected predictors of demand, as well as explicitly incorporating perceived
mental and physical health need, some basic dimensions of interpersonal quality, a proxy for the
expected privacy of a provider and one of the indicators of social context identified as
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important in earlier chapters i.e. access to extra-budgetary funds from another household. A
number of different demand models were generated using the same data to enable the explicit
analysis of cross-sector use and multiple care seeking and, where possible, these were structured
as panel data models to incorporate the dynamic nature of care seeking as a process.
The model indicated that health service use versus non-use was predicted by gender,
household crowding, mental and physical health, the receipt of extra-budgetary funds from
outside the household and the expected price of a consultation with a private provider.
In so far as household crowding is an indicator of relative poverty then, even in this
universally 'poor' population, poverty acted as a barrier to care seeking - perhaps by limiting
access to guidance regarding appropriate health seeking behaviour, and by limiting access to
financial and other household resources that may facilitate health seeking. Although both
physical and mental health were significant predictors of service use, the coefficient for the
physical health variable was more than three times the size of that for the mental health variable.
Access to extra-budgetary funds from other households was also a predictor of service use,
and in such a way that the potential access to those funds is the pertinent factor rather than the
size of funds actually received. This is therefore not simply a post-hoc coping strategy once
household budgets have been exhausted, but an antecedent of health seeking behaviour.
In the model of the number of visits to any provider, corrected for zero inflation, the number
of visits to any provider was predicted by per capita household income, crowding, medical
aid/insurance, the perceived financial situation of the household, mental health, the receipt of
extra-budgetary funds, the expected price of a private clinic and doctor, and the expected quality
of a private clinic and pharmacy. Physical health was a significant predictor of zero inflation
but not of the number of visits to any provider. As such, physical health appeared to play the
more significant role in initiating health seeking behaviour while mental health played the more
important role in shaping that behaviour, and particularly the quantity consumed once treatment
seeking was initiated.
The analysis of service choice revealed that different variables predicted the use of different
service providers. The findings regarding the choice of provider present a more complex
picture than those for service use (versus non-use) or the number of visits to any provider.
Although the findings for public and pharmacy choice were not significant overall, the findings
for private service choice were significant. Generally the predictors of private service use were
financial or quality related. Financial predictors increasing the likelihood of private service
choice include capita income, participation in a community savings scheme and the receipt of
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remittances. Similarly, the higher the expected quality of a private doctor overall, the higher the
predicted likelihood of private service usage
Overall, variables not commonly incorporated into demand models were included with
mixed outcomes. The multi-attribute indicators of need were easily incorporated into this form
of analysis as was the measure of access to extra-household resources. Both were significant
predictors of demand. However, as discussed at length in Chapter 7, the measures of
interpersonal quality and perceived provider privacy were too rudimentary to be effective i.e.
although they were not significant predictors of demand, we cannot be confident that this lack of
significance is accurate and not due to the nature of their construction using proxy data. That
said, the multiple iterations of the demand model did provide important insights into cross-use
and multiple care seeking behaviour although the benefits of this analysis might have been
further enhanced by a larger sample size and longer placement period for the diaries. The use of
the panel data methods also delivered more robust predictions and greater confidence in the
findings of the models. This level of confidence is perhaps the most significant overall
contribution of these innovations. Without a benchmark against which to compare the findings
of these models it becomes difficult to make definitive statements regarding significant
modelling improvements in a statistical sense. However, we can say that some variables which
are not normally included were found to be significant predictors of demand and, while these
models remain imperfect and highly simplistic representations of a complex reality, we have
enhanced our understanding of that reality. This has been partly accomplished through the
process of deconstructing and critically analysing the constituent parts of the model, partly by
contributing the data to specify that model and partly in aiding the interpretation of the models'
predictions and understanding the limitations of those predictions.
4) METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE ANALYSIS OF DEMAND
Aside from the theoretical and empirical contributions discussed above, the use of the health
diary constitutes a methodological contribution worth noting. This is not the first study to
utilise the diary method for collecting health expenditure data or even self assessed health.
However, it is the first to combine health service use, expenditure and a multi-attribute measure
of self rated health into a single health diary. It is also the first to use panel data methods to
analyse the data from the diaries. This study further illustrates that health diaries do not require
large research budgets and can be effectively used for smaller scale projects.
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5) VALIDITY OF THE FINDINGS
5.1) INTERNAL VALIDITY
The intention of this study was not to attribute causal relations between variables but to
understand the relationships between potential independent, dependant and/or causal variables,
for example the determinants of self-assessed health need as presented in Chapter 4, or demand
as presented in Chapter 7. As such, internal validity is a lesser but still significant
consideration. Particular aspects of this study that may reduce the internal validity of the
findings include history, maturation, repeated testing and experimental mortality.
As far as history is concerned, the protracted nature of a panel means that outside events
may influence subjects in the course of the study. To ameliorate this effect, specific questions
were asked each week about possible outside events such as household shocks. Maturation
refers to the possibility that subjects may change permanently or temporarily during the course
of data collection. Again, the risk of maturation is higher with a panel study than a cross-
sectional study but the questionnaire was expressly designed to reduce the impact of maturation
on internal validity. Repeated testing refers to the fact that prior measurement of the dependant
variable may affect results obtained from subsequent measurements. In this case it is more
likely that the frequency of the measurements may actually increase internal validity over the
full course of the study although this effect may not be uniform across subjects or consistent
within each subject over time. Finally, experimental mortality refers to the fact that subjects
may drop out over the course of the study. This is probably the greatest threat to internal
validity in this study as a small number of subjects did leave the sample either permanently or
temporarily, and these represented a non-random sample of the study participants. Imputation
techniques were used to reduced the impact of this non-random behaviour on the findings of the
study.
5.2) EXTERNAL VALIDITY
A fall in the value of the US Dollar as the project was going into field, combined with the
expense of testing the health diary method for the first time in this setting, all placed
considerable strain on the research budget. As a result, the diary placement period was reduced
from 12 to 8 weeks and the sampling process was simplified to reduce the chance for error and
to allow the field team to focus on applying the new diary method and retaining individuals
recruited to the study. The simplified sampling procedures did not compromise the quality of
the data collected but did have an impact on external validity as the data collected was not
intended to be representative of the national or even the provincial population, but only of those
particular communities under study. As such, the findings may only be strictly generalisable to
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these or very similar communities. In the case of the quantitative data this refers to high TB
prevalence communities in urban Cape Town.
While these findings are likely to hold in other urban settings' In South Africa, it is
questionable how applicable these findings might be to the national case or to poor urban
communities in other countries. That said, some of the findings may well apply across settings
although the reader is asked to apply caution when drawing firm conclusions for other contexts.
This concern may apply differentially to the qualitative and quantitative data, however the
general point remains that these data were collected to be representative of the communities
studied.
6) LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
As discussed above, this study has contributed to the understanding of both the theory of
demand and the empirical application of that theory, while also making a methodological
contribution through the use of the health diaries. Through the careful selection and
implementation of data collection and analysis methods, every effort has been made to ensure
that these results are both reliable and replicable. That said however, the study has a number of
weaknesses and limitations which should be noted.
In the first instance, the inductive approach to the critical analysis of existing theory and the
highly exploratory approach to extending 'new' theory may limit the perceived usefulness of
these findings. Some readers may argue that the conclusions of the study were open to
influenced by investigator bias. In anticipation of this argument, triangulation techniques were
adopted to ensure that the findings are as little influenced by the investigator's perspective as
possible. Of course this cannot remove every element of possible bias but it can reduce any
likely effect.
It is commonly true with quantitative data that a larger sample would improve confidence in
any the analysis. In this case it is particularly true as a larger sample would have ensured better
stability in the panel data regression models and potentially removed need for imputation.
Similarly, the duration of the panel would have benefited from extension as eight weeks was too
short a time period to identify a meaningful number of new TB cases, or to follow new TB cases
from onset, through diagnosis and treatment - even in these high prevalence communities. In
this setting however, TB is not a seasonal disease and data collection was unlikely to be
significantly impacted by seasonality in this urban setting where few households rely on
subsistence farming and the temperate climate does not result in rainy and dry seasons. Of
course the higher incidence of winter colds and flu, as well as the higher risk of paraffin-related
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fires and inhalation can pose additional health risks in the winter, but these are unlikely to have
affected the findings of the study significantly.
The internal and external validity of the data is discussed in the preceding section, however,
aside from the general limitations of the methods, the analysis also identified some very specific
limitations of the data. Chapter 7 contains a detailed discussion of the limitations of the
econometric demand models generated in this thesis. In this chapter, we briefly highlight two
limitations which have relevance for the research priorities highlighted in the next chapter.
Firstly, only a very general measure of quality was collected in the survey. All other
dimensions of quality raised in the group discussion, such as the expected thoroughness of the
exam or the availability of drugs, were not collected directly and had to be measured with a
proxy variable for the purposes of the analysis above. The same is true for the variable
measuring the expected privacy at a particular provider. These proxy variables will tend to
underestimate the extent to which a provider is associated with a characteristics and this may
explain why these characteristics are not significant determinants of use overall. Secondly, the
models of public service choice and pharmacy use were not significant overall. This may
suggest that the variation in the sample, or in the users of these services as represented by this
sample, was insufficient for a modelling exercise of this nature, or that this is not the optimal
characterisation of the provider choice problem in a multiple use dataset.
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CHAPTER ·NINE:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH PRIORITIES
1) INTRODUCTION
The final stated objective of this study is to inform policy decisions around combining TB
and HIV services. This chapter will thus draw together the findings from the preceding analyses
to motivate appropriate policy recommendations aimed not only at the combination of TB and
HIV service explicitly, but also at the effective delivery of TB services and the improvement of
general health service delivery in TB endemic urban communities such as those under study.
The policy recommendations proposed in this chapter fall into two broad categories i.e.
systems-related and patient-related recommendations, which may aim to improve the
patient/system interface for example, or to reduce the negative economic and social impact of
health seeking and the concomitant inequalities. Of course, all recommendations are based on
the data collected and analysed for this study, all of which is patient-sourced. These
recommendations are directed at Cape Town city officials primarily but will also have relevance
for national and international policy makers.
Aside from appropriate policy recommendation, this chapter also aims to highlight areas of
priority for future research that may further inform policy or improve the usefulness of applied
demand research.
2) POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1) THE INEQUALITY OF HEALTH NEED
The measurement of health need has been conducted in a number of ways in this thesis.
Analysing the inequality of health need required the use of the quantitative ill health variables
and the assumption that this ill health did indeed reflect health need as discussed in Chapters 2
and 4. The unstandardised concentration index of physical health for the sample was 0.039 and
the standardised concentration index was 0.015. The unstandardised concentration index of
mental health for the sample was 0.044 and the standardised concentration index was 0.015.
These indices point to an unequal distribution of health need even within these two relatively
poor urban communities. Residents of these areas should therefore not be treated as an
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homogenous group when deciding on policy strategies to meet the needs of the poor in urban
Cape Town.
2.2) THE COMPLEX TRADE-OFF BETWEEN QUALITY AND COST
As discussed in Chapter 6, any price/quality trade-off is 'framed' within the complex
context of health seeking. Of all the quality-related criteria, the availability of medication and
the correct equipment to conduct diagnostic tests appeared to be the most influential non-price
determinants of service use among the focus group respondents. In the quantitative dataset,
public clinics were seldom recommended because they would have the necessary drugs and
even in the case of flu, only 11% of respondents expected that they would have the necessary
drugs. The focus group participants also expressed considerable concern about the availability
of drugs in public clinics. This concern, as with a number of other quality-related concerns,
appeared to be more adamantly expressed by participants from KhayelitshalNyanga. The
available data are unable to clarify definitively whether this perceived variation is geographic or
ethnic but, in the case of staff attitudes at least, respondents attributed the 'poorer' treatment to
their ethnicity rather than their locality.
These reported drug shortages and the differential perceptions of quality between areas and
ethnic groups needs to be addressed as it is one of the drivers of multiple care seeking and
higher treatment costs, as well as one of the drivers of observed inequality in this dataset.
Records of drug availability are unlikely to be sufficient if healthcare workers are withholding
drugs from certain patients or selling drugs out of the 'back door'. Spot checks or a very simple
'mystery patient' strategy might be more effective as an auditing system with a monitor tasked
to pose as a patient needing treatment (Conteh and Hanson, 2003).
2.3) THE ROLE OF PIUVACY IN HIGH TB/HIV CO-PREVALENT COMMUNITIES
Throughout this dissertation, privacy is discussed in some detail as a determinant of
provider choice. In these densely populated settlements, patients are easily seen walking to and
from clinics and are frequently known by the health care workers in clinics. All of this
conspires to reduce any sense of patient privacy when seeking care for TB or other diseases
which may carry social stigma. Strategies to improve patient privacy might include:
• Enabling patients to access public services outside of their residential area.
• Limiting the extent to which TB services are offered separately from other
services.
• Switching to some form of community DOTS to reduce the number of
times patients need to be seen walking to and from clinics.
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• Rotating staff between clinics to ensure that they do not become so familiar
with an area or a community that they are able to personally identify
patients and their families",
Combining HIV services with TB services in a vertical clinic that is separate from other
health services is likely to add to the privacy concerns of patients seeking treatment for TB.
2.4) REDUCING DIAGNOSTIC DELA Y IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In the discussion of provider quality in Chapter 5, a number of focus group discussants
mentioned that public service providers in these high TB prevalence communities had failed to
diagnose TB at the outset. This was commonly attributed to false negatives in the sputum test,
failure to produce sufficient sputum for a test or patients presenting with unusual forms of TB
such as 'stomach TB' or 'TB of the waist'. These problems are common challenges to the
diagnosis of TB in HIV co-infected adults. It was clear that the focus group respondents were
unaware of this potential link with HIV, although the Black/African respondents were very
aware of the general association between the two diseases.
While it is perhaps unsurprising that focus group participants from these relatively
impoverished urban areas lack this sophisticated knowledge, public health service providers
seem either equally unaware of the link or are simply unwilling/unable to address the challenges
posed to successful and prompt TB diagnosis. There appear to be no effective fail-safes in place
in the public system to account for the challenges posed by co-infection - and the public sector
is the sole provider of DOTS in the Cape Metropole. This could be addressed, in part at least,
by attempting the following:
1) Increasing the speed of diagnostic results
2) Equipping clinic staff with consistent strategies for dealing with
patients who cannot generate sputum
3) Giving staff consistent strategies for dealing with patients who present
with TB symptoms but produce a negative sputum samples.
4) Improve the interaction/communication between public sector
providers
Creating a platform for interaction between public and private providers, as discussed
further in Section 2.5 below, would also go some way towards mitigating the other cause of
diagnostic delay identified in this dataset Le. the tendency of patients to switch between the
• This recommendation should be w"l<!;hcdagainst the risks posed by reducing continuity of care between a patient and an
individual health service provider, as well as concerns that staff may feel dcrnotivatcd by regularly moving between work
settings.
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public and private sectors. This phenomenon is referred to throughout this text as cross-usage
and amongst TB affected respondents the cross-usage of public and private health service
providers appears to be driven by two key factors; the need for privacy on the part of the patient
andlor failure to diagnose TB on the part of the service provider (public or private). These
findings relate particularly to process of diagnosis and the use of both private and public
services to obtain that diagnosis, as TB treatment cannot take place within the private sector in
South Africa.
The diagnostic delays resulting from cross sector use appear to be significant, and attempts
to refer patients between sectors (and even within sectors) are largely ineffective. The
implications of this cross sector use were more strongly identified by respondents from
KhayelitshalNyanga than those from Oostenburg/Mitchell's Plain. Respondents from
KhayelitshalNyanga were more likely to initiate treatment seeking for suspected TB with a
private provider, and private providers were more likely to misdiagnose TB than public clinics.
Policies to improve diagnostic methods in the public sector have been discussed earlier in
this section, while policies to improve the interaction between the public and private sectors are
discussed further in the next section.
2.5) REDUCING THE ("tPACT OF CATASTROPHIC SPENDING
On average, Black/African households spent 25% of household income on direct health
expenses while Coloured households spent an average of 2% of their household income on
direct health costs. Direct health spending was thus catastrophic for these Black/African
households. Aside from the obvious impact of catastrophic health spending at the household
level, there is also reason to believe that catastrophic health spending may impact extended'
family networks over multiple households. Indirect health expenditure further exacerbated both
the negative economic impact of health seeking for Black/Africa respondents and the inequality
between Black! African respondents and their Coloured counterparts. Black! African respondents
had higher waiting times that constituted a significantly higher proportion of total expenditure
on health despite failing to account for carer time in the indirect costs of care seeking. Given
that the qualitative data identified female household members as the most likely to take on the
role of carer and to compensate for the productivity loss to the household of a sick individual,
the inclusion of carer time \\ ould, in all likelihood, have identified gender disparities in indirect
health expenditure.
One possible solution to reduce the impact of direct health expenditure would be to remove
the perceived need to use private providers. This means removing the need to visit private
pharmacies as well as private doctors. Reducing the need to visit private pharmacies would
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necessitate better drug availability in public clinics. Reducing the need to visit private providers
is a more complex problem however, better drug availability, shorter waiting times, faster
diagnostic procedures in the case of potential TB cases, assistance for potential TB cases who
cannot generate sputum, educating public providers about sputum-negative TB and improved
patient privacy would go some way towards achieving this aim. Privacy could be improved
simply by allowing patients to access services in any area, not only in the areas in which they
are resident. Of course travelling out of area would increase the travel costs of care seeking but
at present patients seem to be travelling out of their immediate area and accessing private
providers.
Reducing waiting times would reduce the indirect costs of care seeking and would impact
not only on the ethnic inequalities in the costs of care seeking but would also impact on the
gender inequalities one would almost certainly observe if carer time were quantified in this
study.
However, while spending on private service providers, privately purchased drugs and
transport costs for out of area public and private service providers may be one driver of
catastrophic health expenditure, it is by no means the only one. Multiple care seeking both
within and between sectors effectively multiplies the cost of health seeking and the consequent
burden on household, and extra-household, resources. Evidence from the focus groups
presented in Chapter 6 suggests that, once a health seeking strategy has commenced,
respondents would continue to seek advice or care until an effective treatment was obtained.
Similarly, respondents did not appear to factor unexpected costs into their treatment seeking
strategies at the outset. Instead, the burden of unexpected costs was generally compensated for
during or after the health seeking event.
Multiple care seeking raises complex policy challenges in a pluralistic setting such as this.
While improving privacy, increasing the speed of diagnostic results, providing assistance
generating sputum and educating public providers about sputum-negative TB will reduce some
amount of multiple care seeking, it is unlikely to halt the practice altogether. In addition, any
reduction in multiple care seeking is likely to lag significantly behind policies to improve
aspects of public service quality as perceptions of public services will take some time to change.
Thus the immediate challenge to policy makers is how to minimise the adverse consequences of
multiple care seeking as it stands. One clear way to do this would be to improve the integration
between service providers so that patients do not have to begin the diagnostic process anew
when they switch between the private and public sectors. This could be done either by creating
a central data-bank that can be accessed by both public and private providers, or by having
information move with patients in a format that is acceptable to both providers. As the
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latter strategy would not require a substantial investment in infrastructure, it could be
implemented fairly quickly. Furthermore, as patient-held records have been used in the past for
childhood immunisation programs, they would be worth piloting in the study setting.
In short, high direct and indirect costs of health seeking drive catastrophic health
expenditure among the poorest population groups and this effect is further exacerbated by
multiple care seeking both within and between sectors. Addressing these phenomena is no
simple task but a number of strategies may make a positive impact.
3) FUTURE RESEARCH PRIORITIES
3.1) COLLECTING l\IORE DETAILED DATA
Although this study made every effort to collect very detailed data on health seeking, data
on a number of variables cou Id have been improved. Firstly, the qualitative evidence suggests
that a more detailed measure of quality would have improved the usefulness of the quantitative
data analysis. Characteristics such as the expected thoroughness of an exam and the availability
of drugs should be attributed to providers in a general manner as' well as within an iIIness-
specific framework. Furthermore, a matrix or conjoint analysis exercise attributing
characteristics (including but not limited to quality-related characteristics) would enrich the
quantitative analysis as a \\ hole and facilitate the formal specification of a Lancaster Model.
Formally specifying the Lancaster Model would help to establish whether that theoretical
framework would in fact add significantly to our understanding of demand in the final analysis.
3.2) METHODS TO ACCOMMODATE DYNAI\HC MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION
MAKING
Aside from a stationary or fixed Lancastrian approach, empirical modelling techniques are
needed which can cope with dynamic multi-attribute decision making such as that identified in
the process of health seeking. Decision field theory may have the potential to cope with this
empirical challenge and Zanakis et al compare several methods for solving multi-attribute
decision making problems (MADM), which they define MADM as one class of multiple criteria
decision making models in \, hich a limited number of pre-specified, discrete alternatives require
"inter or intra-attribute comparisons, involving implicit or explicit tradeoffs" (Zanakis et aI.,
1998). Unfortunately these models could not be tested with the available data but this is
highlighted as an area for future research.
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3.3) UNDERSTANDI:\G HO\V HEALTH SPENDING IMPACTS MULTIPLE
HOUSEHOLDS
Although this study has highlighted the fact that health spending drew on the financial
resources of multiple households, this phenomenon is little understood. These data enable us to
measure the impact on health seeking of available funds from other households, however, little
is known about the generality of this finding and the wider economic impact of this
phenomenon where it does occur. For example, does it result in multiple households being
caught in a medical poverty trap or, by spreading health spending, does it spread the negative
impact of health costs. Considerable further work is required in this area if the financial burden
of care seeking is to be accurately measured.
3.4) INFLUENCE OF :\IULTIPLE CARE SEEKING ON THE DELIVERY OF
STRUCTURED TREATMENT PACKAGES
Multiple care seeking i.e. seeking care from more than one health service provider for a
single illness episode, can prolong illness, place a significant economic burden on households
and undermine the treatment of diseases such as TB, Malaria and increasingly, HIV. Pluralistic
health settings such as South Africa, Zambia and India offer the greatest opportunity for
multiple care seeking. Government health services work alongside private providers, NGO-run
services, church based services and even traditional healers. In some cases these providers offer
different services but in many cases they treat the same illnesses at the primary care and
outpatient level particularly.
While little is known about the reasons for multiple care seeking, this study has shown that
perceptions of quality, stigma and the concomitant need for privacy or even simple geographic
constraints may play an important role. However, with the growing emphasis on structured
treatment protocols such as DOTS, usually offered through a single health service provider
,(public or NGO), there is a need to firmly understand the reasons for this behaviour and the
implications for health service delivery at the local, national and intemationallevel if treatment
is to be effectively delivered, without compounding the health inequalities already emergent in
this and other similar settings.
The Stop TB Partnership estimates that, between 2000 and 2020, approximately one billion
people will be newly infected with TB, 200 million people will become sick and 35 million
people will die from the disease (The Stop TB Partnership, 2002). Malaria also causes more
than a million deaths per year and the global malaria burden shows increasing levels of malaria
morbidity and mortality (World Health Organization, 1998b; Ibid World Health Organization,
2005). In addition, an estimated 45 million people are infected with HIV worldwide and the
disease has already killed more than 20 million people (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS TB
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and Malaria, 2006 (Last acccssed:OS/lO/2006)). These diseases disproportionately affect the
poorest communities in the poorest countries in the world and this thesis provides evidence that,
without a better understanding of demand-side barriers to effective diagnosis and treatment,
curtailing the spread and impact of these diseases will be difficult if not impossible.
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Department of Public Health and Policy
Health Policy Unit
Keppel Street, London WC1E 7HT
Project Sahara Discussion Guide
1. Introduction and Warm-up (5 min)
Moderator:Please ensure that the respondents feel comfortable) and understand that there are no
right or wrong answers. We are only interested in their opinions etc.
Discuss:
• Marital status/relationships, children
• Hobbies, interests and backgrounds
2. Health Status (10 min)
Moderator: We would like to understand how people stay healthy and which elements of their
lifestyle might put them at risk of disease.
Please read:
We all get sick now and again but some times are worse than others. There are some things in
our lives that increase our chance of getting sick and there are some things that help us to stay
well. I would like you to think about your lives for a minute and think about these things.
Moderator: Please divide a page on the fUp chart into two columns, one for 'Makes us
unhealthy/sick' and another for 'Keeps us healthy'. Record the following discussion on this page.
Discuss:
• What might make you sick
• What might stop you from getting sick
Probe briefly if not mentioned spontaneously:
• Diet
o Do you have enough to eat?
o How is food shared in your household?
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o What is your idea of healthy eating?
• Smoking
• Hygiene/ sanitation
• Exercise
• Stress
• Crowded living conditions
• Occupational hazards/ dangers in the workplace
3. Personal health-seeking behaviour (15min)
Moderator: We need respondents to talk through their last illness experience step by step. Some
illnesses may be of a personal nature and respondents need' to be reassured that if they are
uncomfortable, they do not need to name the problem.
Probe:
I would like you to think about the last time you were ill. ..
• How long ago was this?
• How did you know you were ill?
• Did you tell anyone that you were not feeling well?
• How did they react?
• Where you able to carry on with your normal responsibilities while you were sick?
• Did anyone inside your household help you with your job or your chores while you were .
sick?
• Did anyone outside your household help you with your job or your chores while you were
sick? Probe for NGOs and broader community organisations
Moderator: We are aware that people may try different things to feel better and we need to
understand this process step by step.
Discuss:
Sometimes when we are sick, we have to try different things before we feel better. I would like you
to think about all the things you did to feel better the last time you were sick.
• What was the first thing you did? And next? And next? Why?
• How did you know what to do?
• Did you take any medicine? Where did it come from?
• Did you have to pay any money to get well? Where did this money come from?
• Do you think you should have done anything differently?
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4. Perceptions of illness (15min)
Moderator: Please take care, someone in the group may have suffered, from an illness that
another member considers 'distasteful; you need to be on the lookout for these sorts of tensions.
Discuss:
Some sickness is very common and some sickness is very rare. Thinking now about yourself, your
family and your community;
• Which illnesses would you say are very common? Record on flip chart
• Which illnesses would you say are very rare? Record on flip chart
• What illness do you and your family fear most? Why?
• What illness do you and your family fear least? Why?
• Would you be to blame if you caught any of these illnesses? Which? Why?
• Would any of these illnesses prevent people from speaking to you or treating you
normally? Which? Why?
5. Perceptions of TB (15min)
Moderator: We are now going to spend a short time talking aboutTS (Tuberculosis) in particular.
Probe:
• Have you ever heard of TB or Tuberculosis?
• How else would you speak about TB - does it have any other names?
• Is TB the same as any other sickness?
• Is TB the same as any other sickness? How is it the same? How is it different?
Moderator: We are going to use a game to talk about TB. Please use the picture cards provided
and start by acquainting the group with 'her/him' on a personal level before proceeding with the
formal discussion.
Informal introduction:
Here is a picture of someone who might live in your neighborhood. What name should we give
her/him? Do you think shehe works or not? Does she/he have children? How many? Is she/he
married? What is her/his husband/wife like? What is her/his home like? (Note that for male
groups this picture will be of a man.)
TB specific enquiry:
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She/he thinks that she/he might have TB:
• What makes her/him think she/he might have TB?
• How does she/he feel emotionally? Worried? Scared?
• Does she/he tell her/his family about her thoughts? How would they react?
• Does she/he tell her/his neighbour her/his thoughts? How do they feel about her/him?
• Does she/he tell anyone else outside the household about her/his thoughts? Probe for the
expected reaction of health service providers (doctors, nurses etc), NGOs and
broader community organisations.
• What should she/he do?
• Will she/he get better?
6. Awareness and perceptions of health service providers (15min)
,
Moderator: Some health service providers may already have been mentioned in the above
discussion. Now we need to put together a list on the flip chart. We are going to play a word
association game with these providers so leave space to do this.
All providers:
Please tell me abou all the health service providers that you know of or have ever heard of. Write
these onto the flipchart.
• Go through each of these facilities and ask for words that respondents would use to
describe these facilities - write the descriptions onto the chart.
• What facilities are available to the respondents and their communities?
• Are there any facilities/treatments that they need but do not have? Why do they think these
facilities/treatments are not available?
Public versus private providers:
On a new sheet of the flip chart, create a circle for -all government faoilities' and 'all private
facilities' but take care to use the language of the respondents when explaining these concepts.
• What words would the group use to describe each of these two types of provider? Write in
the circle for each provider.
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7. Budget Gameand Concluding thoughts (10min)
Moderator: We have talked about some very senous issues. This section is an opportunity to
leave the discussion on a lighter note and to get an Idea,of how respondents would like to see the
health budget spent.
Budget Game: (Divide the group into two)
We have talked about sickness and health, we have talked about things that make us ill and ways
to get better. Let us say that you are the Minister of Health for just one day, these eleven cents are
your health budget (give each group eleven cents). I would like you to tell me how you would
divide your money between the services we have listed on the chart (turn to the full list of
service providers). You can ignore any services or add any to the list if you want - it is up to you!
Moderator: Give the groups 2 minutes to cooter and then ask for their allocation - record on the
flip chart so the two groups can be briefly compared. Probe any large differences
Concluding probe:
• If you could make just one change to South Africa's health system, what is the most
important change that you would make? Go around the table quickly.
• Are there any thoughts you would like to add to our discussion here today?
• Have you found this discussion interesting?
Moderator: Thank respondents and close.
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MARKINOR
_, __~",_","" __vk." .•.__...,.,·_.,..",.,_,....,......
151 Floor, East Block
Tannery Park
21 Belmont Road
Rondebosch 7700
Tel: +2721 6809200
Information Letter and Consent Form
Focus Group Discussions
Dear Sir/Madam,
My name is and I work for a company called Markinor. We are assisting
researchers from a number of Universities, including the University of Cape Town. We would like to invite
you to take part in a group discussion on the at. .
We will provide transport to the venue and will provide transport home after the discussion. The group
discussion itself will take no longer than 2 hours and we will provide drinks and snacks at the venue.
Before deciding whether or not to attend, please note the following information about the project. If
anything is unclear, or if you would like more information, please don't hesitate to ask. Your participation
in this study is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw at any time.
The purpose of this study is to understand how people use health services, which health services people
use and why they use those services. We also want to know which services people don't use and which
services people would like to see offered to their community that are not currently offered. The results of
this study will help to inform government planning in the Western Cape and in the rest of South Africa.
The results will also help international institutions, such as the World Health Organisation, to understand
how health service use differs around the world and how this affects the health of different populations.
The group discussions will be audiotaped and the tapes will be transcribed. All names will be removed
from these transcripts. The tapes and transcripts will be stored with a principle investigator who will be the
only person with direct access. The principle investigator will destroy the tapes six months after the
completion of these focus groups. You and your household will not be identified in any report or
publication. Your privacy will be carefully protected.
Please be aware that;
• Your participation is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to take part, and you may stop at any time if
you do not want to continue. You also have the right to skip any particular question or questions if you
do not wish to answer them.
• All information collected for this study will be kept strictly confidential. Your individual responses to our
questions will never be made public in a manner which could identify you, and no information that
could identify you or other household members will ever be released. The findings collected for each
person will be combined and used only for research purposes.
• You have the right to ask questions at any point before the group discussion, during the discussion, or
after the discussion is completed.
• You will receive a small token of our appreciation for your time.
By signing below, .you signify that you agree to participate in the study, and that your participation is
entirely voluntary. We will leave this information sheet with you. Should you require any additional
information, please contact: .
SIGNATURE DATE
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EXECUTIVE:
Melanie Woest GROUP8
SETFIELD 1 - 4
TYPEFIELD 79 -80
0211012007
JOB NO: 04/0181I DP NUMBER:PROJECT SAHARA RECRUITING QUESTIONNAIREr--------,
B. How would you describe your working status? 1.
2.
3.
No -2 CONTINUE
Work part-time -1
Not working -2 CONTINUE
Working full-time -3
Younger than 20 years -1 CLOSE
-2
-3
CONTINUE
RECRUITED BY: .
DATE OF GROUP: .
DESCRIPTION OF GROUP RECRUITED FOR:
NAME: ..
SUBURB: AREA: POSTAL CODE: .
TELEPHONE: HOME WORK: .
CELL: .
My name is ... I'm calling from Markinor, a marketing research company. May I please ask you a few questions?
A. Have you been to a market research group discussion in the 1. Yes -1 CLOSE
last 6 months? . .
2.
C. Which age group applies to you? 1........................................................................................................ .
2. 20 - 29 years
3. 30 - 39 years...................................................................................................................................................
4. 40-49 years -4
CLOSE
5. 50 years and older -5
D. In which of the following suburbs is your primary residence 1. Athlone -1
CLOSE
Le. the home in which you sleep most nights? 2. Goodwood -2
...._--_ .. ._----_ ..._ ...
3. Khayelitsha -3
4. Mitchell's Plain -4
CONTINUE
5. Nyanga -5
6. Oostenberg -6.._---- ....... .---."-_.
7. Other -7 CLOSE
E. GENDER: INTERVIEWER TO RECORD WITHOUT
1. MaleASKING. -1 CONTINUE
2. Female -2 CLOSE
F. ETHNICITY: INTERVIEWER TO RECORD WITHOUT
1. WhiteASKING -1 CLOSE
2. Asian -2
3. Black -3 CONTINUE
4. Coloured -4 CLOSE
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G. What is your occupation? Respondent: RECORD
Occupation: ..............................................
Company: ................................................
Industry:...................................................
H. In an average month, what is the combined income of all 1. Less than R500 -1
members of your household? 2. R500-R1499 -2
3. R1 500 - R2 999 -3
4. R3 000 - R4 999 -4
5. R5 000 - R9 999 -5
6. R10000 or more -6
7. Don't know -7
8. Refused -8
I. When last, if ever, have you suffered from each of the following symptoms?
Within the last Within the last Longer than
1-2 months Smonths S months ago
Never
1. Feverl night sweats 1 2 3 4
2. HeadachelMigraine 1 2 3 4
3. High/low blood pressure 1 2 3 4
4. Persistent coughing lasting more than 3 weeks 1 2 3 4
5. Nausea 1 2 3 4
J. When last, if ever, have you suffered from each of the following ailments/diseases?
Within the last Within the last Longer than
Never
1-2months Smonths S months ago
1. ColdlFlu 1 2 3 4
2. Bronchitis 1 2 3 4
3. Tonsillitis 1 2 3 4
4. Tuberculosis CLOSE IF
1 2 3 4 CODE 4 FOR
TB
5. Measles 1 2 3 4
Outcome of recruitment:
VISIT1 VlSIT2 VlSIT3 VlSIT4 VISITS VISIT S VISIT 7 VlSIT8 VlSIT9 VISIT 10
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10
VISIT 11 VISIT 12 VISIT 13 VISIT 14 VlSIT1S VlSIT1S VISIT 17 VISIT 18 VlSIT19 VISIT 20
-11 -12 -13 -14 -15 -16 -17 -18 -19 -20
Results codes:
1. Refused - in principle. Does not participate in surveyslfocus groups
2. Refused - time constraints
3. Refused - not interested in topic FINAL OUTCOME OF
4. Never available ... INTERVIEW· SeE RESULTSCODe AND RECORD5. Respondent too sick.to leave the house
6. Completed
7. Other (specify) .....................................................................................
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DECLARATION IF RECRUITMENT SUCCESSFUL:
I declare that the respondent (NAME AND ADDRESS ABOVE) recruited by me qualifies according to the criteria supplied to me by
Markinor for this specific group. The respondent understands the content of the information letter and freely agrees to participate.
SIGNED: .
DATE: .
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DRAID
(Office Use) 1
Questionnaire No.
(Office Use)
I
INTRODUCTORY HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
;" »
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
INTERVIEWER READ OUT:
THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO PARTICPATE. THIS INFORMATION IS CONFIDENTIAL AND THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE RESPONDENT WILL NOT BE
USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. NAMES WILL NOT BE LINKED TO THE INFORMATION GATHERED EXCEPT AS REQUIRED FOR THE PURPOSE OF FOLLOW
UP IN THE STUDY, HANDLED ONLY BY PROJECT STAFF
DANKJE OAT U INGESTEM HET OM DEEL TE NEEM. HIERDIE INFORMASIE IS VERTROULIK EN DIE NAAM EN ADRES VAN DIE RESPONDENT SAL NIE GEBRUIK
WORD VIR ENIGE ANDER DOELEINDES NIE. NAME SAL NIE VERBIND WORD MET DIE INFORMASIE WAT INGESAMEL IS NIE. DIT SAL NET GEBRUIK WORD
VIR DIE DOELEINDES VAN DIE OPVOLG STUDIE EN NET DEUR PERSONEEL WAT DIE PROJEK VERWERK HANTEER WORD.
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: Respondent should be:
1. 18 years or older! 18 jaar oud of ouer
2. Very knowledgeable about people living in the household! een wat die meeste weet van die mense wat in die huishouding bly
ORIGINAL CONTACT DETAILS:
Name: EA Number I I I I ~rll
dd mm
Household
Number:
Community:
Address:
Telephone (Work):
Telephone (Home): Cell Phone:
Date: __ ' ./2004
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Contacts and VisitslKontakte en Besoeke
INTERVIEWERS VISIT:
VlSIT1 VlSIT2 VISIT 3 VlSIT4 VISIT 5
Date
Time
Result
RESULT CODES: 1. Completed 1
2. Respondent not available 2
3. Refused 3---------------------------------------------------- ----4. Partially completed 4
5. Mentally unfit 5
6. Deaf 6---------------------------------------------------- ~---7-7. III (not temporary condition)
9. Other: (GIVE REASON) 8
9.........................................................................................................................
INTERVIEWER NAME: CODE: I I I I
DATE COMPLETED INTERVIEW: W I I I I I I 2 I 0 I 0 I 4 Im m y y v V
CHECKED BY SUPERVISOR (NAME): .................................................................................................................................................................
W I IDATE: I I I I I I 2 I 0 I 0 4m m y v y y
~ INTERVIEWER: COMPLETE ON WRITE IN TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
FINISHING THE QUESTIONNAIRE. 1. I I IToml
I I
2. Number prepared to participate in the diary I
study
3. Number unavailable at the time of interview
I I I
4. Une number of respondent for household I I Isurvey
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2. HOUSEHOLD EVENTS
I want to ask you now about events or situ~tiofJs that cen sometlmes happen to families and households. Have any of
the following events occurred in this householdover'the past 12 MONTHS? ' . '
Ek wi) u nou ultvra oor gebeurtenisse wat met enlge tiuishoodlng kan gebeur. Het enlge van die volgende
gebeurtenisse die afgelope 12 maande met die huishoudlna.aebeor?
MM yy
1=Yes
2 = No~SKIP TO Q2.4
Has this household experienced the death of a household member or other
family member in the last 12 months?
r::]J=- Het die huishouding enige dood van enige lid van die huishouding of
enige ander familielid gehad?
2.1
2.2 IFYES: After this occurred, how did the household cope
financially? Did the household:
INOIEN JA:nadat dit plaasgevind het, hoe het die
familie dit finansieel gedoen?Het die huishouding
1 = Sell assets or use savings
Het goed verkoop of spaargeld gebruik
2 = Borrow from a money lender or a Stokvel
Geleen by stokvel of geldvoorskieter
3 = Take children out of school
Het kinders uit die skool gehaal
4 = Get help from others
Het hulp van ander gekry
5 = Use insurance
Het versekering gebruik
6 = Nothing! Niks
-3 = Refused! Geweier
MUL TIPLE RESPONSE ALLOWED
Other (Specify)_
2.3 When did the death occur?
Wanneer het die persoon! mense gesterf? Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
Has serious illness or injury kept a household member from doing normal
activities in the last 12 months?
Het enige ernstige siekte of beserings 'n lid oorgekom wat hom/haar
weggehou het van die normale aktiwiteite die afgelope 12 maande?
1=Yes
2 = No \.SKIP TO Q2.B2.4
2.5 IFYES: After this occurred, how did the household cope 1 = Sell assets or use savings
financially? Did the household: Het goed verkoop of spaargeld gebruik
INOIEN JA:nadat dit plaasgevind het, hoe het die 2 = Borrow from a money lender or a Stokvel
familie dit finansieel gedoen?Het die huishouding Geleen by stokvel of geldvoorskieter
3 = Take children out of school
Het kinders uit die skool gehaal
4 = Get help from others
Het hulp van ander gekry
5 = Use insurance
Het versekering gebruik
6 = Nothing! Niks
-3 = Refused! Geweier
MUL TIPLE RESPONSE ALLOWED
Other (Specify)
Name
MM yy
2.6 What is the name and line number of the person/people who suffered the
illness! injury?
Wat is die naam en die Iynnommer van die persoon/persone wie aan die
siekte of besering lei? Person 2
Person 1
Line No.
Person 3
When did the illness! injury occur?
Wanneer het die siekte Ibesering plaasgevind?
2.7
Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
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2.8
r:ir
Has a household member lost a regular job in the last 12 months?
Het 'n lid van die huishouding sy/haar werk verloor die afgelope 12
maande?
1=Yes
2 = No \ SKIP TO Q2.12
2.9 IFYES: After this occurred, how did the household cope
financially? Did the household:
INOIEN JA:nadat dit plaasgevind het. hoe het die
familie dit finansieel gedoen?Het die huishouding
MUL TIPLE RESPONSE ALLOWED
1 = Sell assets or use savings
Het goed verkoop of spaargeld gebruik
2 = Borrow from a money lender or a Stokvel
Geleen by stokvel of geldvoorskieter
3 = Take children out of school
Het kinders uit die skool gehaal
4 = Get help from others
Het hulp van ander gekry
5 = Use insurance
Het versekering gebruik
6 = Nothing! Niks
-3 = Refused/ Geweier
OtheriS~
2.10 Line No.What is the name and line number of the person/people who lost their job?
Wat is die naam en Iynnommer van die persoon/persone wat hul werk
verloor het? Person 1
MM
Name
Person 2
Person 3
2.11 When did this occur?
Wanneer het dit gebeur?
yy
Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
2.12 Has this household experienced a cut-off or decrease in financial support
from outside the household (e.g. government grants or money from
family/friends who do not live here) in the last 12 months?
Het die huishouding enige tekorte of vermindering in finansiele bydrae
vanaf buite die huishouding (5005 Staatstoelae of geld van
familie/vriend wat nie hier woon nie) in die afgelope 12 maande
ondervind?
1 =Yes
2 = No~SKIP TO Q2.16
2.13 IFYES: After this occurred, how did the household cope
financially? Did the household:
INOIEN JA:nadat dit plaasgevind het I hoe het die
familie dit finansieel gedoen?Het die huishouding
MUL TIPLE RESPONSE ALLOWED
1 = Sell assets or use savings
Het goed verkoop of spaargeld gebruik
2 = Borrow from a money lender or a Stokvel
Geleen by stokvel of geldvoorskieter
3 = Take children out of school
Het kinders uit die skool gehaal
4 = Get help from others
Het hulp van ander gekry
5 = Use insurance
Het versekering gebruik
6 = Nothing/ Niks
-3 = Refused! Geweier
Other(Specify).
2.14 Line No.What is the name and line number of the person!people who were receiving
this financial support?
Wat is die naam en die Iynnommer van die persoon/persone wie die
finansiele ondersteuning gekry het?
Person 1
MM
Name
Person 2
Person 3
When did the cut off take place?
Wanneer het die tekorte plaasgevind?
2.15
Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
yy
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2.16 Has this household experienced abandonment or divorce in the last 12
months?
Het die huishouding enige verwerping ondervind of het iemand vanuit
die huishouding geskei die afgelope 12 maande?
1=Yes
2 = No \ SKIP TO Q2.20
2.19 yy
2.17 IF YES: After this occurred, how did the household cope
financially? Did the household:
INOIEN JA:nadat dit plaasgevind het, hoe het die
familie dit finansieel gedoen?Het die huishouding
MUL TIPLE RESPONSE ALLOWED
1 = Se" assets or use savings
Goed verkoop of spaargeld gebruik
2 = Borrow from a money lender or a Stokvel
Geleen by stokvel of geldvoorskieter
3 = Take children out of school
Kinders uit die skool gehaal
4 = Get help from others
Hulp van ander gekry
5 = Use insurance
Versekering gebruik
6 = Nothing! Niks
-3 = Refused/ Geweier
Other (Specify).
2.18 What is the name and line number of the person/people who experienced the
abandonment/divorce?
Wat is die naam en Iynnommer van die persoon/persone wat die
verwerping of egskeiding ondervind het?
When did this occur?
Wanneer het dit plaasgevind?
Person 1
MM
Name Line No.
Person 2
Person 3
Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
2.20 Has this household experienced serious theft, fire or destruction of household
property in the last 12 months?
Het die huishouding enige ernstige diefstal, brand of verwoesting van
die eiendom in die laaste 12 maande ondervind?
1=Yes
2 = No \ SKIP TO Q2.23
2.21 IF YES: After this occurred, how did the household cope
financially? Did the household:
INOIEN JA:nadat dit plaasgevind het I hoe het die
familie dit finansieel gedoen?Het die huishouding
MUL TIPLE RESPONSE ALLOWED
1 = Se" assets or use savings
Goed verkoop of spaargeld gebruik
2 = Borrow from a money lender or a Stokvel
Geleen by stokvel of geldvoorskieter
3 = Take children out of school
Kinders uit die skoal gehaal
4 = Get help from others
Hulp van ander gekry
5 = Use insurance
Versekering gebruik
6 = Nothing/ Niks
-3 = Refused/ Geweier
Other (Specify)
2.22 When did this theft, fire or destruction take place?
Wanneer het die diefstal, brand of verwoesting plaasgevind?
MM yy
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2.23 Has this household experienced the failure of business or bankruptcy of 1 =Yes
business in the last 12 months? 2 = No\.SKIP TO SECTION 3
r:1r Het hierdie huishouding enige mislukkings van besighede of
bankrotskap van enige besighede in die afgelope 12 maande
ondervind?
2.24 IF YES: After this occurred, how did the household cope 1 = Sell assets or use savings
financially? Did the household: Goed verkoop of spaargeld gebruik
INDIEN JA:nadat dit plaasgevind het, hoe het die 2 = Borrow from a money lender or a Stokvel
familie dit finansieel gedoen?Het die huishouding Geleen by stokvel of geldvoorskieter
3 = Take children out of school
MUL TIPLE RESPONSE ALLOWED Kinders uit die skool gehaal
4 = Get help from others
Hulp van ander gekry
5 = Use insurance
Versekering gebruik
6 = Nothing! Niks
-3 = Refused! Geweier
Other (Specify)_
2.25 What is the line number of the person who experienced the failure of the Name Line No.
business! bankruptcy?
Wat is die Iynnommer van die persoon/persone wie die mislukkings of Person 1
bankrotskap van die besighede ondervind het?
Person 2
Person 3
2.26 When did this occur? MM yy
Wanneer het dit plaasgevind? Person 1
Person 2
Person 3
3. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISITICS
3.1 How many rooms are in this residence? Include bedrooms, living WRITE IN THE NUMBER:
rooms, kitchens, lounges, dining rooms as well as backyard shacks if SKRYF NOMMER IN
they are part of the household. Exclude bathrooms, toilets and
passages.
Hoeveel kamers is in die huis. Ingesluit slaapkamers, leefarea,
kombuis, sitkamer en eetkamers en ook slaapplek buite die huis Rooms! Kamers
indien deel van die huishouding. Die badkamers, toilette en gang is
uitgesluit.
3.2 What is the most often used source of drinking 1 = Piped -Internal! Water in pyp- binne
water in this residence? 2 = Piped - Yard tap! Water in pyp- buite
Wat is die beste bron van drinkwater by die 3 = Water - Carrier/tanker/ Water - houer of tenk
huis? 4 = Piped - Public Tap/Kiosk (free)
Water in pyp- openbare kraan/kiosk (vrye water)
ONE ANSWER ALLOWED 5 = Piped - Public Tap!Kiosk (paid for)
Water in pyp- open bare kraan/kiosk (betaal vir dit)
6 = Borehole! Boorhat
7 = Rainwater tank! Reenwater in 'n tenk
8 = Flowing water/Streaml Lopende water/stroom
9 = Dam/Stagnant water/ Daml stilstaande water
10 =Well (non-borehole)! Put (nie boorgat nie)
11 = Protected spring! Beskermende ontginde water
Other (Specify)
What kind of toilet does this residence have?
Watter soort toilet het die huis?
3.3 1 - Flush toilet! Spoel toilet
2 = Improved pit latrine with ventilation (VIP)
Verbeterde putlatrine met ventilasie
3 = Other pit latrine! Ander putlatrine
4 = Bucket toilet! Emmer toilet
5 = Chemical toilet! Chemiese toilet
6 = None! Geen
ONE ANSWER ALLOWED
1 = Yesl Ja
2 = Nol Nee
Is this residence connected to an electricity supply?
Het die huis elektriese tyd voorsiening?
3.4
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3.5 Does anyone buy paraffin for lighting, heating or 1 = Yes/ Ja
cooking in this residence? 2 = No! Nee
Gebruik enige iemand parafien vir ligte,
verhitting of kook in die huis?
3.6 INTERVIEWER: Record main 1 = Traditional materials (mud, brick, duka)
material used for the wall of the 2 = Temporary shack (plastic, cardboard, plywood)
residence. 3 = Permanent shack (corrugated iron, mixed brick)
4 = Permanent brick (brick, block)
ONL Y ONE ANSWER
Other (specify)
3.7 INTERVIEWER: Record main 1 = Traditional materials (thatch)
material used for the roof the 2 = Temporary shack (plastic, cardboard, plywood)
residence. 3 = Permanent without guttering (corrugated iron, tile, asbestos)
4 = Permanent with guttering (corrugated iron, tile, asbestos)
ONL Y ONE ANSWER
Other (specify)
3.8 What is the main language of the residents in this 1 = English
household? 2 = Xhosa
3 = Afrikaans
Wat is die hoof taal van die inwoners van
hierdie huishouding? Other (Specify)
ONL Y ONE ANSWER
3.9 What is the main religion of this 1 = Anglican
household? 2 = Baptist
Wat is die huishouding se mees belangrikste 3 = Catholic
geloof? 4 = Dutch Reformed!Hervomnd!Gereformeend
5 = Full Gospel
ONL Y ONE ANSWER 6 = Jewish
7 = Methodist (including AME) Presbyterian
8 = Mormiam
9 = Muslim
10 = New Apostolic
11 = Non-Denominational Christian
12 = Old Apostolic
13 = Pentecostal/Charismatic
14 = Pinkster Protestant
15 = 7th Day Adventist
16 = Zionist
17 = None
Other (specify)
3.10 Does the family rent or own this 1 =Own
residence? 2 = Rent
Behoort die grond/eiendom aan die familie of
word die grond/eiendom gehuur? Other(Specify)
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We would now like to ask you some questions about the things household members own. We will use this infunnation to compare households
in our study. Some of these things may not apply to you, but we need to ask these q\Jestions In all the places in which we are working.
Ons wil u graag vragies vra oor goedere wat die huishouding besit Ons sal hierdie Infannasle gebNik om te vergelyk met die
huishoudings in ons studie. Sekere van hierdie dinge mag dalk riie met u van toepaSSSing, wees nie, maar on. moet hierdie vragies
by at die huishoudings waar ons werk, vra.
INTERVIEWER: ASSURE RESPONDENT THAT THEINFORMAnON IS CONFIDENTIAL
/.
3.11 Does anyone in this household own the following items ...? (Ask about each item on the list)
Besit enige iemand in die huishouding die volgende items ...? (Vra oor elke item op die Iys)
3.11.1 Radio, stereo or cassette recorder 1 = Yes! Ja
Radio, stereos of kasset opnemers 2 = No! Nee
3.11.2 Television 1 = Yes! Ja
Televisie 2 = Nol Nee
3.11.3 Video, VCR 1 = Yes! Ja
Video, VCR 2 = No! Nee
3.11.4 Telephone (not cellular) 1 = Yes! Ja
Telefoon (nie selfoon nie) 2 = No/ Nee
3.11.5 Cellular telephone 1 = Yes! Ja
5ellulere foon 2 = No! Nee
3.11.6 Refrigeratorlfreezer 1 = Yes! Ja
Yskas I vrieskas 2 = No/ Nee
3.11.7 Gas!electric stove 1 = Yes! Ja
Gasstootl Elektriese stoot 2 = No! Nee
3.11.8 Microwave 1 = Yes! Ja
Mikrogolfoond 2 = No/ Nee
3.11.9 Washing machine 1 =Yes! Ja
Wasmasjien 2 = No! Nee
3.11.10 Bicyde 1 = Yes! Ja
Fiets 2 = No/ Nee
3.11.11 Motorcyde 1 = Yes! Ja
Motorfiets 2 = No! Nee
3.11.12 Car, Bakkie or Combi 1 = Yes! Ja
Motor, Bakkie of Kombi 2 = No/ Nee
3.11.13 ComputerJ1aptop 1 = Yes! Ja
Rekenaarl toeklap rekenaar 2 = No/ Nee
3.11.14 More than 5 books 1 = Yes! Ja
Meer as 5 boeke 2 = No! Nee
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4. HOUSEHOLD INCOME, EXPENDITURES AND DEBT
INTERVIEWER READ OUT:
Iwoukllike to ask you a few questions about how families get and spend money·
Ek wil u graag oor die familie se uitgawes en hoe u geld uitgee vra.
4.1 Does anyone in this household have a bank or a savings account? 1 = Yes! Ja
Het enige iemand in die huishouding In bank rekening of
2= Nol Neespaarrekening?
4.2 Does anyone in this household participate in a Stokvel, Goi Goi, mgalelo, 1 = Yes/ Ja
community savings scheme or funeral policy?
Het enige iemand in die huishouding al deelgeneem aan Stokvel, Goi 2 = Nol Nee
Goi, Mgalelo, gemeenskap spaar of begrafnis polis?
4.3 Does anyone in this household have life insurance? 1 = Yes/ Ja
Het enige iemand in die huishouding lewensversekering?
2 = Nol Nee
4.4 How much money does this household receive in a
typical month from everybody (take home pay) including
Write in Amount in Rands: R
all earnings, pensions, grants and so on? Skryf die 8edrag in Rande neer:
Hoeveel ontvang die hele huisgesin in In tipiese maand
almal bymekaar getel (geld wat huistoe gaan) insluitend -1 = Don't Know
aile verdienste, pensioene, toelae ens? -3 = Refused
PROBE RESPONDENT FOR BEST GUESS. IF AMOUNT GIVEN SKIP TO Q4.6
USE LEADING ZEROS.
4.5
IF RESPONDENT DOES NOT KNOW OR WILL NOT PROVID'E A SPECIFIC INCOME AMOUNT IN Q4.4, SHOW
THEM THE INCOME CARD AND ASK THE FOLLOWING:
Referring to the categories on the card, how much
money does this household receive in a typical month
(i.e. take home pay) induding all earnings, pensions,
grants and so on?
Verwys na die kategoriee op die vertoonkaart,
hoeveel is die gesamentlike inkomste van die
huishouding in In tipiese maand?
ONL YANSWER IF DON'T KNOW OR
REFUSED IN Q4.4.
0= No income
1 = R1 - R1 00
2 = R101 - R150
3 = R151 - R200
4 = R201 - R300
5 = R301 - R400
6 = R401 - R500
7 = R501 - R600
8 = R601 - R800
9= R801-R1 000
10=R1001-R1250
11 = R1 251 - R1 500
12 = R1 501 - R1 750
13 = R1 751 - R2 000
14 = R2 001- R2 500
15 = R2 501 - R3 000
16 = R3 001 - R4 000
17 = R4 001 - R5 000
18 = R5 001 - R6 000
19=R6001-R8ooo
20 = R8 001 - R10 000
21 = R10 001 - R12 000
22 = R12 001 - R14 000
23 = R14 001- R16 000
24 = R16 001 - R18 000
25 = R18 001 - R20 000
26 = R20 001 - R22 500
27 = R22 501 - R25 000
28 = R25 001 - R30 000
29 = R30 000 and over
-1 = Don't Know
-3 = Refused
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4.6 Does this household mainly pay for food with cash, or 1 = Cash! Kontant
2 = CrediU Kredietbuy food on credit or on "the book"?
3 = Both, cash more often! Albei, meer kontant
Hoe koop die huishouding hoofsaaklik die kos, met 4 = Both, credit more often! Albei, meer krediet
kontant of koop u kos op krediet of op die boek? 5 = Both, cash and credit equal
IF RESPONDENT SA YS "BOTH", ASK "WHICH IS Albei, kontant en krediet op gelyke vlak
USED MORE OFTEN, CASH OR CREDIT?"
ONE ANSWER ALLOWED
4.7 How would this household dassify its financial situation 1 = Very comfortable! Baie gemaklik
2 = Comfortable! Net gemaklikthese days? Would you say it is very comfortable, 3 = Just getting by! Kan net uitkom
comfortable, just getting by, poor, or very poor? 4 = Poorl Arm
Hoe sal die huishouding die finansiele posisie 5 = Very poor! Baie arm
deesdae klassifiseer? Is dit baie gemaklik, net
gemaklik, kan net uitkom, arm, baie arm.
4.8 During the last thirty days, for how many days did your
household not have enough to eat?
Gedurende die laaste dertig dae, vir hoe lank het die
huishouding nie genoeg gehad nie? Write in Number of Days: Days4.9 In an average month, 1 = Aa::ommodation/ housing (induding rates, taxes and services
how much does this such as electricity)! Huisvesting (water en ligte, huisbelasting ens
household spend on ingesluit) R
the follOwing items? 2 = Education! Opvoeding R
Oor 'n gemiddelde 3 = Transport! Vervoer R
maand, hoeveel
4 = Food and drink (induding alcohol and tobacco products)! Kos enspandeer die
drinkgoed (alkoholiese drank en tabakprodukte ingesluit) Rhuishouding op die
volgende items? 5 = Household goods Onduding deaning products and appliances)1
Huishoudelike goedere (skoonmaak produkte en goedere
ingesluit) R
6 = Clothing and shoes (induding personal care items such as
toiletries and hairdressing)! Klere en skoene (persoonlike items
Rsoos toiletries en haarafsprake ingesluit)
7 = Health services and medicines Oncluding medical aid
subscriptions)! Gesondheidsdienste en medisyne (mediese
voorskrifte ingesluit)
R
8 = Fuel for heating and cooking!
RBrandstof vir verhitting en kook
4.10 How many months could this household live off the 1 = No savings at aliI Geen spaargeld
2 = Less than one month! Minder as eensavings and investments of all members if there were no maand
other sources of income?
Vir hoeveel maande kan hierdie huishouding van die Other (Specify) months
spaargeld en beleggings van al die lede van die . Ander (Spesifiseer) maande
huishouding leef indien daar geen ander bron van
inkomste is nie?
INTERVIEWER PLEASE READ OUT TO ALL HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS:
}"
We would like to invite you and your household to take part in a Health Diary survey over the next eight weeks. All
household members over the age of 18 years are encouraged to participate. If you agree to participate, I will need to
ask you a few short questions about your health and your perceptions of health services. After that, all we would need from
you is approximately 10 minutes each week to fill out a short diary about your health that week.
Ons wil graag u en u huishouding uitnooi om deel te neem aan die Gesondheidsdagboek opname wat oor 'n
tydperk van agt weke sal strek. Aile lede van die huishouding wat 18jaar en ouer is kan deelneem. Indien u instem
om deel te neem, sale k u graag In paar kort vragies wil vra oor u gesondheid en begrip van gesondheidsdienste.
Na dit, salons net 10 minute van elke week van u in beslag neem om die kort dagboek van die week by u in te vul
en op te neem.
This is what we mean by a Diary... (show sample Diary) ... and as you can see, these are simple questions that you can fill
out in your own time during the week.
Oit is wat ons bedoel by dagboek .... (wys voorbeeld dagboek). En soos u kan sien, is dit baie maklike vragies
wat u moet invul oor die tydperk van 'n week.
5.1
Are you comfortable in reading in any of the following 1 = English
languages? 2 = Afrikaans
Kan u hierdie ander tale gemaklik lees? 3 = Xhosa
READ OUT
4 = Not comfortable reading in any of
these languages.
5.2
If no: Is there anyone else in the household who is 1 = Yes! Ja
comfortable reading in English!AfrikaanslXhosa and would be 2 = No! Neeable to assist you?
Indien nee: is daar enige iemand anders in die
huishouding wat gemaklik is om in
Engels/Afrikaans/Xhosa te lees, wat u kan ondersteun?
Each week I would come to visit you to drop off a new diary and collect the old diary. If at any time you don't want to
continue with the Diary you ean just tell me when I come to see you and you can stop immediately. When I visit, I will also
be able to help you with any difficulties you are having with the diary.
Ek sal u elke week besoek om die voltooide een op te tel en die nuwe een af te gee. Indien U op enige tydstlp nle
wit aangaan met die Dagboek nle, kan u my net vertet wanneer ek na u toe kom. U kan onmiddellik stop. Wanneer
ek u besoek kan ek u ook help indien u enige moelikheid met die invul van die dagboek ondervind.
1= Yes! Ja
2= No! Nee
Would you like to participate in the Health Diary survey?
WiJ u deelnaam aan die Gesondheidsdagboek opname?
THIS QUESTION MUST BE ADDRESSED TO ALL HOUSEHOLD
MEMEBERS OVER 18YEARS OF AGE
5.3
If yes:
1, All respondents who agree to participate must now sign the acceptance letter (the respondent who
answered the introductory survey will already have signed a letter but still needs to agree to do the
diary).
2. All respondents who agree to participate must now complete the Introductory Health Survey. You need
to ask this survey, it is not a self completion survey.
3. Once the Introductory Health Survey is complete, you will use a Weekly Health Diary to show the
respondent how to fill out the Diary.
4. Finally, you will leave a new Health Diary with each person participating and one pencil case per
household.
5. You must also schedule a time to collect these Diaries. Leave the reminder slip with the respondent so
they know when to expect you back.
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If no:'
1) Encourage all respondents over 18 t6 participate.
), ,
2) If they still refuse, thank respondent and proceed to Section 6, explain the reasons for refusal in
,Question 6.6.
) INTERVIEWER READ OUT: Thank you very much for your time. All of the information you have given me has been very
helpful. As part of our quality control system, a supervisor from Development Research Africa may visit you to check that
this interview did take place. They will also ask you a few questions, some will be the same as what I have asked. This is
nothing to be worried about. They are simply making sure I have done my job correctly.
Baie dankie vir u tyd. AI die informasie wat U ons gegee het is van groot hulp. As deel van die kwalitieits kontrole
sisteem, mag daar 'n toesighouer van Development Research Africa u besoek. Dit is om net te sien of die
veldwerker u wei besoek het. U hoef nie bekommerd te wees nie. Ons kyk net of die werk korrek gedoen is.
INTERVIEWER COMPLETE SECTION 6 AND, ONCE THE LETTERS HAVE BEEN SIGNED, ADMINISTER THE
INTRODUCTORY HEALTH SURVEY.
6. INTERVIEW EVALUATION - TO BE COMPLETED BY INTERVIEWER ONLY
6.1 Record time at end of interview.
HH MM 24 HOUR CLOCK
6.2 Language(s) used during interview? 1 = English
~ = Xhosa
MUL TIMENTIONS POSSIBLE 3 = Afrikaans
Other (Specify)
6.3 Were other persons within hearing range at any 1 = No other person within hearing range at any time
time during the interview? 2 = 1+ persons within hearing range for part of interview
3 = 1+ persons within hearing range for all of the interview
6.4 Did more than one person help to complete this
r::r questionnaire? 1 = Yes2 = No ~ SKIP TO Q6.6
6.5 If so, which household members helped to FILL IN THE LINE NUMBERS OF THOSE WHO ASSISTED
complete the questionnaire? Line #:
Line #:
Line #:
6.6 Any additional comments about specific questions or data quality?
(If respondents refused to participate in the health diaries please explain the reasons here)
6.7 GENDER OF INTERVIEWER 1 = Male
= Female
~ INTERVIEWER: PLEASE GO TO COVER SHEET AND COMPLETE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
AND NUMBER OF DIARY PARTICIPANTS.
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DRAID
(Office Use)
2
Questionnaire No.
(Office Use)
Introduction
INTERVIEWER PLEASE READ OUT:
! INTR9t;>4CTO~Y HEALTH SURVEY
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the Weekly Health Diary. Before I show you how to use the Diary I need
to ask you a few questions about your health and your views of health service providers. Please remember that
you may refuse to answer any question and we can stop at any time.
Isibuliso Mhlekazil Nkosazana
Siyabulela ngenxaso yakho kulencwadi yethu. Phambi kokuba siqale, ndifuna ukukubonisa ukuba
isetyenziswa njani. Ndifuna ukukubuza imibuzo embalwa ngempilo neembono zakho ngeenkonzo
zempilo. Ukhumbule ukuba awunyanzelekanga ukuphundula imibuzo kwaye singayeka naninina xa
ungasafuni kuphendula.
r INTERVIEWER: Please take a moment to copy the 'cover page from the Introductory Household Survey
I into the blocks below. .. , ! !.
Dear Sir/Madam,
Ukwazisa
Name:
Line Number:
(From Introductory
Household Survey)
EA Number:
Household
Number:
____ ~ ~/-----
DD MM
Date: yy
Diary Number
Convenient contact
number:
[j
.1. INTERVIEWERS VISIT:
VlSIT1 VlSIT2 VlSIT3 VISIT 4 VlSIT5
Date a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
llme b1 b2 b3 B4 b5
Result c1 c2 c3 04 cS
. ISEE RESULT CODeS ON SHEET PROVIDED
2. INTERytEWER NAME; CODE: I I I I
3. DATE COMPLETEQ INTERVIEW: W I I I I I I 2 1 01 0 I 4 Im m V v v V
4.CHECKED BY SUeERVISOB: NAME:
~U,""'.l"'"""'I't..""••• ,,,,),,""""'."'1I"."""I''''''''''''_'''''''''I,''''.'''''''',. ...................IU ... J, ...................................... " ........................ _......................... , .............. .._...........
W I5. DATE: I I I I I 2 I 01 0 14 Im m y y y y,.
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1. PERSONAL HEALTH STATUS:
1.1 In general, how would you rate 1 = Excellent!lphucuke ngokugqibeleleyo
your health? 2 = Very good Ilphucuke kakhulu
Ngokunokwakho ungathi injani 3 = Good /Iphucukile
impilo yakho? 4 = Fair Iingcono
5 = Poor Iisenzima
6 = Very poor Iisenzima kakhulu
1.2 Do you suffer from any long term 1 = Yes I Ewe
r:,- or chronic illness? 2 = No I Hayi \ SKIP TO SECTION 2Unesigulo esinganyangeki?
1.3 What is your long term/ chronic 1 = Diabetes
illness (or its symptoms)?1 2 = High blood pressure
Sithini isigulo onaso okanye 3 = Low blood pressure
iimpawu zaso? 4 = Asthma
5 = Epilepsy
DO NOT PROMPT 6 = Arthritis
7 = TBfTuberculosis
B = HIV/AIDS
OtherlS_Qecify}_
1.4 Are you receiving treatment for 1 = Yes/Ewe
r::r- your long terml chronic illness (or 2 = Nol Hayi \.SKIP TO SECTION 2its symptoms)?
Lukhona na unyango
olufumanayo kwisigulo sakho
okan_}'eiim__E_awuzaso?
1.5 Where/ from whom do you receive 1 = Public/Government Hospital
the treatment for your long terml 2 = Publici Government Clinic
chronic illness (or its symptoms)? 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
Uwafumana phi okanye kubani 4 = Private hospital
unyango kwisigulo sakho? 5 = Private clinic
6 = Private doctorlspecialist
DO NOT PROMPT MUL TlPLE 7 = Traditional healer
MENTION POSSIBLE. B = Spiritual or alternative healer
9 = Pharmacyl Chemist
10 = Health facility provided by employer
11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
12 = None
1.6 Why do you visit this/these 1 = Clean
provider(s) for treatment? 2 = Good reputation (heard from others)
Kutheni undwendwela lendawo 3 = Personal experience
okanye ezindawo xa ufuna 4 = Has good equipment! the right equipment
unyango? 5 = Will give a thorough examination
6 = It is a specialised provider
7 = More chance of seeing a doctor
B = Staff is friendly
DO NOT PROMPT 9 = Waiting times are shorter
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 10 = It is closer to homel convenient for transport
11 = I trust this service provider
12 = They will receive more attention at this provider
13 = The staff is more knowledgeablel better trained
14 = They will have more privacy with this provider
15 = This is a safer provider
16 = They will have the necessary drugs available
17 = Affordable
Other (Specify)
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2. AWARENESS AND PERCEPTIONS OF HEALTH SERVICE PROVIDERS
1 = PubliclGovernment Hospital
2.1 Which service providers do you know 2 = Publici Government Clinic
of or have ever heard of? 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
Zeziphi iinkonzo zempilo ozaziyo 4 = Private hospital
okanye owe va ngazo? 5 = Private clinic
(Uvumelekile ukukhetha 6 = Private doctor/specialist
ngaphezulu kwenye impendulo. 7 = Traditional healer
8 = Spiritual or alternative healer
9 = Pharmacy! Chemist
DO NOT PROMPT 10 = Health facility provided by employer
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
12 = None
2.2 Which of the following service 1 = PubliclGovernment Hospital/Isibhedlele sikarhulumente
providers have you personally ever 2 = Publici Government Clinic /Ikliniki karhulumente
used? 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
Elinye iziko lezempilo likarhulumente
Zeziphi iinkonzo zempilo 4 = Private hospitai/lsibhediele sabucala
ubuzindwendwele ngokwakho 5 = Private clinic /Ilkliniki yabucala
kwezi zilandelayo? (Uvumelekile 6 = Private doctor/specialist
ukukhetha ngaphezulu kwenye Ugqirha wabucala okanye okhethekileyo
impendulo) 7 = Traditional healer /Isangoma
8 = Spiritual or alternative healer
Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele
READOUT. 9 = Pharmacyl Chemist Ilkhemesiti
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 10 = Health facility provided by employer
Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho
11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
Elinye iziko lezempilo labucala
12 = None! Ayikho
2.3 Which of the following service 1 = PubliclGovernment Hospital/Isibhedlele sikarhulumente
providers would you never consider 2 = Publici Government Clinic Ilkliniki karhulumente
using? 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
Elinye iziko lezempilo likarhulumente
Leliphi iziko kula alandelayo 4 = Private hospital/Isibhedlele sabucalal
ongazoze ulisebenzise? 5 = Private clinic Illkliniki yabucala
(Uvumelekile ukukhetha 6 = Private doctor/specialist
ngaphezulu kwenye impendulo). Ugqirha wabucala okanye okhethekileyo
7 = Traditional healer Iisangoma
8 = Spiritual or alternative healer
READOUT. Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 9 = Pharmacy! Chemist Ilkhemesiti
10 = Health facility provided by employer
Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho
11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
Elinye iziko lezempilo labucala
12 = None / Ayikho
FOR ALL SERVICES PROVIDERS MENTION IN Q2.3. PLEASE CIRCLE THE YES COLUMN ON THE
PAGE BELOW
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2.5 How much would you expect to pay for a visit to each of these service providers for the
consultation only (excluding transport costs and drug costs)?1
Yimalini oyijonge ukuba ungayibhatala xa usiya kundwendwela laamaziko ukubona ugqirha
okanye umongikazi (ungayifaki lmall okhwele ngayo kwakunye neyamachiza)
READOUT
Amount Don't Know
Imali Andazi
A Publici Government Hospital
Isibhedlele sikarhulumente R -1
B Publici Government Clinic
Ikliniki ka rhulumente R -1
C Other publici Government sector provider
Elinye iziko likarhulumente R -1
D Private hospital
Isibhedlele sabucala R -1
E Private clinic
Ikliniki yabucala R -1
F Private doctor/specialist
Ugqirha wabucala okanye okhethekileyo R -1
G Traditional healer
Isangoma R -1
H Spiritual or alternative healer
Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele R -1
I Pharmacyl Chemist
Ikhemesiti R -1
J Health facility provided by employer
Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho R -1
K Other private health service provider
Elinye iziko lempilo labucala R -1
2.6 Please rate the following service providers in terms of their overall quality.
Please use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is very poor and 5 is very good,!
Sicela usebenzise isikali ngokukala laamaziko ezempilo angaphantsi ngendlela asebenza ngayo. Isikali
ngokwenombolo, umgangatho ongaphantsi kakhulu abe ngunye kuthi ongaphezulu kakhulu abenguntlanu
HAND RESPONDENT THE SHOW CARD WITH THE SCALE
READ OUT LIST OF SERVICE PROVIDERS
Very Neither Very Don'tgood Good good nor Poor Know I
bad poor Refused
Publici Government Hospital 5 4 3 2 1 -11 Isibhedlele sikarhulumente
Publici Government Clinic 5 4 3 2 1 -12 Ikliniki karhulumente
Other publici Government sector provider 5 4 3 2 1 -1
3 Elinye iziko lezempilo likarhulumente
Private hospital 5 4 3 2 1 -14 isibhedlele sabucala
Private clinic 5 4 3 2 1 -15 Ikliniki yabucala
Private doctor/specialist
Ugqirha wabucala okanye 5 4 3 2 1 -1
6 okhethekileyo
Traditional healer 5 4 3 2 1 -1
7 Isangoma
Spiritual or alternative healer 5 4 3 2 1 -1
8 Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele
Pharmacy/ Chemist 5 4 3 2 1 -1
9 Ikhemesiti
Health facility provided by employer 5 4 3 2 1 -110 Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho
Other private health service provider 5 4 3 2 1 -111 Elinye iziko lezempilo labucala
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3. HEALTH SERVICE PROVIDER USE
3.1 Which one of the following health service 1 = PubliclGovernment Hospitai/lsibhediele sikarhulumente
providers would you recommend to 2 = Publici Government Clinic Ilkliniki karhulumente
someone suffering from flu? 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
Yeyiphi kwezi zilandelayo inkonzo Elinye iziko lezempilo likarhulumente
yempilo ongamthumela khona umntu 4 = Private hospitai/lsibhediele sabucalal
ogula ngumkhuhlane? 5 = Private clinic Illkliniki yabucala
6 = Private doctor/specialist
Ugqirha wabucala okanye okhethekileyo
READ OUT 7 = Traditional healer Iisangoma
SINGLE MENTION ONL Y 8 = Spiritual or alternative healer I Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele
9 = Pharmacyl Chemist Ilkhemesiti
10 = Health facility provided by employer
Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho
11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
Elinye iziko lezempilo labucala
12 = None I Ayikho
3.2 Why would you recommend this service 1 = Clean
provider for flu? 2 = Good reputation (heard from others)
Kutheni ukhetha eliziko kumntu 3 = Personal experience
onom khuhlani? 4 = Has good equipmenV the right equipment
5 = Will give a thorough examination
6 = It is a specialised provider
DO NOT PROMPT 7 = More chance of seeing a doctor
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 8 = Staff is friendly
9 = Waiting times are shorter
10 = It is closer to hamel convenient for transport
11 = I trust this service provider
12 = They will receive more attention at this provider
13 = The staff is more knowledgeable
14 = They will have more privacy with this provider
15 = This is a safer provider
16 = They will have the necessary drugs available
17 = Affordable
Other (Specify)_
3.3 Which one of the following health service 1 = PubliclGovernment Hospitai/lsibhediele sikarhulumente
providers would you recommend to 2 = Publici Government Clinic Ilkliniki karhulumente
someone suffering from TB or a 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
~ersistent cough with blood? Elinye iziko lezempilo likarhulumente
Khetha libe linye iziko lezempilo 4 = Private hospitai/lsibhediele sabucalal
ongamthumela khona umntu onesifo 5 = Private clinic Illkliniki yabucala
sel2hel2ha okan~e okhohlela ade 6 = Private doctor/specialist
akhohlele agazi? Ugqirha wabucala okanye okhethekileyo
7 = Traditional healer Iisangoma
8 = Spiritual or alternative healer I Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele
READOUT 9 = Pharmacyl Chemist Ilkhemesiti
SINGLE MENTION ONL Y 10 = Health facility provided by employer
Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho
11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
Elinye iziko lezempilo labucala
12 = None I Ayikho
3.4 Why would you recommend this service 1 = Clean
provider for TB or a ~rsistent cough with 2 = Good reputation (heard from others)
blood? 3 = Personal experience
Kungokuba kutheni ungakhetha 4 = Has good equipmenV the right equipment
eliziko xa uthumela umntu onesifo 5 = Will give a thorough examination
sel2hel2ha okan~e okhohlela kakhulu 6 = It is a specialised provider
ekhohlela igazi? 7 = More chance of seeing a doctor
8 = Staff is friendly
9 =Waiting times are shorter
10 = It is closer to homel convenient for transport
DO NOT PROMPT 11 = I trust this service provider
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 12 = They will receive more attention at this provider
13 = The staff is more knowledgeable
14 = They will have more privacy with this provider
15 = This is a safer provider
16 = They will have the necessary drugs available
17 = Affordable
Other (Specify)_
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3.S Which one of the following health service 1 = PubliclGovernment Hospitai/lsibhediele sikarhulumente
providers would you recommend to 2 = Publici Government Clinic Ilkliniki karhulumente
someone suffering from HIV (or someone 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
who susgects the~ have Hlv)? Elinye iziko lezempilo likarhulumente
Leliphi iziko lempilo ongathumela 4 = Private hospitai/lsibhediele sabucalal
khona umntu ogula ~intsholongwane 5 = Private clinic Illkliniki yabucala
kagawula~o okan~e umntu 6 = Private doctorlspecialist
uzicingela~o ukuba unetsholongwane Ugqirha wabucala okanye okhethekileyo
kagawula~o? 7 = Traditional healer Iisangoma
8 = Spiritual or alternative healer I Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele
9 = Pharmacyl Chemist Ilkhemesiti
READOUT 10 = Health facility provided by employer
SINGLE MENTION ONL Y Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho
11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
Elinye Iziko lezempilo labucala
12 = None I Ayikho
3.6 Why would you recommend this service 1 = Clean
provider for HIV (or someone who 2 = Good reputation (heard from others)
susgects the~ have Hlv)? 3 = Personal experience
Kutheni ukhethe eliziko lezempilo nje 4 = Has good equipmenU the right equipment
xa umntu ezisola ngokuba 5 = Will give a thorough examination
unetsholongwane kagawula~o? 6 = It is a specialised provider
7 = More chance of seeing a doctor
8 = Staff is friendly
DO NOT PROMPT 9 = Waiting times are shorter
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 10 = It is closer to homel convenient for transport
11 = I trust this service provider
12 = They will receive more attention at this provider
13 = The staff is more knowledgeable
14 = They will have more privacy with this provider
15 = This is a safer provider
16 = They will have the necessary drugs available
17 = Affordable
Other (Specify)
3.7 Which one of the following health service 1 = Public/Government Hospital I Isibhedlele sikarhulumente
providers would you recommend to 2 = Publici Government Clinic Ilkliniki karhulumente
someone suffering from an injury such as 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
a stab wound or burn? Elinye iziko lezempilo likarhulumente
LeJiphi iziko lezempilo ongamthumela 4 = Private hospital I Isibhedlele sabucalal
khona umntu onenxeba lokuhlanma 5 = Private clinic Illkliniki yabucala
okan~e lokutsha? 6 = Private doctor/specialist
Ugqirha wabucala okanye okhethekileyo
7 = Traditional healer Iisangoma
READOUT 8 = Spiritual or alternative healer I Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele
SINGLE MENTION ONL Y 9 = Pharmacyl Chemist Ilkhemesiti
10 = Health facility provided by employer
Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho
11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
Elinye iziko lezempilo labucala
12 = None / Ayikho
3.8 Why would you recommend this service 1 = Clean
provider for an injury such as a stab 2 = Good reputation (heard from others)
wound or burn? 3 = Personal experience
Kutheni ukhetha eliziko lezempilo xa 4 = Has good equipmenU the right equipment
umntu enenxeba lokuhlan~wa okan~e 5 = Will give a thorough examination
lokutsha 6 = It is a specialised provider
7 = More chance of seeing a doctor
8 = Staff is friendly
DO NOT PROMPT 9 = Waiting times are shorter
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 10 = It is closer to homel convenient for transport
11 = I trust this service provider
12 = They will receive more attention at this provider
13 = The staff is more knowledgeable
14 = They will have more privacy with this provider
15 = This is a safer provider
16 = They will have the necessary drugs available
17 = Affordable
Other (Specify)
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3.9 Which one of the following health service 1 = Public/Government Hospital / Isibhedlele sikarhulumente
providers would you recommend to 2 = Public/ Government Clinic / Ikliniki karhulumente
someone who wants to have their child 3 = Other publici Government sector provider (Specify)
immunised? Elinye iziko lezempilo likarhulumente
Leliphi iziko lezempilo ongamthumela 4 = Private hospital / Isibhedlele sabucalal
kulo umntu of una ukugonya 5 = Private clinic / Ilkliniki yabucala
umntwana? 6 = Private doctor/specialist
Ugqirha wabucala okanye okhethekileyo
7 = Traditional healer Iisangoma
READOUT 8 = Spiritual or alternative healer I Umthandazeli okanye Ixhwele
SINGLE MENTION ONL Y 9 = Pharmacy/ Chemist / Ikhemesiti
10 = Health facility provided by employer
Iziko lezempilo emsebenzini wakho
11 = Other private health service provider (Specify)
Elinye iziko lezempilo labucala
12 = None I Ayikho
3.10 Why would you recommend this service 1 = Clean
provider for wants to have their child 2 = Good reputation (heard from others)
immunised? 3 = Personal experience
Kutheni ukhetha eliziko lezeml2ilo xa 4 = Has good equipment! the right equipment
ufuna ukuthumela umntu o~okugon~a 5 = Will give a thorough examination
umntwana? 6 = It is a specialised provider
7 = More chance of seeing a doctor
8 = Staff is friendly
DO NOT PROMPT 9 = Waiting times are shorter
MUL TIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE 10 = It is closer to homel convenient for transport
11 = I trust this service provider
12 = They will receive more attention at this provider
13 = The staff is more knowledgeable
14 = They will have more privacy with this provider
15 = This is a safer provider
16 = They will have the necessary drugs available
17 = Affordable
Other (Specify)
INTERVIEWER READ OUT: Thank you very much for your time. All of the rnformation you have given me has been
very helpful. As part of our quality control system, a supervisor from DevelOpment Research Africa may visit you or
phone you to check that this interview did take place. TI1erwill also ask you a few questions, some will be the same
'as what I have asked. This is nothing to beWOrried about. They are simply making sure I have done my job correctly,
I am now going to show you how to use the Weekly Health Diary that I willieave with you when I go.
(HAND THE RESPONDENT A DIARY AND SHOW THEM HOW TO FILL IT OUT CORRECTLy)
1tU~l:t!]III!LWu!W!lW.aJ~WjIMlW.J~· Sly_bulela ngexesha lakho. Zonke linkcukakca ondlnike zona
i1uncedo kakhulu. Ngokom$ebel1%i wethu umqondlsi wenkampani yaseDevelopment Research Africa
zakukundwendWela okanye akuthinte emxebeni ukujonga ukuba lomsebenzi Ingaba wenzlwe nyanl na. Uzakubuza
emibuzo embalwa nje. eminye izakufana nale sendikubuze yona. Asiyonto omawuzlkhathaze ngayo bafuna nje
kwazi ukuba umsebenzl ndtwenzile na.
dizakukubonisa indlela omawuylsebenzise lencwadi yaleveki yempllo. Ndlzakukuahly. nentsha ndlthathe le
ndala, masiyenze sobabini. (Nika umphenduli umzekelo wencwadl kwaye umncede ngokuylbhala kakuhle.
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WEEKLY HEALTH DIARY/ WEEI«.IKSE aESONDHEIDS DAGBOEK
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Introduction
Dear Sir/Madam,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the Weekly Health Diary. This diary asks for your views about your health. This information will help
you keep track of how you feel and how well you are able to do your usual activities.
Each week you will be given a diary like this one to complete. It shouldn't take you more than 10-15 minutes to fill out your health diary. At
the end of the week, your field worker will pay a short visit to collect your old diary and drop off a new one for the next week. Answer every
question by selecting the answer as indicated. If you are unsure about how to answer a question, please give the best answer you can. You
can also ask your field worker for help when they come to collect the diary.
Before you begin the diary, please check that your details below are right. If anything has changed, please tell your field worker when they
come to collect the Diary.
Bekendstelling
Geagte Meneer IMevrou
Dankie dat u ingestem het on deel te neem aan die Weeklikse Gesondheidsdagboek. Hierdie dagboek vra u opinies oor u
gesondheid. Hierdie informasie sal u help om 'n rekord te hou van hoe u voel en hoe goed u die daaglikse aktiwitieite doen.
Elke week sal u so 'n dagboek kry om te voltooi. Oit behoort u nie meer as 10 - 15 minute te neem om die dagstuk in te vul nie.
Teen die einde van die week sal die veldwerker u kom besoek om die week se dagboek op te tel en om die nuwe een vir die
volgende week te gee. Antwoord asseblief die vrae soos aangetoon. Indien u onseker Is hoe om die vraag te beantwoord, gee
asseblief die beste antwoord beskikbaar. U kan ook die veldwerker vra om u te help wanneer hy/sy die dagboek kom kollekteer.
Voordat u met die dagstuk begin, kyk net dat u besonderhede korrek is. Indien enige verandering nodig is maak net seker dat die
veldwerker dit so verander wanneer hy/sy die dagboek kom kollekteer .
. .A. ..",y;,;N ',.,
INTERVIEWER: PlEASE TAKE A MOMENT TO COpy DETAI'LS FROM THe INTRODUCTORY HOUSEHOLD SURVEY INTO THE
BLOCKS BELOW
Callback:
1 = Yes
2 = No I
Line Number:
From Introductory
Household Survey
I I I I I I I Household Number:
__ I 12004
dd mm
Week Number:
Name:
Drop off Date:
__ I 12004 Collection Date:
dd mm
Convenient Contact Number:
Telephone 1 = Yes2= No
Proxy: 1 = Yes2 = No
INTERVIEWERS VI§I!:
..: 'i
1",
VlSlT1 VlSIT2 VlSn3 ... VlSIT4 VISITS'"
Date 81 a2 a3 ""; ..'. a4 a5
Time b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
Result c1 c2 c3 04 ee
- ,
SEE RESULT CODES ON SHEET PROVIDED I ,{
"
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I I I I2. INTERVIEWER NAME! CODE: ,
3. DATE COMPLETED INTERVIEW: c;Q I I I I I 12 I 0 I 0 14 I~ m m V v v y
4.CHECKED BY SYPERVISOR: NAME:
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1. PERSONAL HEALTH STATUS I PERSOONLIKE GESONDHEIDS TOESTAND
For each of the following questions"wrife a number into the box next to tach question. Only one number
per box: ;_..:
Vir elk van die vo/gende vrae, skryf aS$ebli~f di., regtt no"!m.",;n dl. blokkle • Net Hn nommer per blQlckie.
1.1 Overall, how would you rate your health during the 1 = Excellent! Uitstekend
past week? 2 = Very good/ Baie goed
Oor die algemeen, hoe sal u, u gesondheid 3 = Goodl Goed
gedurende die afgelope week klassifiseer? 4 = Fair! Redelik
5 = Poorl Swak
6 = Very poor! Baie swak
1.2 During the past week, how much did physical health 1 = Not at all/ Geensins
problems limit your usual physical activities (such as 2 = Very little! Baie min
walking or climbing stairs)? 3 = Somewhat! Bietjie
Gedurende die afgelope week, het enige fisiese . 4 = Quite a lot! Redelik baie
gesondheids probleem u gestrem om die normale 5 = Could not do physical activities
aktiwiteite te doen (soos loop en trappe klim)? Kon geen fisiese aktiwiteit doen nie
1.3 During the past week, how much difficulty did you 1 = None at aliI Geen
have doing your daily work, both at home and away 2 = A little bit! Baie min
from home, because of your physical health? 3 = Some! Bietjie
Gedurende die afgelope week, hoe moeilik was dit 4 = Quite a loti Redelik baie
om die daaglikse take, by die huis en weg van die 5 = Could not do daily work
huis te doen as gevolg van u fisiese toestand? Kon nie daaglikse werk doen nie
1.4 How much bodily pain have you had during the past 1 = Nonel Geen
week? 2 = Very mild/ Baie gemiddeld
Hoeveel liggaamlike pyn het u die afgelope week 3 = Mild! Gemiddeld
ervaar? 4 = Moderate! Taamlik
5 = Severe/ Erge pyn
6 = Very severe! Baie erge pyn
1.5 During the past week, how much energy did you 1 = Very Much/ Baie
have? 2 = Quite a IoU Redelik baie
Hoeveel energie het u die afgelope week gehad? 3 = Some/ Gedeeltelik
4 = A little! In Bietjie
5 = None/ Geen
1.6 During the past week, how much did your physical 1 = Not at aliI Geensins
health or emotional problems limit your usual social 2 = Very little/ Bietjie
activities with family or friends? 3 = SomewhaU Baie min
Gedurende die afgelope week, hoeveel het u 4 = Quite a IoU Redelik baie
fisiese gesondheids toestand of u emosionele 5 = Could not do social activities
probleme om die normale sosiale aktiwiteite vir Kon geen sosiale aktiwiteite doen nie
die familie en vriende te doen, u die afgelope
week cestrem?
1.7 During the past week, how much have you been 1 = Not at aliI Geensins
bothered by emotional problems (such as feeling 2 = Slightly! "n Bietjie
anxious, depressed or irritable)? 3 = Moderately/ Taamlik
Gedurende die afgelope week, hoeveel het u 4 = Quite a IoU Redelik baie
emosionele probleme (soos angstigheid, 5 = Extremely! Uiters baie
depressiwiteit of irritasies) u gepla?
1.8 During the past week, how much did personal or 1 = Not at all! Geensins
emotional problems keep you from doing your usual 2 = Very little/ Baie min
work, school or other daily activities? 3 = SomewhaU Bietjie
Gedurende die afgelope week, hoeveel het 4 = Quite a IoU Baie
persoonlike of emosionele probleme u 5 = Could not do daily activities
teruggehou van die normale daaglikse aktiwiteite Kon nie daaglikse aktiwiteite doen nie
le 1.9 Were you sick in the past week? 1 = Yes/ Ja
r::r Was u die afgelope week siek? 2 = No/ Nee \ SKIP TO SECTION 2
1.10 If you were sick in the past week, please tell us how you were feeling and what where your symptoms.
For example, Louise had a fever and she was coughing.
Indien u siek was die afgelope week, vertel ons van u simptome en hoe u gevoel het. Byvoorbeeld,
Louise het koors gehad en sy het gehoes
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2. HEALTH SEEKING BEHAVIOUR I GESONDHEIDS GEDRAGSPATRONE
2.1 Did you visit a health service provider in the past week? 1 = Yes IJa
c:Ir Het u In gesondsheids diensverskaffer die afgelope week 2 = No/Nee', SKIP TO Q2.3besoek?
2.2 In the past week, did you visit any of these health service providers or did you ask a friend, family member or neighbour
for healthcare advice or treatment? Please tell us which provider you visited first, second, third etc by placing a tick in
the appropriate box. If you used a service provider more than once, please list each visit.
In die afgelope week. het u enige van die gesondheids diensverskaffers besoek of het u In vriend of familielid of
bure gevra vir gesondheids advies of behandeling? Vertel ons asseblief watter verskaffer u eerste , tweede,
derde ens, besoek het. Plaas die regmerkie teenoor die verlangde blokkie, Indien u die diensverskaffer meer as
een keer besoek het, merk asseblief elke besoek.
A 8 C 0 E F G H I J
(:).... N M "It It) CD ,.... co en ....~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) tn Cl) Cl) Cl) 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0(/) tn tn tn tn Cl) tn Cl) tn VI
Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) Cl) al
Cl)
al
Cl) Cl)
al al m m m al al al- - - - - - - - - -.... N M "It It) CD ,.... co en (:)... ... ... ... ... .. .. .. .. -'0 '0 '0 '0 '0 'U; 'U; 'U; 'U; ..s s s s s s s s s '0s
1 PublicI Government HospitalPubliekel Staats Hospitaal
2 PublicI Government ClinicPubliekel Staats Hospitaal
Other publicI Government sector
3 providerAnder publiekel Staats sektor
verskaffers
4 Private hospitalPrivate hospitaal
5 Private clinicPrivate kliniek
6 Private doctor/specialistPrivate dokterlspesialiste
7 Traditional healerTradisionele genesers
8 Spiritual or alternative healerGeestes of alternatiewe genesers
9 Pharmacyl ChemistApteek
Health facility provided by employer
10 Gesondheids fasiliteit deur
werkgewer verskaf
Other private health service provider
11 Ander private gesondheids
diensverskaffers
Health treatment I advice from a family
12 member, friend or neighbourGesondheids behandeling/advies
van In vriend of bure
NOTE: ONE TICK PER COLUMN I EEN MERK PER KOLOM
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2.3 Did you ask anyone else for advice or treatment 1 = Yesl Ja
r:Jr
Het u enige eimand anders vir advies of 2 = No I Nee \ SKIP TO Q2.5
behandeling gevra?
2.4 Is there anyone else you asked for health advice or treatment in the past week? If so, please list them here and
tell us how many times you visited that provider or asked that person for advice:
Is daar enige iemand anders vir wie u vir gesondheidsadvies gevra het? Indien wei, Iys hulle hier en Iys
hoeveel keer u die persoonl persone van advies gevra het:
Person Visited Number of Times Visited
Persoon besoek Hoeveelkeerbesoek
A
B
C
0
E
2.5 If you were unwell in the past week 1 = Too expensivel Te duur
but did not seek helg from a health 2 = Too farl Te ver
service grovider, please tell us why? 3 = Not necessary, self treated with what I had at home
Indien u siek was die afgelope Nie nodig gewees nie, het myself behandel met dit wat ek
week en niemand se hul~ gevra by die huis gehad het.
het nie, vertel ons hoekom nie? 4 = No transport! Geen vervoer
5 = No time! Geen tyd
6 = Did not know who to see
MUTLIPLE MENTION POSSIBLE Het nie geweet wie om te besoek nie
MEERDERHEID OPSIES 7 = I was not sick in the past in past week
Ek was nie siek gedurende die afgelope week nie
Other(Specify)_
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3. PAYMENT FOR HEALTH SERVICES I BETAALING VIR GESONDHEIDS DIENSTE
3.1, Did you visit a health service provider in the past 1 = Yes I Ja
er week? 2 = No I Nee \ SKIP TO SECTION 4Het u In gesondsheids diensverskaffer die
afgelope week besoek?
3.2 If you sought advise or treatment, how much did you have to pay? Please also tell us separately how much your
transport cost in total (the journey there and back)? If you had to buy any medicine, please tell us separately how
much that cost? If you did not have to pay, please put a zero next to the provider you visited. Please fill in the
amount in Rands next to each provider you saw in the last week.
Indien u behandeling of advies gekry het. hoeveel het u betaal? Vertel ons ook hoeveel die vervoer gekos
het, apart van die behandeling (vervoer is die retoer rit). Indien u nie nodig gehad het om te betaal nie, skryf
teenoor die verskaffer wat u die vorige week besoek het.
PLEASE FILL IN THE AMOUNT IN RANDS NEXT TO EACH PROVIDER YOU SAW IN THE LAST
WEEK.
VUL ASSEBLIEF DIE BEDRAG IN RANDE IN TEENOOR DIE VERSKAFFER WA TU DIE VORIGE WEEK
BESOEKHET
Amount spent Amount spent Amount spent
in on the visit on transport for on Drugs
Begrad the visit IMedicines
spandeer met Bedrag Bedrag op
besoek spandeeraan medisyne/gene
vervoer vir die esmiddels
besoek spandeer
A
PUblic/GovernmentHospaal
Publieke/Staats Hospitaal
Public/GovernmentClinic
B Publieke/Staats Kliniek
C
Other publicI Government sector provider
Ander publiekel Staats sektor verskaffers
0
Privatehospital
Private Hosiptaal
Privatedinic
E Private Kliniek
F
Privatedoctorlspecialist
Private dolderl spesialiste
Traditionalhealer
G Tradisionele geneser
H
Spiritualor alternativehealer
Geestes of altematiewe geneser
I
PhannacylChemist
Apteek
J
Healthfacilityprovidedby employer
Gesondheids fasilitiet deur werkgewer verskaf
K
Otherprivatehealthserviceprovider
Ander private gesondheids diensverskaffer
Health treatment / advise from a family member, friend or
L neighbour
Gesondheids behandelingl advies van 'n vriend of bure
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3.3 Did you pay for advice or treatment, transport or medicine? 1 = Yes! Ja
r::;r Het u vir advies of behandeling, vervoer of 2 = No ! Nee \ SKIP TO SECTION 4geneesmiddels betaal? SKIP NA DEEL 4
3.4 If ~ou l2aidfor advice or treatment. where 1 = Own salary! wages! Eie salarislloon
did you get the money from to pay for the 2 = Own savings! Eie spaargeld
advice! treatment? If the money came 3 = Family member living in this household!
from more than one place please tick all 'n Familielid wat in die huis bly
sources. 4 = Family member living outside this household!
Indien u betaal het vir behandeling of 'n Familielid wat weg van die huis af bly
advies, waar het u die geld gekry? 5 = Friend or neighbour living outside this household!
Indieen u die geld van meer as een vriend of bure wat weg van die huishouding bly
plek gekry het, merk net die bron. 6 = Money lender! Geld voorskieter
7 = Other source! Ander bron
3.S Did you use your own money to pay for advice or 1 = Yes! Ja\SKIP TO SECTION 4
r::;r treatment, transport and medicine? SKIP NA DEEL 4Het u u eie geld gebruik om vir die advies of 2 = No! Nee
behandeling vervoer of medisyne te betaal?
3.6 If ~ou did not use ~our own mone~ to ga~ for advice or 1 = Yes! Ja
treatment I transgort and medicine. do you have to pay the 2 = No! Nee
money back?!
Indien u nie u eie geld vir die behandeling. vervoer en
medis~ne gebruik het niel moet u die geld terug
betaal?
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5.INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD EVENTS IINKOMSTE EN HUISEHOUDELIKE SKOKKE
5.1 Please tell us how much money you received in total after tax (Le. take home pay) from each of the following
sources this week.
Vertel ons asseblief hoeveel geld u in totaal gekry het (Voor belasting) vir elkeen van die volgende
bronne hierdie week.
A Work or trading (including your salary) R
Werklhandel (salaris ingesluit)
B Pension (including pensions from the government or from your employer) R
Pensioen (pensioen van die staat of werkgewer ingesluit)
C Unemployment benefits R
Werkloosheids versekerings voordele
D Disability grant R
Ongeskikheids toelae
E Child welfare grant R
Kinderwelsyn toelae
F Money you got from savings R
Geld verkry vanuit spaargeld
G Other sources (please write here wherelwho this money came from): R
Ander bronne (skryf asseblief van waar of van wie die geld verkry is)
Source 1! Bron 1:
G1 Was it a gift, loan, remittances? 1 = GifVGeskenk
Was dit 'n geskenk, lening of toelaag?
2 = Loan! Lening
3 = Remittances! Toelaag
Other(Specify)
Ander (Spesifiseer)
G2 Does this person! persons live in this household? 1 = Yes! Ja
Bly hierdie persoon! persone in die huishouding? 2 = No! Nee
G3 Other sources (please write here wherelwho this money came from): R
Ander bronne (skryf asseblief van waar of van wie die geld verkry is)
Source 2! Bran 2:
G4 Was it a gift, loan, remittances? 1 = Gift! Geskenk
Was dit 'n geskenk, lening of toelaag?
2 = Loan! Lening
3 = Remittances! Toelaag
Other(Specify)
Ander (Spesifiseerl
G5 Does this person! persons live in this household? 1 = Yes! Ja
Bly hierdie persoonl persone in die huishouding? 2 = Nol Nee
G6 Other sources (please write here wherelwho this money came from): R
Ander bronne (skryf asseblief van waar of van wie die geld verkry is)
Source 3! Bran 3:
G7 Was it a gift, loan, remittances? 1 = Gift! Geskenk
Was dit 'n geskenk, lening of toelaag?
2 = Loan! Lening
3 = Remittances! Toelaa9
Other(Specify)
Ander (5pesifiseer)
G8 Does this person! persons live in this household? 1 = Yes! Ja
Bly hierdie persoonl persone in die huishouding? 2 = Nol Nee
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5.2 How much money, if any, did you save this week?
Hoeveel geld, indien enige, het u hierdie week gespaar? Write in rands
Skryf in rande R................
5.3 How much money, if any, did you spend on medical aid or
medical insurance this week?
Indien enige, hoeveel geld het u deur die mediese fonds Write in rands
of mediese versekering vir hierdie week spandeer? Skryf in rande R. ...............
5.4 Was there anything you needed this week that you could not 1 = Yes / Ja
r:r afford 2 = No/ Nee \ SKIP TO Q5.6Was daar enige iets, die week, wat jy nodig gehad het en
nie kon bekostig/koop het nie?
5.5 If Yes, Please explain what it was that you could not afford?
Indien ja, verduidelik asseblief wat u nie kon gekostig het nie.
Write in Response:
Skryf die antwoord neer:
5.6 Has anything happened to this household in the last week that we should 1 = Yes / Ja
know about? For example, has anyone lost a job, experienced a theft, had 2 = No/Nee
an accident, received a new grant or anything else?
Het enige iets met die huishouding gedurende die afgelope week
gebeur vanwaar ons moet kennis neem? Byvoorbeeld, het enige
iemand 'n werk verloor, diefstaf gehad, 'n ongeluk gehad, ander
inkomste of toelae ontvang, of enige iets anders?
5.7 If Yes, Please explain what this household experienced the last week?
Indien Ja, verduidelik asseblief wat die huishouding die afgelope week ervaar het?
Write in Response:
Skryf die antwoord neer:
That is it for this week! Thank you very much for your time.
All of the information you have given us is very helpful. Your field worker will contact you to arrange a time to col/ect this
Diary and to give you a new Diary for next week. As part of our quality control system, a supervisor from Deveopment
Research Africa may visit you to check that the fieldworker visited you. This is nothing to be worried about. We are
simply making sure that they have done their job correct/yo
Dit is a/ vir die week! Baie dankie vir u tyd.
AI die informasie wat u ons gegee het is van groat hulp. U vedwerker sal u kontak om In tyd te reel vir die afhaal van
hierdie dagboek en om u 'n nuwe dagboek vir die volgende week te gee. As deel van die kwalitietskontrole sisteem, mag
daar In toesighouer van Development Research Africa u besoek. Dit is net om te sien of die veldwerker u weI besoek
het. U hoef nie bekommerd te wees nie. Ons kyk net of die werk korrek gedoen is.
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Tel: +44 (0) 20 7927 2306
Telex: 8953474
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7637 5391
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
(University of London)
Department of Public Health and Policy
Health Policy Unit
Keppel Street, London WC1 E 7HT
Department of Public Health & Policy
Health Policy Unit
Head: Dr Ruari Brugha
Information Sheet and Consent Letter for Diary Respondents
Dear Respondent,
You are invited to take part in a Health Diary Survey over the next eight weeks. Before deciding whether
or not to attend, please listen to the following information about the project. If anything is unclear. or if you
would like more information. please don't hesitate to ask. Your participation in this study is entirely
voluntary and you may withdraw at any time.
This study is being conducted by researchers from the University of London. the University of Cape Town.
the University of the Witwatersrand and the University of Oklahoma.
If you take part in this study. you will be asked to keep a diary every week for the next 8 weeks. In the
diary you will need to tell us if you felt sick during the week and whether you looked for treatment or health
advice. Filling out your diary should not take more than 20 minutes a week. At the end of each week.
someone will come to collect your old diary and give you a new one.
All information that you share will be kept strictly confidential. Other members of your household will not
know what you put in your diary unless you choose to show them. You and your household will not be
identified in any report or publication. Your privacy will be carefully protected.
You may stop at any time if you do not want to continue. You also have the right to skip any particular
question or questions if you do not wish to answer them. You have the right to ask questions at any point
before the interview. during the interview. or after the interview is completed.
The results of this study will help to inform government planning in the Western Cape and in the rest of
South Africa. The results will also help international institutions. such as the World Health Organisation. to
understand how health service use differs around the world and how this affects the health of different
populations. You will receive a small token of our appreciation for your time.
We will leave a copy of this information sheet with you. Should you require any additional information.
please contact: Enver Ravat, Development Research Africa, 021- 6864436, 073 125 1703.
By signing below. you signify that you agree to participate in the study. and that your participation is
entirely voluntary.
DATESIGNATURE
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DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AFRICA
www.dra.co.za
1si Floor Riverside Centre
Corner Belmont & Main Road
Rondebosch, 7700
Project manager - Enver Ravat
021-686 4436
Health Diary Survey 2004
Fieldworker Visiting Slip
Dear Sir/Madam,
A survey of health service use is being conducted by Development Research
Africa.
Your household has been randomly selected from this area to be included in this
study. Unfortunately you were not available to be interviewed when I came. I will
be coming back on (day) at (time) to
conduct the interview.
The questions are not at all difficult to answer and your responses will be
confidential. We would be pleased if you would make yourself available as it is an
important study and your responses are important to us.
Should the time indicated not be convenient for you, and you want to schedule an
appointment, please contact me. My name is and
my number is _
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INTERVIEWER CHECKLIST
BEFORE YOU GO TO A RESPONDENT'S HOME PLEASE GO THROUGH THIS
CHECKLIST:
Do you have the following with you?
Item Check the appropriate box:
1 One Introductory Household Survey (No 1) for each household? yes no
2 Enough Introductory Health Surveys (No 2) for all the adults in the household yes no
(take extra just in case)?
4 Enough Weekly Health Diaries (No 3) for all the adults in the household (take yes no
extra just in case)?
5 Have you filled the week number on the front of all the Weekly Health Diaries yes no
(No 3)?
6 Enough Information and Consent Letters for all the adults in the household yes no
(take extra just in case). and one to leave behind in each household?
7. A list of contact numbers to leave behind in each household?
8. One pencil case with 4 pencils and an eraser for each household?
9 Your laminated sheet of code lists? yes no
BEFORE YOU LEAVE THE RESPONDENTS' HOME PLEASE GO THROUGH THIS
CHECKLIST:
Have you remembered to do the following?
Task Check the appropriate box:
1 Have all the letters been signed and returned to you? yes no
2 Have you used a sample Weekly Health Diary to show all participating yes no
respondents how to fill out the Diary?
4 Have you left a new Weekly Health Diary with all participating respondents? yes no
5 Have you scheduled a time to collect the Weekly Health Diary? yes no
6 Have you left the reminder slip with the respondent so they know when yes no
to expect you back?
7. Have you left the information sheets for each respondent?
8 Have you left enough pens or pencils for all participating respondents? yes no
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APPENDIX 3:
MAPPING RECORD
362
MAPPING RECORD
1.0 Interviewer names
1.1 EA Number I I I I I I I
1.2 Area name
1.3 Date DD: I MM: I YY:
[dd/mm/yy]
Landmarks numbered starting in the bottom Last digit of EA number .
left corner and going clockwise on the map 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ~;·O•.
Land Land mark description
¢hI'. ~f.
""'~'" """.
mark#
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
3 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
4 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1
5 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4
6 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3
7 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2
8 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1
9 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
. ~',. ...... ...
List the number and description of the landmarks found in the EA on the table below. "Using the'last· ;~ : e, "',
digit of t~e EA number, find tha.tn~mber along the top row of the table.. Follow that number dow~too 6 <;t"0;"if;:
the last Ime where a landmark IS fisted. The number that you come to IS the number of the / OC)" ,.;.J:
landmark that is the starting point. <'OOa if
,off"..'
,/~~.j
.","" .~';-.'
'IN .~~~:~~
1.4 Land mark number 1.5 Land mark
selected description
1.6 Type of 1= Urban formal
settlement 2= Urban informal
1.7 Changes to EA Does the EA look significantly
different from the 2001
photograph/map?
Note any major changes here.
1.8 Dwelling units Have any new parts of the EA
become settled since 2001?
Estimate the number of additional
dwelling units in these newly-settled
areas.
Office use only: a cu ation 0 mterva size or nt
2001 census estimate 2004 adjustment
1.9 Number of dwelling units
1.10 Sampling interval (= question 1.9/12)
C I I' f' I . h
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